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This thesis examines the development of Arthur Koestler's
spirituality and ethics, from the publication of The Gladiators in 1939
to The Sleepwalkers twenty years later, drawing upon the extensive
material within Edinburgh's Koestler Archive.
Where his work has often been divided into "political" and
"scientific" phases, this thesis adopts a unified approach based on the
single hierarchical system that arose from Koestler's analysis of human
freedom. The ethical trilogy - The Gladiators, Darkness at Noon and
Arrival and Departure - revealed Koestler's continuing abhorrence of
the deterministic philosophy he had espoused within the Communist
Party. After his abandonment of revolutionary ethics, Koestler proposed
an ethical hierarchy to understand the allegorical figures of his
eponymous essay, The Yogi and the Commissar.
Arthur Koestler viewed society as constantly shifting between the
polar opposites of Yogi and Commissar. Hierarchical ethics sought to
transcend both poles. What emerged was a more optimistic, life-
enhancing ethic than has hitherto been acknowledged. The work of
Richard Hillary, George Orwell and Michael Polanyi enabled Koestler to
refine his theory, the outcome of which was evident in the 1946 League
and the anti-hanging campaign a decade later.
In his scientific writing, Koestler sought to understand the movement
of individuals within the hierarchy. If scientific models could be
utilised to explain moral and creative insight, he also become
convinced, earlier than one might suppose, that the evolution of the
human brain was the cause behind the failure of the species to ascend
the ethical hierarchy.
Biological factors alone do not account for the irrational ethic that
survives Koestler's dystopic vision. The thesis presents evidence that
this ethical system contains an essential spiritual element traceable
to its author's mystical experience whilst imprisoned in Seville. Thus
the principle underlying his work and aspirations for humankind, post-
Hiroshima, is of a spiritual reality, the admission of which is
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The focus of this thesis is the development of ethics and
spirituality in the work of one particular writer of the present
century. Ethics, according to one dictionary definition, is the science
of morals, that branch of philosophy which is concerned with human
character and conduct. The term spiritual i ty, on the other hand, was
first used by the eighteenth century Jesuit Giovanni Scaramelli to
refer to the science of spiritual life, involving "the relationship
between the whole person and a holy God" (Albin 1988) and thus has a
vertical dimension to it not necessarily possessed or required by the
ethicist^ .
"Both morality and religion refer to certain attitudes, types of
awareness, belief and behaviour that arise from the discernment
of certain values and that are expressed or embodied in certain
beliefs and behaviour that are deemed to be appropriate responses
to the values discerned." (Hicks 1996: 23)
If we substitute ethics and spirituality for "morality and religion" -
with the caveat that spirituality may go beyond the myopic vision
limited to one's own religious tradition - then we have at least
arrived at a working definition for the kind of ethics and spirituality
that concerned Koestler. For Koestler approached ethics from the
standpoint not of an academic but of a true-life revolutionary: one
whose attitudes and behaviour arose from the first-hand discernment of
the beliefs and behaviour of his years as a Communist and, as I hope to
demonstrate, in particular his time in prison in Seville during the
Spanish Civil War. Revolutionary ethics, the subject of the first
•1
In a recent article, David Hicks raised the question as to whether or
not morality depends upon religion (Hicks 1996). It is clear from Hicks' own
answer that spirituality, like morality, "has to do with the discernment of
and response to a being or beings of worth" (Hicks 1996: 24). There is what
he calls "the inner spiritual dimension to morality" that is common to all
religions. It is important thus to make clear at the outset that
"spirituality" as I shall apply the term to Koestler does not necessarily
contain a Christian import, yet nevertheless directly influenced his moral
thinking.
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chapter of this thesis, was simply the means of changing the world in
which we live. Originally Koestler equated this with Stalinism but soon
saw parallels in other ages to the world in which he lived. And
although, as I hope to demonstrate, revolutionary ethics was
substituted by other, admittedly less well-defined, ethical systems in
Koestler's later writing, nevertheless Koestler remained first and
foremost an observer of twentieth-century humanity with a desire to
offer pragmatic solutions. The question to Koestler, certainly as his
theory of the biological flaw in humanity came to the fore in later
years, was one of how to avoid man's self-destruction.
Koestler the sceptical humanist
By introducing the term spirituality into a thesis upon Arthur
Koestler, I am acutely aware that I am, to a certain extent, going
against the conventional view of Koestler the humanist.
Such a view usually takes as its starting-point what Rees refers to
as "the history of a loss of faith" (Rees 1975: 110): Koestler's
disillusionment and resignation from the Communist Party. Fyvel reminds
us that after his break with Stalinism, Koestler found no real new
political position (Fyvel 1975: 160), a point first noted by George
Orwell. He retained, in the writing of many of his critics and friends,
the epithet "ex-Communist". And of course his own writing further
accentuates a humanist philosophy, whether it is in his metaphor of a
man pulling himself out of the bog in the manner of his boyhood hero,
Baron Munchausen, or in his assertion in The Trail of the Dinosaur "we
shall either destroy ourselves or take off to the stars" (Koestler
1955: 252). It is impossible, he had said in the same essay, to turn
back to the language and symbols of a past religious age. God was no
longer present in man's world: a premise that formed the background to
one of his novels, The Age of Longing.
The view of the ex-Communist is best summed up by an early
biographer, John Atkins:
"In his heart Koestler remains a Communist, but his Communism is
the pristine variety of the theorists, not the dirtied sample
displayed by Soviet Russia. The fact that Koestler no longer
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calls himself a Communist [in 1956] does not invalidate this
view...The Yogi has complicated the vision unbearably." (Atkins
1956: 42-43)
But one could profitably compare Atkins' description to Koestler's own
summary of his philosophical progression, mapped out in an extensive
note for The Invisible Writing that was not used in the published
autobiography. Here, he lists the well-known "external" circumstances
of his 1ife "Vienna, University...Ber1 in 30-32 - Russia - Paris exile -
Spain...France+England - Post war" with a revealing "internal" paral1 el
development (Figure 1). The "internal" progression begins with
Religion, and is superseded by a breathless and bewildering list of "-
isms" (including "constructive Zionism, dialectical materialism, avant-
garde leftism and bureaucratic leftism"!) culminating in "sceptical
humanism". At the very least, the existence of this important
manuscript note reveals that Koestler perceived himself as a sceptical
humanist.
It is my contention that such apparent restlessness and
dissatisfaction with humanism is evidence of Koestler's spirituality,
and that only by seeing Koestler in this light does the continued and
single thread of his works become apparent.
A unified approach
Selective approaches to Koestler's work have dominated in recent
years, following Harris' Festschrift to mark Koestler's seventieth
birthday (Harris (ed) 1975). Allowing different essayists to analyse
Koestler's work, each according to his or her own speciality, seemed to
be the only solution available to Harris to define Koestler's work.
Few, if any, critics would claim a mastery of quantum physics,
psychology and Middle Eastern politics, let alone have the ability to
write accomplished novels: yet these apparently incompatible
disciplines were mastered in some degree by Koestler in the space of
fifty years. Harris admits to the limitations of his anthology.
"This volume, then, is not an attempt to encompass Koestler
within one pair of covers. Any such project would be doomed to
failure, for he has crossed too many frontiers, explored too many
territories, left his imprint on too many maps for this to be
u
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Figure 1. Koestler's unpublished notes for The
Invisible Writing in which he parallels the
"external" events of his life with "internal" changes
to his philosophy. (MS2342/3)
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remotely possible." (Harris (ed) 1975: xiii)
Harris' approach thus allowed a biologist to evaluate Koestler's
contribution to biological thought (Thorpe 1975), a political
journalist to consider Koestler's impact upon anti-capital punishment
campaigns (Grigg 1975), a parapsychologist to explore his interest in
the paranormal (Haynes 1975) and so forth.
A similar approach was adopted more recently by Sperber (Sperber (ed)
1977), although Sperber still tends to treat Koestler's political
contributions as of primary importance.
Harris was prepared to accept that within the different facets of
Koestler's writing, a broader and more unified picture begins to
emerge. The novels referred to above were only one part of his written
output which range from autobiography and novel to political essay and
scientific thesis. Readers of Harris' anthology will discern not simply
a diversity of subject but an author who "persistently and patiently
pursued the same truth" (Harris (ed) 1975: xiv) from his childhood
quasi-mystical experiences onward.
Rees (Rees 1975), for example, notes that the 'Grammatical
Fiction'2, the existence of which the Communist Party could not
accept, is central to Koestler's opposition of deterministic philosophy
in later years. And Webber ley's "attempt at an overview", whilst
recognising that Koestler's breadth of vision is seen as a disadvantage
in any attempt at a critical synthesis of Koestler's work, also argues
the case for a more unified approach. "Koestler is often discussed as
if he were two writers rather than one", the literary writer of
Darkness... and the scientist of the Janus trilogy (Webber ley 1975: 2).
One could argue that Koestler, to some extent, asked for such an
approach with his "vocational change" plea in the Preface to The Trail
Of The Dinosaur (Koestler 1955); but such a plea must, forty years
later, be set into the context of his later work in assessing to what
extent Koestler did indeed change vocation.
Webber ley's thesis suggests that connecting the different categories
p
The term is an important expression of Koestler's ethical philosophy
and is used to help explain Rubashov's "confession" in Darkness at Noon. (See
Chapter 1 for a full discussion.)
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of Koestler's output is a hierarchical system in which freedom is the
key issue. The novels merely put the problem of freedom in a concrete
but increasingly philosophical and psychological world inhabited by
what is, to one degree or another, Koestler himself. The issue of
freedom is then taken up in The Yogi and the Commissar, a much
underrated series of essays in Webber ley's opinion, from which the
fundamental notion of hierarchy emerges.
I have taken Webberley's model as the starting-point for a critical
analysis of Koestler's contribution to ethics, which Koestler himself
suggested would emerge in due course from his theory of the holon.
Thus, the novels, of which Darkness at Noon was the second, are staging
posts towards a fully developed ethical theory.
Nevertheless, Webberley's synthesis of Koestler's work does not,
indeed cannot, in so few pages go far enough. Firstly, Koestler never
did write the promised sequel to Insight and Outiook in which the
threads of the hierarchy would be drawn together and a properly
articulated ethical theory spelt out.
"In the preface [to Insight and Outlook] I had promised the
reader a second volume 'which is in preparation and will, it is
hoped, appear twelve months after the first'. But all I had to
show for volume II was a chaotic jumble of notes, the mere sight
of which gave me indigestion. After a hopeless struggle I had to
shelve volume II 'for the time being'. In actual fact, it never
saw the light of day. Its place was taken by The Act of Creation,
published fifteen years later." (Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 50)
The Act of Creation will disappoint readers who hope to find the
definitive statement of the hierarchy. There is no fully developed
ethical theory as such, though one can be in no doubt from Koestler's
later postscripts in the Danube edition to his work and in his
interviews with the late Iain Hamilton that he had such a theory in
mind, even if on paper it was merely "a chaotic jumble of notes". Thus,
my own approach can be defined as an attempt to define Koestler's
ethical system, from its genesis in the ethical novels to the
scientific work of later life, and to analyse the features that made
his ethical system unique.
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Recent developments and literature
To adopt a unified approach to the whole of Koestler's work is not in
itself new: the biographies of Atkins and, more recently, Iain Hamilton
(Hamilton 1982) and Car let's 1963 unpublished thesis (MS 2435/4), have
attempted to show the philosophical consistency running throughout
Koestler's writings. In a sense, their relative failure merely reflects
the age in which they were written: Atkins was focusing on Koestler's
life midstream, and invariably political issues dominate: Hamilton -
whose final work Koestler came close to attempting to suppress (MS
2370) - had only limited access to Koestler's papers; and Carlet is
more concerned with the psychological roots of Koestler's work rather
than its philosophical implications. And, of course, they al1 shared in
common the overriding fact that their subject was very much alive.
Koestler's suicide on 1 March 1983, with that of his third wife
Cynthia, has inevitably altered the landscape for Koestlerian scholars.
In the first place, it demonstrates that even in his final act, there
is a thread of Koestler's anti-deterministic philosophy still
discernible that one can trace directly back to the ethical novels. I
venture to suggest that a unified approach to Koestler, and more
serious consideration to his ethical system, becomes almost necessary
in the aftermath of Koestler's premeditated decision (that clearly
dates to June 1982) to take his own life. Harris (in Koestler. A. & C.
1984: 10) may be right in thinking that as vice-president of the
Voluntary Euthanasia Society, the suicide of a man terminally ill with
leukaemia and suffering from Parkinson's disease was not unexpected.
Not everyone would agree; and, in any case, the double suicide itself
raises questions, as many recognised at the time^. The impact was
certainly felt upon Mark Levene:
"When Koestler died, the shock was tremendous, unexpected. People
who had discounted his scientific work, who, when they thought of
him at all, saw him as an anomalous figure - a believer in an age
of metaphysical and literary buffoonery - suddenly recalled the
moment when they finished reading Darkness at Noon, when their
entire sense of politics was "riddled with light". In March 1983
they felt the unique loss that comes only with the passing of an
See Mikes 1986; the insinuation that Arthur was somehow responsible for
Cynthia's suicide has been aired again by Avishai (Avishai 1997).
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age and an individual in whom it was most sharply lived." (Levene
1985: 32)
Death has a remarkable propensity to shift the focus on to the
subject's achievements; and in Koestler's suicide, the manner of his
death the more so.
Secondly, and indirectly, his death led to the foundation of the
Koestler Archive at the University of Edinburgh, an event that in
itself clearly transforms the whole arena of Koestlerian scholarship^.
The result is that the primary handicap that frustrated Hamilton -
namely, the limited access to Koestler's wealth of published and
unpublished material - is now lifted, enabling researchers to gain a
more complete and certainly more accurate overview of Koestler than
hitherto possible.
Two theses in particular have been undertaken to date using the
Koestler Archive as their primary source. Both attempt to follow
Webber ley's example and offer a single theory by which to understand
Koestler's writing, though Tyndall, as her title suggests - The
Personal Becomes Political: Arthur Koestler, 7940-7950 - restricts
herself to the productive novel-writing years of Koestler's life.
Tyndall's theory (Tyndall 1992) is that Koestler's "personal agenda"
(Tyndall 1992: v) shaped his political action during this decade. In
particular, she traces Koestler's rejection of Communism to his
upbringing as a "Germanized-Hungarian Jew" and subsequent search for a
quasi-religious solution to the predicament of man in the twentieth
century. The deep sense of resentment that followed his rejection of
Communism then resulted, in Tyndall's thesis, to Koestler shaping,
through his writings, an image of the Soviet Union as the "evil
empire".
^Details of this development vary (University of Edinburgh 1987:
introduction; Beloff 1993) but, relying on Beloff's account as one of the
Estate's executors, it appears that Koestler had specified that his entire
estate be used to provide a Chair of Parapsychology at any British university
willing to accept such a challenge. Edinburgh was the most willing of several
interested universities and hence the executors agreed to bestow on it the
Koestler Chair (Beloff 1993: 280). The Archive came to Edinburgh soon
afterwards, with the assistance of Koestler's literary executor, the late
Harold Harris, and London Library, to which Koestler had initially left his
books.
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Goldstein's thesis also alights upon Koestler's Jewish background
(Goldstein 1992) but her title - Arthur Koestler: A European
Intel lectual Of The Twentieth Century - places his work into that
generation of European intellectuals "born between the last quarter of
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, whose lives
were shaped by the relentless criticism of traditional faith and values
that eroded secure standards" (Goldstein 1992: 2). Koestler belonged to
a specific sub-group of central-European Jewish intelligentsia that
inherited an equally specific romantic and messianic concept of
history. Goldstein attempts to place Koestler's life and thought as a
response to these two stimuli: the changes in Europe and his own
cultural messianic concept of history.
The use and limitations of biography and novel
Carlet, Goldstein and Tyndall share the belief that the roots for
Koestler's work lie in his background. But it is surely the case that
a psychological analysis of why Koestler wrote what he did does not
preclude a study that properly categorises what he wrote, regardless of
the reasons for his writing.
However, Tyndall and Goldstein have shown the value of biographical
material in understanding the evolution of Koestler's ideas. One can,
for example, cite various points at which Koestler's writing was a
direct result of his recent life - Spanish Testament and part of
Darkness at Noon are obvious examples - and the Archive, above all,
assists research in the correspondence and diary notes it contains,
thus affording us insights into Koestler's mind that no prior
researcher has enjoyed^.
Indeed, the Archive is frequently the only source for important and
hitherto unpublished information, such as the manuscript to the sequel for
Arrival and Departure, which, as far as I can ascertain, must rank as a
discovery as a literary piece that can only now be added to the Koestler
canon, and the various manuscripts for Dr Icarus. Koestler would frequently
be working on a project years before it reached its fruition, and the
discovery of so-called "scientific" theories sketched out in 1952 that were
only published in the Janus trilogy twelve years later is further warning of
the hazards of using only Koestler's published research as source material.
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It is also possible to trace the development of Koestler's
spirituality and ethics through his works of fiction. Certainly
Pritchett, for example, treated Arrival and Departure as a total
expression of Koestler's political thought. Atkins offers a useful
warning against such an approach in the field of fiction.
"I believe that a novelist should be given the benefit of the
doubt when he writes of characters such as Peter and Nikitin [in
The Age of Longing], even if one of them serves as the leading
character...Simi1ar1y it is erroneous to view the particular
theme of a novel as expressing the favoured conception of its
author. He may be warning or merely commenting." (Atkins 1956:
81-82)
Creative writers distance themselves from their characters. And it is
most certainly the case that The Age of Longing and, to a lesser
extent, Twilight Bar are the anti-utopian visions conjured up by a
creative writer to serve as a warning against a totalitarian - and I
shall, argue, a humanist - view that its author saw as a threat to the
very existence of the planet, rather than a means of expressing "the
favoured conception" of its author.
Atkins' note of caution is equally applicable to Koestler's first
novel, The Gladiators, seen by many (not least Orwell) as evidence of
Koestler's Utopian streak. "Koestler in sandals" never quite rings true
of Spartacus; we are on safer ground if we view this novel, and those
that followed, as expressions of Koestler's ethical progression, in
Hicks' terms commenting upon the values of society as he discerned them
and evaluating whether or not such attitudes and behaviour as displayed
by his fictional characters were "appropriate responses to the values
discerned". Thus, I hope to demonstrate that the novels outline
Koestler's dissatisfaction with the prevailing ethic and his own
struggle towards a less avowedly humanist ethic that might usefully
replace what he termed Commissar-ethics.
The concept of a spiritual ethic
Whilst Tyndal1 and Goldstein place Koestler within a certain literary
or cultural context, neither see fit to draw attention to the
significant periods in which Koestler collaborated with others, often
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with dramatic results (the anti-hanging campaign of 1956 being a prime
case in point) and always with a concomitant development in his own
ethical thinking. Koestler was clearly not the only ethicist of merit
in Britain in the post-war years; it has been necessary, therefore, to
highlight the contributions made by other writers in Koestler's ethical
development, notably Richard Hillary, George Orwell and Michael
Polanyi.
Calder has already noted the similarities between Orwell and Koestler
whilst curiously failing to grasp the existence, let alone the
significance, of the Orwel1-Koestler project of 1946. Attributions of
authorship between two partners are difficult to answer, even after
scrutinising the papers in two Archives - Koestler having been
instrumental in setting up the Orwell Archive in University College
London Library some years earlier. Nevertheless, such a collaboration
has an important role to play in establishing the precise nature of
Koestler's practical ethics. I shall use the evidence from such short
but crucial periods of collaboration (the nature of which was usually
unacknowledged by Koestler) to map the disillusionment that took
Koestler away from revolutionary ethics towards the concept of the
holon.
Koestler's use of Hillary's material - some would say misuse -
appears to have been a deliberate ploy on Koestler's part to argue for
his growing conviction of an ethic that was at least non-rational, if
not spiritual. Hillary's life served a useful purpose for Koestler at
a time when Marxism had been exposed, in his view, as ultimately
barren. Hillary could not know that after his death Koestler's theories
would perpetuate a mythical and incomplete picture of a man whose
sacrifice may indeed be more logical than Koestler supposed.
These partnerships themselves raise the final, and most important,
question to the researcher seeking to find a unified ethical theme to
Koestler's life. In what sense did Koestler's ethics differ from that
of, say, Orwell or Hillary?
Once again, the answer is only becoming clear in the light of
Koestler's suicide. I intend to demonstrate not only that Koestler
retained his spiritual, almost Yogi-ethical, Weitanschauung throughout
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his life but also that such a view enabled him to take his own life
with, as he stated in his suicide note of June 1982, "some timid hopes
for a depersonalised after-life beyond due confines of space, time, and
matter and beyond the limits of our comprehension" (MS 2308; Plates 1
and 2). Such hopes, however "timid", certainly set Koestler apart from
many of his contemporaries, possibly even Orwell, whose own belief in
an after-life was as tenuous as Moses the Raven's belief in Sugarcandy
Mountain in Animal Farm®.
The thesis that Koestler was engaged in a struggle with his own
spiritual nature is not without precedent as I shall discuss in Chapter
1. I use the word spiritual deliberately - there is a distinction to be
drawn, not least by Koestler himself, between spiritual and Christian,
the latter equating in Koestler's mind to a rational and closed
definition of God with little room for a sense of mystery7. It is this
sense of mystery that fascinated Koestler throughout his life. Beloff
goes as far as to say that Koestler never "explicitly repudiated" his
belief in the "doctrine of the Third Order" (Beloff 1975: 82). Given
the circumstantial evidence that confirms Koestler as a reluctant
mystic at precisely that period in his life when he was attempting to
reject yogi-ethics, it seems entirely right to ask the question of
whether it is the influence of his perception of spiritual reality that
gave rise to his distinctive hierarchical system, of which Koestler's
ethics was but one strand.
Such a proposal is in itself not entirely new. Hamilton and Pearson
(Pearson 1978), among others, have suspected Koestler of having a more
spiritual side than he would publicly admit. Goldstein and Tyndal1 base
g
Certainly, as Crick points out Orwell's request to be buried in a
churchyard "when he had no connection with any church" (Crick 1980: 405) took
people by surprise, and in the notebook Orwell wrote whilst hospitalised in
London shortly before his death he refers, in an entry entitled "Death
Dreams", to his "extinction" (Crick 1980: 401).
n
The distinction is also illustrated by Koestler's suicide note, in
which he explicitly refers to his "timid hopes for a de-personalised after¬
life": however else one interprets his timidity and concept of the "aftei—
life", it would be difficult to equate such views with those of mainstream
Christianity.
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much of their work on the assumption that in Koestler's life various
gods had failed, to paraphrase the title of one of his famous
collaborative works (Crossman (ed) 1950). But what if, in fact, his
spiritual side (I would not presume to use the definitive word "god")
did not fail him, but indeed provided the foundation for his ethical
system?® Might it not be that those who, rightly or wrongly, argue the
case for Koestler's spirituality are looking in the wrong place - that
is, looking for overt admissions of religiosity rather than the
implicit spirituality of his ethics?
It is my aim to demonstrate that the reality of the Third Order is an
integral foundation to the post-war hierarchical system of ethics for
which Koestler became justly famous in the Janus trilogy.
One shares with Crick after reading Orwell the distinct feeling that
Orwell never lost faith in his Jack Londonesque "proles" - just as one
reads Hillary's The Last Enemy with the feeling that for Hillary too,
for all his snobbery, the key to salvation was the "bombed woman" who
alone had the power of lifting his eyes to the reality around him. But
for the student of Koestler, it is possible to come away from reading
his great works, three of which are still in print - Darkness at Noon,
Arrival and Departure and The S1eepwalkers - with quite the opposite
thought. The more I studied Koestler, the more his spiritual side,
first revealed at "the hours by the window" in the Seville jail, became
apparent. Certainly, for Koestler, the proles always seemed to let him
down, as they did his fictional creations, anti-heroes such as Rubashov
or Peter Slavek. If there was any salvation to be found for them, it
was by having faith in a higher reality that allowed them, and in 1983
Koestler himself, to accept death as part of the order of the universe,
but not necessarily the highest order.
O
If one accepts the argument of ethicists such as Peter Baelz (Baelz
1977) then one could argue that inevitably Koestler's questioning of the
prevailing ethical system he had encountered in Soviet Russia would lead to
wider questions about religion. For Baelz maintains that if the moral point
of view is to hold a man's attention, it must contain a vision of "ex-
centring... the conviction that in some way men belong to one another". Such
visions, whilst not always religious, are either products of the imagination
or windows into "ultimate reality". Only in terms of this higher reality does
morality, according to Baelz, makes sense.
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Compare the final experience of Rubashov in Darkness at Noon
"A second, smashing blow hit him on the ear. Then all became
quiet. There was the sea again with its sounds. A wave slowly
lifted him up. It came from afar and travelled sedately on, a
shrug of eternity." (Koestler 1940: 267)
with the autobiographical account of his mystical experience in Seville
"Then I was floating on my back in a river of peace, under
bridges of silence. It came from nowhere and flowed nowhere. Then
there was no river and no I. The I had ceased to exist."
(Koestler 1954a: 352)
or with his own suicide note written forty years later
"I wish my friends to know that I am leaving their company in a
peaceful frame of mind, with some timid hopes for a de¬
personalised aftei—life beyond the confines of space, time, and
matter, and beyond the limits of our comprehension. This 'oceanic
feeling' has often sustained me at difficult moments, and does so
now, while I am writing this." (MS 2308)
Thus what matters, even in the particular and historic setting to his
fictional work, is the principle underlying Koestler's hierarchy and
his own aspiration for the world in the shadow of Hiroshima: the
principle of a higher, or spiritual, reality, the admission of which is
necessary before a complete working ethic can be undertaken. Darkness
at Noon, for which Koestler is justly most remembered, is not simply a
great work of fiction. It may herald the higher ethic that is a
necessary affirmation of Koestler's "Third Order" beyond the perceptual
and conceptual realities of human existence.
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CHAPTER 1: REVOLUTIONARY ETHICS
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to show how Koestler's experience of
Stalinism shaped his early ethical theories. It is difficult to
conceive his own particular brand of holism and abhorrence of
determinism in all its forms arising but for his years in the Communist
Party. The Russia that Koestler visited as an already successful
journalist was of course a country in which the ethical debate of "ends
and means" was being played out in all-too human terms - the Show
Trials, the mass famines, the purges were seen as justifiable means if
the end of a good and just society was achieved. That was Koestler's
dream, and if it was punctured by events in Spain, the novels were to
be a means by which such an ethical system could be more objectively
examined.
But Koestler could never totally put aside his own experiences. It is
his spiritual experience in Spain that gives rise to the Grammatical
Fiction, which itself provides Koestler's unique answer to the critical
question of the 1930s: Why did Bukharin confess?
I will attempt to show that only by analysing Koestler's
revolutionary ethics by recourse to the so-called "reality of the Third
Order" does Koestler's solution make any sense. That is not to say that
Koestler's ethics were overtly religious; on the other hand, it has
emerged that during the reign of Pope Paul the ex-Communist "was
attracted to Roman Catholicism" according to his third wife, Cynthia
(Koestler, C. 1975: 147). And there was no shortage of readers who
chose to see Koestler as "essentially a Christian marque", largely
because of his flight from humanist "closed systems" such as
Communism''. So perhaps the time has come for an overview of Koestler's
ethics that takes proper account of his spiritual nature.
4
See, for example, Ursula Roberts to Arthur Koestler, 12 September 1954.
"I can't but think of you as an essentially a Christian marque" (MS 2379/3).
Roberts was one of several correspondents who tried to persuade Koestler to
join the Anglican communion.
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It is by taking into account the "reality of the Third Order", which
has its origin in Koestler's experiences as a prisoner in Seville, that
Webberley's progression, from the concrete to the philosophical, is
complete: the progression ends with the spirituality of Rubashov's
Grammatical Fiction and the irreducible "I love, therefore I am" ethic
of Peter Slavek in the unpublished sequel to Arrival and Departure. The
importance of this newly-discovered work lies in the manner in which
the individual ethic is reinstated, thus providing the Yogi side of the
spectrum of ethics that Koestler had encountered post-Communism but
which still left him feeling dissatisfied.
I will then address the question Koestler posed in The Yogi and the
Commissar: why did attempts to change the nature of man by Commissar
methods fail? Koestler's answer is that Commissar-ethics does not
accept the existence of a "Third Order" or Grammatical Fiction; both
concepts, aired in the novels, point to the importance of the
individual ethic and a solution to the "ends and means" dilemma that
reconciles the apparently opposing poles of society and the individual.
I shall argue that the novels (together with the unpublished
manuscripts) are therefore an important exploration of the nature of
freedom as suggested by Webber ley, but importantly a barren exploration
for neither the Yogi-ethic nor the Commissar-ethic was satisfactory
either to Koestler the writer or Koestler the true-life revolutionary.
Finally, I hope to demonstrate the strong link between the writings
of Richard Hillary and Arthur Koestler, and Koestler's indebtedness to
Hillary for providing further evidence of the ethical significance of
guilt and the existence of the Grammatical Fiction in a contemporary
situation. I will suggest that Koestler uses the character of Peter
Slavek, like Rubashov before him, to reveal the moral bankruptcy of
revolutionary ethics and to prove that in complex real-life situations,
neither Yogi-ethics nor Commissar-ethics offers a practical solution to
the modern ethicist.
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1.i. KOESTLER'S EARLY LIFE
The revolutionary hero
"The Rubashovs and Ivanovs have long been posthumously
rehabilitated. The Gletkins have grown old and have long been
picking up their 'merited pensions', they grow strawberries at
their dachas and sigh about the past." (Bukovsky 1980: 7)
Much has changed since Arthur Koestler wrote Darkness at Noon. The
system that attracted and later repelled the Hungarian-born writer has
been dismantled, as Bukovsky predicted (Bukovsky 1980: 15); yet even at
the time, Koestler's close friend and ally George Orwell suggested that
close inspection of the revolutionary world inhabited by Rubashov,
Gletkin and Ivanov would never appeal to the English-speaking world:
"The special world created by secret police forces, censorship of
opinion, torture and frame-up trials is, of course, known about
and to some extent disapproved of, but it has made very little
emotional impact...For an Englishman to write Darkness at Noon
would be as unlikely an accident as for a slave-trader to write
Uncle Tom's Cabin." (Orwell and Angus 1970a: 272)
The late Iain Hamilton, too, whilst conceding the enormous political
impact of Darkness... notes the "English reluctance to acknowledge the
reality of violence" (Hamilton 1975: 87); yet in 1941 it was surely
understandable if readers at the time thought Darkness... strong meat.
Writing in October of that year, Koestler remarked that reality was so
horribly overstating itself as to become indigestible for the normal
and particularly the normal English mind (MS 2372/1: 105).
Koestler had provided the "emotional impact" but that also seems
further to restrict him to the Cold War era when "the end of history
seemed real, often imminent" (Sperber 1977: 1). Thus, Sperber argues,
Koestler's reputation is clouded by the memory of this apocalyptic and
prophetic writer allowing readers to place him in a very small
pigeonhole marked anti-Communist.
Darkness... as prophecy
But there is a wider context to Koestler, the revolutionary hero,
than merely the confessions, in novel form, of one clambering "out of
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a poisoned river strewn with the wreckage of flooded cities and the
corpses of the drowned", to quote Koestler's parody of Picasso
(Koestler 1954a: 15). Bukovsky believes that Darkness at Noon will
remain topical for as long as there are people alive wishing to
transform society for the better, communism being "the most consistent
and the most extreme form of this striving" (Bukovsky 1980: 15). His
thesis is that the pull towards justice is a powerful emotive force
which man has the greatest difficulty in controlling. There will always
be revolutionary heroes like Rubashov created by writers like Koestler.
Also, one can take from Sperber's analysis of Koestler qua prophetic
and apocalyptic and argue that these very labels place the subject
outside the pigeonhole of "anti-Communist". Rees, for example, observes
that Darkness. . . "has had the peculiar distinction of appearing to
predict and influence the future" alluding to the public confession of
Koestler's one-time Communist Party comrade, Otto Katz in the Czech
purge of 1952. In his last statement to a tribunal that had accused
Katz of assorted contrived charges, Katz quoted, virtually word for
word, Rubashov's last speech to indicate its falsity and appeal to his
friends to organize the kind of rescue operation that he and others had
organised to save Koestler in Spain (see Koestler 1954a: 405). It
appeared, Rees wrote later, "as if Rubashov had returned to life to
repeat the message of the novel" (Rees: 275).
Katz' confession and the unfolding farce of another show trial filled
Koestler with a horrific sense of deja vu. This was fifteen years after
the publication of Darkness... But one does not have to look far beyond
the novel to see evidence of the prophetic intention of the writer. In
Koestler's correspondence with E. M. Forster, suffused with the
pessimism of the darkest year of the war, Forster writes that Koestler
"vividly recalls the duty of prophecy" (MS 2345/1: 52) and suggests
they both have in common a dream of "a society where human love can
flourish". One correspondent noted
"Your books are a terrible indictment of our era of so-called
civilisation, but I believe they are human documents of the
greatest value to the world of the future." (MS 2371/2: 50-51)
Koestler the prophet is a title that the author himself acknowledged in
a preface to a later collection of essays, when, having published the
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second volume of his autobiography, he suggested that
"the errors are atoned for...Cassandra has gone hoarse, and is
due for a vocational change." (Koestler 1955: viii)
He had, after all, alerted the world to the full extent of the horrors
of the Stalinist Purge; the world may not have been ready to listen as
for much of the War it was in the Allies' interests to look favourably
on 'smiling Uncle Joe' Stalin, a fact that was not lost on Koestler's
friend, George Orwell, writing in his diary in July 1941.
"One could not have a better example of the moral and emotional
shallowness of our time, than the fact that we are now more or
less pro-Stalin. This disgusting murderer is temporarily on our
side, and so the purges, etc, are suddenly forgotten." (0A7/4:
105)
Clearly, there were those who sought to persuade Koestler to refute the
obvious analogy between "Number One" and Stalin in later printings of
the book. Paul Willert advised otherwise:
"I do not think that you will feel like changing anything that
you wrote because of the success of No. 1. And what is more
important, you should not change anything. Nor should anyone who
has regard for the truth, a hope that plus ga change is not the
inevitable sum of human endeavour, be anything but grateful for
the book [Darkness at Noon]. It is still hard to talk with the
faithful." (MS 2371/3: 51 )
In such an atmosphere, even the arch-English Orwell found it virtually
impossible to find a publisher for Animal Farm, the manuscript being
refused by Gollancz and T. S. Eliot - "what was needed [in Animal Farm]
was... more public-spirited pigs" (OA: A157) .
Thus, in its first year of publication. Darkness. . . only sold 4,000
copies in Great Britain. But in 1946, Darkness. . . was translated into
French (Le Zero et L'Infinie), sold 400,000 copies and de Gaulle was
swept into power on the back of the anti-Communist vote assisted in no
small measure by the French Communist Party's misguided attempts at
suppression of the novel. In Britain, the end of the war brought to
light the hidden contradiction between the aims of Russia and the West,
and the "truth of the terrible picture Koestler had drawn" (Rees: 273)
was discovered. The revolutionary hero had come of age.
O
Koestler remarked in an interview to the late Iain Hamilton (5 March
1974) that the "official line" from 1942 to 1945 was that nothing should
irritate Stalin. "Nobody wanted to publish Orwell." MS 2436/5: 25.
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Guilt and helplessness
But note "the errors are atoned for": the need for atonement and the
sense of guilt had been themes in Koestler's life since childhood:
"...the first major fact that took root in my mind was the
consciousness of guilt. These roots grew quickly, silently, and
greedily, like a eucalyptus tree, under the driftsand of early
experience." (Koestler 1952: 34)
Koestler was no ordinary revolutionary hero. He admitted that he
acquired guilt automatically "in the same way one's hands grew dirty as
the day wore on" (Koestler 1952: 34) and the Tree of Guilt figures
large in his writing. If Rees and Browne (MS 2323/4) fail to make the
connection between the overriding sense of guilt and helplessness and
the nature of Koestler's revolutionary involvement and its aftermath,
others, notably Carlet and John Hale, stress the ethical significance
of guilt in Koestler's writings of this period.
Carlet and Hale share the thesis that the revolutionary hero, as
depicted in the novels and the author's own life, serves as a means of
breaking the walls of a "portable prison" (MS 2435/4: 154). In Hale's
screenplay, Koestler is literally chained to the past - symbolised by
a desk in a prison cell inhabited by both Rubashov and Koestler -
"paying the debt" (MS 2436/1: 19). This is a barely disguised allusion
to a phrase from his wartime friend, the pilot Richard Hillary, often
used by Koestler: "The survivor is always the debtor". For Koestler, a
Hungarian Jew, survived whilst Carlet estimates 90% of his family and
friends were to die in the gulags of Stalin or concentration camps of
Nazi Germany (MS 2435/4: 156). Curiously, Koestler himself did not see
his survival as anything other than a "typical case history of a
central-european member of the educated middle classes born in the
first years of our century" (Koestler 1954a: 422), dismissing the mass
extermination of his race in six lines of text within the context of
his Zionism (Koestler 1954a: 379).
"It was entirely normal for a writer, an artist, politician or
teacher with a minimum of integrity to have several escapes from
Hitler and/or Stalin, to be chased and exiled" (Koestler 1954a:
428)
Entirely normal? How could anyone feel less than guilty when eventually
waking to the fact that the typical histories of many in the Jewish
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middle classes of central Europe ended not in survival but torture and
death?
Destiny from above
But Hale's prison has another dimension, for Koestler also confessed
in his autobiography that in his youth the universe was, in Galileo's
paraphrase, a book printed in the language of mathematical equations.
The prison is no more or less than the fixed universe of Kepler to
which Koestler returned again and again both for inspiration and
consolation but which, at this period in his life, spoke of destiny
determined from above, trapping him in time and space, chapter and
verse. It would be anachronistic to read into any analysis of Koestler
the revolutionary hero the neat ethical distinctions between destiny
from above and destiny from below which were to appear in 1943, after
Arrival and Departure, and out of which were to grow Koestler's
developed idea of Yogi-ethics and Commissai—ethics - and ultimately the
holon. But it is surely not anachronistic to detect an almost obsessive
regard for the influence of the stars and a feeling of determinism
quite literally from the very first sentence of Koestler's
autobiography:
"From the beginnings of civilisation man has held the belief that
the constellation of heavenly bodies at the moment of his birth
had an influence on his fate." (Koestler 1952: 13)
Koestler began writing the account of his early life by looking up the
"secular horoscope" (i.e. the newspaper reports of actual events) for
the day of his birth, a horoscope which "yielded as much information as
the stars ever would on the field of force into which I was born and on
the influences that were to shape my character and fate" (Koestler
1952: 18).
Scammell has argued that this was an autobiographical trick (Scammell
pers. comm.): Koestler merely selected from The Times, ex post facto,
news items that reflected his later interests in life - pogroms in
Russia, the Russo-Japanese pact and so on. Thus Scammell is not
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convinced that Koestler believed in any "occult" connection3. However,
one could cite Koestler's belief in synchronicity (Koestler 1972) to
argue that he may have been amenable to some form of astrological
synchronicity, if not destiny from above.
The revolutionary hero is thus fighting against the stars, or at
least against some predetermined fate - "the law and order of things"
as Spartacus tells Nicos - that induces a feeling of helplessness as
much as guilt. Helplessness and guilt are twin themes to which we
shall return frequently in the course of this analysis of Koestlerian
ethics; suffice to say that Koestler saw himself at this point as a
revolutionary hero following in the footsteps of his childhood hero,
Baron Munchausen - fighting the helplessness by taking a part in the
action (Koestler 1952: 41).
The action had taken him from his student days at the University of
Vienna and a collective farm at Galilee to various important
correspondent's posts (including one assignment on the Graf Zeppelin
trip to the North Pole). Finally, he joined the Communist Party and
duly made the pilgrimage to Russia: "more in the nature of an
hallucination than a journey through a real country" (Rees: 257).
Koestler's conviction in his actions was to be finally shattered by his
involvement in the Spanish Civil War.
"For him, as others, the issues in Spain were so absolutely clear
that the Civil War offered an opportunity, perhaps the last, for
the Party to demonstrate that, in spite of the mutilations and
deformations it had suffered, it was still the only force capable
of defeating fascism. In Spain, however, the policy of the Party
revealed the same contradictions... the same perverted logic, as
it had already shown in Germany and in the Soviet Union itself."
(Rees: 260)
The god had failed, leaving Koestler to use his novels as an expiation
of guilt and a prophetic means of combating the sense of helplessness
that had dogged him throughout his life.
Q
If it was merely an "autobiographical trick", then it was one that
Koestler was prepared to repeat on more than one occasion, notably in Robert
Reid's BBC "biography/autobiography of Arthur Koestler" for BBC TV, in which
Koestler persists in referring to his horoscope as a "template" for his life
(MS 2435/3: 11 ) .
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"The reality of the Third Order"
Supposedly under the sentence of death whilst in the Seville
prison , Koestler underwent what he perceived as a spiritual
experience, the nature of which was to influence his writing for at
least the next decade. "His whole outlook and sense of values", Beloff
writes (Beloff 1975: 82) "underwent a profound transformation as a
result of a mystical experience."
Readers of his account of his adventures in Spain, Spanish Testament
and Dialogue with Death®, will search in vain for a detailed account
of this experience. Koestler later said this was because he was "still
too shattered and confused to give a clear account, even to myself, of
what had happened in cell no. 40" (Koestler 1954a: 353). Throughout the
various printings of Dialogue... , Koestler remained resolutely silent
on the matter.
"Still more often I dream that I must return to No. 416 because
^Koestler always asserted that after his arrest in Spain he had been
sentenced to death, repeating the claim in numerous interviews and articles.
Thus, in the Danube edition of Dialogue with Death, he makes reference to
Marcel Junod's Warrior without Weapons claiming that "Junod...negotiated my
exchange...[and] was officially informed that I had been sentenced to death."
(Koestler 1966c: 6). In fact, the passage to which Koestler refers mentions
only the rumour to this effect (Junod 1951: 1 24f). As Scammell has pointed out
(Scammell, pers. comm.), it is highly unlikely that a foreigner of such
standing would be sentenced to death at that time. It is more reasonable to
assert that Koestler thought at the time he was under sentence of death, and
in later reminiscences allowed this feeling to become an established objective
fact.
5Dialogue with Death first appeared as Part II of Spanish Testament, an
overtly propagandist account of his experiences during the Spanish Civil War
(Koestler 1937: 207-382). For various reasons, Spanish Testament was never
reprinted in its original form and the psychological account of Koestler's
experiences was abridged and published separately in its own right (Koestler
1954b; Koestler 1966c). Justifying the separation of the two works, Koestler
wrote "...the political background was irrelevant and the narrative, [Dialogue
with Death] as far as it went, was the truthful account of an intimate
experience" (Koestler 1954b: 7). In his discussion of the complex relationship
between the two works, Sperber draws attention to Dialogue. . . being more than
a reissue of the second half of Spanish Testament. (Sperber 1977: 109)
6It is a minor point, but Koestler's memory of the number of his cell
is unreliable. In The Invisible Writing and later works, he invariably refers
to his cell as cell number 40.
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I have left something behind there. I think I know what this
something is, but it would be too complicated to explain."
(Koestler 1954b: 208)
Sixteen years after his release from Seville, he was more
forthcoming.
"The 'hours by the window' [in the cell],..had filled me with a
direct certainty that a higher order of reality existed, and that
it alone invested existence with meaning. I came to call it later
'the reality of the third order'. The narrow world of sensory
experience constituted the first order; this perceptual world was
enveloped by the conceptual world which contained phenomena not
directly perceivable, such as gravitation, electro-magnetic
fields, and curved space. The second order of reality filled in
the gaps and made sense of the sensory world. In the same manner,
the third order of reality enveloped, interpreted and gave
meaning to the second. It contained 'occult' phenomena which
could not be apprehended or explained either on the sensory or on
the conceptual level, and yet occasionally invaded them like
spiritual meteors piercing the primitive's vaulted sky." (my
italics) (Koestler 1954a: 353)
The duration of the actual experiences, which seem to have arisen
during Koestler's attempts to forget his predicament by focusing upon
mathematical formulae7, was difficult to measure. They apparently
occurred two or three times a week and could never be voluntarily
induced. Each time the "coming-back to the lower order of reality" was
gradual, "like waking up from anaesthesia" (Koestler 1954a: 352).
Interestingly, they continued after his liberation but less frequently.
The important fact is that Koestler "found a peaceful ecstasy" (West
1977: 89). Koestler, Sperber writes, "emerges from the trials and
temptations of politics to discover spiritual meaning and to be born
anew" (Sperber 1977: 110). The question may still be asked, however, to
what extent did Koestler's apparent experience of these 'three orders'
of reality amount to a philosophical system in his later work, or was
this another example of Koestler's "utter confusion of intellect and
emotion" (Deutscher 1977: 98)?
Beloff is in no doubt, concluding his essay on "Koestler's philosophy
of mind" with the account of the "hours by the window" and subtly
n
See, for example, Koestler's account in the later screenplay he wrote
to Dialogue... (MS 2324/1), and his autobiographical account of Seville
(Koestler 1954a: 351).
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restyling Koestler's phrase "the reality of the third order" into "the
doctrine of the third order". Beloff justifies the approach by
balancing this view of Koestler with the latter's scientific interests,
which might indicate a more rational philosophy. The two sides need to
be reconciled.
"In that case his naturalistic theory of mind might belong only
to the more familiar scientific face while a quite different
esoteric doctrine might issue from the other lesser-known face."
(my italics) (Beloff 1975: 82)
Hence, one supposes, a doctrine of the third order.
I shall adopt a more cautious approach in this thesis, using
Koestler's original phrase, "the reality of the third order", which
seems to me to both emphasise the objective veracity behind Koestler's
experience and the importance it played in shaping Koestler's ethics.
The phrase also suggests, to me at least, that Sperber is misleading by
referring to "the hours by the window" as the mere discovery of "self".
But I hope we shall see, as Koestler wrestles with the memory of his
encounter with spiritual reality, that there is no individualistic
creed at stake here. On the contrary, such glimpses of higher reality
became the foundation upon which Koestler's writing would be built. He
himself said as much.
"In the years that followed I wrote a number of books in which I
attempted to assimilate the experiences of cell No. AO. Ethical
problems had hitherto played no part in my writing: now they
became its central concern. In The Gladiators, two-thirds of
which was written after Seville, and Darkness at Noon...I tried
to come to intellectual terms with the intuitive glimpses gained
during the 'hours by the window'." (Koestler 195Aa: 358)
So important was this experience that the title of the second volume of
his autobiography, The Invisible Writing, arose from his analysis of
"the hours by the window". It was, he wrote,
"a text written in invisible ink, and though one could not read
it, the knowledge that it existed was sufficient to alter the
texture of one's existence, and make one's actions conform to the
text." (Koestler 195Aa: 354)
It is not unreasonable to argue, as West has done (West 1977), that
an experience that seemed to bring into question the very existence of
the self, should slowly alter Koestler's intellectual foundations and
cause him to search for a substitute for the utilitarian concept of
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ethics®. Thus we can trace Koestler's concern in ethics as much as his
awareness of spirituality to this same point, when "The I had ceased to
exist" (Koestler 1954a: 352).
The ethics of revolution
I suggest that ethical considerations were to preoccupy Koestler for
the rest of his life. Certainly, when reassessing his own novels thirty
years later he eschewed a political approach, highlighting the ethical
core of the trilogy.
"Darkness at Noon is the second novel of a trilogy...which
revolves around the central theme of revolutionary ethics, and of
political ethics in general: the problem, whether, or to what
extent, a noble end justifies ignoble means, and the related
conflict between morality and expediency." (Koestler 1977: 257)
Calder concurs with this analysis but sharpens the focus by pointing
out that the battle of ends and means is fought out on a personal level
by individuals embroiled in a conflict between collective necessity and
individual morality (Calder 1968: 121). We may label these specific
conflicts either historical (The Giadiators), historical-political
{Darkness...) or psychological {Arrival and Departure). In each story,
the central character has to weigh up his own personal moral code
against the needs of a larger group. By exploring the different routes
chosen by the characters, Koestler defines revolutionary ethics.
By placing the novels within a biographical context, however, I aim
to demonstrate the validity of Webber ley's thesis which seeks to unite
Koestler's political and scientific work as two different approaches to
the same ethical debate on the concept of freedom, a view endorsed by
the tentative title (dropped before publication) of Hamilton's
controversial biography of Koestler: Ends and Means (or The Man Who
Survived)^.
"what distinguishes Koestler as an interdisciplinary figure is
Q
This is certainly Koestler's conclusion to his account of "the hours
by the window" (Koestler 1954a: 358).
^See Hamilton's draft synopsis for the biography. MS 2436/5. (1974?
notes)
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his capacity, not merely to cross a cultural chasm, but to take
the same essential problem [freedom versus determinism] with
him." (Webberley 1975: 12)
We may not agree with Webberley's claim that the determinist with a
microscope is just as dangerous as the determinist with a gun, but
Koestler had experience of both - his bitter personal and legal dispute
with his biographer arose because Hamilton could not see the link
between the two areas of his subject's life - and maintained frequently
that the mentality of Ivanov and Gletkin is as much an ethical problem
in science as it is in politics. For example, Calder reminds us of
Koestler's abhorrence of behaviourism, which she believes stems from
the denial of the validity of private consciousness. Consequently for
the behaviourist the political problem of "ends and means" ceases to
have meaning.
This is aired, of course, in The Yogi... essays in which political
and scientific attitudes to determinism form a spectrum and the earlier
focus on "ends and means" is subsumed into a debate on ethics in
general. But it is, nevertheless, in the novels that the principles of
"revolutionary ethics" are contained, principles that served only to




When Koestler began his first full-length novel in 1935, he already
felt disillusioned with the Communist Party in the wake of the Kirov
murder. The Soviet Utopia had failed him and other writers of his
generation (notably Auden). The Gladiators, the first novel in the
trilogy, is, in the author's own words, "the story of another
revolution that had gone wrong" (Koestler 1966a: 316). The writing of
the novel at the time was thus "a form of occupational therapy"
(Koestler 1966a: 317) rather than a serious analysis of revolutionary
ethics.
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The book took four years to write - a series of interruptions,
culminating in Koestler's time in a Spanish prison, made writing
difficult; but the nature of these interruptions and Koestler's growing
unease with where the modern revolution was leading also ensured that
the first century BC became an attractive alternative in which the
revolutionary hero could dwell. His imagination, requiring details of
a "strict, indeed, pedantic accuracy" such as the design of the slaves'
shoes and how they were tied, ensured the escape (Koestler 1966a: 319).
The central figure is the leader of The Slaves' Revolt, Spartacus.
His Utopian dream of establishing a "Sun State", a brotherhood of slave
towns, in which the freed gladiators might 1ive in a Realm of Goodwi 1 1 ,
is ended when Spartacus finds he does not have the stomach to witness
the slow death by crucifixion (that he himself has ordered) of the
dissident Celts whose brutality had threatened the new order. By the
end of the novel, nobody has really changed and Koestler echoes his own
feelings on the helplessness of the revolutionary hero:
"Really, everything depended on the period in which...a man was
born...whether time threw him on the rubbish heap or allowed him
to make history." (Koestler 1939: 287)
The Sun City is destroyed and Spartacus, once again an anonymous slave
"the man with the fur-skin" - is crucified with the other
revolutionaries.
Opinions are divided over the literary merits of the novel.
Pritchett, a consistent critic of Koestler's writing, is surprisingly
fulsome in his praise of The Gladiators, citing its sense of human
tragedy and an absence of twentieth century Marxist or Freudian
influence (Pritchett 1977: 57). Conversely, Orwell considers it a weak
novel in which the motives of the main character are never fully
explained. Spartacus is depicted neither as a visionary nor as powei—
hungry but is driven by some obscure force he does not understand.
Orwell's view, shared by most reviewers, is summed up by a contemporary
comment of Spartacus as a character who "remains shadowy, veiled in the
half-light of a dream born out of due season" (Anon. 1939).
Yet in a sense such views are the best possible answer to those
critics who see the novel in largely autobiographical terms: Spartacus
as Koestler in sandals. Koestler was, and always remained, more
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interested in ideas than people: "it is the dream that matters most for
Mr Koestler, deliberately so." (Anon. 1939). Spartacus remains
strangely mute; when he does speak, he finds his own voice alien to him
(Koestler 1939: 65) - as Peter will also find in Arrival and Departure.
A law of history
It is the Law of Detours that endows the novel with an ethical
significance outwith the historical period of its setting. Simply
expressed, the Law of Detours is the Koestlerian principle that heroism
must be tempered by discipline. The approach the Law advocates is
utterly dispassionate and objective: the hero has to take hard
decisions for the good of the group. Compassion is perceived as a
danger to the heroic ideal, frustrating the success of the revolution
by detouring the hero's attention from the original goal. It is a Law
most famously invoked by the "unsex me here" soliloquy of Lady Macbeth:
"...make thick my blood,
Stop up th'accesse, and passage to Remorse,
That no compunctious visitings of Nature
Shake my fell purpose, nor keepe peace betweene
Th'effect and hit." (Macbeth Act I Scene V^®)
Thus the Law of Detours is a law that prohibits detours and emphasises
the goal of revolution even to the exclusion of all human emotion or
"visitings of Nature", as noted by Koestler's creation in The
Gladiators, Zozimos, the first to expound the Law of Detours in
Koestler's fiction:
"Many a man has strutted the road of tyranny, at the outset
solely with the purpose of serving his lofty ideals, and in the
end the road alone made him carry on." (Koestler 1939: 141)
If the book is disillusioning, it is because the impetus of The Law
of Detours makes revolutions disillusioning events, for "the road
alone" devoid of the original compassion or ideals that precipitate
1 0
The influential literary critic, Arnold Kettle, made a direct
comparison between what he perceived as the pessimism of Orwell and Koestler




revolution becomes a heartless place'
What Koestler had called The Law of Detours Orwell's reviewers
labelled "the betrayed revolution", a thesis that in the opinion of
Cyril Connolly neither Koestler nor Orwell had explored in sufficient
detail (Connolly 1945b: 215-216). Connolly argued that the two writers
had not realised that the violence necessary to achieve revolution
generates an admiration of violence per se. In other words, following
the Law of Detours inevitably leads to an abuse of power - "all animals
are equal but..." Revolutionary ethics was thus represented by the
horns of a dilemma: obey the Law of Detours and sacrifice all humanity;
ignore the Law of Detours and allow compassion to colour your actions,
and sacrifice the revolution itself.
That Koestler and Orwell found the same law of revolutionary ethics
at work is not surprising; both were preoccupied at this stage of their
writings with Stalinism, and there is a sense too in which the almost
inevitable failure of those who adhere to the Law of Detours is merely
part of history itself.
"All these sufferings, all these turbid detours which it is said
one had to take for the sake of the goal - were they perhaps not
means to an end at all, were they the law of history itself; and
the goal only human fancy - without any reality to back it up?"
(Koestler 1939: 149)
Thus, Fulvius' misgivings concern the dialectic of history rather than
one relatively insignificant incident within that history. Spartacus
attempts to obey the Law of Detours, "which compels the leader on the
road to Utopia to be 'ruthless for the sake of pity'" (Koestler 1966a:
317), whilst in the process of a heroic struggle against suffering
itself, "the law of history". By struggling against the law of history
in this way, Spartacus attempts to free the slaves from their own
heroic struggle against their masters, a struggle that reminded
1 1 The Law of Detours may also be applied to the satirical context of
Animal Farm, where the ruthlessness of Napoleon (whose revolutionary path
bears close resemblance to that of Spartacus) contrasts with the idealism of
Snowball. In Orwell's work, however, Napoleon does follow "the road alone" -
compare Boxer's fate with the reprieve of Koestler's dissident Celts - leading
to the problems epitomised in arguably the most famous sentence of twentieth
century literature: "All animals are equal but some animals are more equal
than others."
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Spartacus of the problem of self-sacrifice that the author was to
address more properly in Darkness...
"Heroism was obviously the outcome of man's physical ineptitude
in attempting to assert Idea against the alien forces and menaces
of Nature. But that a slave should place his heroism at the
disposal of his master without either threat or ideal did still
seem strange." (Koestler 1939: 134)
Rebellion and revolution
Carlet sees the nature of this struggle as rebellion rather than
revolution (MS 2435/4: 137-138), because the hero pits himself against
powers with which he cannot identify. The distinction is reinforced by
Koestler's own experience:
"A revolutionary can identify himself with power, a rebel cannot;
but I was a rebel, not a revolutionary." (Koestler 1954a: 120)
For a revolution to succeed, according to this Koestlerian analysis,
the hero must learn to be ruthless for the sake of pity - to adopt the
methods of the ruling powers in order to dethrone those same powers in
the long term. As Zozimos puts it, "law must bow to necessity"
(Koestler 1939: 58). So it is necessary for Spartacus to employ the
barbaric method of crucifixion to establish order in the Sun City. Yet
at the very last moment, as Spartacus watches thirty of his fellow
slaves being crucified as punishment for disobeying the laws he has set
down for Sun City, his nerve fails and he allows himself to be detoured
by the pleading of Zozimos by ordering his tortured comrades to be
taken down and freed. The failure of nerve is equated by John Hale in
his unrealised screenplay with the subsequent failure of the slave
revolution.
"Is it possible that Spartacus failed because he didn't
understand that it is necessary to kill old comrades who
deviate?" (MS 2436/1 : 44)
In allowing compassion to cloud his judgment, Spartacus had not been
able to adhere to the Law of Detours, as he later reflected.
"What had he done wrong, what had he omitted, to allow the horde
to wriggle from his hold, so that his words meant nothing to
them? He had walked the straight road, evil past behind and goal
in front, had turned neither left nor right. Or was this the very
error, to walk the straight and direct road - was it necessary to
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make detours, to walk the crooked roads?" (Koestler 1939: 114)
Clearly there are ambiguities that remain in the Law of Detours. It
is obvious that Spartacus on reflection is unsure whether a more
compassionate approach to the foundation of Sun City would have
achieved the desired goal of a brotherhood of slaves. Added to
Spartacus' doubts is the undisputed fact that for most of the course of
the slave revolt, he had "turned neither left nor right". Would a more
compassionate, human approach - "to walk the crooked roads" - have been
more successful? Zozimos, as ever the voice of conscience, is certainly
in no doubt.
"He who yearns for the Sun State and the Realm of Goodwill should
not use political wiles and sinister facetious tricks." (Koestler
1939: 139)
The very fact that such doubts remain unresolved in the mind of
Spartacus tells us much about Koestler's view of heroism. Heroism is
characterised in Koestler's early work as ill-thought out and hasty -
a reflection, one need hardly add, of his view of his recent Communist
years.
More importantly, it is perceived to be ethically weak, because the
heroic ideal is not shared by a large number of people. It is therefore
a defining characteristic of rebel 1 ion rather than revolution, for it
lacks the power base of the latter. Indeed, Spartacus' attempts to set
up a Sun State were doomed before he transgressed the Law of Detours
and shrank from taking the final step of killing Crixus. For Spartacus
cannot communicate his heroic ideals to the slaves, and in Car let's
analysis it is this "inanity of communication" that "leads back to
failure and nightmare" (MS 2435/4: 93).
The reviewer in The Times Literary Supplement agreed, suggesting that
the slaves were not sure enough to become disciplined soldiers of a new
revolution. Hence, too, Spartacus' deep suspicion of prophets - "all
prophets and priests are swindlers" is a favourite phrase of the slave
leader (Koestler 1939: 289) - because, in Koestler's pragmatic view,
prophecy succeeds only when it fits in "with the taste of the time -
the wishes of many - the need and longing desire of many..." (Koestler
1939: 70). For Spartacus, the painful lesson was that a society which
depends upon the inspiration of one man is doomed. Rebellion cannot
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succeed for Spartacus.
Koestler realised that for the rebellion of two or three to become
the revolution of a larger group, with a power base, a shared programme
or credo was necessary. He suggested in the Danube edition^ that a
pre-Christian philosophy of communality ("which found a more sublime
expression in the Sermon on the Mount") should have been implemented by
Spartacus. But, of course, that is not the point of the book. Orwell
may be right in thinking that Koestler deliberately falters between
allegory and history by allowing the Sun City to be destroyed. In
reality, there was no Sun City (Orwell and Angus 1970a: 275). But the
novel was not intended to be a history lesson. Rather, it can be summed
up as "a melancholy commentary on the failure of politics to respond to
men's inner needs" (Scott-James 1939). Without the shared credo that
might have changed the course of Roman history, the conclusion is
inevitably disillusioning as Koestler no doubt intended, and most
readers will want to concur with Hartley's observation that what
remains in the memory is the killing and crucifixions.
In summary, Koestler's first piece on revolutionary ethics draws an
important distinction between rebellion and revolution. Three criteria
need to be satisfied for true revolution to take place:
(a) the aspirations of a few must be shared by a larger number;
(b) proper communication must take place between leader and followers;
(c) heroism must be tempered with discipline (The Law of Detours).
Koestler was by now beginning to consider the question of what would
happen if a Spartacan revolutionary followed the Law of Detours to the
bitter end (Koestler 1966a: 317). The character of the Essene in The
Gladiators provides the vital link with Koestler's next novel, Darkness
at Noon. The Essene is the first character in Koestler's writing to
emphasise the primacy of the individual over the needs of the group -
see, for example, his lengthy discussion with Spartacus (Koestler 1939:
1 2The Danube Edition was the name chosen by Koestler to describe the
collected works published by Hutchinsons from 1964 onwards. Koestler had
raised the idea of a uniform edition in November 1962 (MS 2354/4). A
publisher's memo of 1978 states "The Danube edition, in its completed form,
will contain al 1 novels, essays, and autobiographical books selected by Arthur
Koestler to be preserved in standard edition of his works." (MS 2463/7)
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70-74) - and is also the first to articulate the corruption of success,
the darkness at noon that results from the revolutionary ethic.
Koestler's achievement, and arguably the work for which he will be
most remembered, was to place the revolutionary ethic in a Stalinist
setting. Thus, "the Many", the collective identity and inner voice of
the Five Thousand who listen to Spartacus' call for a 'Town of Slaves'
becomes the Grammatical Fiction of Darkness... The voice of reason,
Nicos, is sharpened into the more dominant figures of Ivanov and
Gletkin; the arithmetical logic of Lentulus becomes the algebra of
Ivanov and of the revolution itself; and the diary of Fulvius becomes
the diary of Rubashov.
Such comparisons are essential to establish the link between the
novels that Koestler saw but which was missed at the time by readers
whose concern was focused upon the more overtly biographical elements
of Darkness... . Koestler's correspondence of this period is full of
criticism and comments upon Dialogue With Death, Scum of the Earth and
Darkness... . The Gladiators, in contrast, was neglected in favour of
this other 'trilogy'13 in which the connection was perceived as
purely semi-autobiographical rather than ethical. Yet it is possible to
see Nicolai Salmanovitch Rubashov as a logical successor to Spartacus,
a figure who pursues the Law of Detours to the bitter end and by whose
predicament Koestler can fully explore the revolutionary ethic set out
in his story of the slave rebellion.
1.iii. DARKNESS AT NOON
Rubashov
There are three levels at which Koestler's most famous novel can be
viewed: semi-autobiographical, political and ethical. Whilst it is the
latter that is the subject of this thesis, a brief examination of the
13E. M. Pye to Arthur Koestler, 10 October 1941, refers to the three
aforementioned books collectively, and in common with other correspondents,
makes no mention of The Gladiators. (MS 2371/2: 60-61)
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first two will help to highlight the ethical considerations in
Rubashov's plight.
Koestler had arrived in Spain as an agent for the Comintern after
consultation with Willy Munzenberg under the guise of correspondent for
the News Chronicle. It was almost inevitable that this rather crude and
ill-thought out strategy would be exposed; in February 1937 Koestler
was arrested and sentenced to death as a spy. In the period of solitary
confinement that followed, Koestler was confronted with death.
"During three months my thoughts revolved round death as a top
spins round its axis. Yet I thought Death was close when he was
miles away, and laughed in my dreams when he fetched my
neighbours." (Koestler 1954b: 208)
On one occasion when the warders were taking away men from their cells
for execution, the priest was about to open the door of Koestler's cell
before, for whatever reason, the warder changed his mind^.
Rees argues that both Koestler and Rubashov experienced in prison a
"sudden and explosive eruption into consciousness" of experiences
hitherto repressed (Rees: 261). Instincts that had not, could not, be
given expression in the closed system of Marxism now came to the
surface.
"The dilemma of Koest1er-Rubashov in his cell is precisely what
kind of validity to attribute to a kind of insight which
threatens to shatter the coherence of a system of thought on
which the whole of his life has been based." (Rees: 262)
Koestler perceived a certain rough justice in his predicament - he was
a spy, and had spent his years as a Communist, in Rees' words,
impersonating a character in which he fundamentally did not believe.
Like Rubashov, he must pay for his crime. It is an interesting parallel
that Rees draws, but nevertheless a dangerous one. Koestler was treated
much more humanely than his fictional creation, Rubashov; he did not
undergo physical torture nor did he share the same unhappy fate.
Entering into the mind of Koestler cannot take us into the mind of
Bukharin, upon whose experience the characterisation of Rubashov is
1 u
We have, of course, only Koestler's word for this. The incident is
described in Dialogue With Death: "They came to my cell and the priest fumbled
at the bolt. I could see him through the spy-hole... 'No, not this one' said




The question might even be asked: did Koestler, an unreliable
autobiographer at the best of times, later embellish his account of his
time in prison to deliberately highlight the parallels between his
experience and that of Rubashov?
Certainly, the details of Rubashov's prison are so strikingly similar
to Koestler's account of the prison cell in Seville that they cannot be
coincidental: Cell number 40 in Seville becomes Cell number 404 in the
novel. Rubashov's desire to study astronomy16, the dimensions of the
prison cell (six and a half paces each way up and down the cell) and
Rubashov's ritual of never walking on the cracks of the paving
stones16, the betrayal of Arlova1^, the characterisations of
Gletkin and Ivanov16, all have immediate identifiable counterparts in
Koestler's real life. But if the parallels are no more than that -
parallels made with the benefit of hindsight that are used as
inspiration for a fictional setting by an imaginative author at the
peak of his creative powers - the fact that Koestler drew attention to
them himself is worth noting, even if Rees' identification carries the
parallels too far. Koestler may well have been alerting the reader to
the fact that he, Arthur Koestler, had once been taken in by a system
of thought upon which he had sought to base his whole life and that he,
like Rubashov, had his whole life questioned by the insight he had
gained whilst in prison.
Ironically, the proofs of the novel were delivered to Pentonville to
1 5
Hamilton, Koestler's biographer, is typical of many critics who saw
The Sleepwalkers as a later interest; in one of his taped interviews with
Hamilton, Koestler corrects his biographer by emphasising that his interest
in astronomy dates to around 1934. MS 2436/5.
1 6
Rubashov's superstitions were shared by Koestler and Anthony Grey, a
journalist and former prisoner of the Chinese communists, whose interview with
Koestler was reprinted for publication in Koestler 1974:153-154.
1 1
Hale (MS 2436/1) makes the figure of Arlova virtually interchangeable
with Nadeshda, the woman Koestler felt guilty at betraying in Baku - see
Koestler 1954: 90-107.
1 ft
Hale (MS 2436/1 : 9) notes that Gletkin and Ivanov are based on the two
GPU workers that Koestler met in Baku.
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"Arthur Koestler Prisoner no. 8539", where he also endured solitary
confinement as an enemy alien entering Britain after his release from
Seville, internment in Vichy France and brief stay in Lisbon. It was
Daphne Hardy, his girlfriend and the translator of the novel, who
suggested the title from Milton's lines in Samson Agonistes "Oh dark,
dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon", on one of her visits to
Pentonville. The fact that the wording of the title was an afterthought
long after the novel had been completed serves as a warning against
those such as Pritchett who read Jewish themes into the novel, which
Koestler had provisionally entitled The Vicious Circle.
The Theory of Confessions
Leaving aside the contentious matter of semi-autobiographical detail,
Koestler certainly did intend his readers to draw parallels between his
knowledge of the Stalinist purges and Show Trials and the experiences
of Rubashov. The dedication of the novel is quite explicit: "N. S.
Rubashov is a synthesis of the lives of a number of men who were
victims of the so-called Moscow trials." Political similarities are
apparent: Rubashov's thinking is based on Nikolai Bukharin - indeed,
the confessions of the two men are almost identical! In some instances,
the parallels between fact and fiction became apparent only years after
the novel was published: a former head of Soviet intelligence, Walter
Krivitsky19, describing the interrogative techniques used by Sloutski
on the old Bolshevik Mrachovsky, could just as easily be writing about
the interrogation by Ivanov on Rubashov, a similarity that Koestler
admitted was not entirely explained by the comparable framework of
ideas and historical circumstance.
"...there were similarities that went beyond that. In both cases
the interrogation opens with accuser and accused indulging in
1 9
Krivitsky 1992: 199-217. Krivitsky argues that "the confessions never
presented a riddle to those who had been on the inside of the Stalin machine",
because those who capitulated did so in the firm belief that Socialism "might
still emerge out of his bloody and monstrous tyranny". It is clear from
Krivitsky's account that Sloutski used the same logic as Ivanov to persuade
Mrachovsky by "days and nights of argument...that nobody else but Stalin could
guide the Bolshevik Party."
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sentimental reminiscences of the civil war; in both cases the
accuser has served under the accused's command; as a result of
the civil war, one in each pair of antagonists has a game leg; in
both cases the interrogator in turn liquidates himself. As I read
[Krivistky], I had the impression of meeting the Doppelganger,
the spectral doubles of Rubashov and Ivanov..." (Koestler 1954a:
400)
One reader reckoned that Darkness at Noon was "the most devastating
exposure of Stalinism that I have read" (MS 2371/1: 11). Reviewers
noted "a grimly fascinating interpretation of the logic of the Russian
Revolution" and "a plausible reason for these incredible confessions at
the Moscow trials" (Anon 1940; George 1941: 18).
It is possible therefore to view the book purely as a political-
historical comment on events in Moscow in the 1930s, an attempt to
answer the question why steadfast revolutionaries who had experienced
hard labour and torture suddenly acknowledge absurd accusations and
repent.
Hence the novel is categorised as "moral fable" by Browne (along with
Orwell's Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four) in which the true nature
of Stalinist Russia is explored and the confessions by Bukharin and
others rationalised (MS 2323/4: 17f).
Orwell (Orwell and Angus 1970a: 276) offers three explanations for
the Show Trial confessions:
1. The accused were guilty.
2. The accused confessed because of torture or threats to their
f ami 1ies.
3. The accused confessed because they feel themselves to be mentally
bankrupt. Unable to argue with the rational logic of the Party, they
despair and confess in a final act of loyalty.
Orwell concludes by noting that the third option is that favoured by
Koestler. But that is not strictly true, as Koestler himself, wounded
by the sort of harsh review Orwell inflicted upon his friends, points
out (Koestler 1954a: 401). Hare-lip confesses due to the second option,
the illiterate peasant because he could not understand, Arlova from the
first option, and so on. Orwell had clearly forgotten Rubashov's final
thoughts:
"Some were silenced by physical fear, like Hare-lip; some hoped
to save their heads; others at least to save their wives or sons
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from the clutches of the Gletkins. The best of them kept silent
in order to do a last service to the Party, by letting themselves
be sacrificed as scapegoats." (Koestler 1940: 253)
But there is one major obstacle for those who wish to pursue a
political interpretation of Darkness... , namely the introduction by
Koestler of the Grammatical Fiction, "the silent partner" (Koestler
1940: 255) whose existence called into question the mathematical nature
of revolution espoused by Ivanov. The Grammatical Fiction makes its
first appearance during the Second Hearing. Confronted by the
"consequent logic" of Ivanov, an inner voice seems to call into
question the infallible Tightness of the Party's reasoning.
"He [Rubashov] found out that those processes wrongly known as
'monologues' are really dialogues of a special kind; dialogues in
which one partner remains silent while the other, against all
grammatical rules, addresses him as 'I' instead of 'You', in
order to creep into his confidence and fathom his intentions; but
the silent partner just remains silent, shuns observation and
even refuses to be localised in time and space." (Koestler 1940:
108)
Thus the Grammatical Fiction takes its title from the apparently
scandalous discovery of the existence of self, the first person
singular, which the Party cannot concede (hence Grammatical Fiction).
Rubashov finds the Grammatical Fiction, referred to as the "silent
partner", spoke without being addressed; his experience of it was not
mystical but of "a quite concrete character" and far more important
than the interview with Ivanov.
"Rubashov tried to study this newly discovered entity very
thoroughly during his wanderings through the cell; with the
shyness of emphasising the first person singular customary in
the Party, he had christened it the 'grammatical fiction'."
(Koestler 1940: 11 0-111 )
Crucially, Rubashov notes that Grammatical Fiction began when
logical thinking ended, thwarting Ivanov's attempts to persuade
Rubashov to see the logic of revolutionary ethics.
"It was obviously an essential part of his being, to remain out
of reach of logical thought, and then to take one unawares, as
from an ambush, and attack one with day-dreams and toothache."
(Koestler 1940: 111)
Ivanov interprets this as the discovery of conscience in "Saint
Rubashov" but tells Rubashov that history has no conscience - every
compromise with one's conscience is treachery. To make peace with
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yourself is to betray the cause. It is these "sentimental impulses"
that lead to Rubashov having to contradict historical necessity and now
unable to see the logic of sacrificing a few thousand for the future
good of mi 11 ions.
So why does Rubashov confess? The answer lies in the role of
conscience played by the Grammatical Fiction and the demands it makes
upon him - not unlike, indeed, the role Zozimos plays in helping
Spartacus break the Law of Detours. In the Koestlerian scheme of
things, the stirrings of conscience and the voice of compassion break
the logical equation. Rubashov is forced from the dialogue with his
"silent partner" to admit that his previous lack of compassion and
obedience to the Party's logic have been a fundamental error. The
principles of the Party are now, Carlet notes, "pretexts" as Rubashov
passes from "guiltless consideration to fruitless solitude" (MS 2A35/1:
1AA). Confession follows and for the last few hours of his life
Rubashov is left alone with his silent partner.
"The hours which remained to him belonged to that silent partner
whose realm started just where logical thought ended." (Koestler
19A0: 25A)
He is acutely aware that by failing to acknowledge the Grammatical
Fiction, he has committed a treachery to himself and to Richard and
Ar1 ova.
It has to be said, however, that this does not entirely answer
Orwell's misgivings over the Theory of Confessions. Even given that
Rubashov is in a tiny minority who confess because of the discovery of
their self-deception, rather than for the protection of family or
friends or the fear of torture, what is to be gained by such a
confession? Why should Rubashov assist the Party by signing a
confession knowing that their logic is such a sham?
The explanation favoured by Carlet is that Rubashov feels that he
must share the fate of those he now realises he has destroyed in the
past (MS 2A35/A: 145). Hence the feeling of peace immediately before
his death - a factor frequently ignored by critics of Darkness. . . . This
does not necessarily provide a full answer, primarily because it
ignores the historical fact that all such revolutionary dissidents had
their fate sealed long before the question of signing confessions
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arose. One could argue that there might be more peace to be gained from
non-cooperation and a total dissociation of the revolutionary motive
(i.e. martyrdom) than by suddenly admitting to various ridiculous
crimes. Why should the reawakening of conscience lead to this
particular action as opposed to other available options?
The question is central to a proper understanding of the different
approaches to revolutionary ethics by Orwell and Koestler. The dominant
themes in Orwell's work, according to Crick (Crick 1980), emerge from
his reading and subsequent book reviews and coincidentally or not
Animal Farm followed soon after Orwell's re-evaluation of Koestler.
Certainly, Orwell does not avoid the conundrum posed by Rubashov's
confession in his "fairy story" - witness the "confessions" made by the
farmyard animals for "crimes" that they had clearly invented (Orwell
1945: 73-74) - but Orwell chooses to emphasise the brutality of the
executions by Napoleon's dogs rather than the possible motives behind
the "confessions".
The numinous in Koestler's ethics
One possible solution lies in Rees' approach which emphasises the
spiritual aspect of the silent partner:
"He is like the shadowy character whom the disciples encountered
on the road to Emmaus, shapeless and featureless in the dusk, and
yet, as they all felt, the real centre of the great event in
which they had taken part." (Rees: 268)
Rees' scriptural analogy is a reasonable one, given that Koestler
himself had introduced the figure of Christ into cell 404 early in the
novel. Examining his feet, a verse occurs to Rubashov that compared the
feet of Christ with a white roebuck in a thornbush (Koestler 1940: 14).
From that point to the end of the novel, Christian metaphors abound.
Indeed, the penultimate scene has old Wassilij comparing the trial of
Rubashov with the trial and passion of Christ. There, Wassilij recalls
Christ's prophecy of Peter's denial and in his reaction to Rubashov's
final speech utters the words from Gethsemane "Thy will be done"
(Koestler 1940: 252).
The spiritual soul of Rubashov, the animula blandula, vagula (Rees)
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is outside the experience and the vocabulary of the 'Neanderthal'
Gletkin, and quite possibly Ivanov also. For to admit its existence is
only to compound one's guilt and multiply the offences with which one
is charged. The Party becomes almost incidental to the real struggle
for Rubashov's soul, and finally merely provides a means by which
Rubashov can pay for those acts of treachery revealed to him by his
silent partner. As we have noted above, a reading of Darkness... often
ends with a feeling of relief or even blessed release as Rubashov
finally surrenders, not so much to the Party as to his conscience.
It is Koestler's spirituality - he would eschew the term mysticism,
according to his third wife (C. Koestler 1975: 147) - that ultimately
leads him to offer his Theory of Confessions where Orwell merely
observes. Orwell's animal revolutionaries have no perception of a
Koestlerian "Third Order" or spiritual world; the vision of Moses the
raven concerning Sugarcandy Mountain, an exception to this, is confined
to one paragraph and is received contemptuously by the pigs (Orwell
1945: 99-100). Moreover, the raven is absent for the revolution and its
immediate aftermath. "The real problem is how to restore the religious
attitude while accepting death as final" said Orwell of Koestler in
1944 (Orwell and Angus 1970a: 281). That Koestler should espouse a
spiritual approach is in keeping with his own experiences in the jail
in Sevilie.
In short, Rubashov's guilt and the so-called "theory of confessions"
is best analysed in terms of a spiritual reading of the Grammatical
Fiction: the "silent partner" acts as Confessor, and the death of
Rubashov becomes a means of atoning for his sins. Certainly, it is
evident that Rubashov's dialogues with the Grammatical Fiction have
given him an increased sense of awareness of the numinous:
"Why had not the Public Prosecutor asked him 'Defendant Rubashov,
what about the infinite?' He would not have been able to answer -
and there, there lay the real source of his gui1t...Could there
be a greater?" (Koestler 1940: 257)
The spiritual dimension to Rubashov's ethic is also tacitly
acknowledged by Ivanov himself:
" '
In a moment you will be calling out, Get thee behind me,
Satan.'" (Koestler 1940: 149)
The semi-autobiographical element is in evidence again, for the
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Grammatical Fiction is implicit in Koestler's experience of Third
Order, the world of infinity beyond logical reasoning which sustained
Koestler in Seville now beckoning Rubashov to see beyond his immediate
circumstances. Thus, Rubashov wishes to study astronomy if he were to
be reprieved at the last minute. Thus too the "shrug of eternity" that
marks the end of Rubashov and indeed the book itself.
But it must be said that there is no trace of the Grammatical Fiction
in any account of the Show Trials. Bukharin's widow has shed light on
the motives behind her husband's confession that are redolent of
Krivitsky's review of events, putting on record her husband's belief
that his Bolshevism still offered hope for the future and was by no
means a matter of self-deception
It is therefore Rubashov's revelation, clearly not shared by his
real-life counterpart, with its hints of Franciscan stigmata
(Rubashov's toothache always anticipates the return of the Grammatical
Fiction), that makes the political analysis of Browne, Bukovsky and
even Orwell inadequate and leads us, as Koestler intended, into the
arena of ethics and personal morals.
Political ethics
Central to Koestler's exposure of the fallacy of revolutionary ethics
is Ivanov's argument that "the principle that the end justifies the
means is and remains the only rule of political ethics" (Koestler 1940:
156). Koestler maintains that there are two basic systems of ethics:
(a) Christian/humane ethics - the individual is sacrosanct. The rules
of arithmetic may be applicable in ethics insofar as humanity is
considered as an abstract term, but, as Rubashov realised in his final
few hours in the cell, mathematical principles cannot be applied to
human units.
(b) The collective aim justifies all means. This system demands that
the individual is subordinated and sacrificed to the community. In
20
See BBC, The People's Century, 1995 for an interview with Bukharin's
widow in which she testifies that her husband wrote to her from prison
requesting that their children be brought up as Bolsheviks.
44
Ivanov's consequential logic, the starvation of millions can be
justified by the health of generations yet unborn - historical
necessity being the argument for the sacrifice of those who are living.
The evidence of Krivitsky and Bukharin's widow suggests that this
consequential logic may still have retained its appeal to Bukharin and
the others who confessed, by persuading them that the death of a few
thousand Old Bolsheviks might in the long run facilitate the creation
of a truly socialist state.
Certainly this latter consequential ethic seemed in the prevailing
Weitanschauung to be unavoidable; nor was it confined to Stalinist
Russia. George Orwell's review of Spanish Testament could have been
written by an Ivanov or Gletkin:
"...if someone drops a bomb on your mother, go and drop two bombs
on his mother. The only apparent alternatives are to smash
dwelling houses to powder, blow out human entrails and burn holes
in children with lumps of thermite, or to be enslaved by people
who are more ready to do these things than you are yourself; as
yet, no-one has suggested a practical way out." (Orwell 1938)
The "consequent logic" ethic - the ends justifies the means - that
Koestler had seen in Stalinism was now put into the character of Ivanov
and Gletkin. Of course, he had once believed in this ethical system
himself and may have shared Orwell's pessimism that there was no
practical solution. Rubashov's diary at the beginning of the Second
Hearing bears striking resemblance to Koestler's own thoughts in his
years with the Communist Party. Claiming that "nothing really important
has been said about the rules of political ethics" since Machiave11i's
Prince, Rubashov notes in his diary that "we were the first to replace
the nineteenth century's liberal ethics of 'fair play' by the
revolutionary ethics of the twentieth century." (Koestler 1940: 97)
The ethic has an almost mathematical foundation in which politics and
history itself are seen as algebraic equations. There is no avoiding
the mathematical allusions throughout the novel - the mathematics of
logic that had first been seen in Lentulus' percentages of survival for
The Gladiators in the arena. Thus, early in his imprisonment Rubashov
muses that one day the ideas of Number One would be taught by means of
tables of statistics, and politics would be reduced to algebraic
formulae (Koestler 1940: 17), an idea reinforced in the First Hearing
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by Ivanov:
"In our case, x stands for the anonymous masses, the people.
Politics mean operating with this x without worrying about its
actual nature. Making history is to recognise x for what it
stands for in the equation." (Koestler 1940: 84)
Bukovsky's analysis confirms the mathematical logic of Stalin's
revolutionary ethic, tracing the origin of the purges to a memorandum
by Lenin to the Politburo of 10 February 1922 - victory will justify
temporary cruelty: the harder it is to achieve an end, the greater the
number of sacrifices which have to be made and the more terrible the
means justified. The mathematical argument almost becomes an end in
itself (the essence of Rubashov's argument against Gletkin) as
demonstrated in Lenin's memorandum:
"...the larger the number of members of the reactionary
bourgeoisie and reactionary clergy we are able to shoot under
these auspices the better" (quoted in Bukovsky 1980: 12)
The role of the Grammatical Fiction
Arlova had been merely a factor in the equation; it is the suffering
of an individual (Bogrov, former sailor on Battleship Potemkin,
Commander of the Eastern Fleet) that unbalances the logical equation
for Rubashov and reinforces the claims made by the inner voice, the
Grammatical Fiction. Nor was this discovery pure fiction:
"When you had heard those shouts and they ring in your ear, then
you realise that one of the basic tenets of one type of politics,
that the end justifies the means, has become unacceptable."
(Koestler 1974: 155)
The Grammatical Fiction makes itself felt "answering vibrations", as
if, in Koestler's words, a tuning-fork has been struck, and evokes
synaesthetic memories (Arlova's scent, for example) that continue to
tilt the equation in favour of the individual, the Grammatical Fiction
or "I", against the collective needs of the Party.
The revolutionary ethic is thus found wanting because the
mathematical logic of Gletkin is operating on the wrong dimension. The
mathematical symbols depersonalise the individuals involved. This was
a fictionalisation of the ail-too real Communist mathematical logic
that Orwell and Koestler had seen at first hand in Spain ("if someone
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drops one bomb...go and drop two bombs") and which could even affect
Allied thinking in the war, as Orwell was soon to reflect in his diary.
"The authorities in Canada have now chained up a number of German
prisoners equal to the number of British prisoners chained up in
Germany. What the devil are we coming to?" (0A7/4: 13)
Rubashov had sought to live his whole life within the confines of
such a mathematical system, and only in his last few days had asked the
question "What the devil are we coming to?" For in attempting to follow
the Law of Detours to the end, he had allowed his friends to be
sacrificed for the greater good of the Party and suspended all feelings
of compassion in the process. In other words, Rubashov had taken the
path that Spartacus had not been prepared to take: he had obeyed the
Law of Detours.
But the emergence of the Grammatical Fiction compounded Rubashov's
deep guilt: by admitting to "an error...in the whole mathematical
system of thought" (Koestler 1942: 242) and the existence of the "I",
that previously unacceptable figure in the account book, Rubashov
discovers for himself a higher ethic and a code of self-sacrifice
beyond the mathematical logic of the Party. This was Koestler's
conclusion, of course, in the cell in Seville where he had initially
sought solace in mathematics and thus discovered a higher dimension in
the so-called doctrine of the Third Order.
Beloff sees Koestler's acceptance of the Third Order as evidence of
his mystical nature (Beloff 1975: 81-82). But there is no evidence of
the mystic's "oceanic sense" being the natural conclusion of the detour
followed by Rubashov other than the merest hint, in the novel's final
paragraph, that death may not necessarily mean a total cessation of
Rubashov's existence^ .
The error was, according to Rubashov, simply in believing that the
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"There was the sea again with its sounds. A wave slowly 1 if ted him up.
It came from afar and travelled sedately on, a shrug of eternity." (Koestler
1940: 267). It is rather odd that Orwell's recollection of Rubashov's last
memory is "the leaves of poplar trees on his father's estate" (Orwell and
Angus 1970a: 277) but, whether it was poplar trees or the sea, a similar
argument can be constructed along the lines offered by Orwell: namely that
Rubashov's inner strength came from boyhood memories and these form the basis
of the book's final paragraph, rather than any mystical experience of
infinity.
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ends justifies the means. "It was this sentence which had killed the
great fraternity of the Revolution and made them all run amuck."
(Koestler 1940: 242) Rubashov firmly believed that a new system, of
knowing both Ivanov's mathematical logic (the Neanderthals and their
numbered beads) and the oceanic sense of the mystic, might be
developed, and it was this conclusion that first hints at the
Koestlerian notion of the holon that was to figure in later work:
"Perhaps they will teach that the tenet is wrong which says that
a man is the product of one million divided by one million, and
will introduce a new kind of arithmetic based on multiplication
[which]...wi11 develop a consciousness and an individuality of
its own." (Koestler 1940: 260-261)
Note - "a new kind of arithmetic", in other words a rational system,
rather than a mystical or "Third Order" system was Rubashov's solution.
Rubashov finally becomes the Moses figure hinted at in the
conversation in the exercise-yard with the peasant at the end of the
Third Hearing. He remembers the allusion to the Exodus in his final
conversation with Gletkin; for the choice, as Rubashov perceived it,
was straightforward: either return to the mathematical logic of the
Party and the relative security it offered or go forward to create a
new system of values that took account of a higher dimension. The new
ethical system was clearly no more or less than a Promised Land2**.
These, at least, are Rubashov's last thoughts, tinged with irony at the
fact that he had not been taken to the top of the mountain and still
saw nothing but desert and the darkness of night. He is "confronted by
absolute nothingness" (Koestler 1940: 251), the Law of Detours having
taken him down a cul-de-sac of introspection from which there was no
escape other than confession.
That Bukharin and the others had not shared the insights offered by
discourse with the Grammatical Fiction is immaterial because
Darkness... makes it abundantly clear that no easy vocabulary exists by
which the "I" can be identified, let alone reconciled with the
revolutionary ethic espoused by the Gletkins and Ivanovs of this world.
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The fact that it is Moses rather than Christ that Koestler uses in his
analogy adds weight to the argument of some Koestlerian scholars that he was
strongly influenced by his Jewish background (see Goldstein 1992), and to some
extent contradicts Koestler's own first category of Chr/sfc/an/humane ethics.
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Rees concludes his examination of the Grammatical Fiction by arguing
that the distinction between the objective and subjective is impossible
to make, but notes too that the distortion of historical material by
Koestler is perfectly justifiable. In other words, Rubashov's attempt
to solve the mathematical equation, or (in Rees' analogy) to balance
the profit and loss figures of the accounts of his life by introducing
the "I", is perfectly plausible and may well be the only rational
explanation of an otherwise inexplicable series of confessions -
inexplicable, unless you accept the alternative conclusion of one
reader and merely say "Ah, but the Russians are different" (George
1941: 18) .
Koestler himself saw the novel as the perfect foil to The Gladiators ,
an examination of what would happen if the Law of Detours was followed
to its end. The moral and emotional bankruptcy that engulfs Rubashov in
his final hours is indicative that Rubashov has been forced by the
Grammatical Fiction to ditch the pure reason of the scientific
revolutionary and the argument of historic necessity. But in favour of
what?
The obvious conclusion is that at the time of writing Koestler "comes
near to claiming that revolutions are of their nature bad" as Orwell
suggests (Orwell and Angus 1970a: 277). Koestler, like Rubashov, had
suffered a total loss of faith; if revolutions were doomed to the
corruption and cruelty of the mathematically-minded, what hope was
there?
Koestler needed to explore the revolutionary ethic from a fresh
angle, one that would make another attempt to balance the two sides of
the equation, the collective necessity of history and the freedom and
worth of the individual.
1.iv. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE
Peter Slavek
Arrival and Departure concerns a young man, Peter Slavek, who has
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escaped from the Nazis to arrive in "Neutral ia", where he has an affair
with a French girl (Odette) before suffering a nervous breakdown. Peter
is then psychoanalysed by Dr Sonia Bolgar, for whom Peter's heroism is
no more or less than a mechanism of atonement, a means of dealing with
his guilt. Dr Bolgar probes into his past in an attempt to explain his
revolutionary actions; layer after layer of guilt is peeled away as
Sonia seeks to provide a logical explanation of the revolutionary
ethic. He is persuaded by Sonia to adopt the way of expediency and
renounce his revolutionary heroism by travelling to the safety of
America. But as he boards ship, the young man realises that the option
of staying and fighting Nazism is almost compulsive; in what is rather
clumsy symmetry, the book ends as it begins with Peter jumping - the
parachute-jump heralding Peter's departure for an unknown fate in the
resistance movement, still unsure of the ethical values or meaning
behind his heroism.
Just as Rubashov is outwardly modelled on Bukharin, Peter is modelled
on the figure of Endre Havas, a Hungarian poet and close friend of the
author. But as in Darkness... , Koestler makes use of his own
experiences: Neutralia could quite easily be Portugal, and Peter's time
there coincides almost to the day with the duration of Koestler's
period in Lisbon prior to his journey (also by aeroplane) to non-
neutral territory (England), Koestler also having first explored the
option of applying for a Visa to neutral (pre-Pearl Harbour) America.
Indeed, a screenplay examined and approved by Koestler set the film of
the novel not in "Neutralia" but in "Lisbon, Portugal 1941. "^3
Andrews, the disfigured pilot, is based on Richard Hillary, the
subject of an essay Koestler wrote contemporaneously with Arrival and
Departure; the inspiration for Bernard came from Fritz Burde,
Koestler's immediate superior in the Red Army Intelligence service
(Koestler 1954a: 17); Sonia also has a counterpart in real life
although Koestler refused to disclose her identity to his
23
Hoffman, R. Arrival and Departure: Adapted from the novel by Arthur
Koestler. Typescript. MS 2317/2: 2.
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biographer2 , and even Peter's hysterical paralysis had been
observed, Koestler later remarked, by the author in Seville jail
(Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 30).
But once again any semi-autobiographical detail should not cloud the
purpose behind the novel.
"Its central theme is the conflict between morality and
expediency. In the two previous novels, I was mainly concerned
with its impact on history; here, I have tried to transpose it
into terms of individual psychology." (Koestler 1966b: 190)
Thus Webber ley traces Koestler's concern with freedom and determinism
from a concrete issue (Spartacus) to the less concrete (Rubashov) and
finally to a philosophical level (Webberley 1975: 7). What Peter Slavek
gains at the end of the novel, according to Webberley, is freedom from
psychological determinism - a phenomenon that Koestler was to wage war
against for the rest of his life.
But the psychotherapy practised by Sonia should not be taken as an
attack on Freudianism, just as Darkness. . . is not simply an attack on
Marxism. The fallacy of Sonia's method is essentially the fallacy of
Gletkin's revolutionary ethics. Sonia believes in reducing courage to
first principles of a mathematical-anatomical nature (mathematics and
anatomy having been employed together to describe the mind of Number
One) just as Ivanov and Gletkin had postulated (Koestler 1943: 114);
Peter seems to have taken Rubashov's advice - the novel suggests at one
point that the two revolutionary heroes inhabit the same world,
possibly known to each other through the intermediary, Raditsch
(Koestler 1943: 97) - and studied astronomy to find order:
"He felt the exultation of his early student days, when he had
suddenly grasped the principle of Kepler's laws of planetary
movement and the chaotic world around him was tamed, and
transformed, into an orderly, harmonious system." (Koestler 1943:
123)
Koestler thus uses the novel to demonstrate that at the heart of
Peter's heroism lies a core beyond the reach of cause and effect that
cannot be influenced by rational argument, just as the Grammatical
Fiction cannot be explained using the vocabulary of the revolutionary.
At this core of human existence lie the ethical absolutes, imperatives
^Interview with Iain Hamilton, 5 March 1974. MS 2436/5.
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that "cannot be invalidated by reducing them to factors operating on a
different level" (Koestler 1966b: 190). Sonia, like Ivanov and Gletkin
before her, fails in the task of rationalising and exonerating the
revolutionary ethic.
"In the type of psychotherapy practised by Sonia there is no
provision made for ethical absolutes: its aim is to make the
patient accept reality: and if the reality is that of Europe in
1942, it cannot be helped." (Koestler 1966b: 190)
Koestler's thesis was the irreducibi1ity of ethical values; this may
seem reasonable enough now but in 1943, Koestler admitted, it ran
counter to the prevailing climate of Freudianism, Marxism and
Behaviourism. The central problem of 'ends and means' had not been
resolved in a logical manner, but that was precisely the point Koestler
sought to make; just as Rubashov had been confronted by a flaw in the
mathematical equation, so Peter finds ultimately that rationalism is a
dead end.
Not surprisingly, Orwell missed the point, claiming that Koestler had
made Peter suffer a "loss of intelligence" at the conclusion of the
nove1.
"The real problem is how to restore the religious attitude while
accepting death as final. Men can only be happy when they do not
assume the object of life is happiness. It is most unlikely,
however, that Koestler would accept this. There is a well-marked
hedonistic strain in his writing Therefore he draws the
conclusion: This is what revolutions lead to." (Orwell and Angus
1970a: 281-282)
Hamilton uses the conclusion of the same essay - "All revolutions are
failures, but they are not the same failures" - to argue that Orwell
was intent on providing an intelligent reconciliation between
revolutionary ethics and individual conscience, perhaps in the form of
an English form of socialism - a belief he was to abandon in due course
when he came to write Nineteen Eighty-Four (Hamilton 1982: 87)^.
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However, we can now date the outline for Nineteen Eighty-Four to 1943
- the novel then having the embryonic title The Quick and the Dead (Crick
1980: 407-409) - with at least part of a first draft written in 1946 (Davison
(ed) 1984: ix-xiv). Orwellian scholars would now dispute the "reconciliation"
theory or the notion that Nineteen Eighty-Four was the product of depressive
illness. Rather, Orwell and Koestler were in fact exploring Connolly's
"revolution betrayed" thesis at precisely the same time. They both foresaw an
increase in totalitarianism during the war and indeed their similar ethical
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It would have been more accurate for Orwell to accuse his friend of
a sudden loss of rat Zonality for that is the essence of the Koestler-
Peter conundrum. V. S. Pritchett, a lifelong critic of Koestler,
chooses to focus upon the "pornographic" qualities of Peter's torture
(the same charge would be levelled against Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-
Four: Lindsay 1955: 95-97), claiming that the novel is an attack on
belief itself.
But Pritchett makes the fundamental error of thinking that Peter
concludes by agreeing to Sonia's analysis that 'The Cause' is nothing
more than a psychological aberration; the point is that the "agreement"
is as superficial as Rubashov's "confession". Koestler uses the
experiences of his fictional hero, Peter, to explore the possibility
that ethics can be explained by psychological traits, but Sonia's
method only proves that "reasons do not matter so much" (Koestler 1943:
176). Belief, indeed faith itself, remains intact and is, if anything,
the stronger for Koestler's probing analysis even if the irrationality
of Peter's behaviour was so baffling to Orwell and Pritchett.
The ethics of individualism
Koestler was, by 1943, well on the way to becoming involved in
practical ethics on two fronts. Firstly, he was increasingly
preoccupied with exploring practical methods by which he might support
friends imprisoned and tortured under the totalitarian regimes of
Stalin and Hitler. Thus, he produced various film scripts for the
Ministry of Information, such as "Lift Your Heads Comrades" and "The
Race Film", and a further two scripts for BBC radio, "Protective
Custody" and "Black Gallery" (MS 2340/2; MS 2340/326). The
utilisation of writers such as Koestler and Orwell indicates the
seriousness by which the Government and the BBC perceived propaganda
positions led to a collaboration that was of great significance for Koestler
in 1945 (see Chapter 2 below). It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that
Orwell was not satisfied that Koestler had properly addressed the issue of
"the revolution betrayed" with the publication of Arrival and Departure.
Incorrectly catalogued in the Koestler Archive as pre-war material
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(but for a fuller discussion, see Tyndal1 1992: 100-107). The insertion
of the "Mixed Transport" account in Arrival and Departure, for example,
does little to further the argument against the revolutionary ethic,
nor does it add to the plot of the novel; but Koestler had heard only
weeks earlier from a Polish writer of the fate suffered by Jews in
Poland and inserted the account after the Polish writer's broadcast had
been criticised as sensationalist.
Secondly, Koestler was taking a keen interest in the Palestinian
problem, a natural preoccupation given his Jewish background.
Peter Slavek represents the end of Koestler's exploration of the
revolutionary ethic. What had begun as an historical analysis with
Spartacus had moved to a more contemporary and finally psychological
level with Peter's heroism. In the process, Koestler had reinstated the
value of the individual ethic against the mathematical logic of the
revolution.
Yet there is new evidence to suggest that Koestler had not been
totally satisfied with the trilogy as it stood. Did he feel the need to
respond to Orwell's accusation of a sudden loss of intelligence? He
certainly seemed aware that the ideas expressed in Darkness... and
Arrival... had been less than clear. But then, he wrote, "the times
were not exactly conducive to a clear crystallisation of ideas" (MS
2372/4: 224).
In addition, the author also faced an impassioned plea at the end of
1943 to "compose a moving appeal to the public at large for Youth
Aliyah" (a movement for the rescue of Jewish children from countries of
oppression and their rehabilitation in Palestine). The many letters
from Mrs Vera Weizmann to Koestler found the latter not unresponsive to
the idea of such an appeal. The two were to meet frequently in the
early months of 1944 to discuss Koestler's contribution to the cause
(MS 2305).
However, Koestler was not sure "if he was up to the task"; reminded
of the good job he had done of describing the transport of Jews in the
gas vans in Arrival... , Mrs Weizmann then suggested an appeal to Jews
and non-Jews
"to save our children against whom the world has so sadly and
blatantly sinned. Were I a Christian, I would say: let the
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suffering children come to me." (MS 2371/1: 7)
What emerged from these meetings and exchange of letters was Arrival
and Departure II, for there is little doubt in my mind, given the dates
of the correspondence and meetings and the dates of the working
manuscript, that the sequel to Arrival... and the inspiration for the
rescue of David by Peter was, at least in part, Koestler's response to
Youth Aliyah and its need for publicity.
The novel took up six months of Koestler's busy war-time schedule,
from 21 November 1943 to 23 June 1944, and described Peter's mission
for the Resistance following his volte-face at the end of Arrival and
Departure. He hoped that the conclusions implied in this work would be
less disappointing to his readers. (MS 2372/4: 224)
The handwritten draft of the unfinished work runs to some eighty
pages, of which twenty three and a synopsis also exist in revised
typescript form (MS 2317/2: see Appendix 1). No reference to the work
has been found by this author in the two Koestler bibliographies or in
the archival research of Tyndall and Goldstein.
Once again, Koestler was not averse to drawing upon his own
experiences: the description of the balloon redolent of Koestler's
Arctic adventure on the Graf Zeppelin, Peter's post with the Board of
Psychological and Ethical Warfare mirroring much of Koestler's army
work, and importantly the feeling of helplessness it engendered.
Although certain themes are repeated from the earlier novel, such as
the "Jerusalem" rabbit story (with a more optimistic gloss upon the
conclusion) and repeated descriptions of the mixed transports, the
novel is much more Kafkaesque than anything written by Koestler before
or since.
Its importance in an ethical analysis of Koestler's work, however,
lies in the clear indication that Peter still felt guilty about his
past and found it impossible to believe in himself. Once again, the
stars indicate to Peter the immutable 'destiny from above' that his
heroism had sought to change but could not; at the beginning of the
novel, even the Grammatical Fiction seems beyond Peter's reach and the
short-term pessimism associated with Koestler re-emerges stronger than
ever.
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"He [Peter] was cut off from the subterranean communion with a
force he could not name, and left shivering and alone; the stars
had suddenly become paler, the immense night had shrunk and
closed in around him like walls; his lost shadow had returned and
lain down at his feet. Grace had been withdrawn, death re-gained
(sic) its sting. He was condemned to hope again." (MS 2317/2: 3)
There is surely no more telling statement of the individual ethic in
Koestler's (or indeed, any writer's) work than the conclusion "Grace
had been withdrawn...He was condemned to hope again."
The saving of Rachel
"The immense night had shrunk and closed in..." Darkness at Noon had
returned. His own guilt and uncertainty is countered by a Greek
Orthodox priest, Father Zlatko, (a rare occurrence of a religious
figure in Koestler's work), whose heroism was based on real-life events
that had come to the author's attention, possibly through Youth Aliyah
and Mrs Weizmann. Thus in February 1944, Koestler wrote to Father
Dickinson asking for more information about the priest.
"The story is based on facts which I heard; an unnamed priest,
after the destruction of the monastery in which he had lived for
about fifteen years, took refuge in a small town somewhere in the
Balkans, and saved the lives of several Jewish children doomed to
'physical liquidation'." (MS 2372/4: 150)
Father Zlatko hears Peter's confession and then, with young Rachel - a
name later linked by Koestler in his "Laban's sheep" analogy with his
years of Communism (Koestler 1954a: 392) - he is introduced to the
grotesque tiny creature, David, rescued by Father Zlatka from
starvation. Zlatko's conversations with Peter are the means by which
Koestler attempts to spell out with the clarity he thought lacking in
earlier novels the indivisible nature of the ethical imperative,
opposed to the mathematics of revolutionary logic. The story Zlatka
uses is Abraham's bargaining with God over Sodom.
"Now there are two kinds of people. There are those who are
disgusted with Abraham's haggling and think that the Lord was
very patient with him, and side with the Lord. Those are the
people who have righteousness but no love. But there is the other
kind, who are on Abraham's side. They understand that numbers do
not count, and that one ounce of goodness may redeem a hundred
tons of wickedness, because God's creatures cannot be weighed
against each other on a fishmonger's scale." (MS 2317/2: 23)
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"Numbers do not count..." On the cover of the typed manuscript,
Koestler has written in pencil, Amo, ergo sum: I love, therefore I am.
Peter's loss of rational ism is certainly sharper than in the previous
novel; nor would Pritchett have found in the sequel much evidence of
the "pornography" of physical torture, or an attack on belief itself.
On the contrary, the priest's faith helps Peter re-evaluate his own
motives.
From Koestler's notes on the plot, we know that he intended Peter to
save Rachel after the death of David and the arrest of Father Zlatka:
"the saving of Rachel" is the most important leitmotif of the story (MS
2317/2: Addendum, Plate 3).
The manuscript is also proof that Koestler had begun to think of the
diametrically opposed systems of "Yogi-ethics" and "Commissar-ethics"
outlined in his recent (June 1942) essay, The Yogi and the Commissar.
His notes (Plate 3) suggest that later in the novel he intended to
introduce another character, Cyril, "as a Yogi", almost certainly based
on Koestler's friend and the publisher of Horizon, Cyril Connolly.
Cyril's meditative experiences were to be more of a "temptation" than
a solution to the practical problems to which Peter addressed himself.
In summary, the novel was intended as a "synthesis of ratio[nality]
with enhanced awareness of suffering", with Peter's love for David and
Rachel balanced by the pragmatism of the disillusioned priest. If, in
the earlier works, Koestler had exposed the fallacy of Commissar-
ethics, and had begun to think of Yogi-ethics - the voice of the
Grammatical Fiction - as the solution to the ends and means dilemma,
then this unpublished work clearly demonstrates that neither approach
was deemed satisfactory.
The sufferine of David
It was typical of Koestler, however, to explore fully this avenue
before looking elsewhere for a solution, if only because Orwell had
maintained at the outset that Arrival and Departure was a blind alley,
and that his friend still believed that the Earthly Paradise was both
desirable and possible (although it would be more accurate to suggest
that The Gladiators marks the end of Koestler's Utopian dream).
Orwell's comment, upon reviewing Arrival and Departure, that suffering
is an inevitable fact of human life so that the choice before man is
"always a choice of evils" is precisely the point made in the sequel:
Rachel is saved at the cost of her starving young brother's life.
The importance of the individual and the necessity of love is seen
more clearly in these manuscripts than anywhere else in Koestler's
oeuvre. The sacrifice of Father Zlatko and the "decisive hour" of Peter
and his concern for these strangers who had taken him into their trust
speak of love and hope for the future.
"The picture of the human situation that emerges from the novels"
wrote Kettle summing up Koestler's work with that of Orwell, Huxley and
Greene, "is in the last degree unhopeful" (Kettle 1953: 166). Whilst
that may be true of the published trilogy of novels, it is hard to see
how that could apply to Peter's saving of Rachel and the compassion of
Zlatko. I love, therefore I am. Kettle's analogy with Macbeth (see p.
29 above) - in Shakespeare, Kettle argued, it is Macbeth, not Scotland
that is damned; the inference being that in Koestler and Orwell,
society is damned - may be applicable to the society that exonerates
the Law of Detours and the revolutionary ethic, but cannot be applied
to Arrival and Departure II.
Koestler suffered from severe mental depression in the summer of
1944, a fact that was incidentally to lead to the rewriting of Twilight
Bar (see Chapter 2 below). Under such a cloud, made worse by the
absence of Mamaime Paget, whom he had met in Connolly's flat in January
of that year, writing was not easy. Such was his depression that, with
the exception of Twilight Bar, written in six weeks and completed on 15
August, he found the progress of Arrival and Departure II almost
impossible due to these "violent depressive interruptions"^'. He
confided in his diary: "...not knowing whether I can write at all". The
preparations involved in a visit to Palestine must have come as a
welcome relief to a writer who thought he might never write a novel
27
See Koestler's diary entry for 29 June 1944. Hamilton makes no mention
of Koestler's breakdown, probably because Koestler himself did not allow
Hamilton access to the diaries.
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again.
Secondly, Koestler may have been influenced by Jonathan Cape's
advice of March 1944 that he should collect various articles into a
book which would give his readers "an extremely good follow-up to
Arrival and Departure." (MS 2373/1: 203). In fact, Koestler had
already thought of such an idea the previous year, even listing the
possible contents of such a collection in his diary (MS 2305). At the
same time, he was already beginning to formulate ideas for a theory of
laughter, making notes for Insight and Outlook. Thus the sequel to
Arrival and Departure was put aside. Perhaps a vestige of guilt
remained for Koestler as it did for Peter in this unfinished work?
'"Now he will die' , he [Zlatko] went on, 'and it is my fault. My
fault, and your fault.'" (MS 2317/2: 19)
Koestler, in immersing himself in the Palestinian cause and the
suffering of his people, had finally laid to rest the ghost of the
revolutionary ethics of Gletkin and Ivanov. But the dramatisation of
what had once seemed to be a problem of mathematics or astronomy, in
this aborted story of Rachel and David, must have been a painful
experience and one that led to yet deeper involvement in the
Palestinian movement, a cause that was to occupy much of his time in
the aftermath of the 'revolutionary ethics' trilogy.
In the immediate future, however, Peter's story was abandoned and
Koestler set about compiling The Yogi and the Commissar.
1.v. THE YOGI AND THE COMMISSAR
The Yogi and the Commissar I
The volume, when published, took its eponymous title from an essay
first published by Cyril Connolly in the influential review magazine
Horizon in June 1942 - i.e. after the publication of Darkness. . . but
before Arrival.... Koestler felt he owed a great debt to Connolly for
introducing him to "the Horizon crowd". Connolly had also recently
published an extract from the (then) unfinished Arrival and Departure
relating to the "mixed transport" episode, which resulted in Koestler
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receiving many letters accusing him of a morbid imagination (Hamilton
1982: 79). If Koestler wanted to set down his ethical and political
beliefs as they stood at the time, Horizon was the natural choice for
an important essay.
Yet the content has not merited serious study by Koestlerian
scholars. Webberley comments it is "crucial and neglected" (Webberley
1975: 8); Calder, Atkins and Car let ignore the essays in favour of the
novels: and Hamilton confines his treatment of the essay's reception to
a single page of the 397-page biography. Only Orwell gives The Yogi...
the attention it undoubtedly merits, but even that was three years
after its original publication.
In The Yogi... , Koestler sets out the themes he had been exploring in
his novels. Essay and novel complement one another, and an examination
of The Yogi... will allow us critically to evaluate the ethics of
Spartacus, Rubashov and Peter removed from the concrete situations of
the novels. Indeed, the essay strengthens the argument that Koestler's
ethical thinking progressed from the historical and autobiographical to
the philosophical, whilst retaining the consistency of the "ends and
means" theme, as Koestler later acknowledged in the preface to the
collected essays in 1945:
"Since my school-days I have not ceased to marvel each year at
the fool I had been the year before. Each year brought its own
revelation, and each time I could only think with shame and rage
of the opinions I had held...but lately the new revelations,
instead of shattering and destroying all that went before, seem
to combine into a pattern sufficiently elastic to absorb the new
material and yet with a certain consistency in its basic
features." (Koestler 1945a: 7-8)
Koestler's ethical spectrum
Central to a proper understanding of Koestler's ethics is the concept
of a spectrum, introduced by Koestler at the beginning of the essay.
Human behaviour is akin to the dazzling yet impenetrable light of the
sun's rays, and as such does not lend itself to critical analysis of
its component parts. Koestler asks us to imagine an instrument not
unlike Newton's glass prism "which would enable us to break up patterns
of social behaviour to diffract the spectrum of all possible human
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attitudes to life" (Koestler 1945a: 9).
At the infra-red end of the spectrum, Koestler places the Commissar.
He believes in "Change from Without", a radical reorganisation of
social life that can only take place by revolution. Whatever the means,
this reorganisation of life and the harmony it will create always
justifies the means, however violent. There is a mathematical logic to
the Commissar, for whom reasoning "is an unfailing compass and the
universe a kind of very large clockwork" (Koestler 1945a: 9).
At the opposite - i.e. ultra-violet - end of the spectrum lies the
Yogi who believes in "Change from Within". There is no easy
mathematical way of understanding the universe for the Yogi, and
consequently the End is always unpredictable. The Means alone count.
Understandably, given such uncertainties, the Yogi rejects violence,
believing instead that
"each individual is alone but attached to the all-one by an
invisible umbilical cord...and that his only task during his
earthly life is to avoid any action, emotion or thought which
might lead to a breaking of the cord." (Koestler 1945a: 10)
Koestler admits that these are the two extreme poles of human
behaviour, and that most human attitudes lie in the middle bands of the
spectrum. Nevertheless, the opposite poles of the spectrum provide a
useful if simplistic means of understanding the "ends and means" debate
and, according to Koestler, demonstrated why the practical political
arguments of the day seemed to him to be futile.
"You can argue with post-war planners, Fabians, Quakers, Liberals
and Philanthropists. But the argument will lead nowhere, for the
real issue remains between the Yogi and the Commissar, between
the fundamental conceptions of Change from Without and Change
from Within." (Koestler 1945a: 10)
What is required, he argues, is a synthesis between the saint (the
Yogi) and the revolutionary (the Commissar). But this has never been
achieved: compromise, Koestler states, is not the same as synthesis.
All attempts to change the nature of man by Commissar methods had thus
far failed "from Spartacus' Sun State through Inquisition and
Reformation to Soviet Russia" (Koestler 1945a: 11).
Koestler then goes on to ask the question he had earlier addressed in
The Gladiators and Darkness... : why had such attempts ended in failure?
The Law of Detours, in which it is posited that for revolution to
succeed, the revolutionary must avoid any detours of compassion or
individual concern for the good of the group at ail costs, is expressed
in different guise in The Yogi... in keeping with the scientific
language of the essay, by the Antimony of the Serpentine.
The Antimony of the Serpentine
Utopia is compared to a high mountain peak. For those who aspire to
reach its lofty grandeur, a direct route would be impossibly steep;
therefore, one takes a serpentine path so that one never actually faces
the peak head-on. The problem lies not in the route itself but in the
sheer numbers of people following their revolutionary leader.
"If a great mass of people are pushing forward along the
serpentine they will, according to the fatal laws of inertia,
push their leader off the road and then follow him, the whole
movement flying off at a tangent into the nowhere." (Koestler
1945a: 11)
The inference, as in The Gladiators, is that revolutions fail because
of a lack of communication: those at the head of the trail failing to
communicate their goal, or indeed the pace of revolution, to their
impatient followers. On this rewriting of the Law of Detours, there is
a greater sense of shared responsibility for the detours that prevent
the revolutionaries reaching Utopia: one presumes that a more co¬
ordinated society of slaves would have accepted the need for discipline
so that the crucifixions of the dissidents would be ruthlessly
completed.
Yet a more cautious approach is also not without problems according
to this law, for the danger of a more co-ordinated march at a slower
pace to Utopia is that ultimately all upward momentum is lost. In such
circumstances, the upward spiral towards the peak merely becomes a
circle that does not gain height.
The Antimony of the Slopes
The second root cause of all revolutionary failure by Commissar
methods is what Koestler terms "the Antimony of the Slopes". This is
simply another way of saying that either the means are subordinated to
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the end or vice versa. You can argue that your own particular cause
accepts both are important, but there comes a point when a practical
decision has to be taken and then, according to Koestler, you must
choose one way or the other. Once you have chosen you are on the slope.
One can apply this to the revolutionary ethic of Gletkin and Ivanov:
once they had chosen to give the ends a greater importance than the
means, then their other arguments - the sacrifice of the starving
thousands now is necessary for the greater good of the millions later;
to be ruthless now will shorten the struggle - inevitably follow, and
Rubashov finds (for a time) that the sacrifice of Arlova makes perfect
sense.
The importance of these two laws, as expressed in The Yogi..., is not
that they provide a simplified rewriting of the ethical laws of the
first two novels, but that they are general laws applicable at both
ends of the spectrum and not solely concerned with the historical or
semi-autobiographical situations that preoccupied Koestler during this
period.
Thus, Koestler now argues, the Yogi also finds the peak of Utopia
equally elusive: "whenever an attempt was made to organize saintliness
by exterior means, the organizers were caught in the same dilemmas."
(Koestler 1945a: 12). Inquisition, established for the good of the
Church at a time when heresy was threatening the very stability of the
Christian faith, "flew off at a tangent"; and the Church in the liberal
era "circle[s] round and round the peak without gaining height". As for
the Antimony of the Slopes, this is demonstrated in Koestler's analysis
by Gandhi's choice of non-violence: once the means take over, the end
is inevitably lost, as non-violence degenerates to non-resistance.
Koestler calls the Yogi's approach "inverted Machiavellianism" that is
no better than the ruthless approach of the Commissar: "the Yogi and
the Commissar may call it quits" (Koestler 1945a: 12).
Of course, Koestler continues, they don't call it quits but unable to
form a synthesis, they attract and repel each other at rhythmical
intervals.
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The spectrum in motion
One of the fundamental tenets of Koestler's ethics is that the
spectrum is constantly in motion - "one of the more exciting aspects of
History which Marxism, otherwise the most serviceable guide, falls
short of explaining" (Koestler 1945a: 13). At different periods of
history, there is a strong pull towards one or the other end of the
spectrum. Like other writers of his generation, Koestler frequently
refers to the 1930s as "the pink decade", in which Commissar-ethics
dominated. Clearly, Koestler reflected upon his own past as inhabiting
the Commissar end of the spectrum: yet he also felt that he "belonged"
(Koestler 1945a: 13) to the ultra-violent end, in which quasi-religious
and mystical values dominate: further evidence that suggests Rubashov's
Theory of Confessions is best understood by accepting the reality of
the Third Order .
Koestler detected that, such was the disillusionment of the failed
revolutionary ethic, a general displacement was taking place in which
the emphasis was again shifting towards the Yogi end of the spectrum.
The spectral displacement was achieved too quickly and too glibly by
many writers for Koestler's taste, and the essay reflects his disgust
of those who change their allegiance too quickly. But another
fundamental tenet of the Yogi-Commissar spectrum is that the Commissar
finds such "spectral displacement" more difficult, for he is defined as
"the human type which has completely severed relations with the
subconscious" (Koestler 1945a: 14).
Koestler's overt criticism of the Commissar's dilemma and his
"climate of perpetual adolescence" is more than merely a loathing of
his own revolutionary past. It goes some way towards explaining the
gulf in thinking between Ivanov and Rubashov, or Peter and Sonia, in
addition to elucidating the reality of the Third Order. At the heart of
the Commissar's dilemma is a severed connection between the umbilical
cord that connects the individual with the Absolute. The Commissar may
live his life in the conviction that this umbilical cord is a "luxury-
organ", but sooner or later he faces a crisis, at which point he
realises it is not a luxury. For Koestler, such a point clearly came in
the prison in Seville and the "hours by the window". For Rubashov, it
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was the sudden appearance of the Grammatical Fiction, the language and
logic of which the Party could not admit to. For Peter, it was the
post-analysis decision to disembark and choose danger, and, in the
unfinished sequel, the confrontation with the grotesque David.
For each of these events, the connection that Commissar-ethics
successfully makes between man and society is not enough. There is a
fundamental connection between man and the universe that has been
deliberately severed and which now demands to be re-established.
Koestler rather dramatically calls this the "revenge of the amputated
organ".
"At this point one of two things might happen. Either the cut
connection is re-established, and as an act of atonement the Man-
Society connection broken off; this is the classical case of the
Revolutionary turning into a Mystic, the total jump from
Commissar to Yogi. Or the connection is not re-established - then
the dead cord coils up and strangles its owner. This is the
equally classical case of the ex-revolutionaries whose souls died
of suffocation." (Koestler 1945a: 15-16)
This can be read as a psychological interpretation of Rubashov's
Theory of Confessions. Rubashov - and his real-life counterparts in the
Show Trials - typifies those "ex-revolutionaries whose souls died of
suffocation" when they fail, in spite of their discovery of the Third
Order or the Grammatical Fiction, to re-establish their connection with
the "oceanic feeling". The psychological import is further emphasised
in the essay by Koestler's observation that Jung, in his interpretation
of the subconscious, comes close to describing the "umbilical cord" (in
his theory, one presumes, of the collective unconscious).
But the umbilical cord, by implication in Koestler's theory, can have
positive effects too. Thus, Peter's apparent guilt has a positive
contribution to play in the establishment of a proper ethical
perspective because it is the means by which "the cut connection is re¬
established". One can further deduce from the unpublished sequel to
Peter's heroic endeavours that the connection nevertheless remains a
tenuous one that is all too easily broken, once again isolating the
individual in an ethical world devoid of a higher perspective - the
telling "Grace had been withdrawn, death re-gained its sting. He was




The Yogi... thus sheds fresh and important light on the reality of
the Third Order. For in Koestler's three-world system (perception,
conception and the numinous/"occul t") the Third Order exists quite
independently of the observer, who may go through life ignorant of its
reality until a crisis looms, during which time the umbilical cord that
connects the individual to this higher order becomes of crucial
importance.
The Commissar, therefore, may choose to deny that such a higher
reality exists; but that merely prevents him from formulating a proper
view of the world. In other words, and in the language of The Yogi... ,
the man-society connection of the Commissar is not enough. Any ethical
system that claims to be complete must take into account the reality of
the Third Order.
Does that imply that Yogi-ethics is where Koestler was heading? The
idea is not a new one; Beloff postulated whether Koestler "might not be
some kind of crypto-transcendentalist" (Beloff 1975: 82), offering as
evidence the experience of Seville. The same experience, with its
reiteration of Euclid's proof that the number of primes is infinite
scrawled on the prison wall, is also used by Renee Haynes to convince
the reader that Koestler was a mystic in disguise (Haynes 1975: 175-
186) - long before his interest in parapsychology blossomed into an
almost full-time occupation. "In Spain, above all Koestler discovered
mysticism" notes Carlet (MS 2435/4: 159), who then goes on to suggest
that this had a decisive influence in Koestler's works.
Beloff's thesis is given added validity by the text of Koestler's
suicide note of June 1982 which reinforces Beloff's argument that
Koestler never repudiated the doctrine of the Third Order. In
Rubashovian terms, Koestler wrote in June 1982
"I wish my friends to know that I am leaving their company in a
peaceful frame of mind, with some timid hopes for a de¬
personalised after-life beyond due confines of space, time and
matter and beyond the limits of our comprehension. This 'oceanic
feeling' has often sustained me at difficult moments,and does so
now, while I am writing this." (my italics) (MS 2308)
Such a hope, albeit "timid", again highlights a difference between
Koestler and Orwell, who during his final illness had referred to his
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impending death in terms of extinction, confirming the "death is final"
statement he had earlier made in reviewing Arrival and Departure. More
tragically, one can perceive a contrast between Arthur Koestler's
belief in a higher reality and the desolation that Cynthia Koestler
felt at her imminent death, reflected in the typed postscript to the
suicide note added at the time of their suicide (Plate 2).
There is some circumstantial evidence in support of a Yogi-ethic
interpretation of 1940s Koestler. "Believe it or not", Mamaine wrote to
her twin sister in May 1947, "K has now only one interest: mysticism"
(Goodman (ed) 1985: 51). There is Cynthia's revelation that during the
time of Pope John, Koestler was attracted to Roman Catholicism. One
could also cite the now famous bitter dispute with the late Iain
Hamilton, and in particular the preface rewritten at Koestler's
insistence28 after Hamilton had attempted to put forward a Yogi-ethic
view of his subject.
"My reading of Koestler's works has convinced me that he is au
fond a deeply religious man. He has never admitted this,
confessing only to several experiences of the quasi-mystical
Freudian 'oceanic' feeling." (MS 2370/3)
Finally, there are the numerous interpretations, some of which are
listed in the first part of this chapter, which use Yogi-ethical terms
to describe Commissar-ethical behaviour of Rubashov and, for good
measure, Gletkin: "atonement", "excommunication", "faith" and "grace"
occur frequently in analyses of Koestler's work of this period.
This suggests that Koestler was engaged in a spiritual struggle, that
lurking beneath the surface of the Commissar there is a Yogi longing to
make himself heard, possibly the voice of Koestler himself who wished
he "could still write an honest infra-red novel without an ultra-violet
ending"! (Koestler 1945a: 13). Sidney Pearson, an American biographer
of Koestler (Pearson 1978), goes as far as to suggest that indeed all
Koestler's writings have a religious undertone.
One has to point out, however, that interest in mysticism or
28The precise grounds for Koestler's annoyance are unclear;
interestingly, however, Koestler's blue crayon cross is alongside the phrase
"he has never admitted this" - suggesting that, perhaps with the interview
with fellow ex-prisoner Anthony Grey in mind (Koestler 1974) he had not denied
his religious inclinations.
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Koestler's belief in miracles, also mentioned in Mamaine's letters, do
not allow us to conclude that Koestler was a religious thinker.
Interest in mysticism can, after all, remain the detached interest of
the journalist or scientist. Belief in miracles can be assimilated in
an atheistic Weltanschauung. Indeed, given that Koestler's background
was that of a journalist and a scientist, it might be surprising had he
not been keen to pursue a 'Yogi' approach to his experience in Seville
and the writing that flowed out of it.
Perhaps such uncertainty reflects upon Koestler's inherent scepticism
or the triumph of a novelist who was skilled at hiding his true beliefs
beneath the characterisations of his novels. Perhaps also it is a
tribute to the ease with which we assimilate Koestler's concept of the
ethical spectrum into our thinking that we see the writer himself
moving so adeptly towards one end of the spectrum or the other.
For my part, I am inclined to agree with Sidney Pearson up to a
point, and conclude that for a period in the 1940s, Koestler, like many
others who had emerged from the "pink decade", was heading towards the
pararational world of Yogi-ethics. He had already suggested to a close
friend that many of the best writers - he cited Huxley, Dostoievsky and
Tolstoy - had started as revolutionaries and ended as mystics (MS
2372/1 : 75).
Writing The Yogi... had however alerted Koestler to the fact, as
explained above, that Yogi-ethics did not solve the problems that the
Commissars had tried by more forcible means to overcome. It is
significant that in his notes to the sequel of Arrival..., written
after this essay, the character of a Yogi was to be introduced in less
than complimentary terms. Note, too, that Robert Hoffman's adapted
screenplay of Arrival and Departure, in its second draft form (which
had been submitted to Koestler previously for approval and which
contains Koestler's comments in blue crayon throughout) has all
references to Peter "becoming a mystic" omitted, and the paranormal
scene in which an apparition of Sonia communicates with Peter is
rewritten as a meeting with the real Sonia in a cafe (MS 2317/5).
It is probable therefore that Koestler was striving to find a way out
of the Yogi-Commissar dilemma and the repetitive swing of the pendulum
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that is the subject of the final part of the essay. The Yogi and the
Commissar were, to Koestler, predominantly the good and the evil of
Nietzsche. Like Nietzsche, Koestler sought now to define an ethical
system beyond good and evil that took into account the almost
superhuman qualities of those at the Yogi-end who were in tune to the
higher order of reality without abrogating the wider responsibility
towards society that was often the concern of the Commissar.
1. vi. TOWARDS A SPIRITUAL ETHIC
The influence of Richard Hillary
If it is virtually certain that Koestler would be familiar with
Nietzsche's writings from his student days in Vienna, one can be
equally sure that Private Koestler 13805661 would not wish to identify
his work with a philosopher often held to be Hitler's inspiration2^.
A more profitable approach, yet one apparently no Koestlerian scholar
has pursued, is to look at the influence of an English-speaking writer,
literally straight out of Oxford and the R.A.F.
"If the RAF represented Britain [in 1 940-41] . . .and if the fighter
pilots were its epitome, there was a short time when the most
emblematic of them all was Richard Hillary." (Faulks 1996a: 113)
Faulks' recent biographical study of Hillary attempts to analyse the
reasons for the young Battle of Britain pilot's continuing appeal half
a century after his death by making reference to what Koestler called
"the specific weight" of Hillary's story.
Rache Lovat Dickson introduced Richard Hillary and his lover Mary
Booker to Koestler at a literary gathering in London on 31 May 1942.
"Richard much admired Koestler, and after he left London they
29
Whether it is fair judgment on Nietzsche is a moot point;
nevertheless, at the time Nietzsche's ideas were "a spiritual source of
contemporary conflict", to quote Copleston, whose study of the German
philosopher was only published in 1942 on the British censors' understanding
that it unambiguously condemned Nietzsche. Koestler would be all too aware of
the climate of opinion even if he did take up some of Nietzsche's ideas. See
Copleston 1975: vi-viii.
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continued to correspond. Mary took to him less: too much
intellect, too little heart." (Burn 1988: 92)
Certainly at the time Hillary made a great impression on Koestler. The
two can often be seen quoting one another in letters to friends, and at
one point, it has been suggested, they planned to share a flat with
Koestler's ex-lover, Daphne Hardy - "Koestler plus Hillary I thought to
myself, too strong in one house" commented Hillary's lover later (MS
2418/1)3°. Hillary, as stated already, appears under another name in
Arrival and Departure; and the pilot's death (on 8 January 1943, during
a night training flight at the age of 23) devastated Koestler. He was
instrumental in setting up a Trust Fund, with the help of Hillary's
parents, in Richard Hillary's honour to encourage young writers and was
also entrusted with much of his unpublished material.
But quite apart from the biographical perspective - and in passing,
it is astonishing to note that Hamilton's biography makes no mention of
Hillary - there are sound reasons for arguing that Hillary provided
ethical material for Koestler.
One need look no further than The Yogi and the Commissar collection
of essays for prima facie evidence of Hillary's ethical contribution to
Koestler's development - for notwithstanding the final section (written
specifically for the publication of The Yogi and the Commissar and
dealing with the vast subject of the Soviet "experiment"), Koestler's
valedictory essay on Hillary is the longest piece in the book: longer
even than the eponymous essay discussed above and its sequel.
Secondly, if one takes into account the fact that Koestler was
writing the Hillary essay at the same time as writing Arrival... (MS
2372/4: 9), it is equally important to realise that many people read
the Hillary essay in the Horizon issue of April 1943 at the same time
as Arrival.... A cursory glance at the volumes of correspondence
received by Koestler from 1942 to 1943 reveals that Yogi-ethics and
Commissar-ethics left most people cold; but the exploits of a young
Battle of Britain pilot, and Koestler's tribute to such an unusually
Of)
When this assertion of Mary Booker was put recently (August 1997) to
Denise Patterson (to whom The Last Enemy was dedicated), she was apparently
highly amused at the thought, indicating perhaps Booker's comment was not to
be taken seriously (Sainsbury, pers. comm.).
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gifted pilot, were predictably a different matter altogether^.
Hillary's ethical dialogue
Hillary's The Last Enemy (Hillary 1942) still offers the reader one
of the most perceptive accounts of what it meant to be one of "the few"
in 1940. Indeed, as Faulks observes, Hillary's only published work
rapidly acquired
"the peculiar aura of a book that says something vital, whose
importance goes beyond what it literally describes." (Faulks
1996a: 168)
What it "literally describes" is the emergence of Hillary and others
of his generation - the self-styled "long-haired boys" - from the
university air squadrons to the training squadrons of the R.A.F. and
then to Fighter Command and their matter-of-fact deeds in the Battle of
Britain. Much of the book is descriptive, but its significance to the
ethicist lies in its description of the beliefs held by Hillary and his
close friend and fellow pilot in 603 Squadron, Peter Pease.
Hillary's cold, calculating approach to the war (before his
disfigurement and his encounter with the dying young woman in the
Blitz) suggested to Commander Peters, writing to Koestler in May 1943,
that Hillary "had advanced far along the road to renunciation" (MS
2372/2: 104) by the time of his premature death. This sounds remarkably
similar to Koestler's description of Spartacus attempting to deviate
neither left nor right. Hillary, like Spartacus before him, had sought
to blot out any thoughts of compassion or warmth towards his fellow
pilots, but ultimately - like Spartacus - failed to obey the Law of
Detours.
Certainly, anyone who had read Darkness... two years previously would
be struck by the parallels between Koestler's novel and the pivotal
chapter of Hillary's book, "The World of Peter Pease". Faulks maintains
that this chapter "indulges the less interesting aspect of Hillary's
31
Captain Tony Sainsbury, who became the first Trustee of the Hillary
Archive, acknowledges that this is the case (Sainsbury, pers. comm. ). "I was
17-18 and reasonably widely read, but though I knew of The Yogi... they (.sic)
did leave me cold."
writing" (Faulks 1996a: 169). But the chapter is only "less
interesting" to those who see the book as a factual account of what it
was like to fly a Spitfire in the Battle of Britain - just as the First
and Second Hearing passages in Darkness at Noon will disappoint those
who look to Koestler for a factual account of what it was like to be a
revolutionary in Stalinist Russia. In Koestler's work, however, the
dialogue is convincing. Hillary's "long recreated conversations" with
Pease are, in contrast, contrived as Faulks suggests (Faulks 1996a:
169). But they serve precisely the same purpose as the Hearings in
Darkness. . . and remind us that Hillary's intention behind writing the
book was less autobiographical and more ethical , as he sought to
express his own gradual conversion to an ethic of self-sacrifice.
Thus, Hillary, consciously or otherwise, borrows the Koestlerian
technique of ethical dialogue to stress the difference between his own
value-system and that of Pease, the quintessentially Anglican war hero.
Hillary contrasts his own selfishness with Pease's idealism and faith.
The lengthy dialogue is reminiscent of the First Hearing in
Darkness. . . , even down to the development of the argument in which
Hillary, like Rubashov, attempts to take the offensive but is put on
the defensive by the other's conviction. The "Tightness" of the Party
is strikingly similar to the moral certainty of Pease's Christianity.
Pease points out that Hillary is no medieval mystic, just as Gletkin
had pointed out that Rubashov was no saint. Hillary concludes with the
accusation that in Pease's world, he would be a cog in the Party
machine; Pease's sole concern was society, Hillary's the individual.
Hillary and Rubashov
Like Rubashov and Gletkin, Hillary and Pease represent opposite ends
of the ethical spectrum. Intentionally or not, Hillary's account is a
contemporary demonstration of Koestler's ethical spectrum in action.
Hence the immature Hillary admits that even after the flying accident
that left him scarred and requiring drastic plastic surgery to rebuild
his face and hands that
"I could congratulate myself that I was self-centred enough to
have survived any attack on my position as an egocentric."
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(Hi 1lary 1942: 203)
The climax of the book occurs when the "egocentric" Hillary helps to
dig out a woman with her (dead) baby from a bombed building. The
woman's comment to Peter "I see they got you too" caused a crisis of
faith in Hillary's cynicism, just as the execution of Bogrov had
"unbalanced the logical equation" (Koestler 1940: 134) for Rubashov.
"That that woman should so die was an enormity so great that it
was terrifying in its implications, in its lifting of the veil on
possibilities of thought so far beyond the grasp of the human
mind." (Hillary 1942: 215)
The ghostly awareness of Peter Pease that had been to Hillary his
personal Grammatical Fiction reasserted itself as Hillary attempted to
evaluate his own ethics in the light of the woman's suffering. Pease,
he reflected, had instantly recognised Nazism as an embodiment of evil
rather than the machinations of a criminal power. Hillary, who had
reacted to the woman's words by silently cursing her, was overwhelmed
by guilt, just as Rubashov had been^.
"And it was in the end, at bottom, myself against which I raged,
myself I had cursed. With awful clarity I saw myself suddenly as
I was." (Hillary 1942: 216)
"With awful clarity I saw myself suddenly as I was": words which might
just as easily have been spoken by Rubashov after his "dialogues" with
the Grammatical Fiction had led him to see, for the first time, the
manner in which he had betrayed Arlova, Richard and little Loewy for
his own selfish ends.
Thus, Hillary's contemporary experience demonstrates the validity of
Koestler's Grammatical Fiction in situations far removed from the
original Stalinist context. In other words, Hillary has shown the
ethical significance of guilt postulated by Koestler in the three
novels, but in a contemporary wartime setting.
The parallel continues throughout the last chapter of The Last Enemy.
If we take as the equivalent of Rubashov's confession the self-
inflicted curse Hillary had made, then the similar awareness of guilt
32The encounter with the dying woman was apparently a fabrication on
Hillary's part, intended to highlight the author's bankrupt ethical system of
the past; the crisis of faith and subsequent conversion of Hillary may have
been much more gradual: but see Faulks 1996a: 161.
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now made Hillary also look for a means of atoning his "sin". Confession
was not an option available to him as it had been to Rubashov. Yet the
motive of atonement and the need for confession are implicit in the
final sentence of the book:
"If I could...tell a little of the lives of these men [Peter
Pease and his flying companions], I would have justified, at
least in some measure, my right to fellowship with my dead, and
to the friendship of those with courage and steadfastness who
were still living and who would go on fighting until the ideals
for which their comrades had died were stamped for ever on the
future of civilisation." (Hillary 1942: 221)
Hillary therefore is seen at the end of the book as embracing, with the
help of his own Grammatical Fiction - the unseen presence of Peter
Pease, whose death he had experienced in a premonition whilst under
anaesthetic (Hillary 1942: 141^) - precisely the kind of non-
rational ethic that he had previously denounced. His journey therefore
was almost identical to that of Rubashov, the only difference being
that for the moment, at least, Hillary was spared the ultimate
sacrifice of death. It is little wonder, therefore, that as Carlet
observed (MS 2435/4: 156), Koestler was fond of quoting Hillary's maxim
"the survivor is always the debtor". The significance of guilt in
radically changing one's ethical position on the spectrum had been
established, in Koestler's mind, beyond doubt. It was Koestler who was
the debtor.
Hillary and Peter Slavek
There is also a close link between Hillary and Peter Slavek that
again vindicates Koestler's growing dissatisfaction with revolutionary
ethics and points towards the re-instatement of the individual ethic.
The key event, which spawned the lengthy essay In Memory of Richard
33Unlike Hillary's description of the dying woman at the end of the
book, this is no piece of literary licence. In July 1942, The Society for
Psychical Research sought to verify the experience and to obtain corroborative
evidence (HA II/3/109). Hillary replied in terms that are indeed less
confident than was the case in The Last Enemy ("...for the moment I can give
you neither the time nor the date of this experience...") but remains emphatic
that the account was a truthful recollection of an actual event.
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Hillary in Horizon, was Hillary's tragic death3^.
However, it is not possible to say how much of an influence upon
Arrival and Departure Hillary's death was: for whilst we now know that
Hillary died three months before the completion of Arrival...35, we
still cannot say whether the manner of his death influenced the novel's
ending. It is certainly possible that Peter's "departure" on such
irrational grounds was influenced, if not determined, by news of
Koestler's young friend.
But if that must remain a matter of conjecture, it is apparent that
Hillary's return to flying was as illogical in Koestler's mind as Peter
Slavek's "departure" and return to danger at the end of Arrival....
Furthermore, the two events were connected in the minds of some
readers. Hilde Spiel asked Koestler whether Hillary would have insisted
on joining the "fraternity of the dead" if he had met his own Sonia (MS
2372/3: 49); and E. M. Forster wrote shortly after the publication of
Arrival... "that you, rather than Hillary, were fumbling after this
very important mystery of the intersection of the tragic and the
trivial" (MS 2345/1: 56).
The crucial point to note is that Hillary appeared to accept that, in
his own terminology, his days were numbered, and there is an
inevitability in the fatal crash.
"He knew he was going to die, and he wanted to find out why. In
fact he had deliberately chosen a course of which he knew that it
could not end otherwise but by his death." (Koestler 1945a: 47)
In support of this theory are Hillary's letters, many of which are
addressed to his lover, X [Mary Booker], and used by Koestler (against
Q /
The background to the fatal crash has been the subject of some
controversy over the years. Pilot error remains the most feasible theory, as
suggested by the two accident report summaries (HA II/4/4 5:3 and 5:4) with
the supporting evidence of a similar, but in this case, not fatal, error by
.a maimed Spitfire pilot (Burn 1988: 236-237).
q c
Hillary died on 8 January 1943; we can now confidently date the
completion of Arrival and Departure to 20 May.
Hillary's family's wishes3®) to support the ethical viewpoint that he
had articulated through the fictional experience of Peter Slavek.
'"You ask me to have faith, darling. Yes, but faith in
what?...But if you mean faith that I shall survive, why then
again No. If this thing plays to its logical conclusion there is
no reason why I should survive.'" (Quoted in Koestler 1945a: 47-
48)
Again, but for the context one might deduce this was Koestler's Peter
Slavek writing to Odette, rather than Hillary to his real-life lover.
For Hillary, like Peter Slavek, follows his instinct against all
reason.
Furthermore, there is a very marked resemblance between Hillary's
desire to fly again and Peter's desire to fight. Sonia sees this as a
death-wish: but as Peter's second crusade takes shape from the after¬
shock of Sonia's psychoanalysis (a medical parallel to Hillary's
enforced slow recuperation), Peter wishes to embrace "the fraternity of
the dead" (Koestler 1943: 133) - which is as near to Hillary's
"fellowship with my dead" as you could get using different words!
Just as Sonia tried (but ultimately failed) to rationalise Peter's
heroism, Hillary attempted to do likewise and similarly failed.
"One can rationalise for ever and one's reason finally tells one
that it is madness, but it is one's instinct to which one
listens..." (Quoted in Koestler 1945a: 48)
Koestler follows Sonia Bolgar's lead in suggesting vanity, fanatical
devotion and an urge towards self-destruction as psychological
explanations of Hillary's guilt and consequent heroism. He is forced to
admit defeat because, according to Faulks, even Koestler could not
quite believe in the strength of Hillary's conversion, expressed in the
final paragraph of The Last Enemy (Faulks 1996a: 202).
"We are, of course, fond of our little adjectives: they save us
from pathos and embarrassment, from the threat of having to face
the tragic implication. We prefer to let our lights shine like
candles under the stars. But once they have burned down we are
back where we started, under a sky too large for us. Our
adjectives fade...only the subject remains, alone under the
stars, faced with that nameless force which is set to destroy
3®See Burn 1988: 228-229. It is quite clear that Koestler did not have
aermission to quote directly from the Hillary-Booker letters in the Horizon
article, a major factor in the early demise of the Hillary Memorial Volume.
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him." (Koestler 1945a: 54)
From Koestler thinking of Hillary to Koestler writing of Peter a few
months later (in the unpublished sequel):
"He was cut off from the subterranean communion with a force that
he could not name, and left shivering and alone; the stars had
suddenly become paler, the immense night had shrunk and closed in
around him like walls." (MS 2317/2: 3)
From Peter Slavek "left shivering and alone" to Hillary reflecting on
his need for "fellowship with my dead":
"Perhaps it is the fear of being so much alone...the total lack
of human contact [at the RAF training base] is awful..." (Quoted
in Koestler 1945a: 56)
My argument is that Hillary and Peter Slavek are almost interchangeable
personalities, facing similar ethical problems.
The problem of the non-rational ethic
Hillary's death, and its awful probability, confirmed to Koestler
that he had been right in making Peter behave as il logically as he did.
But of course irrational behaviour is subject to a number of
interpretations3''. There will always be those who will follow Peter
Kramer's unpublished analysis of Arrival and Departure (MS 2373/2: 116-
119) and claim that it is Koestler's critique of Sonia's psychoanalysis
rather than Sonia herself that is flawed. Hillary's oft-quoted "I can
rationalise no further. I must let instinct decide" (quoted in Koestler
1945a: 54) is proof that the ethic of Hillary or Peter Slavek cannot be
read purely as neurosis as Kramer implied. But it is not necessarily
proof that the ethic was i1 logical.
One only has to read Michael Burn's account of Hillary's return to
flying to see a persuasive argument for the logic of Hillary's death:
37
With regard to Hillary's death, Phyllis Bottome, in an unpublished
paper "Richard Hillary of the R.A.F.", refers to "the logic of his last
wordless act". In suggesting Hillary returned to the Air Force simply because
he knew every man capable of flying was still needed, she also points out his
death was perhaps partly "to defy and punish those who had outraged his sense
of human decency." (HA II/4/6/A/32: 8). Bottome's view deserves consideration
as she was "nearly Hillary's biographer" (Sainsbury, pers. comm.); it also
demonstrates one can never exclude the possibility of a logical explanation
for apparently illogical acts.
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the fear of failure, disgust at the futility of his London life, the
sense of unfinished business and writer's block all contributed to
Hillary's return to active service. A contemporary, who discussed the
matter of Hillary's death with Koestler shortly afterwards, has
suggested
"...his return to flying was seen as admirable if not heroic
(though the latter word was one that we used sparingly if at
all). Certainly I did not consider it 'irrational', though I
would not use the word 'logical*. We took it for granted that
after recovering from wounds one went back to duty unless one had
been medically downgraded." (Sir Michael Howard, pers. comm.)
Once back in control of a fighter plane, there is a sad and terrible
logic to the plane spinning out of control if one has hands like
Hillary (Burn 1988: 238-240).
The "admirable if not heroic" action of such characters, in real life
or fiction, may have been motivated simply by guilt. But such actions
as Hillary insisting a /a Douglas Bader to fly again after horrific
injury, and Slavek's jumping ship at the last moment, surely deserve to
be judged on their own merits rather than psychoanalysed. At any rate,
any explanation that the Sonias entertain does not detract from the
wholly non-rational bravery of such men. One can therefore conclude
that Faulks' lengthy analysis of the reasons for Hillary's death is
largely irrelevant: Hillary simply did what he did.
Faulks' review of the various interpretations of Hillary's death
mirrors the difficulty that Koestler encountered in making his
fictitious heroes conclude by engaging in equally illogical acts -
Rubashov's confession, Peter's jumping ship and so on. Faulks' thesis,
placing Hillary's work into the mainstream of 1930s English literature
devoted "to the dilemma of what action a person should take in troubled
times" (Faulks 1996a: 198) does not however acknowledge the difference
between Hillary and Koestler, and other writers such as Orwell who had
also struggled to don the "man of action" epithet post-Wilfred Owen.
The difference, in my opinion, is that the pararational ethic
demonstrated in real life by Bukharin's confession (even without the
assistance of a Grammatical Fiction), Koestler's "hours by the window"
and Hillary's search for the "fraternity with my dead" can only be
explained by accepting that a fundamental change had taken place by
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which their previous accomplishments and values counted for nothing.
'Finishing the job' may seem to account for Bukharin's confession, as
Middleton Murry assumed it also did in what he alleged was Hillary's
suicide (Faulks 1996a: 202-203). But what was at stake was so much more
than their individual lives that in championing this thesis, Faulks'
explanation remains unsatisfactory. After all, Hillary's return to
flying was to cause the death of his navigator, Wilfrid Fison3®. (And
what of those who would be implicated and arrested by Bukharin's
"confession"?)
Unfortunately, the fundamental change to the pararational ethic is as
understated in The Last Enemy as it is in Koestler's ethical novels and
particularly Arrival and Departure.
The literary clue to Hillary's acceptance of a higher ethic comes, as
Faulks realises, in the use of the phrase "my dead" at the end of The
Last Enemy (Hillary 1942: 221). But whereas Faulks, in his 'finishing
the job' theory of Hillary's death, focuses upon the word "my", with
its hints of comradeship and possession of a shared goal, the emphasis
should properly be upon the word "dead": the direct sense of communion
with his dead comrades that Hillary felt. Such a sense of other-worldly
fellowship implies the existence of the Third Order that Koestler had
discovered in Seville and is redolent of Rubashov's synaesthetic
fellowship with Arlova, or Peter Slavek's identification with his dead
brother3'.
Something more powerful than mere "intellectual change", which is the
only transformation that Faulks concedes, is at work in Hillary.
Phyllis Bottome expressed this by stating that Hillary "stood on the
QO
Curiously, Koestler does not seem to be aware of Fison's death (Burn
<1988: 231 ). Otherwise, he might have been more circumspect before using the
ohrase of Hillary being "drawn, like a moth to the flame" in the Horizon
article: a phrase that Burn states gave rise to the "suicide" theory, which
if accepted, is actually a murder theory.
39
Hillary's perception of a spiritual reality whilst airborne was
:ertainly shared by some Spitfire pilots during the war and is memorably
summed up in a poem of the Canadian fighter pilot John Gillespie Magee, "High
rlight". "And, while with silent lifting mind I've trod/The high, untrespassed
-sanctity of space,/ Put out my hand and touched the face of God".
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brink of another world" (HA 11/4/6/A/32:6) ; in the context of her essay
it is unclear whether this refers to his new life in England after his
American visit or a reference to his impending death. Such ambiguity is
in itself a reflection of Hillary's love of life combined with his
acceptance of the probability of his death.
What Koestler chose to focus upon was Hillary's initial rejection of,
and later 'fraternity' with, Pease's spiritual ethic. Koestler's own
theory at the time - that Hillary's was an "exemplary death" - is
curiously accepted by Faulks elsewhere (Faulks 1996b: 305). Burn's
final analysis of Koestler's writings is essentially damning: namely,
that Koestler used Hillary as a guinea-pig to support his theories of
an irrational ethic (Burn 1988: 229). My own view is that it did indeed
suit Koestler not to know that Fison was on board at the time of the
fatal accident, or to research (as he could have done later) the Board
of Enquiry reports which refer unambiguously to pilot error.
Hillary, through his writings and his death, was therefore
deliberately used to lend support to Koestler's argument for the
rejection of revolutionary ethics. The various theories that were, and
still are, generated to account for Hillary's action are not as
important, indeed, as the debate itself. The old question "Why did
Bukharin confess?" had now found a home on Koestler's adopted shores:
"Why did Hillary return to flying?" Orwell's "loss of rationality"
argument is no longer applicable simply to a work of fiction.
Furthermore, in addition to assisting him explore the nature of the
individual (Yogi) ethic through the characterisation of Peter, Hillary
had also shown the manner in which individuals might move from one end
of the ethical spectrum to the other.
But Hillary had one final contribution to make, in a letter to his
lover only weeks before his death, in which he referred to the two
planes of existence, the vie tragique and vie triviale that make up
human existence (Koestler 1945a: 60). Hillary proposed that we cannot
live permanently on the one plane or the other but must oscillate
between the two. Koestler himself observed that Hillary too oscillated
between his twenty-three years and eternity, acceptance and revolt.
This of course is Yogi-ethics and Commissar-ethics under a different
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guise. Hillary now pointed the way forward to Koestler by suggesting
instances where the two planes might meet (such as his own experiences
of physical danger); Koestler began to think less in terms of extremes
- had not Hillary echoed Koestler's abhorrence of mysticism per se?
(Hillary 1942: 163) - and more in terms of an intersection, or
synthesis, of the diametrically opposed ethical standpoints. In this
way, Hillary can be seen as instrumental in establishing the ethical
framework, independently of Koestler's novels, for the construction of
the holon in Insight and Outlook. This ethical framework will be the
subject of discussion in the next chapter.
Conclusion
Revolutionary ethics had ultimately proved barren, except that from
the guilt-ridden world of Nicolas Rubashov and Peter Slavek had arisen
the "unnamed force", the Grammatical Fiction, that made a nonsense of
any logical or rational ethical system. The individual ethic and the
need to change society had to be reconciled, but as yet there was no
structure for such an ethic. This at least is Koestler's epitaph for
Hillary and the last of the long-haired boys he represented.
"It is the myth of the crusade without a cross, and of desperate
crusaders in search of a cross. What creed they will adopt,
Christ's or Barrabas', remains to be seen." (Koestler 1945a: 67)
Peter Slavek's departure (so far as the published novels are
concerned) is Koestler's final word on the futility of following the
Yogi-ethic or the Commissar-ethic. The real world in which difficult
decisions of conscience have to be made (and which Koestler attempted
to describe in the sequel, through the complex ethical dilemma of
David's suffering and the saving of Rachel) required something deeper
than the revolutionary ethics he had previously encountered.
Ironically, in Arrival and Departure as Peter is led away to the
airplane that heralds his second crusade, he is led away by a young
pilot "about Peter's age". The spring in his step, the undone buttons,
the "certain jauntiness bordering on conceit" point to only one person:
Richard Hillary. The undone buttons were a trademark of the Battle of
Britain pilot; Hillary had said of himself "My walk as I enter the Mess
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is jaunty" (Koestler 1945a: 48). Koestler's literary portrait of the
young pilot matches the Eric Kennington oil painting of Hillary
commissioned by his father (Hillary 1943: colour plate). Might it not
be Hillary who personally escorts us away from revolutionary ethics to
the post-war problems that were to occupy Koestler for the next few
years?
"The door opened again. The young pilot's face was slightly more
tense now, and his gait a trifle more jaunty than before.
'Well, here we go, young man,' he said cheerfully." (Koestler
1943: 187)
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CHAPTER 2: HIERARCHICAL ETHICS
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine Koestler's departure from
revolutionary ethics, which he had implicity acknowledged with the
first Yogi... essay would be inadequate to deal with the complex post¬
war world, and to trace his move towards his significant contribution
to ethics, the theory of the holon.
The bridge between revolutionary ethics and the later concept of the
holon was made in 1945, when Koestler first used the term 'hierarchy'.
I hope to demonstrate that Koestler's scientific background enabled him
to apply what he perceived as once solely a theological term to
understand the modern world.
Replacing a horizontal 'spectrum' with a vertical 'hierarchy' allowed
Koestler to explore the idea that human action could be understood by
rules which operate only on a specific hierarchical level, and that
unlike a horizontal spectrum, higher levels could be interpreted as
being more successful or integrated than lower levels. For the first
time in Koestler's writing, the concept of progress is introduced,
related to movement up the hierarchical ladder. This theory makes the
action of his ethical novels understandable within Koestler's
scientific terminology and enables us to appreciate the lack of
communication between the characters in the novels. I shall also
examine Koestler's claim that the theory demonstrates the
irreducibi1ity of ethical absolutes.
I shall finally examine the 1946 League For the Freedom and Dignity
of Man that was the combined effort of Orwell and Koestler. The project
occupied so much of Koestler's energies in the immediate aftermath of
the war that it deserves close examination to see if, and how, it
relates to its author's ambitious claims made at the end of the second
Yogi... essay for a synthesis between the two opposite ends of the
ethical spectrum that Koestler had set down.
In addition to the archival material and Koestler's autobiographical
accounts of the period, two other sources have proved to be a rich if
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unlikely vein in examining Koestler's ethics of the post-war period:
Twilight Bar (Koestler 1945b), published simultaneously as The Yogi...
and The Call-Girls (Koestler 1971), Koestler's last novel. It is all
too easy for Koestlerian scholars to dismiss Twilight Bar, for the
perfectly good reason that Koestler himself was dissatisfied with the
work: yet if one is prepared to overlook the clumsy stagecraft,
particularly in Act Three, and the puppet-like nature of the characters
(Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 131-132 for Cynthia Koestler's recollection of
the production of her husband's play), it provides some interesting
clues to Koestler's developing ethical theory, and these will be
discussed below.
The Cal1-Girls is equally neglected, but a careful reading of the
novel sheds a great deal of light of the operation of Koestler's
ethical system in an area inspired by his own life story. If Webberley
suggests The Yogi... essays deserve a rerating, then I will argue in
this chapter that these two works are much more important in
understanding Koestler's philosophy than hitherto supposed.
Koestler's ethical development
"A novel is not a philosophical treatise, and thus the intended
message of Peter Slavek's story could only be hinted at in an
implicit, oblique way. But I have endeavoured to clarify it in
later works, the first of which was The Yogi and the Commissar."
(Koestler A. & C. 1984: 31)
There can be no doubt that Jonathan Cape's suggestion of compiling an
anthology of essays (see page 58 above) came at the right time; it is
clear from the diaries that by 1944 Koestler felt exhausted as a
novelist and, as has been noted, the idea of compiling a series of
essays had already occurred to him.
More importantly, however, such a series of essays would emphasise
the author's ethical development. Cape had observed that many of
Koestler's magazine articles had illustrated themes from Arrival and
Departure. An anthology was, in Cape's opinion, important "when some
sort of clarity about the intellectual's position is essential. What a
fog we live in!" (MS 2373/1: 203)
With Cape's backing, this was an ideal opportunity for Koestler to
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elaborate upon the ideas aired in the ethical novels. Nor was there any
difficulty in gathering the material. Koestler had the Horizon material
to hand^, and given that Horizon readers had voted Birth of a Myth as
the most popular work in Connolly's magazine in 1943 (Shelden 1989:
83), it was perfectly natural to include such material in an anthology.
Koestler had also been busy writing for various American magazines, the
style of which he reasoned would be a counterpoint to the subtler
Horizon essays. The Yogi and the Commissar might therefore be seen as
almost incidental to the main preoccupation of Koestler in 1944, the
Zionist cause.
Tyndal1 argues that Koestler's renewed interest in Zionism was due to
two. factors: the mistaken belief that his mother had died in Auschwitz
and his wife's entrapment in France. Tyndal1 notes that Koestler played
an important part in establishing the state of Israel, a crusade she
traces to his Ostjuden background (Tyndal1 1992: Introduction). In
fact, as Scammell has pointed out (Scammell, pers. comm.), Koestler's
mother's family was one of the most distinguished Western Jewish
families in Austro-Hungary. Tyndall then suggests that when Koestler
heard that his mother was alive and his wife was safe, he turned his
attention to campaigning against Communism.
The final part of the anthology, which Koestler called Explorations,
adds weight to Tyndal1's thesis. For this contained the only material
written specifically for the anthology's publication; and of the four
new essays, three concerned themselves with what Koestler called "the
Soviet experiment" - "Anatomy of a Myth", "Soviet Myth and Reality" and
"The End of an Illusion". Certainly, these new pieces of work were the
ones that caused most controversy upon publication, with Koestler
branded an "anti-Sovieteer" and charged with "lies, half-truths and
insinuations" (De Villiers 1945: 13-16). The same pro-Stalin sentiment
that had blighted Orwell's plans for Animal Farm now brought a pamphlet
by John Lewis and Reginald Bishop protesting against the publication of
The Yogi... with its authors accusing Koestler of encouraging a
"violent overthrow of the Soviet state" (MS 2370/5).
1 "The Yogi and the Commissar" (June 1942); "Birth of a Myth" (April
943); "The Intelligentsia" (March 1944).
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However, as I have sought to demonstrate in Chapter 1, Koestler's so-
called "campaign", to use Tyndall's word, against Communism had never
really ceased since he had left the Party in 1938. Further, Tyndall's
preoccupation with Koestler's role in shaping immediate post-war
history excludes any comment in her thesis upon the ethics of Koestler
as they continued to take shape, from Darkness... and Arrival... to the
post-war friendship with Orwell. It is difficult to agree
wholeheartedly with Tyndall's argument that Koestler was partly
responsible for Western anti-Soviet feelings during the Cold War when
even the prospect of legal action (to which Koestler was never averse)
would not draw him into a debate on anti-Soviet propaganda. He
preferred not to answer De Villiers' damning article, when at least one
academic, 0. G. Backeburg of the University of Witwatersrand urged a
reply (MS 2373/4; MS 2374/1); and he told his lawyers that he wished to
pursue libel in the courts only if the court could be turned into an
arena for a wider ethical discussion. To Koestler, Stalinism was still
merely an example of the polarised ethic of the Yogi or Commissar that
he had learned to distrust. The only conclusion to be safely drawn is
that it was the non-Soviet essays and their ethical implications that
were the important parts of The Yogi and the Commissar.
2.i. KOESTLER THE SCIENTIST
The role of science
The final essay in the 1945 anthology offers important clues both to
Koestler's scientific past and to the synthesis of Yogi-ethics and
Commissar-ethics that he hoped to achieve in a hierarchical approach to
ethics. For like the Soviet essays, the piece had been written
specifically for the 1945 publication deadline.
"I have fought myself over this issue for the last quarter of an
hour and finally I have locked the gin and the vermouth in the
cupboard and settled down to my desk, feeling very satisfied
with myself." (Koestler 1945a: 227)
Indeed, it might appear from Koestler's cavalier approach to the
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writing of the sequel to the 1942 Horizon essay that the world of
science was alien to Koestler. The opening must not deceive the reader,
however. Koestler had been very much engaged with the world of science
from his student days in Vienna and now sought to look at the
contrasting figures of the Yogi and the Commissar from a fresh,
scientific angle.
He had undergone what seems like an almost Augustinian "Tolle, lege"
experience as a 19-year old student first encountering Einstein's
theory of Relativity.
"A phrase suddenly struck me and has remained in my memory ever
since. It said that the theory of General Relativity led the
human imagination 'across the peaks of glaciers never before
explored by any human being' . This cliche had an unexpectedly
strong effect. I saw Einstein's world-shaking formula - energy
equals mass multiplied by the square of the velocity of light -
hovering in a kind of rarefied haze over the glaciers, and this
image carried a sensation of infinite tranquillity and peace."
(Koestler 1952: 98)
Admittedly, in Arrow in the Blue Koestler was recalling the incident
with the benefit of hindsight, but his clear fascination with the image
of relativity, still fresh after the intervening years ("a kind of
rarefied haze over the glaciers"), does illustrate Koestler's dual
attraction to art and science.
As a student, he had then "tried to keep abreast with the
revolutionary developments in theoretical physics" (Koestler 1952:
111). In addition to his knowledge of mathematics, theoretical physics
and psychology, he also possessed at least a basic knowledge of biology
long before his controversial support of Kammerer's Lamarckian
theories^, so that in 1947 (still during what is usually referred to
as Koestler's "political period"!) Koestler was writing in his diary
entry for 9 July, "Why is there no evidence for inherited
characteristics?" (MS 2305).
p
Koestler 1971. Briefly, Kammerer claimed to have bred the toad, Alytes
ibstetricans, underwater, the result of which fifth generation toads had
nherited the acquired characteristic of spikes on their hands to assist them
n the mating process. Such a claim, if proven, would be contrary to the laws
>f Darwinian evolution, but Kammerer shot himself in 1926, shortly after the
Miscovery that some of the specimens had been faked - or, as Koestler
supposes, tampered with by another hand.
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It is clear he had also kept abreast of scientific developments after
his student days were over. In 1929, as a journalist working for the
influential Ullstein group, he had managed to obtain an interview with
the Nobel Prize Winner for Physics, Louis de Broglie (awarded the Prize
for his wave theory of matter). De Broglie was apparently more than
pleased to be interviewed by a journalist who had a "scientific
education"; they talked "for three or four hours" and the interview
occupied a whole page in Vossische Zeitung (Koestler, A. & C. 1984:
23). When Koestler returned to scientific writing in The Yogi and the
Commissar II, he was very much on home ground.
Scientific language in Koestler's writing
Koestler's scientific background cannot therefore be underestimated.
He had been aware in his years in the Communist Party of the way in
which science could be manipulated for political ends: in Stalin's
Russia, the People's Commissar for Public Education, Lunacharsky, had
made a film documenting Kammerer's work entitled Salamandra, which was
so popular Koestler had still been able to see it in Moscow six years
after its release (Koestler 1971: 3); and of course, Pavlov's
conditioning experiments had been the source of much propaganda by the
pro-Lamarckian Communist Party seeking evidence that knowledge acquired
by teaching the masses could be inherited. Koestler's evocation of
scientific language in 1945 to seek a solution to the Yogi-Commissar
dilemma is therefore his own way to out-Herod Herod and not the new
departure it would seem. Indeed, the first hint of Koestler's later
emphasis on science to define his ethical stance can be found in the
Rubashov-Ivanov and Rubashov-Gletkin hearings of Darkness..., or
possibly earlier, in Calder's view, with Koestler assuming the detached
manner of the scientist recording his experiences in a French
internment camp in The Scum of the Earth (Calder 1958: 75).
Thus, as Webber ley and others have sought to point out, the
distinction between the political Koestler and scientific Koestler is
wholly arbitrary and, in the light of all that has been said above, a
dangerous one to make. Scientific method was merely the means by which
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the Yogi and the Commissar might be analysed.
The application of science in this way had, in fact, concerned
Koestler from a much earlier date than is often supposed. It is
generally assumed that the "scientific period" of Koestler begins with
his "Cassandra has gone hoarse" statement of 1956 and the beginning of
the Janus trilogy, The Sleepwalkers. Yet the more one examines the
archival evidence, the further back one sees Koestler's application of
science to ethics and philosophy.
Two years before he announced in the preface to The Trail of the
Dinosaur his "change of vocation", the notes for the American radio
programme, "This I Believe", hosted by Ed Morrow, reveal that he was
already formulating the theory than man's evolution is flawed (but see
Chapter 3 below). And in his 1941-1943 Diary Notebook, the germ of the
holon can be seen in his notes for Insight and Outlook, eight years
before they came to fruition (MS 2305). The latter diary is dismissed
by Tyndall as being of little importance to the Koestler scholar as it
"offered very limited insights... most 1y jottings and notes for
Koestler's first science book" (Tyndall 1992: 250). Yet the truth, I
suggest, is surely the opposite: the more one is forced to push back
the dates for Koestler's scientific study, the more one can accept the
premise that the application of science was an integral part of the
development of Koestler's social ethics: there is no "scientific"
period to Koestler's life.
2.ii. THE YOGI AND THE COMMISSAR II
Destiny and freedom
Such is the background to an essay which takes Koestler significantly
further away from revolutionary ethics and the political arena towards
a more scientific analysis of the ethical spectrum he had developed in
1942.
In the previous essay on ethics, Koestler had begun by setting the
problem in abstract terms - the spectrum of behaviour which he
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postulated might be diffracted into component parts, the Yogi at the
ultra-violet end and the Commissar at the infra-red. The second essay,
in keeping with Koestler's recent pragmatism (having spent 1944
wrest 1ing with Zionism), sets the ethical problem on a practical level.
At the outset, Koestler makes plain his abhorrence of determinism.
"...the very concept of determinism implies a split between
thinking and doing; it condemns man to live in a world where the
rules of conduct are based on As-Ifs and the rules of logic on
Becauses." (Koestler 1945a: 227)
The terms Yogi and Commissar are replaced by the dichotomy between
destiny and freedom, which Koestler views as an eternal duality in
man's mental structure. The idea of destiny responds to an instinctual
need to find some organising principle, thus alleviating an innate
feeling of insecurity or anxiety (which Car let and Tyndall have made
clear are prominent traits in Koestler's personality). Its outward
form, by which the strange and threatening is reduced to the familiar,
is found in religion.
Around 1600 AD the character of destiny changed, according to
Koestler. Many phenomena became explicable purely by reason.
"Deity, whose human passions had gradually decreased with
increasing wisdom, now became entirely de-personalised...The gods
had been supermen, extrapolations on an ascending scale; atoms
and electrons were subhuman, extrapolations on a descending
scale. Destiny which had operated from above now operated from
below." (Koestler 1945a: 228)
In other words, the Enlightenment retained the idea of an enforced
order, but the seat of the organising principle had shifted.
Koestler sees a parallel development of the human mind. As the human
mind evolves, more complete explanations are sought for the world and
the divinity which operates it becomes more perfected. The paradox
between destiny and freedom now moves on to a conscious level, the
contradiction between divine omnipotence and human freedom expressing
itself in religion and myth.
"Eve eats the fruit of knowledge of good and evil against the
will of the Lord...Jacob fights the angel; the tower of Babel is
built and destroyed. The two instincts are locked in dramatic
battle and the older instinct always wins against the younger
one... On a planet with a friendlier climate populated with a
biologically less vulnerable race, mythology might take an
opposite course: each battle would end with a Promethean victory
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over the gods and the race would grow up free, self-confident,
without priests, leaders and kings - an attractive subject for
dreams on a rainy day." (Koestler 1945a: 230)
The "attractive subject for dreams" is indeed aired, precisely as
that, in the work deliberately published to coincide with the
anthology: Twilight Bar. (Alpha and Omega, the alien interlopers,
certainly fit the "self-confident" description of "biologically less
vulnerable" beings; nor is there any suggestion that their race has any
need for "priests, leaders and kings.") Suffice to say at this point
that Koestler obviously sees as little chance for a reconciliation
between destiny and freedom as he did between the Yogi and the
Commissar; note also the words "biologically less vulnerable race"
indicating that in 1945, Koestler may already have been thinking of the
possibility of the 'flawed evolution' thesis of later years.
The older instinct, destiny, thus accords man "at least the illusion
of freedom". Christianity carries the solution one stage further, by
offering humankind the reality of freedom but on a human plane;
divinity determines the world on a superhuman plane. The dilemma is
sharpened yet at the same time offers a solution by projecting the
dichotomy from the human mind onto the natural world, with God
operating on a different level than that of the humans.
The Christian hierarchy
Thus Koestler introduces his readers for the first time, in 1945, to
the concept of a hierarchy.
"The universe itself has been divided into levels of human
volition, and divine volition = destiny. The levels stand in a
hierarchic order, i.e. the laws of divine logic are impenetrable
to the human mind, whereas the latter is an open book to
divinity." (Koestler 1945a: 231)
In more primitive religions, Koestler argued, the world was
homogeneous, for it was only the increase in knowledge that had led to
the gods becoming de-personalized. The Christian world, on the other
hand, was discontinuous: separate laws operated on separate levels of
the hierarchy. He concluded
"The logical contradiction between freedom and determinism has
been solved by attributing different types of logic to different
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planes in the hierarchy." (Koestler 1945a: 231)
The Christian hierarchy is summed up by three characteristics:
1. God is an explanation of everything, but this cannot be formulated
on a lower (i.e. human or animal) level.
2. The laws of the higher level cannot be reduced to, nor predicted
from, the lower level.
3. Phenomena of a lower level and their laws are implied in a higher
level, but if such phenomena manifest themselves on a lower level -
say, higher level phenomena on a human level in the hierarchy - they
cannot be explained and therefore are interpreted as miraculous.
The final stage in the depersonalization of the divine occurred, in
Koestler's view, in the seventeenth century - "God became a
mathematician" (Koestler 1945a: 231); God, it was now argued, had
created the world according to precise mathematical formulae. Kepler's
laws of planetary motion, which had so impressed Koestler as a boy, are
perceived as eliminating the need for a "subjective operator" in the
heavens: "God dissolved into natural law; for a perfect law leaves no
scope for the judge" (Koestler 1945a: 232).
Koestler's argument is that the world remained homogenous, but on a
higher bend of the evolutionary spiral. Determinism from above had
merely been replaced by determinism from below. Koestler was quick to
point out the implications of scientific determinism. For the laws of
chemistry and physics, and later those of Darwinism and Mendelian
genetics, left as little scope for free choice as the old system of the
subjective God.
"The only difference was that philosophical jargon did its best
to obscure the conflict. By the beginning of this century,
however, philosophers grew tired of their own jargon, arguments
on 'free will' were regarded as bad form and left to the
theologians." (Koestler 1945a: 232)
By transferring the concept of a Christian hierarchy to the
scientific world, he hoped to demonstrate the primacy of the hierarchy
in understanding the world. The hierarchy now encapsulates the conflict
between higher and lower levels of reality, played out by human
consciousness. The problem of how to reconcile these levels when making
conscious ethical decisions is, I believe, at the heart of the
revolutionary ethics of Rubashov and Peter Slavek. As Webberley
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comments upon this section of The Yogi and the Commissar II,
"This passage [pp. 231-232] bears the same relationship to
Koestler's work as Darwin's study of finches bears to the forty
years he spent subsequently in checking, exemplifying and
corroborating." (Webberley 1975: 11 )
Ethical implications
Ethical systems, Koestler reasoned, are based on the implicit
assumption of free choice of action. Primitive religious systems sought
to placate the gods, their ethical systems developing so that human
free will, such as it was, might pacify the destiny determined in the
heavens: in Koestler's language, reconciling the determinant with the
determined. Ritual was a bridge between freedom and destiny.
As the deity became more omnipotent (at least in terms of our human
perception), ethics came to be dominated less by appeasement and more
by submission and humility. Free will became less important than divine
guidance. Such guidance, in Koestler's Weltanschauung, can only be
achieved by sacrificing volition, summed up in Koestler's formula, "I
will not to will" (Koestler 1945a: 233).
With the progression towards a mathematical model of the universe,
ethics followed suit by adopting a quantitative language: the greatest
happiness for the greatest number. Ethics therefore remained true to
its aim, to reconcile man's freedom with his destiny, but its code
shifted in keeping with the changing nature of the perceived deity.
"Before the change, man's condition was derived from a Fall; now
from an evolutionary Rise achieved by permanent violence in the
struggle for survival." (Koestler 1945a: 233)
Christianity had sought to make society conform to the divine order by
"Change from Within"; the new method of achieving Utopia aimed at
"Change from Without". Christian principles of submission, guidance and
meekness were replaced by domination, calculation and ruthlessness
respectively. "The saint is succeeded by the revolutionary; the Yogi by
the Commissar" (Koestler 1945a: 234).
Koestler noted one final twist to the evolution of ethics.
Explanation no longer reassured. He is not as lucid as he might be at
this point, but we can infer that as the level of mental organization
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and the growth of knowledge increased, explanations for the world
became more and more convoluted and difficult for the layman to grasp.
Also, such explanations no longer invoked the deity. Religious
determinism had once satisfied the urge for knowledge and reassurance.
Scientific determinism satisfied only the former. It no longer provided
protection by a paternal power. Koestler concludes his historic review
of ethics by suggesting that "the neglected branch" - the urge for
reassurance - was about to take its revenge by reverting to primitive
myth.
The crisis in scientific determinism
Koestler's personal knowledge and experience of the revolution that
was still taking place in science was now put to good use as he
demonstrated the shortcomings of scientific determinism to meet the
demands of quantum physics and embryology. The uncertain subatomic
world postulated by Schrodinger and Heisenberg meant that, on the
microscopic level at least, the world could no longer be fully
explained in terms of Newtonian laws. A complete explanation by
quantitative measurements was as fallacious as the old deistic
explanations of the mystics.
Koestler then draws an important parallel between the principles of
scientific knowledge and the Christian hierarchy outlined above. For
example, the atom can be understood by recourse to its own set of
particular laws, yet those same laws cannot be invoked in, or even
extrapolated from, the higher, i.e. macroscopic, level. Heisenberg's
Uncertainty Principle does not apply to the everyday world.
Science is now reverting to the hierarchy of levels of organization
it once supplanted; not as a regression into religious thought - though
Koestler fails to admit that there are quantum physicists who see their
discoveries in overtly religious terms - but as an analogy of method to
solve the paradox of freedom and determinism.
Koestler also pointed to recent findings in embryology which
suggested to him that in biology, as in physics, the stratification of
the world into hierarchic levels of organization was a necessary
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expedient. Thus, the components of a cell display different properties
in vitro, in the blastular stage and inside the mature organism. These
specific properties cannot be predicted from a lower level; nor can
they be analysed 'downwards' into their component parts. There then
follows the first statement of what was to be refined into Koestler's
most important contribution to social ethics, the holon.
"Thus the specific behaviour of wholes can only be properly
studied and described in terms of the relations of wholes to each
other, and the specific behaviour of parts only in their
relations to other parts; isolation destroys the very character
of 'part-ness'; and so down to parts of parts." (Koestler 1945a:
240)
In other words, Koestler states, freedom on one level may be destiny at
a lower level; the only way to comprehend destiny is to comprehend that
one is a small part of a greater entity. If that is what the mystics
had once said, it does not mean a victory of mysticism over science,
rather a recognition of the limitations of science within its own
deterministic principles. In effect, Koestler was stating that
deterministic science had to be put into the context of the new, post-
Einstein, probabilistic science: a theme to which he returned almost
constantly for the remainder of his life, in subjects as diverse as
parapsychology (Koestler 1972; Hardy, Harvie and Koestler 1973) and the
possibility of an after-life where Koestler adopts a non-materialist
stance (Koestler 1976).
The hierarchy was the means of putting science and history into the
larger context of a single system which attempted to explain the flaws
of Yogi-ethics and Commissai—ethics and much else besides.
Although the system was to be refined and elaborated upon over the
next twenty years, it stands or falls on the notion of the hierarchy.
Exploration and contemplation
The final part of this crucial essay deals with the different
perceptions one may have of the hierarchy of levels. Koestler compares
the hierarchy to a staircase in which the horizontal surfaces represent
the plane in which the laws of a given level operate and the vertical
steps the quantum jumps which lead to the next level in the hierarchy.
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The Scientific observer ("S") has a 'bird's-eye' view of the staircase,
so that the levels of the staircase appear to be on the same plane: a
spectrum in which the jumps are merely tiny dividing lines with no
depth or substance. The mystic or contemplative ("C") views the
staircase from an entirely different angle - head-on, as it were. The
surfaces of the steps cannot be seen from his angle, only the jumps
that separate the levels. To C, "everything becomes unexplained
mystery" (Koestler 1945a: 244).
Both ways of looking at the staircase are equally valid; religion,
Koestler observes, has indeed taught us these two ways of knowing - the
exploration of the horizontal, wordly planes and the contemplation of
the vertical order.
"The staircase of religion has only a few steep steps between
inanimate matter and divinity, roughly corresponding to the six
days of creation. The staircase of science has a great number of
more delicate steps. The difference in height between the levels
is often hardly visible, and more and finer sub-divisions are
likely to emerge. But nature knows no continuity, only jumps, and
a staircase never becomes a slope, even if the steps are made
infinitely small...in a perpendicular light the whole staircase
will always remain in shadow for him who contemplates it from the
front." (Koestler 1945a: 246)
To avoid ethical confusion, according to Koestler, we must first
establish in our minds the principle of levels of organisation.
Let us take the example of Sonia's analysis of Peter's heroism in
Arrival and Departure - the heroism that so offended writers such as
Orwell. To accuse the central character of a "loss of intelligence", as
Orwell did, was to impose the laws of rationality and logic that
operate on one plane to another plane altogether in which the behaviour
of the central character had been acted out.
Peter had behaved according to a set of principles that took into
account a higher level in the hierarchy: as had been the case with
Rubashov. The vertical jump to the next level of the hierarchy had been
made possible for Rubashov by the appearance of the Grammatical Fiction
and the discovery of the "I" - which simply had not existed on the
(lower) level inhabited by the Gletkins and Ivanovs. For Peter, it was
his guilt - ironically, something that itself emerges from Sonia's
probing of Peter - that suddenly allows Peter to take the quantum leap
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to the level of the hierarchy at which self-sacrifice is, if not
logical, certainly acceptable.
It is almost as if Peter behaves like the kind of sub-atomic particle
that had become familiar to the quantum physicists whose work Koestler
so admired: a human particle with a specific packet, or quantum, of
energy that can operate only on a specific level, and never in between
levels. What Arrival and Departure II demonstrated, in keeping with
Koestler's own acute mental depression of 1944, is that of course one
can suddenly progress downwards in the hierarchy when guilt or the
Grammatical Fiction is no longer available: this is the significance of
Peter's "Grace had been withdrawn, death re-gained (sic) its sting. He
was condemned to hope again" (MS 2317/2: 3). The withdrawal of grace
had left him floundering on a lower level of the hierarchy, from where
his actions no longer made any sense. This, too, was Koestler's own
experience in the summer of 1944, leading him to the abandonment of the
sequel to Peter's story.
In other words, the ethical hierarchy on a personal level at least is
in a constant state of flux, with different people operating on
different levels of the hierarchy, and each person understanding his
own actions according to the rules of that hierarchical level .
Moreover, the same person can find himself at different times in his
life at different levels, as Peter Slavek did; without the "energy" of
the Grammatical Fiction, actions that once appeared justifiable in
terms of conscience now suddenly appear to be no more than wishful
thinking for at the lower level of the hierarchy a different set of
rules applies. Hence grace appears withdrawn, Peter is condemned to
hope again.
Thus, what Koestler had sought to demonstrate in a very subtle manner
in his novels - the irreducibi1ity of ethical absolutes - he had now
formulated in a scientific principle, drawing on evidence from the
human and physical disciplines.
Reductionism in ethics
Koestler had seen at first hand the danger of totalitarian systems
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such as Marxism that attempt to explain all phenomena from the one
viewpoint (i.e. looking down on the staircase). The essay concludes on
a pessimistic note - something his critics were to notice in virtually
all his works from 1945 onwards - as he lists five example of the
tragedy of ethics in its insistence upon utilising a reductionist
approach (Koestler 1945a: 248).
The five "degenerated ethical systems in our time" have indeed been
encountered in the ethical novels. These can be listed as:
1 . The obsession for analysing and reducing ethical values which leads
to nihilism. Koestler quotes Dostoevsky: "When he believes he does not
believe that he believes, and when he does not believe, he does not
believe that he does not believe" (Koestler 1945a: 248). If the world
is homogeneous, its laws can be traced upward to God or downward to
chaos; reductionist ethics takes the latter course.
2. The projection of biological laws on to the level of human ethics.
Thus, Darwinian conceptions such as "the survival of the fittest" lead
to Fascism.
3. The reduction of ethics to the level of psychology. Koestler is
particularly opposed to Freudian psychology, which he likened to the
reduction of live organisms to their chemical components. 'Conscience'
in the Freudian system is traced to the super-ego: Koestler argues that
this is a reductive analysis that leaves out the essential feature of
the deed or thought analysed, namely the freedom on the part of the
subject. Hence, Peter is seen deliberately as being caught between two
opposing acts - fleeing to a neutral country or becoming engaged in the
underground movement against Fascism - and Koestler highlights the
freedom that Peter has by leaving until the last possible moment his
hero's eventual, and illogical, course of action.
In short, Freudian psychology, in Koestler's view, belongs wholly to
the deterministic science that he abhorred. The reduction of ethical
values to the level of psychology was to become one of his most common
targets, typified in his later term ratomorphism - the belief, once put
forward by behaviourists such as Skinner, that human behaviour could be
reduced to the analysis of stimulus-response reinforcement patterns as
studied in the laboratory rat.
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4. The transfer from a lower to a higher (ethical) level of
mathematical measurement. This opposite approach to reductionist ethics
is exemplified by the Commissai—ethics of Gletkin and Ivanov. Koestler
believes that we are so used to working with numbers that the logic of
applying mathematics to ethics can seem like common sense: "we accept
as quite logical that a given number of people should be sacrificed in
the interest of a greater number of people" (Koestler 1945a: 252). Such
a mathematical concept is hardly new to ethics: indeed, Jeremy Bentham
presented a 'hedonistic calculus' two centuries ago, suggesting that
factors such as the intensity and duration of the pleasure or pain
resulting from one's actions can be introduced mathematically when
deciding whether or not an action would increase the total sum of
happiness in the world (Bentham 1789), this being the central principle
of Bentham's version of utilitarianism^.
Koestler immediately highlights the nub of the Benthamite dilemma: at
what precise point does the healer's lancet change into the butcher's
hatchet?
5. The transfer of values from passive contemplation to practical
action: i.e. Yogi-ethics. The problem is that the Contemplative focuses
his attention on the vertical jumps in the staircase, and neglects the
detailed factual interrelationships on the horizontal planes. This, in
Koestler's opinion, leads to a naive and amateur approach to social
problems. Inertia can therefore replace action.
Contemplation should be the opposite of scientific or religious
dogmatism. If Koestler is appalled by the Commissar-ethics of Stalinist
Russia, he is at pains to stress that Christian dogmatism is certainly
not the only alternative. He quotes C. S. Lewis' Screwtape Letters in
which the devil gives advice to a satanic recruit:
"Above all do not attempt to use science (I mean the real
sciences) as a defence against Christianity. They will positively
encourage him to think about realities he can't touch and see.
Otherwise known as universal ethical hedonism, this is the most widely
iscussed consequential ethical theory. Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Henry
idgwick were its main champions. The theory proposes that right actions are
ctions which produce the greatest total pleasure for everyone affected by
heir consequences. Conversely, wrong actions are those which fail to produce
4iis greatest total pleasure.
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There have been sad cases among the modern physicists." (Lewis:
1940: 14)
One might think that Koestler would be only too happy to find an
eminent theologian and novelist concur with his non-materialistic view
of science. However, Koestler is quite angry with Lewis' implication
"that the only alternative to dogmatism is the Church of England, and
that the only approach to what we can't touch and see is through
Christian dogma", accusing Lewis for being "disarmingly naive coming
from a Fellow of Magdalen College in 1944" (Koestler 1945a: 254).
Koestler firmly advocates a synthesis of the two approaches of
looking at the staircase.
"The basic paradox of man's condition, the conflict between
freedom and determinism, ethics and logic...can only be resolved
if, while thinking and acting on the horizontal plane of our
existence, we yet remain constantly aware of the vertical
dimension." (Koestler 1945a: 255)
It has to be said that Koestler, as in his future scientific works, is
better at diagnosing the problem than offering a remedy. This author
shares the views of one reviewer in thinking that his own solution -
namely the teaching of contemplation in schools alongside science and
physical education - is undeniably weak and disappointing.
"It is not Mr Koestler's fault if the picture is one of utter
confusion. Neither can he be blamed that his attempts at finding
solutions for some of the problems he analyses are rather
futile." (Kloetzel 1945)
His argument that social integration can never be achieved by focusing
upon the intellect alone makes it all the more difficult for Koestler
the yogi to come forward with a persuasive argument, which would tend
to appeal only to the mind. It was difficult, if not impossible, for
Peter to convince Sonia of the Tightness of his actions; Rubashov had
encountered the same problem with Gletkin. Koestler ironically finds
himself in the same position as his fictional characters with this
essay, and admits as much in his conclusion.
"It [this integration] has to emerge, facilitated by a 'vertical'
approach which brings to the dry concepts of part-ness, love and
all-oneness the igniting spark of experienced reality. Neither
the saint nor the revolutionary can save us; only the synthesis
of the two. Whether we are capable of achieving it I do not
know." (Koestler 1945a: 256)
The notion of synthesis was to dominate his ethical thinking until his
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death, almost forty years later. Indeed, so important were the ideas in
this essay that he put them in novelistic form on one final occasion,
when in 1972 he wrote the much-underrated novel, The Call-Girls.
2. iii . THE CALL-GIRLS
Approaches to Survival
The Cal1-Girls is important to Koestlerian scholars for two reasons.
The first edition is the only written work in the Koestler canon to
contain an overtly theological, indeed Christocentric, piece .
Secondly, it can be considered as autobiographical, dealing with the
ethical implications of the hierarchy as Koestler experienced them.
The single theme to the book, Koestler later stated, is "mankind's
race towards self-destruction" (Koestler 1979: 175). The action of the
novel takes place during a global crisis. But the novel's theme is once
again the arena of free will and determinism. In short, the
protagonists of the novel face much the same choices as Spartacus,
Rubashov and Peter had encountered in the ethical trilogy of the 1940s.
(Indeed, Koestler clearly intended, though apparently failed, to imply
that Jesus faced a similar choice by shifting the Gethsemanean dialogue
between Father and Son to the march to Calvary. Cohen at least
recognises the connection between the Christological prologue and the
central story: MS 2421/1.) The novel is, therefore, a direct
continuation of the fictionalisation in Koestler's ethics, only in this
instance the ethical dilemma first raised in The Gladiators - whether
or to what extent a noble end justifies ignoble means - is sharpened
into the question: "When may man inflict pain in the interests of
The Prologue (Koestler 1972: 9-15) is based on Jesus' thoughts, as
Destler perceives them, on the way to Calvary and is noted for typical
Destlerian detail on the physical aspects of torture, and for the manner in
lich the author transmits blame for the human condition to the Creator. The
'ologue and Kafkaesque Epilogue about chimeras were removed from later
ditions as "both critics and friends" failed to see the connection between
lese pieces and the central story (Koestler 1979: 175).
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humanity?"
It requires little imagination on the part of the reader to draw
parallels at the beginning of the novel to Koestler's Alpbach Symposium
of the spring of 1968. The physical location of Alpbach, Koestler's
alpine retreat - and in 1968 the apotheosis of the attempted synthesis
that Koestler had declared his aim in 1945 - was used by Koestler in
his description of the alpine village of Schneedorf. The title of the
symposium, "Approaches to Survival", seems to mirror Koestler's urgency
and concern for the survival of the species in the light of his, and
Paul MacLean's, scientific theories on the instability of the human
brain.
The novel's participants come from a wide range of disciplines - just
as those invited to Alpbach in 1968 represented various academic
fields. As for the misleading title (for once, Koestler departed from
the antithetical formula of most of his works), the "call-girls" are
the scientists who spend their lives moving from one conference to
another, as Dr Harriet Epsom explains:
"...I am an academic call-girl. We are all call-girls in this
bus...It becomes a habit, maybe an addiction. You get a long¬
distance telephone-call from some professional busybody at some
foundation or university - 'sincerely hope you can fit it into
your schedule - it will be a privilege to have you with us -
return fare economy-class and a modest honorarium of...' Or maybe
no honorarium at all, and in the end you are out of pocket. I am
telling you, it's an addiction." (Koestler 1972: 23)
The action of the novel takes place during the week of the symposium,
as one by one the invited luminaries air their theories. But their
arguments are almost over-rehearsed and nobody listens to each other -
the breakdown of communication that Car let noted in The Gladiators
returns with a vengeance. Meanwhile, the storm-clouds of war are
gathering and one by one, the academics are recalled to their
institutions. The novel concludes with the tape-recordings of the
proceedings being deliberately burnt by Miss Carey, a subject of an
earlier experiment that had gone almost fatally wrong.
The wit and the pessimism that suffuse the book are neatly
encapsulated in the words of Claire
"There must be some calves out somewhere in a field, which I can
hear but not see - each with a bell round its neck, each tinkling
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a monologue all for itself, to which no one listens. Exactly like
having a symposium?" (Koestler 1972: 41 )
If the novel reflected Koestler's weary cynicism, at least it also
demonstrated his sense of humour - and an ability to write convincing
characterisations of women.
Not for the first time, a critic saw fit to draw a comparison between
Koestler's work and that of George Orwell. Writing in The Sunday Times,
Burton said "You might call it Nineteen Eighty-Four written to amuse
rather than to scare" (Burton 1973).
Nikolai Solovief
Few critics shared Burton's enthusiasm for Koestler's new novel. The
majority found it anticlimactic, representing as it did the first novel
for twenty years from the author of Darkness at Noon. Consensus opinion
accused the writer of using his characters as mouthpieces for
Koestlerian dialogue - "Cal1-Girls has the wrong number" wrote one
reviewer (MS 2421/1); The Cal1-Girls was said to lack the authenticity
of the ethical trilogy, the latter having drawn more directly (or so it
was said) upon the author's first-hand experiences.
As with his early novels, one should not necessarily be caught up in
what can easily become a "spot the philosopher" game trying to match
Koestler's real-life adversaries with fictional counterparts. Koestler
was always more interested in ideas than people, and by 1972
autobiography was well behind him®. Why is The Cal 1-Girls of such
crucial importance if it is so apparently remote from the Stalinist
experiences that inspired the early ethical novels? The answer, I
believe, is that the novel served a vital purpose to its author, as
Koestler's late re-evaluation and practical examination of the problems
of the hierarchy as outlined in theory in The Yogi and the Commissar
5
Harold Harris, in his introduction to Stranger on the Square, makes it
ery clear that autobiography was not at the top of Koestler's agenda in later
ife. "Many of his friends, including myself, had been urging him for years
o continue with his autobiography..." (Harris, in Koestler, A. & C. 1984:
1). It seems reasonable to conclude therefore that neither Koestler nor
arris interpreted The Cal1-Girls in an autobiographical manner.
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II.
Hamilton noted "there is much [in Niko] of Koestler" (Hamilton 1975:
101). But neither Hamilton nor Pearson, whose analysis of the novel
quite properly places it in the ethical context of the Yogi-Commissar
ethical spectrum (Pearson 1978: Ch. 8), goes beyond the simplistic
autobiographical inspiration to linking Solovief's ideas to those of
Koestler and thence back to the central characters of the earlier
novels.
At two important junctures, Nikolai Solovief's views echo those of
his literary creator - in his discovery of Kepler and the "oceanic
feeling" that comes from his contemplation of mathematics (Koestler
1972: 47); and his endorsement of the need, proposed in the novel by
Valenti, "to change the Chemistry" of the human brain (Koestler 1972:
169). The voyage of discovery that Koestler had made, from Kepler and
mathematics to Paul MacLean and schizophysiology, seems to be mirrored
in Niko. Most striking, perhaps, is Niko's apology for his initial
insistence on a psychopharmacological method of 'changing the
Chemistry', an apology that Koestler made in the Alpbach Symposium of
1968, when in Hamilton's words, he seemed to be backing away from his
notion of psychopharmaceutical salvation (Hamilton 1982: 356). Thus, in
the novel we read
"Niko made an effort to pull himself together. Where had he gone
off the rails? When he had let himself be carried away by the
idea of 'biological tampering'. If there was a road to survival,
it pointed in that direction. But did he really believe in that
'if'? The familiar, nagging pain had returned." (Koestler 1972:
170)
If it sounds familiar, compare Niko with Spartacus after the latter's
disastrous human experiment had gone as horribly wrong as the symposium
experiment upon the unfortunate Miss Carey.
"What had he done wrong, what had he omitted, to allow the horde
to wriggle from his hold...? He had walked the straight road,
evil past behind and goal in front, had turned neither left nor
right. Or was this the very error, to walk the straight and
direct road - was it necessary to make detours, to walk the
crooked roads?" (Koestler 1939: 114)
It is clear that Solovief now found himself bound by the same Law of
Detours that had ensnared Spartacus. Solovief, like Koestler in the
1 OA
aftermath of The Ghost in the Machine6, was caught up in the ends-
means dilemma in which the path for survival necessitated a very cold¬
blooded treatment of the Miss Careys of this world. The Law of Detours
applies equally to the scientist as it does to the revolutionary - as
Koestler was finding to his cost.
The picture that emerges of Solovief is of a scientist whose later
work embraced parapsychology (witness Solovief's interest in Brother
Tony, a firm believer in psi) and neurophysiology in a desperate search
for the solution to man's flawed chemistry: in other words, Solovief
and Koestler are remarkably similar.
Koestler was to admit in his suicide note that it was to Cynthia that
he owed "the relative peace and happiness" of the last period in his
life "and never before" (MS 2308). The feelings expressed in Koestler's
suicide note bear comparison with Nikolai Solovief's own sentiments:
"What kept him going through his forties and fifties was partly Claire
and the two children" (Koestler 1972: 53). Certainly some of the most
moving passages in The Cal1-Girls concern the devotion and tenderness
of Solovief to Claire, their affinity and closeness in marked contrast
to the sexual intrigue of the other symposium participants.
Finally, Claire's enthusiasm for an "emergency alliance" is
reminiscent of Mamaime's backing and energetic contribution to the
proposed 1946 Easter Conference and the unlikely partnership of
Russell, Orwell and Koestler.
Put together, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Solovief has
shared many of the experiences and aspirations of his creator, and that
these are perceived in the author's mind as important factors behind
Solovief, like Koestler, pursuing the ethical laws of the hierarchy.
The character of Solovief stands also as a direct successor to the
Rubashov. The most obvious point of contact, which has been commented
6The most obvious allusion to The Ghost in the Machine is found in
■iko's repeated warnings to the conference of a situation without precedent
i history. "In all previous generations man had had to come to terms with the
-ospect of his death as an individual; the present generation was the first
3 face the prospect of the death of the species." (Koestler 1972: 163) Almost
le same form of words is contained in the author's gloomy prognosis in The
-lost in the Machine (Koestler 1967: 322).
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upon by Pearson (Pearson 1978: 125), is Solovief's acknowledgement of
toothache, a phenomenon which is immediately identifiable to the reader
as Rubashovian.
'"Then what is serious?' [Claire]
'Don't you know? A toothache is serious...'[Niko]
'Then I am all for toothaches. Have you got one?' [Claire]"
(Koestler 1972: 142)
The suspicion, at least in my mind, is that the "familiar, nagging
pain" that returns to Solovief as he sums up the symposium's findings
is intended to remind the reader of the toothache that troubles
Rubashov at those moments when the Grammatical Fiction asserts itself.
Not only is there evidence therefore for a post-Rubashovian
experience of guilt and conscience in Solovief but we can also trace
its roots to a First or Second Hearing encounter of Solovief with
Burch, one of the materialistic scientists at the symposium. Burch
stands firmly alongside Ivanov and Gletkin in his philosophy, but
perhaps the significant aspect of this encounter is that, as Pearson
points out, Solovief fears that Burch, like Number One, might be right
(Pearson 1978: 125). Coupled with this nagging doubt is the awareness
that not all his contemporaries have survived.
"Must one's obsession with the perils of mankind exclude the
pleasure of being alive - of being alive sti11?...Perhaps the
trouble was that the prophets of doom were also the merchants of
gloom..." (Koestler 1972: 43)
Such guilt, of course, is precisely that of Peter Slavek in Arrival and
Departure. But by placing the guilt upon the character of Solovief, the
author is intentionally and openly admitting that he still remembered
Hillary's phrase, "The survivor is always the debtor" and that ethics,
for Koestler, remained a guilt-ridden occupation, thirty years after
his departure from revolutionary ethics.
The hierarchy in action
Pearson has argued that the Burch-Solovief dichotomy represents
Koestler's spectrum transposed from the political to the scientific
arena (Pearson 1980: 125). Burch is viewed in Pearson's thesis as the
new commissar. However, Pearson also admits that the yogi-commissar
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polarity does not readily translate into the scientific-ethical arena,
for Solovief, like Rubashov, is no yogi. His ethics are as ends-
oriented as Burch's: both ultimately wish to change human behaviour,
Burch by behaviourist means and Solovief by adapting Valenti's
psychopharmacological thesis to the human brain.
What Pearson fails to realise is that this is the whole point of the
hierarchical system as seen in practical ethics. Koestler had moved on
from the yogi-position with which, I have argued, he struggled in the
1940s. It is hardly surprising that Koestler has Solovief, in calling
the conference, studiously avoiding pigeonholing himself at a specific
place in the spectrum. The tragedy of the novel in ethical terms is
that each of the participants in turn does precisely that.
Burch, for example, stands for the "ratomorphic" model. Indeed, he is
identified as such by a fellow scientist at the symposium.
"...it was fashionable to warn students against the heresy of
anthropomorphism, of attributing human thoughts and feelings to
animals. Now Burch is preaching to us the opposite heresy - that
we should not attribute to man thoughts and feelings which are
not demonstrable in his rats. As my favourite writer^ has said
somewhere: the pundits of Burch's school have replaced the
anthropomorphic view of the rat with a ratomorphic view of man.
I am surprised they are not growing whiskers." (Koestler 1972:
128)
His place in the novel is therefore as an example of those who attempt
to reduce ethical values to the level of psychopathology. Burch,
meanwhile, from his own step in the staircase cannot understand the
neoFreudians.
"Show me a slice of your super-ego under the microscope and I
will believe it." (Koestler 1972: 34)
Curiously, one of the few figures to emerge in a sympathetic light from
Koestler's characterisations is a monk, Brother Tony Caspari "who will
represent the Almighty at the symposium" (Koestler 1972: 32). Brother
Tony is an unreconstructed Beloffian® dualist treated with predictable
7
A veiled reference to Koestler: see, for example, his "The Philosophy
Ratomorphism": Koestler 1967: 15.
O
After John Beloff; a more appropriate adjective to describe the
irtesian dualism of Brother Tony than, say, Popperian, as it represents a
ire empirically based dualism; see Beloff 1962. The only other empirical
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disdain by Burch who would rather believe in "little green men from
Venus travelling in flying teapots" than in mind or soul. Burch, of
course, cannot understand Brother Tony as they occupy different levels
of the hierarchy. His description of micro-PK experiments9 provokes
the most heated exchange of the symposium. Only Solovief is truly
sympathetic to Tony's argument, which places him towards the yogi end
of the spectrum: but, almost as if anticipating Pearson's contention
that the yogi is as ends-oriented as the commissar, Brother Tony points
out he is not advocating mysticism per se.
"'I should have explained that we do not regard contemplation as
an end in itself. Rather we regard the contemplative state as the
most favourable condition for our purpose, which is to tap the
powers of mind at their source....'
'I have tried to explain', Tony said, 'that we have to undergo a
rather severe training to protect us against credulity and ...
wallowing in muddy mysticism. We are not attracted by the fog,
but by the light.'" (Koestler 1972: 134, 137)
Tony continues to describe almost verbatim Koestler's description of
the scientist's approach to the staircase that leaves most of the
staircase in darkness, shedding light only on one or two horizontal
planes on the hierarchy.
Most importantly, Koestler's sympathetic handling of Brother Tony
suggests the author was still sympathetic to the existence of Third
Order reality, for his pursuit of psi clearly takes him further up the
hierarchy to the level of reality beyond the perceptual and conceptual
that Koestler had defined as the 'occult' in Dialogue with Death. It is
clear from his description of Valenti's experiments upon the
unfortunate Miss Carey that Solovief found salvation by electrodes or
drugs repugnant; from the Yogi... essays on, Koestler hankered for
spiritual rebirth: the synthesis of saint and revolutionary, Brother
Tony and Valenti.
The other participants demonstrate the truth of Koestler's 1945
:ientist of note to espouse Brother Tony's implied dualism is Sir John Eccles
'opper and Eccles 1977) but as Beloff points out (Beloff 1993: 309) Popper
id Eccles prefer the noun "interactionism" to describe their philosophy.
9i.e. Psychokinesis (PK) on a micro-scale; the pioneering work alluded
i by Brother Tony is the work of Schmidt. See Beloff 1993: 171-176.
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thesis that science was becoming increasingly fragmented and the
horizontal levels correspondingly small. Many found the arguments of
the different camps (or as Koestler would have preferred, different
levels) petty; the dialogue was seen as tedious and technical. Others
saw the novel as a faithful parody of the academic symposium circuit.
Few, if any, made the connection between this work and the theory of
the hierarchy proposed in 1945.
A failure of theory and ideas
Pearson has however attempted to elucidate Webberley's thesis that
there is a common thread running throughout Koestler's writings, as
discernible in The Cal1-Girls as in The Gladiators. Pearson proposes
that the common denominator in Koestler's work, formulated in the
Yogi... essays, is the failure of theory and ideas that has caused the
human condition of the present century (Pearson 1978: 27).
Pearson's approach is innovative, for it at once shifts the emphasis
away from the heroes of Koestler's work - Spartacus, Rubashov, Peter,
Solovief and so on - to those who represent a failed status quo: the
Roman Empire, Gletkin and Ivanov, Dr Bolgar, and Burch. It could be
argued that Koestler himself shifted the emphasis from the heroism of
the ethical trilogy to the "ethics of survival books", Thieves In The
Night (Koestler 1946) and Promise and Fulfilment (Koestler 1949a). "If
power corrupts, the reverse is also true: persecution corrupts the
victim..." wrote Koestler in a later postscript to Thieves... (Koestler
1965: 335).
The fault of the status quo, of course, in Koestlerian terms, is that
the ethical hierarchy being utilised at that moment is inadequate -
thus, for example, in the present century, the world of Newtonian
physics is inadequate to assimilate quantum physics. In Pearson's
analysis, what emerges most strongly from Koestler's historic analysis
is the failure of the Gletkins, Bolgars and Burchs to solve the
problems with which they are confronted, whether of a renegade
Bolshevik or a young war hero.
The Yogi-Commissar spectrum, in theory and in practice, is a
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manifestation of the same nonpolitical phenomenon
"
. . .the col lapse of Christianity in particular and of religion in
general as the transcendent ordering principle of Western
civilisation." (Pearson 1978: 19)
Pearson suggests that the Slaves' Revolt in The Gladiators is simply
the ultimate secular revolt against the Christian world-view. His
interpretation of the first ethical novel is that even if Spartacus had
known of Christianity, the revolt would not have succeeded for the
revolutionary praxis would have remained the same. Evidence for this,
he states, can be found in the Prologue to the first edition of The
Cal1-Girls, where "for man and Jesus alike, heaven is an illusion"
(Pearson 1978 : 41) .
What Pearson labels as Koestler's "reversal of Christian symbolism"
continues with the failure of the two trials invoked at the end of
Darkness at Noon: the trial of Christ that parallels the trial of
Rubashov are failures of ends over means and means over ends
respectively. In Arrival and Departure, the failure is more opaque: for
Peter is neither yogi nor commissar, but a man stripped of adolescent
fantasies about good and evil.
The fault in such an analysis is that it does not fully explain the
ending of Koestler's novels: the 'oceanic sense' that embraces
Rubashov, Peter's renunciation of the easy way out, the sense of guilt
and foreboding shared by the participants leaving Schneedorf. If the
"reversal of Christian symbolism" thesis is accepted, it is also hard
to understand why Koestler embraced Kepler so wholeheartedly from youth
onwards as a role-model.
Pearson anticipates this criticism by arguing that Kepler, for
Koestler, is important because he belongs to neither the old Christian
hierarchy nor the new scientific one. Both hierarchies in isolation are
fallacious: one only needs to cite Koestler's stinging attack on C. S.
Lewis to doubt that Koestler would ever accept that the most
appropriate hierarchy to adopt is Christocentric. Did Koestler ever
view the hierarchy in religious terms?
"Koestler never saw it as a religious notion. It was simply the
structure of the objective order of things, and religion has
nothing to do with it except that some religious writers had
expressed it better than others. But whereas the religious
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understanding had pointed towards an explicit teleology of human
existence, Koestler stopped short of this assertion." (Pearson
1978: 111 )
The failure of ideas that, in Pearson's view, unifies Koestler's
scientific, political and ethical work is therefore not simply "The God
That Failed" of Communism but all the gods that failed. The Yogi...
essays, and the hierarchy of modern science described in The Call-
Girls, are attempts to explain human behaviour in rational terms in a
world in which scientific determinism, Marxism and Christianity have
attempted to but failed.
Pearson's conclusion is that the characters never break free of this
irrationality - which is surely another way of restating Orwell's "loss
of intelligence" argument. Koestler's search for a rational structure
of mind is "essentially a political quest" (Pearson 1978: 136). But the
quest does not reach its goal; Pearson's portrait of Koestler is not
unlike Hamilton's: "a religious man unable to come to grips with
religion in a personal sense" to use Tyndall's summation of the two
biographies (Tyndal1 1992: 14).
Pearson's analysis undoubtedly has its merits: in particular, it
highlights Koestler's need, as expressed in The Yogi... essays, to
rationalise irrational experiences: such a need is seen as the basic
flaw in Koestler's theodicy. It also redresses the balance in literary
criticism of Koestler's novels by restating the importance of the
opponents to the heroic characters. But it does not answer the question
of why Koestler deliberately emphasised at key points in his work the
irrationality of human behaviour in situations where no logical outcome
was possible in Koestler's mind: Rubashov's confession and death,
Peter's departure, and so on. Pearson concedes that there may be
another, as yet unexplored, side to Koestler's nature. Why is it, that
as Koestler himself admitted, he found it impossible to write an infra¬
red novel without an ultra-violet [mystical] ending?
"There is a strong spiritual side to his writing that also shines
through at some of the most unexpected times. The presence of
spirit is never wholly absent." (Pearson 1978: 152)
The concept of a hierarchy has, as stated above, given a formal place
in Koestler's canon to the reality of the Third Order and the spiritual
(or "occult") world inhabited by the Brother Tonys for whom Koestler,
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like Solovief in The Cal 1-Girls, was full of curiosity, if not
admiration. It is my contention that a genuine synthesis of Koestler's
ethics will only be achieved by a recognition of the reality of the
Third Order and its importance as part of the hierarchy in which
irrational human beings move and think.
Indeed, implicit in the other major critiques of Koestler's ethical
hierarchy, (Toulmin 1979 and Hausman 1966), and explicit in Rivett
(Rivett 1947), is the assumption that the hierarchy by definition lacks
an apex. Toulmin argues that the type of scientific thinking
exemplified in The Yogi... is, in any case, outdated and that only the
Vienna school of logical empiricism would believe in conforming to the
rigid framework of thinking that Koestler regards as "scientific".
Koestler's hierarchy is reminiscent of the Leibnitz-Newton debate.
Koestler, like Leibnitz, is unable to accept what Toulmin calls a
"happenstance" view of scientific contingency. The important point to
note is that in order to make sense of the world, a la Leibnitz,
Koestler has to search for a system of ideas in which the necessity of
Divine creation becomes intelligible and apparently irrational concepts
can be understood as rational. This search, of course, began with
Rubashov, whose dilemma in prison is merely the search for a harmony
between the dictates of Newtonian reason and Liebnitzian faith on a
contemporary and human level. That, certainly, is the inference drawn
by Rivett (Rivett 1947: 91).
Thus the hierarchy, whether or not it is flawed along the lines that
Toulmin and Hausman suggest, is distinctly theological: Toulmin himself
was the first to use the phrase "theodicy" to describe Koestler's
proposed system (Toulmin 1979: 56) and represents Koestler's arguments
in wholly theological terms - sin, theodicy and logos. However, since
Toulmin's misgivings largely focus upon The Sleepwalkers, a fuller
analysis of Koestler's "theodicy" will follow in Chapter 4.
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2. iv. TWILIGHT BAR
"Escapade" or ethics?
Twilight Bar was published simultaneously with The Yogi... anthology
in a deliberate attempt to boost sales of the play, a tactic
acknowledged by his publishers (MS 2373/3: 106). Koestlerian scholars
are quick to dismiss the play out of hand as "an escapade", to use the
play's sub-title. The exception to this is Mark Levene who suggests
that the play is noteworthy for its moral theme and provides a link
between Koestler's literary and scientific output (Levene 1985: 130ff).
In marked contrast, Calder's literary analysis of Koestler refers to
the play only in the bibliography. The play's author never defended the
play in print after its publication, preferring to dismiss it as "a
flight from the pressures of reality" (Koestler 1954a: 159). This was
the impression he conveyed too to Iain Hamilton.
"Koestler himself, or so he said years later, had no inflated
ideas of the play's merits. He had rewritten it mainly for his
own amusement, describing it as a diversion, and one completely
without literary pretensions." (my italics) (Hamilton 1982: 116)
"Or so he said years later..." Hindsight is a wonderful thing, and the
evidence suggests that Koestler's later view of the play is not to be
trusted. He had, after all, been equally dismissive of one of his
greatest works, Arrival and Departure, in a radio tribute to George
Orwell in 1960, referring to Arrival... as "a very bad book of
mine"10. Also, Mamaime Koestler, whilst expecting the American
production of Twilight Bar to be "an awful flop" reports her husband's
comment that "it might be good theatre". (Goodman (ed) 1985: 24).
Finally, one would hardly expect Koestler to post a copy of the play to
one of the most influential and famous movie studio moguls if he did
not think it had some merit. Yet this was precisely what Koestler did
as soon as it was published, perhaps hoping that, through Sir Alexander
Korda, MGM might be interested in filming the play (MS 2373/4: 64).
1 0
Heppenstall, R. George Orwell: A Programme of the recorded
^miniscences. . . BBC Third Programme, Wednesday 2 November 1960. Photocopy
pescript. MS 2340/2: 24.
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A further reason for examining the ethical content of the play is the
precise date of its inception in revised form, in the summer of 1944.
Koestler's journal, as has been noted already, refers extensively to
his mental health problems of that period; Twilight Bar was rewritten
as a therapy, as it had been originally in 1933 outside a Moscow cafe;
but we now also know that Twilight Bar took the place in Koestler's
schedule of the completion of Arrival and Departure II. We know from
the marginal dates inserted alongside the manuscript of the aborted
sequel that Peter's story was abandoned on 23 June 1944 (MS 2317/2);
Koestler commenced the revision of Twilight Bar on or around 4
July11. Any work that effectively ended the revolutionary ethics
sequence of successful novels demands careful consideration.
A Benthamite Ethic
At a first glance, Twilight Bar is familiar territory. The central
character, Glowworm, is a disillusioned journalist taking refuge in the
Bar of the title.
"Basically, I am a poet, Sam. Basically I am a dreamer. I close
my eyes and dream of happiness." (Koestler 1945b: 9)
The setting is an island republic at the present time; but once again,
there is revolution in the air, except in Twilight Bar the ruthless
logic of Ivanov or the idealism of Spartacus is reduced to caricature
in the figure of Mary. An early conversation between Mary and Glowworm
would indicate Koestler is merely going to restate old arguments.
Mary: "This filthy order has lasted long enough; it shan't last
any longer."
Glow: "There I agree with you, Mary. But I don't agree with your
methods. You see, it's all a question of Ends and
Means." (Koestler 1945b: 16)
But Koestler has a new angle to explore. The consideration of
1 1
Twilight Bar was completed on August 15 "in exactly six weeks" (MS
i05) . On 24 August Koestler refers to one correspondent, Hermann Ould, that
i is "trying to finish a book" - this can only be Arrival and Departure II.
<e must conclude that Koestler did attempt to continue Arrival and Departure
after finishing Twilight Bar, although no written work from this period can
traced. Note also this is the last reference Koestler makes to the sequel.
S 2372/4: 261)
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revolutionary ethics is suddenly swept aside by the arrival in the
republic of two aliens, Alpha and Omega, - investigators from "the
Federation" - who solemnly pronounce that the earth is sick with the
pollution of unhappiness. In the galaxy, of which the inhabitants of
earth are largely ignorant, a cosmic war is being fought between the
forces of happiness and misery. Infected by the fallout from the forces
of misery, the earth has become a prime target for colonisation. With
a Wellsian knack of prophecy, Koestler describes the means by which
this colonisation will be carried out: the Delta Ray, which by killing
the earth's inhabitants but leaving buildings intact remarkably
anticipates the invention of the neutron bomb!
The final choice of planet that will succumb to the death ray will be
announced in three days. Effectively, this acts as an ultimatum, with
the selection process clear to Glowworm and his friends at the outset.
Omega: "The planet on which life has the least meaning."
Alpha: "The one where pain outweighs pleasure."
Omega: "Which lives for toil and not for leisure."
Alpha: "Where hatred is stronger than love."
Omega: "Where wisdom yields to stupidity."
Alpha: "Where value wanes before vanity."
Omega: "In other words, the unhappiest one."
Alpha: "For that planet has no aim and no justification, no
cosmic raison d'etre, nothing to regret when it
goes." (Koestler 1945b: 27)
Koestler's Utopian dreams are heard for the last time in Glowworm's
soliloquy ("Humanity's last chance to redeem its wasted milleniums") at
the end of Act I. The dreamer, in fact, gets his chance when Mary's
Gletkin-like approach to the crisis - "The events will take their
inevitable course, determined by the iron law of history" (Koestler
1945b: 43) - proves insufficient to address the problem of endemic
misery. With two days left, Glowworm takes charge initiating a
Rooseveltian "New Era" of happiness.
If, from Act III onwards, the play fails to capitalise on the promise
of the opening scenario, as many critics suggested, what follows
remains an interesting and typically Koestlerian blend of ethics and
freely adapted personal experience. Lucy echoes Rubashov's desire to
study astronomy, and Omega voices a soliloquy that reminds the reader
yet again of Koestler's hero-worship of Kepler. Pointers to the
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original Moscow composition of the play, Bar du Soleil, can still be
found, as in the Glowworm-Omega love scene in Act III and the satirical
references to Russia joining the New Era^.
Further evidence of the qualities of Koestler's writing, despite his
later protestations of its literary clumsiness, is the willingness of
several theatres to produce the play. Jean Villar produced the French
translation in Paris; the play also saw productions in America and
Scandinavia, and later revivals on German television and as a BBC radio
play (Koestler, A. & C., 1984: 73-74). The production photographs that
survive reinforce the view that Glowworm owed much to his creator - in
his light suit and hairstyle, he could easily be mistaken for Koestler
(MS 2456/3 Photo. 16). Alpha and Omega are no more unacceptable than
the sort of science fiction humanoids that Captain Kirk would encounter
in the cult series, Star Trek, two decades later, and to which, in the
production photographs, they bear a remarkable resemblance. The reviews
generally were far from damning, even if many hinted at the potential
of Koestler as a playwright rather than the quality of the play per se.
The happiness quotient
From the ethicist's viewpoint, the significance of the play lies in
Koestler's emphasis on the happiness quotient: in the mathematical
logic of Ivanov in Darkness.. .or to a lesser extent in Lentulus'
philosophy of gladiatorial survival in The Gladiators, one can detect
a hint that behind the revolutionary ethic was merely the old
Benthamite numerical philosophy: the greatest good for the greatest
number of people. Now, the numerical argument is given full rein;
statistic after statistic seems to be the only standard by which
happiness can be measured and thus disaster at the hands of the aliens
1 2
The cafe song that inspired Koestler to write the play included the
'rics "If you love me, you must steal for me" which Glowworm offers to do,
>etically at least: "We may steal your moon"/"I give it to you..." The
issian reference is found in the remark of one of the characters, Walker:
■loscow has...started a purge against everybody who is unhappy...According to




But statistics do not tell the whole story, and Koestler is aware
that the nature of the happiness as measured by his Happiness Quotient
through external means is ephemeral. In the final act, the aliens are
arrested and officials declare that their story and the ultimatum is a
hoax. Glowworm, along with the bar-tender Sam and the others, return to
their old haunts at the eponymous bar. But the conclusion is open-
ended: the three days have not yet elapsed. Might it still be possible
that the earth would be destroyed, that the ultimatum is real? It is
left to Koestler-Glowworm to voice such doubts: "Confidence Trick or
End of the World?" (Koestler 1945b: 75)
The equation of greatest happiness for the greatest number of people
had been forced upon the populace. Without the threat of extinction,
there was no reason for the equation to be tampered with in any way.
"When they were frightened they decided to be happy, because they
had no other choice. And they tasted happiness and found that it
was good; they attempted the impossible and found that it worked.
Then, when they ceased to be frightened, they said: Now that the
danger has passed we can be unhappy again; and with a sigh of
relief they rushed back to their old misery." (Koestler 1945b:
76)
The final exchange between Sam and Glowworm emphasises the state of
uncertainty as the curtain is brought down.
Sam: "Still, I would like to know whether we have been cheated
or not."
Glow: "We'll soon know, Sam. It's eleven now. In an hour it will
be midnight." (Koestler 1945b: 76)
The uncertainty is essential in understanding Koestler's ethics of the
period, and the point of the play. It is, furthermore, easily
overlooked as Koestler's precis of the play in 1954 states
categorically that the aliens are imposters^. Only at the end of his
life does Koestler state "a lingering doubt remains: perhaps the scouts
are genuine after all?" (Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 73).
Theatre critics certainly noted the ambiguous ending of the
productions of Twilight Bar in America and France. The key question -
1 3
Koestler 1954a: 158. It is possible that Koestler was remembering the
33 version and that the 1944 ending was rewritten with a more ambiguous
ding - but that in itself points to the importance of the published ending.
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will people choose happiness or obliteration? - did have added weight
in the month of the play's publication - August 1945. "He has built a
situation which would have seemed fantastic four weeks ago, but which
seems fairly realistic today" commented North (MS 2426/4). The New York
Times also noted the "timely" (post-Hiroshima) appearance of the
aliens' ultimatum, adding "its grim gaiety is neatly in the mood of
contemporary theater" (MS 2426/4). Thus, by not offering any easy
solutions to the inhabitants of the fictitious republic faced with
obliteration, Koestler captured the uncertainty of the time.
This is seen as a failing by many of Koestler's critics who see the
play's ending as a more blatant example of the ambiguity of
Darkness.... Koestler, according to his critics, is better at raising
questions than answering them and this is nowhere better demonstrated
than in Twilight Bar. Bates (MS 2426/4) accused Koestler of failing to
transcend the "either/or" dilemma in both The Yogi... and Twilight Bar.
Koestler faces the reader or theatre-goer with stark choices that echo
the choices faced by Rubashov and Slavek; what he does not do is to
make the decision for the reader himself.
There is a grain of truth in such accusations. Ethically, as in the
revolutionary ethics cycle of novels, Koestler was still seeking a way
out of the ends-means dilemma. The Benthamite happiness-quotient ideal
proposed in the play was, in his view, as unsuccessful as revolutionary
ethics had been to his earlier fictional heroes. It was therefore only
right that the play ended with no solution, leaving the theatre-goer
uncertain over the aliens' credentials. In short, Koestler himself had
not yet overcome the "either/or" dilemma.
But it is also important to remember that Koestler came from a
different, more European, background than English writers such as
Orwell, a tradition in which ambiguity may be more acceptable. This is
certainly Calder's opinion, commenting at the outset of her comparison
of Orwell and Koestler that the latter learnt his politics in a climate
of violence (Calder 1968: 15). It would be understandable if a middle-
european survivor of the Nazi "solution" was now less than ready to
offer his. The uncertainty of Koestler's work of the period mirrors the
uncertain future his readers faced in post-war Europe.
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"Koestler was really writing fiction for readers who did not know
what they were looking for." (Calder 1968: 160)
This explanation of the "flawed nature" (Calder) of his work and the
emphasis on individual characters inadequate for the performance of the
ethical duties required of them is endorsed in a letter written by
Koestler to one of his readers just before the revision of Twilight Bar
and its ambiguous ending. "The writer's job is to stimulate, but not to
work out prescriptions" (MS 2372/4: 201). The ambiguity of the play is
therefore intentional; the "stimulation" of Rubashov's confession and
death, Peter's "loss of intelligence" and departure, and the
possibility that Alpha and Omega were not frauds after all, demand that
the reader look beyond Commissar-ethics to those higher planes of the
hierarchy where one's behaviour is directly affected by one's
perception of Third Order reality.
Koestler's pessimism
The play is also essential in understanding the evolution of
Koestler's pessimism, the trait which Orwell most readily identified
with Koestler's ethics. For in spite of its apparent frivolity -
Koestler's final word on the play cites the Chief of Police's song from
the beginning of Act 1111^ - Twilight Bar is a dark work. It is fear
that drives the emergency government to improve the 'happiness
quotient' , and once the fear of destruction is removed, the perceived
misery of the status quo returns. Fear, Bates noted, had been the
dominant force behind Koestler's recent work. There was little to
commend humanity to the alien visitors; on the contrary, the idea that
the earth was the battleground for the forces between happiness and
misery does point towards the schizophysiology thesis of the Janus
works that followed. Hence Levene argues that the cosmic war is an
allegory of the "faulty brain that causes man's endemic insanity"
(Levene 1985: 130).
1 U tt"Hark, ye people, lend your ears,/Blow your noses, wipe your
ars./Gods on Olympus are your kin - / Who told you pleasure was a sin?/ Who
Id the maidens to be chaste?/ Each unkissed kiss is a deadly waste."
estler 1945b: 47; quoted in its entirety in Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 74.
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Thus, the guilt of the individual heroes of the revolutionary ethics
trilogy is now transposed to a collective group, the inhabitants of the
republic visited by the aliens. No single individual appears to be
credited with responsibility for the dilemma faced by the republic: the
flaw is shared by all humanity. Schizophysiology will give the flawed
design of the human species an evolutionary basis. Twilight Bar can be
viewed as the first work to suggest that any ethical system thus based
that does not address the flawed nature of humanity will not bring
happiness.
It also answers critics such as Rivett who argue that a Benthamite
ethic will solve the problems posed in Koestler's novels. Rivett states
that post-yog/, Koestler underestimates the "English tradition of
gradual reform" (Rivett 1947: 92).
"Since the time of Bentham, we have been trying with increasing
success not only to show that the use of good means is morally
expedient but also to justify that belief by deliberate
invention." (Rivett 1947: 92)
"The use of good means" is at the disposal of the emergency government
in Twilight Bar - yet underlying happiness for the greatest number of
people remains as elusive as ever. There is nothing to suggest that
more gradual reform than the three days allowed the republic will solve
the problem. In that respect, The Yogi and the Commissar II and
Twilight Bar make the same point, even if the actual solution is still
beyond Koestler in 1945.
Similarly, the symposium in The Cal1-Girls may only have lasted a
week (or less for some of the participants) but Koestler leaves us with
no illusions: if the symposium had lasted several years, the result
would still have been the futile stalemate in which those on different
planes on the ethical hierarchy fail to communicate their ideas to one
another. By 1972, Koestler's own pessimism would be so deeply embedded
that Harriet Epsom's observation of Solovief could almost have been
written with Koestler in mind:
"He looks like the captain of a sinking ship, determined to go
down with it." (Koestler 1972: 184)
Significantly, in the Danube edition with the Epilogue now omitted,
these words become the final sentence of the book.
One might assume that as Koestler moved away from evolutionary ethics
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towards a hierarchical system of ethics, such pessimism would be
alleviated by hope of a possible synthesis between the Contemplative
and Scientist. But by transferring the concept of guilt to the group
rather than to individuals, the power of the individual conscience or
Grammatical Fiction to cause a shift in hierarchical thinking is
radically weakened. Grammatical Fiction acts upon individuals, not
species.
Hence the philosophical isolation which Levene traces to this
important period in Koestler's life (Levene 1985: 149) mingled with a
sense of theological frustration. The guilt of individuals such as
Rubashov or Slavek is relatively easy to assuage. But once Koestler
begins to think of an inherent flaw in the human psyche, as I hope I
have shown was the case in 1945, it requires something much more
dramatic than individual guilt to provide the impetus for a shift in
hierarchical ethics. Carlet - "Faith is the last resort through which
Koestler can entertain hope for the future" (MS 2317/2: 161) - and
Levene have both observed the importance of Koestler's faith that the
failure of evolutionary ethics served only to strengthen, yet neither
has explained it. But by stressing the shift in guilt from the
individual to the group, as I have attempted - and which Koestler
demonstrates in the feeling of shared despair and responsibility at the
symposium's failure in The Cal1-Girls - such faith is understandable.
Unfortunately, Koestler does not define his new faith in The Invisible
Writing, but as Carlet states, merely reminds us that it grew in his
later novels (MS 2317/2: 159).
One can deduce from my thesis thus far that Koestler's faith was
inextricably bound up with his perception of the reality of the Third
Order. How else other than a belief in the eventual recognition by the
group of the existence of the Third Order can the group's happiness
come about, in the light of the "catastrophic gradualism" exposed in
1945? Koestler's problem, and the primary reason for his pessimism was
that
"Nowhere he looked in Western Europe was there any suggestion of
vital belief, much less of a new god evolving through the ethical
consciousness of men." (Levene 1985: 150)
"Vital belief" should not be interpreted as Koestler's endorsement of
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mysticism per se. His continued abhorrence of the word, the stress upon
a synthesis of Yogi and Commissar, and the fact that the mystical
"ghost" scene was rewritten at Koestler's insistence in the
dramatisation of Arrival and Departure, suggest that Koestler still
sought a system that was readily amenable to rational analysis. But
"vital belief", when all is said and done, is what separated Rubashov
from his interrogators (at the end), Peter Slavek from Sonia,
Koestler's portrayal of Richard Hillary from many of his non-flying
compatriots. The point is that "belief" is only applicable to an
invisible, arguably irrational world beyond what we can see and know -
beyond, therefore, the perceptual and conceptual orders of reality that
Koestler described in Dialogue with Death. "Vital belief" describes
Koestler's attitude to the existence, or otherwise, of the Third or
spiritual Order of reality. Koestler's pessimism was due to the fact
that so few others saw things his way.
"Change of heart": metanoia in Koestler's writing
If Benthamite ethics are found wanting in Twilight Bar, Orwell also
warned against the dangers of "Catastrophic Gradualism" in his essay of
the same name, published shortly after Yogi... and Twilight Bar (Orwell
and Angus 1970b: 33-36). Orwell strongly opposes the argument that one
must not protest against purges, deportations and secret police forces
because these are the price that has to be paid for progress. If each
era is, as a matter of course, an improvement upon the last, then it
follows that any crime that drives history forward can be justified.
Orwell then raises the question: What is progress? "At this point one
has to call in the Yogi to correct the Commissar" (Orwell and Angus
1970b: 35). Koestler is usually deemed, according to Orwell, to be
close to the Commissar end of the spectrum: the post-Communist Marxist
of Rivett, Pearson and others. In other words, Orwell upheld the
established view that Koestler was a humanist. References to spiritual
reality in any shape or form are merely a novelist's invention, leading
Koestler to a dead end; specific references to a Wordsworthian quasi-
mystical "sea of eternity" at the end of Darkness... (Orwell's "poplar
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trees" as he remembered it!) mere references to childhood memory.
Koestler the Commissar is certainly behind Glowworm's action.
Glowworm epitomises Orwell's summing up of Koestler: "He believes in
action, in violence where necessary, in government..." (Orwell and
Angus 1970b: 35) But Glowworm's reforms do not succeed, however the
ambiguous ending may have been reworked in 1944. The change of heart is
crucial for humanity to advance. Koestler, Orwell reasons, does not
claim that a "religious change of heart" is essential before political
improvement. True, but for Koestler a change of heart must happen.
We can conclude therefore that the significance of The Yogi and the
Commissar II, taken together with Twilight Bar, is that Koestler's
1944-45 work strengthens the emphasis on metanoia in Koestler's writing
and sows the seed of the idea that a flawed design, rather than
individual guilt, lies at the heart of the failure of revolutionary
ethics. Secondly, these two pieces of work, arguably much more than the
Arrival and Departure novels that Orwell found so problematic, bring
Orwell and Koestler very close to one another in their suspicion of the
"English tradition of gradual reform" and their pessimistic view of
humanity. With Koestler's recent writing in the forefront of Orwell's
mind in the autumn of 1945 when "Catastrophic gradualism" was written,
the two writers now found they had a great deal in common. The
fictional character of Peter Slavek, had he returned, would have done
little to cement a friendship that meant such a great deal to Koestler.
Better, therefore, to leave the sequel to Arrival... unfinished and
focus on the possibilities of co-operation raised in his letter to
Orwell of 18 October 1945.
2.V. THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT OF 1945-46
"Psychological disarmament"
"I would very much like to talk to you about a number of things
in which we are both interested." (MS 2374/1: 136)
By the time Koestler wrote these words to Orwell in October 1945, the
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two friends were sufficiently close to one another both personally and
ethically that Koestler's invitation to spend Christmas in the
Koestlers' farmhouse retreat of Bwlch Ocyn received a positive
response. Indeed, the writer of Animal Farm and his adopted son,
Richard (then nineteen months old) were, with Celia, the only guests at
Bwlch Ocyn for Christmas 1945 (Goodman (ed) 1985: 24). On a personal
note, Orwell seemed attracted to Koestler's sister-in-law, Celia, and
Koestler may have harboured a fond wish that Orwell might in fact marry
Mamaine's twin sister.
More importantly, Orwell and Koestler had found themselves on the
same side in defending freedom of speech after the arrest in April 1945
of the editors of a Freedom Press publication, War Commentary.
According to Crick, Orwell was "outraged. He regarded the Government's
decision to prosecute as a political decision which promised badly for
freedom of speech in peacetime" (Crick 1980: 344). With the National
Council for Civil Liberties either ambivalent or downright hostile to
the anarchists, Orwell then found himself actively participating in a
voluntary body for the only time of his life, in his role as Vice
Chairman of the Freedom Defence Committee. Its Chairman, Herbert Read,
wrote to Koestler prior to the trial urging Koestler to join the
sponsors of the Committee. In retrospect, it sounds an insignificant
event: but to Koestler, the freedom to argue had been at the very
centre of Rubashov's stand against Gletkin.
Perhaps Koestler, like Orwell, found the Freedom Defence Committee
too narrowly concerned with defending the cause of victimised British
Left-wingers for his European perspective. From "a number of things" in
Koestler's mind in October 1945, and the Christmas visit, Koestler now
focused his attention specifically upon drawing up a broader committee,
or League, which would redefine "democracy" in the aftermath of the end
of the War, particularly by stressing the need for the exchange of
information between the superpowers. This, Koestler thought, would lead
to "the abatement of suspicion" - what he termed psvchological
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disarmament. The existence of the draft petition and the
memorandum1®, and its attribution to Koestler as the primary author,
is important in understanding how the theories of The Yogi and the
Commissar are implemented in practice.
The proposed "League"
The Christmas visit of Orwell to Bwlch Ocyn, in which the idea of "a
new League" (Goodman (ed) 1985: 26) was raised, was followed a few days
later by a similar discussion with Bertrand Russell, who lived nearby
in Llan Festiniog. Mamaime wrote in her diary on 10 January 1946
"Russell seemed to agree with K's ideas, though he didn't want to
be involved and said he thought the first step should be a
conference of any 12 people with special qualifications, who
should discuss what to do to prevent an atomic war." (Goodman
(ed) 1985: 26)
This re-emerged in the plot for The Cal1-Girls, where the philosophy of
the proposed League and the urgency behind it are hinted at in Bruno
Kaletski's opening remarks to the Symposium: "trying to foster mutual
understanding between races and nations" (Koestler 1972: 69) sums up
Koestler's aims as a practical ethicist in 1945-46.
Russell's misgivings were, according to Koestler at the time, due to
the fact that he had confided to Orwell that it was "too late to start
any sort of ethical movement, that war will be upon us soon..." (MS
2345/2: 13). In fact, this was not the case. Both Koestler and Orwell,
with their journalistic background and previous involvement as war
correspondents, saw that the media had a role to play in "mutual
understanding between races and nations" and in due course, when
Koestler drafted the petition, emphasis was placed on the freedom of
information between nations. But Russell came to the discussions from
a different background. As he later explained to Koestler, it was this
1^Crick (Crick 1980: 450) acknowledges Koestler as the source for the
■morandum (drafted by Orwell) that Crick refers to in Chapter 15. It is
ghly probable that the memorandum to which Koestler referred on several
casions (Crick's interview with Koestler on 19 October 1972 and Angus'
terview with Koestler on 30 April 1964) is the manifesto now housed in the
well Archive for the League for the Rights and Dignity of Man (see below).
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emphasis on the media that Russell found unacceptable (MS 2345/2: 87).
Thus the "ethical movement" that Koestler had hoped would be a
quadripartite alliance became a tripartite movement between Gollancz,
Orwell and Koestler. The primary aim of the petition was to counter the
dangers of Commissai—ethics spreading in post-War Europe. Mamaime wrote
to Celia on 14 Apri1
"K has hatched a new plot to save the world from the Russians:
Russell agreed to it so we (K and I) drafted a petition about
it." (Goodman (ed) 1985: 29)
Mamaime was premature in assuming Russell agreed with the wording of
the petition. But the significance of this short letter is that it
makes it quite clear "we (K and I)" drafted the final petition
regarding psychological disarmament and that Orwell's role was
therefore confined to the prior manifesto to which Crick refers. The
phrase "psychological disarmament" first appears in Orwell's letter of
2 January 1945 to Koestler (MS 2345/2: 6). It seems likely that
Koestler alighted upon this phrase and then elaborated upon the concept
in the petition, which bears the hallmarks of being Koestler's work
rather than Orwell's. The petition and the idea of "psychological
disarmament" very quickly appeared in the guise of an influential
newspaper article in The New York Times in March 1946, later reprinted
in The Trail of the Dinosaur (Koestler 1955: 17-24) with no reference
whatsoever to Orwell - though cynics might argue that Koestler had a
blind spot when it came to acknowledging the contribution of others in
his own ethical writings.
Certainly it was in Koestler's hands that the petition found its
champion: he saw the petition as merely the first step towards what he
called "Renaissance (sic) - A League for the Defense (sic) and
development of Democracy" (MS 2345/2: 13) - a more specific title than
Orwell's "League for the Freedom and Dignity of Man".
The draft petition
The petition that Koestler and his wife worked on at Bwlch Ocyn in
the early months of 1946 does not appear to have been published by any
of Koestler's or Orwell's biographers, though Hamilton notes the
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important connection between the petition and the New York Times
article (Hamilton 1982: 105-114); it is therefore reproduced in
Appendix 2. Koestler did see fit to reprint part of the petition in
Stranger on the Square (Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 42-43), with important
differences to the typescript draft I have examined: Koestler
originally intended the "first step...would be an agreement between
Great Britain and the USSR", again indicating his editorial control of
the draft petition submitted to him by Orwell in January in which the
agreement was to be between "The Big Two of Europe" and the USSR.
In the petition, Koestler sees the different ethical systems of East
and West as the cause of the mutual tension and suspicion that now
threatened a third World War "within the next few decades". Therefore,
his aim was the abatement of suspicion, or what he termed
"psychological disarmament", as opposed to "psychological armament" or
"the extent to which a government obstructs the free exchange of
information and ideas with the outside world". This of course is a
restatement of the problem he had first identified in The Yogi and the
Commissar essay of 1942: namely, the inability of the Yogi or Commissar
to communicate - that is, to exchange information and ideas -with one
another. The petition is thus Koestler's attempt to reconcile the Yogi
and the Commissar by the mutual sharing of information and ideas.
It is also a practical exercise, rather than the academic essays with
which he had been associated until now. Koestler calls for free access
of British newspapers, books and films to the general public in the
Soviet Union and vice versa - the latter is important, for one factor
behind Russell's cooling enthusiasm in April and May 1946 is the
suggestion that the document and the proposed League betrayed an anti-
Soviet stance. Russell referred, in a letter of 13 May 1946, to
differences in "important matters of principle and policy", stressing
that, in his opinion, the term "psychological disarmament" should apply
to all powers - something Russell maintained was not clear in the draft
petition he had examined. Koestler did as much as he could to put this
idea into practice: he and Orwell corresponded regularly over the next
two years over the publication of illicit Ukrainian translations of
Animal Farm and Darkness at Noon aimed at reaching Ukrainian "displaced
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persons" in Germany (MS 2345/2).
"A country which builds a Maginot line of censorship from behind
which it fires its propaganda is committing psychological aggression"
he wrote in 'A Way to Fight Suspicion' (Koestler 1955: 22), but rather
than retaliating with counter-propaganda, he wanted the Western
governments to take the initiative and start the process of
"psychological disarmament". Revolutionary ethics, as deployed by
Gletkin and Ivanov, relied upon restricting the amount of information
freely available to people like Rubashov. Perhaps Koestler reflected on
this as he drafted the important paragraph (8) of the petition.
"I do not know whether this is a counter-revolutionary,
Trotskyite, or Fascist suggestion: but I do know that if it were
carried out, if the doors of the hothouse were opened to the sun
and fresh air of the world's natural climate, the next war (which
will mean the end of us all, including the people of Russia)
could be avoided...Psychological disarmament would almost
automatically lead to material disarmament... and make isolation
the more superfluous. The present vicious circle would be
reversed." (Koestler 1955: 23)
Note "the present vicious circle would be reversed". The choice of
words may be coincidental, but The Vicious Circle was to have been the
title of Darkness at Noon until Daphne Hardy quoted Milton (Levene
1985: 55). It might be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the
practical ethical exercise of the draft petition, which itself arose
from Koestler's perception of the Yogi-Commissar ethical dichotomy, was
intended as a reversal of revolutionary ethics.
The League for the Freedom and Dignity of Man
Koestler's reminiscence that the 1946 petition predated "by several
decades Amnesty International and the Western approach to the Helsinki
Agreement, but aiming in the same direction" (Koestler, A. & C. 1984:
44) is a bold claim that, if supported by corroborative evidence, would
support my thesis that Koestler had moved away from Commissai—ethics
and towards an ethical synthesis that asserted the importance of the
individual, as the Yogi in Koestler would wish, whilst dealing with the
problems of democracy and good government that were the focus of the
Commissar.
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The question that might be raised, therefore, in the light of
Koestler's own expressed intention to search for a synthesis between
the Yogi and the Commissar, as outlined in the second Yogi... essay, is
whether Koestler attempted such a synthesis himself or with others.
Crick's evaluation of the petition (Crick 1980: 345) suggests he did;
but the petition itself is not incontrovertible evidence, nor is the
New York Times article reprinted in The Trail of the Dinosaur. For
"psychological disarmament" alone is hardly sufficient grounds for
comparing Koestler's ideas with Amnesty International. The petition
makes no reference to political prisoners nor does it provide any
indication of "lobbying on behalf of political prisoners and against
oppressive laws everywhere" (Crick 1980: 345), such factors apparently
being the subject of a "memorandum" or "manifesto" alluded to, but
unpublished, in Crick's study (Crick 1980: 450).
Fortunately, corroborative evidence does exist to back up Koestler's
claim. The document in question, housed in the Orwell Archive, is a
manifesto we can date to early January 1946, for a League for the
Freedom and Dignity of Man and appears to be in Orwell's typing (0A15
20/1 - 20/2), forwarded to Koestler for further comment and amendments.
The document begins by setting down the context for such a League.
"During the past fifty years it has become apparent that the
nineteenth century conception of liberty and democracy was
insufficient. Without equality of opportunity and a reasonable
degree of equality in income, democratic rights have little
value." (0A15 20/1)
(This has all the hallmarks of Orwell's authorship: "equality of
opportunity" and "equality in income" are Orwellian rather than
Koest1erian themes).
It is important, therefore, that freedom of speech and the press, the
right to political opposition and an absence of police terrorism are at
the centre of true democracies. However, it is argued, many people in
Britain are unaware of such rights. Hence
"the time has come to form a new organisation to do the work
which such bodies as the League for The Rights Of Man were
supposed to do and failed to do." (0A15 20/1)
The League was to have a two-fold task of theoretical clarification and
practical action. The State needed to guarantee every citizen "equality
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of chance" and protect him against economic exploitation or the
limiting or misappropriation of his creative abilities with the minimum
of interference.
It is under the heading "practical action" that the origins of
Amnesty International can possibly be seen: the League was
"to make itself the advocate of infringements against the Rights
and Dignity of Man, whether they occur in the British Empire or
in Russian occupied territory." (0A15 20/2)
This would involve defending the individual
"against arbitrary arrest, imprisonment without trial, punishment
under retrospective laws, arbitrary displacement or restriction
of movement or of the right to nominate and vote for candidates
of his own choice" (0A15 20/2)
To further its aims, a magazine would be issued, quarterly then monthly
when the League had established itself, to assist the international co¬
ordination "between individuals and groups in various countries
pursuing similar aims". Other organisations undoubtedly already existed
- Orwell had in his possession the declaration of the Ligue
Internationale Pour La Defense Des Libertes Humaines, but in spite of
the Internationale adjective such leagues were largely national or
localised campaigns. Orwell lamented in the manifesto that there was no
mutual contact at present. In practical terms, the emphasis on co¬
ordination between countries and the focus on infringements against
individuals by means of imprisonment and torture undeniably predate the
aims of Amnesty International.
It is, of course, important too to note that once more we see
Koestler, by his enthusiasm for Orwell's manifesto, implicitly fighting
for the defence of individuals and, therefore, championing the Yogi-
ethic .
A practical synthesis of Yogi- and Commissar-ethics
Of course, it can be argued that Koestler was once again, in Car let's
terms, emulating his childhood hero, Baron Munchausen, by taking part
in the action - "driven", as Orwell wrote in the manifesto "by the
sense of urgency in the age of the atomic bomb" - to counter his
growing feeling of helplessness; or, in Faulks' thesis, embracing the
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idea of a League as part of the "man of action" mainstream of English
literature, to which Koestler now clearly belonged.
But just as there is more to the League than a statement of practical
intent, so it is reasonable to read into the League precisely the sort
of synthesis between the concerns of the Commissar (the centrality of
democracy and the need for socio-political ideals) and those of the
Yogi (the need for individual freedom, particularly freedom of
expression) that Koestler had seen as diametrically opposed ethical
opposites in human history. Interestingly enough, perhaps with
Koestler's recent essay in mind, Orwell had used the word synthesis in
the manifesto itself.
"The programme for the Rights of Man has to be restated in the
light of developments since the French Revolution...A synthesis
has to be found between political freedom on the one hand and
economic planning and control on the other." (my italics) (0A15
20/2)
In fact, the question of balance, or synthesising apparently opposite
ethical opinions, had been aired by Orwell himself in his War Diaries,
as for instance when he noted on 27 April 1942 that no-one was capable
of "balanced judgment" or of seeing an opposite point of view -
insensitivity that, he confided in his diary, made him despair (OA 7/4:
13). It says something of Koestler's synthesis argument that Orwell had
seen its merits even whilst preoccupied by the practicalities of living
in London during the Blitz.
My thesis that the League demonstrates a synthesis of the two types
of ethical poles in Koestler's spectrum is given weight by Orwell's
plea that whilst the League should be "tolerant of divergent opinion",
it should be "uncompromising in its fight against any tendency to
subordinate ethical values to opportunistic expediency" (0A15 20/2) -
in other words, it must avoid the subjugation of means to ends that lay
at the heart of Commissar-ethics whilst recognising the value of
ethical stances other than the authors' (or, for that matter, the
League's) own .
In other words, the League seeks to combine the individualist ethic
of the Yogi with the society-orientated goals of the Commissar into an
ethic that is not only a synthesis of the two approaches but higher
than both. Bitter experience had suggested to both Orwell (from those
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observations contained in his War Diaries) and Koestler (as someone who
had been imprisoned without a proper trial) that such a synthesis was
not only desirable but necessary if the pitfalls of Commissar-ethics
were to be avoided in post-war Europe.
The Law of Detours in action
In the months following circulation of the League manifesto and
Koestler's final editing of the petition, the petition (and possibly
the manifesto, though there is no evidence for this) was circulated
among Orwell, Gollancz, Russell and Koestler. In June, Gollancz was
still enthusiastic, writing that he was "tremendously in favour of your
[Koestler and Orwell's] new league for the Rights of Man...this should
be pressed on with immediately" (MS 2345/1: 68). But Russell's
collaboration, Koestler wrote, had been "meanwhile withdrawn" for the
reasons stated above - although later Koestler was to dwell almost
entirely upon the personal acrimony with which he viewed the matter in
retrospect, and implicates Russell's wife as the prime factor in the
project's demise (Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 43-44).
In fact, the failure of the project sheds light on precisely those
ethical laws that Koestler had set down in The Gladiators. The failure
of the project was the failure of one man (Koestler) to communicate his
ideas to the wider group, just as Spartacus had failed to do. Koestler
perceived that group co-operation was a prerequisite if the project was
to succeed, doubtless with the lessons of the failure of Spartacus'
revolutionary ethics in mind. He wrote to Russell by return of post to
a crucial letter in which Russell had laid out his misgivings over
paragraph (8), emphasising in his reply, as he had done in The
Gladiators, that it is the chorus and not solo voices that influence
history (MS 2345/2: 87, 90). Russell's final letter on the subject was
merely to suggest that Koestler sign the petition as an individual.
This Koestler was not prepared to do.
Koestler appeared undeterred in the face of Russell's withdrawal of
support. He was ready for compromise, telling his friend Manes Sperber
that the petition was "meant as a very tentative draft" (MS 2374/1:
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390) and urging Gollancz to make "any alterations you like: neither
Orwell nor I have any copyright or vested interest in this matter" (MS
2345/1: 70). Almost inevitably, this acted as an invitation for lengthy
discussions between Gollancz and Koestler over the exact wording of the
petition. Koestler's enthusiasm wanes almost visibly with the passing
of each letter and each minor correction or criticism. Koestler thus
experiences the Law of Detours for himself; unable to press ahead
regardless of criticism and personal rancour, he bent over backwards to
retain the support of his friends and influential figures such as
Russell even if Russell was hardly likely, from his philosophical
background, to agree with Koestler's ethics^®. By attempting to meet
his critics halfway, as Spartacus had also done, and avoiding the
dictum of the Law - to be ruthless for the sake of compassion - the
project was doomed to failure.
Spartacus' failure had been a failure of communication and shared
ideals, and perhaps ultimately this was the reason for the League's
failure. Certainly, as far as the rift between Russell and Koestler is
concerned, the tensions are barely disguised in the fictionalisation of
the League in The Cal1-Girls.
Bruno Kaletski's opening remarks to the Schneedorf symposium mirror
the pessimism of Russell at the proposal of the League, particularly
Russell's belief that nuclear war was imminent. Indeed, the symposium
itself in The Cal1-Girls, whilst outwardly modelled on Koestler's
Alpbach gathering of 1968, has its genesis in the Snowdonia conference
that Russell aimed at in 1946 but which never materialised.
Tyndall erroneously attributes the idea of the Conference to Orwell
and Koestler (Tyndall 1992: 159-161). It is clear from Koestler's
correspondence that the proposal for a Conference was Russell's idea.
(Its failure was primarily attributed by Koestler to the withdrawal of
support, organisational and financial, by its potential sponsors,
Humphrey Slater and Rodney Phillips, on the grounds that their support
of the League would compromise the purely theoretical nature of their
1 6Russell's espousal of identity theory - see Popper, in Popper and
:les 1977: 82-83 - would certainly make him disagree with Koestler's
ilosophical concept of the three orders of reality.
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magazine, Polemic.) Nor is there any suggestion that the "proposed
meeting in Wales would be a propaganda move" (Tyndal1 1992: 160) when
the petition echoes the neutral stance of the League's manifesto in
asserting that the "arrested bloodstream of the world" - a typical
Koestlerian physiological analogy - rather than any single country or
bloc was Koestler's focus of attention. As Koestler wrote to Orwell on
9 January 1946
"He [Russell] thinks it is too late to start any sort of ethical
movement, that war will be upon us soon, and that more directly
political action is necessary to prevent it. He suggests that a
conference should be called with no more than a dozen people who
are all experts - one expert on the Far East, one on Science,
Propaganda, etc., to work out a programme of action. He himself
is ready to read a paper but not to act as a convener. . .1 believe
his idea for a Conference can be fitted into our plan and that
the people at such a Conference would be in favour of initiating
an organization on our lines." (MS 2345/2: 13)
Fiction it may be, but one recalls Solovief's reflections on Bruno's
refusal to sign the petition in The Cal1-Girls.
"'Bruno will talk and talk and sit on the fence. In the end he
will say he cannot sign because he is a member of several
official bodies...In matters of Weitanschauung we have no common
language. I am not sure whether they care. They might regard
caring as sentimental. But we had to have them to complete the
spectrum and avoid giving the impression that we are biased.'"
(Koestler 1972: 80)
It is possible to argue from the above that Koestler had been seeking
a reconciliation of Yogi-ethics and Commissar-ethics in the proposed
League and that the spectrum (or the hierarchy in The Yogi and the
Commissar II) needed to be fully represented if the League, or even the
petition, was to succeed. But just as the League demonstrates
hierarchical ethics in action, so its early demise demonstrates the
difficulties of applying such an ethic in practice, difficulties which,
as stated above, hark back to the difficulties of communication faced
by Spartacus. Koestler, in attempting a hierarchic ethic, was in a
singular minority. He does not disguise his contempt of Russell's
philosophy in Solovief's summation of Bruno Kaletski and indeed all
those who could not see beyond their own level of the hierarchy.
"'But though we hate each other's philosophical guts, emergencies
create alliances. They may co-operate out of opportunism, to be
on the band-waggon. Or they may not. Then at least we shall have
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tried, and to hell with them.'" (Koestler 1972: 80)
Conclusion
If Koestler's frustration at the time is apparent from his later
fictionalised account of the abortive League, it does at least
demonstrate how much he had moved on from revolutionary ethics. It is
also evidence that, in practical as much as theoretical terms, Koestler
sought to bring together the Yogi and the Commissar. Radical action was
required; Koestler shared Orwell's contempt of "catastrophic
gradualism" as Twilight Bar makes clear, and this helps explain the
urgency with which the League was proposed.
Quite simply, the League might well have come to fruition but for the
lack of support at the last minute from Slater and Phillips and the
intransigence of Russell; the continuing strength and worldwide
influence of its true descendant, Amnesty, demonstrates only too well
the power that is to be harnessed when Yogi-ethics and Commissai—ethics
are combined to form a higher ethic that acknowledges the strengths of
the two poles. Orwell continued to find the lack of any organisation
that highlighted individual freedom and democratic rights a serious
deficiency in post-war Britain. Exactly a year since the demise of the
proposed League, Orwell still felt strongly about the need for such an
organisation, as the recently discovered letter to Koestler shows:17
"the point is that the N.C.C.L. [National Council for Civil
Liberties] became a Stalinist organisation, and since then there
has been no organisation aiming chiefly at the defence of civil
liberties." (MS2375/1: 249; incorrectly filed)
But the League's co-founder had moved on in other ways. Individual
1 7
The letter I found from Orwell to Koestler, dated 21 March 1947 is
listed in Orwell and Angus 1970b and the Orwell Archive where no copy of
is letter existed. It is miscatalogued in the Koestler Archive. The contents
/eal their importance to Orwellian scholars: Orwell's identification of
larchists" as "moving spirits" in the Freedom Defence League and his
sumption that the Freedom Defence League might yet become the organisation
and Koestler had wished for twelve months earlier occupy much of the
.ter. The letter ends with an oblique reference to the continuation of
]efceen Eighty-Four on his return to Jura, the appalling winter of 1946-47
I Richard's progress. See Davison (ed.) 1997: 84, Item 3196A, for its new
ation in Orwell's collected writings.
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guilt no longer concerned Koestler; he had begun to think of an
inherent flaw in the human species, and analogies of such a medical
diagnosis begin to emerge at precisely this point in Koestler's
writing: the hints at the schizophysiology in Twilight Bar, the need in
the petition to restore "the arrested bloodstream of the world"
(paragraph 9) and Koestler's pessimism not based on individual or even
government action but upon humanity at large.
Such a flaw required an almost theological solution, as Toulmin
points out. The abortive League indicated to Koestler that practical
action, even when based upon his own belief in hierarchical ethics, was
futile. On only one more occasion would Koestler immerse himself in
such a crusade, in his involvement in the anti-hanging campaign. The
special reasons for this shall be discussed in Chapter 3.
Meanwhile, he and Polanyi set to work on a book that, according to
Koestler at the time, would solve the problems he had encountered as a
practical ethicist. This was eventually published as Insight and
Outlook. As he wrote to a friend in December 1945,
"I have just finished...my Palestine novel, and am starting on a
very fat book on psychology which solves all problems and will
get the Nobel Prize (for Science). Misi [Polanyi] and I have
become great friends and are going to save the world together. So
for the next few months there is enough to do and I must close
lest world-saving be delayed." (MS 2374/1: 196-197)
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CHAPTER 3: THE HOLON
Introduction
In this chapter, I shall examine the culmination of Koestler's
ethical theories: the concept of the holon set out in Insight and
Outlook. The theory of holism was not in itself new, as Koestler
acknowledged. It emerged in biological thinking as a theory, developed
by Smuts (Smuts 1926) that whole entities, and above all living beings,
have specific characteristics which differ from those of their
individual parts. Koestler, taking his cue from disciplines such as
Gestalt psychology, recognised that holistic thinking could be used to
expand the notion of hierarchy he had put forward in The Yogi...
essays. Members of a hierarchy, like the Roman god Janus, have two
faces looking in opposite directions. "To talk of sub-wholes...is
awkward and tedious" Koestler later wrote, and so he proposed
"to coin a new term to designate these nodes on the hierarchic
tree which behave partly as wholes or wholly as parts, according
to the way you look at them. The term I propose is 'holon', from
the Greek holos = whole, with the suffix on which, as in proton
or neutron, suggests a particle or part." (Koestler 1967)'
I shall then describe the mechanism of bisociation which is at the
centre of this crucial work, as the means by which individuals may move
up the ethical hierarchy.
With the publication of The Trail of the Dinosaur, prefaced by the
author's now-famous pronouncement that "Cassandra has gone hoarse",
(Koestler 1955:viii) Koestler then began what scholars such as Hamilton
or Crick see as a different, and scientific, phase of his life.
Certainly, the "self-consciously big books" that followed (Crick 1989a:
65) appear to owe more to physiology than politics. But I shall attempt
to demonstrate that Koestler's scientific ethics are remarkably similar
to his earlier political ethics.
However, Koestler's bold claim that a second volume of Insight and
A
I make no apology for using Koestler's later succinct definition of the
on for the sake of brevity and clarity! The Ghost in the Machine remains
! most easily digestible summation of Koestler's arrival at the holon in
9 (Koestler 1967: 45-58).
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Outlook would appear shortly in which his system of ethics would be
properly set down was not met. Yet again, one must look at an ethical
novel - in this case, The Age of Longing - to see the implications of
the holon for the twentieth century. Increasingly, Koestler felt that
the integrative tendency of the human species was being thwarted by an
inbuilt tendency towards self-destruction, which acts as a downward
drive in man's slow advance up the ethical hierarchy. This is evident
both in the non-fictional work of the 1950s and The Age of Longing,
which highlights Koestler's dystopic vision of a species capable of
acts of creativity yet prone to self-destruction. Nevertheless, I aim
to show that the spiritual basis of Koestler's ethic remained intact
during this turbulent period.
During this time, the novelist and philosopher remained also a
practical ethicist. This is nowhere better demonstrated than the anti-
hanging campaign, the importance of which can be viewed by the pre¬
eminence that Cynthia Koestler gave to this in the last volume of her
husband's autobiography (Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 186-207). I shall
present evidence to suggest that even this apparently humanitarian
campaign had a deeply spiritual and ethical side to it.
Thus, it is possible to discern a uniformity here, as elsewhere, to
Koestler's work. With the central planks of his ethical system in
place, if not spelt out, before he began the Janus trilogy of later
years, apparently diverse themes as human creativity and the abolition
of capital punishment may be seen as the outworking of an ethical
system based upon a transcendent and spiritual view of humanity.
3.i. INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK
Polanvi's ethics
Koestler dedicated The Yogi and the Commissar to Michael Polanyi.
Polanyi's reaction was typically gracious, writing to Koestler to say
he was "moved and pleased by this act of friendship...we have much in
common, in fact" (MS 23344/7:42). In the same letter (11 September
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1945) Polanyi told Koestler that there were "a number of things" in his
mind he hoped to share with Koestler, not least the idea of funding a
journal "to explore the foundations of liberty". (Polanyi had not, of
course, been privy to the correspondence between Orwell and Koestler of
the same period so did not know that such a project had already been
mooted.) Certainly, the "breakdown" (MS 2344/7: 66) of the 1946
Conference appears to have heralded a period of close collaboration
between Polanyi and Koestler, resulting in the refinement of the
ethical system of the second Yogi... essay into the scholarly work
Insight and Outlook in which the concept of the holon was examined at
some length.
The two men had begun to exchange ideas soon after the publication of
Polanyi's The Contempt of Freedom. For Koestlerian scholars may be
misled by the inscription of the presentation copy of The Contempt of
Freedom in Koestler's own library2 and conclude, wrongly, that
Koestler read these essays only after his own Yogi essays were
published. In fact, it was one of the first books that Private Koestler
read in his time off from the 'Digging for Victory' campaign, less than
six months after his release from Pentonville. The possibility of
collaboration was indeed raised at the same time, in May 1941 (MS
2344/7: 2), by which time Koestler was aware of Polanyi's emerging
concept of a hierarchy and his own discovery of the primacy of the
creative act.
Given that Koestler had read The Contempt of Freedom four years prior
to its author presenting him with an inscribed copy, one can speculate
as to whether Polanyi's notion of the hierarchy facilitated Koestler's
own model of the ethical spectrum. Also, there remains the possibility
that the title of Arrival and Departure came to Koestler after his
reading of Truth and Propaganda, in which Polanyi had concluded
"Unless intellectuals make a new departure, inspired by
unflinching veracity, truth will remain powerless against
propaganda." (Polanyi 1940:116)
The handling of similar themes within Truth and Propaganda and Arrival
p
The book is inscribed "To Arthur - who so kindly tries to take me
iously. 4 Nov. 1945 Misi." [SC4326]
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and Departure may be coincidental, even if Peter Slavek does fit the
description of an intellectual with "unflinching veracity". Koestler's
ethical novels at the very least reveal considerable common ground
between Koestler and Polanyi.
However, once the two men began their lifelong friendship3 their
research cannot be said to be independent. It is indeed easy to
conclude, as Polanyi's widow did, that by failing to acknowledge his
debt to Polanyi, Koestler was guilty of the serious charge of academic
plagiarism.^
The creative act was taken up in Science, Faith and Society, the
eponymous lectures that led to the creation of a new chair that
Manchester granted, somewhat reluctantly, to Polanyi, in which he draws
the reader's attention to the creative, or as he calls it, the
intuitive act.
In the previous year, Koestler had argued that as a solution to the
endless cycle of Yogi-Commissar ethics, individuals could be trained in
various disciplines of meditation. It was a suggestion that was met
with no small amount of academic scorn. Yet Polanyi was thinking along
similar lines, for as Torrance has noted (Torrance 1980:138) Gestalt in
Polanyi's view is equally amenable to the trained eye. Within one year
of each other, Koestler and Polanyi were making the same point, calling
for a rediscovery of 'intuition' or the creative act, Koestler from his
background as a condemned prisoner and his dramatic perception of the
reality of the Third Order, Polanyi from his background as a chemist
and his encounter with Bukharin which had so alarmed him in 1935.
It was that idea of intuition that was pursued by both Koestler and
Polanyi in their comparable ethical hierarchies. Both men were adept at
Q
Their closeness is best indicated by the extent of the Polanyi file in
e Koestler Archive, which runs to 249 pages from 1941 to 1980: in other
%ds, for all except the last three years of Koestler's life since he settled
England. (MS 2344)
^See, for example, Magda Polanyi to Arthur Koestler, 25 August 1980,
.er her husband's death (MS 2344/7: 249). "It would be time to repair your
>utation, instead of PERSEVERING TO LIVE ON OTHER PEOPLE'S - mainly
rhael's - ideas. Your 'Janus' has been mentioned to me as a blatant
imp 1 e ."
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using examples from the natural sciences to argue for the importance of
intuition. Koestler returned to his childhood hero of Kepler to make
this very point at great length in The Sleepwalkers. Scott (Scott
1985:38-39) illustrates Polanyi's argument with the example of Marie
Curie, who had been attracted intuitively to Becquerel's work5 without
being able to rationalise her fascination (which of course is a
scientist's version of Peter's dilemma in Arrival and Departure).
Much later, and shortly before his mental health began to
deteriorate, Michael Polanyi wrote to Koestler remarking upon the
development of their respective hierarchical systems as a "partnership
as outsiders in philosophy" (MS 2244/7:235). Polanyi traced this
partnership back to the publication of Insight and Outlook in 1949. It
need not surprise us that two men sharing a common background and a
common hostility to Bukharin and totalitarian science should alight
upon the same hierarchical system with which to counter Commissar-
ethics .
Koestler's metatheory
"My new book is about psychology, ethics and the world
'
uberhaupt' . My outlook is more pessimistic than ever, and an
occasional bottle of Government-imported French wine is the only
mitigating circumstance." (MS 2374/1: 415)
Insight and Outlook was Koestler's second full-length work of non-
fiction, and thus represented a much more difficult challenge than the
compilation of essays in The Yogi.... His "enquiry into the common
foundations of science, art and social ethics" - the subtitle of
Insight and Outlook - would occupy Koestler for longer than any other
project, before or since. He had first considered writing about a
theory of humour in May 1943, even before the conclusion of Arrival and
Departure-, seven years were to pass before the theory was published, by
5
This traditional interpretation of Marie Curie's intuition, which owes
:h to Irene Curie, has recently been challenged by Susan Quinn. She offers
=tore prosaic view of Marie Curie, suggesting Curie's research was a natural
>gression from that of Lord Kelvin (Quinn 1995: 143-154) whilst noting that
rre, with his belief in psychic phenomena, was the Koestlerian sleepwalker
intuitive partner in the husband and wife team (Quinn 1995: 207-208).
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which time it had become a "back door approach" to the much wider issue
of creativity that had so occupied Koestler and Polanyi in the post-war
years. Koestler, immodest as ever, referred to it as "a fascinating
thing and [Insight and Outlook] should create a minor revolution" (MS
2374/2).
However, in another sense Insight and Outlook is a logical successor
to the Yogi... essays, in which he had passionately argued for a
synthesis between the saint and the revolutionary. Thus, Koestler took
the concept of a hierarchical relationship a stage further, seeing the
relationship not in terms of two separate entities but as part of a
whole, or a single system.
"Because a hierarchy consists of a series of levels of
organisation, there will exist throughout its structure a series
of part-whole relationships, in which components at one level
will be subordinate to the organisational level above, and
supraordinate with respect to components of which they themselves
are composed." (Webber ley 1975: 12-13)
The word holon that Koestler invented to describe entities with such
dual attributes was clearly too technical for many of his readers, and
in his later work he tended to highlight his use of the Roman god
Janus, who was said to have two faces facing opposite directions, to
describe the system based on the holon. Ethics could therefore be
subsumed into a general theory that sought to explain the behaviour of
both organic systems and inorganic systems or societies. Webber ley sees
this as Koestler's most important contribution to philosophy: a
synthesis of creativity and General Systems Theory that can, in
Webberley's opinion, be treated as metatheory (Webber ley 1975: 12).
Indeed, Webber ley goes as far as to say that only by invoking General
Systems Theory® can the relevance of his work be properly assessed
(Webber ley 1975: 16) .
Using Webberley's own definition, General Systems Theorists "take as
■sir province both biological and electrical systems, linguistic and social
.terns and mathematical systems, indeed any pattern of organised activity in
ch the whole made by its components is richer in ways of behaving than what
obtained by leaving the parts isolated... [They] seek to establish laws
ch apply to all systems, and far from regarding such laws as philosophical,
e come in certain cases to view them as empirical." (Webberley 1975: 16-
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Certainly, Koestler himself appeared to lay claim to such a broad
application of his ideas in the preface to Insight and Outlook.
"The aim of this book is [to show]... that all the creative
activities of man are based on a common pattern, and to present
a unifying theory of humour, art and discovery...Secondly, the
attempt is made to show the possibility of a system of ethics
which is neither utilitarian nor dogmatic, but derived from the
same integrative tendency in the evolutionary process to which
the creative activities of art and discovery are traced."
(Koestler 1949b: vii)
Humour exists as a "comic clue to creative thought" (Koestler 1949b:
14) and was an appropriate starting-point in Koestler's quest for a
metatheory of art, science and ethics. Indeed, his findings might be of
interest only to the historian of psychology, but for the fact that
this opening part of Insight and Outlook introduces the reader to
central tenets of Koestlerian metatheory that apply as much to ethics
(or so Koestler would assert) as they do to the humble music-hall joke.
Bisociation
The idea that behaviour and thought form patterns or coherent units
can be traced back to William James' scheme of "streams of
consciousness" and, later, Kohler's Gestalt theory. Koestler calls
these phenomena "operative fields". For most of the time, such
operative fields will function completely independently of one another,
even within the same subject. Different rules apply to different
operative fields. Koestler uses the example of a chess-player viewing
the different pieces on a chess-board: the operative field of thinking
by which he perceives the knight will differ from that with which he
perceives the pawns or king. "Each operative field tends to facilitate
its 'permitted' type of association and to inhibit all others"
(Koestler 1949b: 41).
Bisociation occurs when two independent and self-contained logical
chains intersect; the clash of two associative streams of thought being
totally unpredictable. And humorous too: for Koestler proposed that the
essence of the joke or comic routine is the bisociation of two
operative fields in a junctional concept which is a member of both. As
an example, Koestler used Bergson's example of the joke of the
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Monagasque dignitary wearing 36 medals. Asked what heroic deeds he had
carried out, he replied "Simple: I got a medal for my faithful service
to the prince; I put it on a number at the roulette wheel and the
number came up." (Koestler 1949b: 19f). Two independent and self-
contained logical chains are operating in the mind of the listener.
Firstly, the logic of the roulette wheel with its own set of rules:
stake one unit on a single number and, if successful with the gamble,
the return is 36 times the stake. Secondly, the logic of military
awards also applies: this man must be a hero in order to boast 36. The
junction is the concept "medal".
"Thus laughter rings the bell of man's departure from the rails
of instinct. He has emancipated himself from the humourless laws
of the biological urge, from the fanaticism of purposeful single-
mindedness; he has become bisociatively double-minded. All
animals are fanatics; man is able to see both faces of the medal
at the same time...he can see the trivial aspects of his tragedy
and the tragic absurdity of his routine." (Koestler 1949b: 70)
The important principle is that the sudden clash of two usually
independent lines of reasoning sparks off a reaction that is entirely
unpredictable and frequently creative.
The principle immediately takes us beyond a theory of humour to the
ethical arena of Koestler's earlier novels. Rubashov and Slavek are
"bisociatively double-minded": at least, they become so, at key moments
in the action of the ethical novels. As an example, consider the
critical moment at which, for Rubashov, the mathematical equation of
the Party's logic was unbalanced: the sight of Bogrov being dragged
away for execution. Two independent streams of thought run through
Rubashov's mind. Firstly, what had they done to this naval hero to draw
the childish whimpering that so terrified him in his cell? Secondly, he
remembered that Arlova had been dragged away in a similar manner, her
shoes rather than Bogrov's trailing along the corridor. The junctional
concept was one of execution. The two previously unconnected streams of
thought suddenly united in Rubashov's mind to convince him of the moral
bankruptcy of the Party's mathematical ethic.
"The unimportant factor had grown to the immeasurable, the
absolute; Bogrov's whining, the inhuman sound of the voice which
had called out his name, the hollow beat of the drumming, filled
his ears; they smothered the thin voice of reason, covered it as
the surf covers the gurgling of the drowning." (Koestler 1940:
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The bisociation of these two hitherto unrelated streams of thought is
undoubtedly a creative moment for Rubashov: it not only "smothered the
thin voice of reason" but took him to that higher plane in the ethical
hierarchy that made his own confession and sacrifice seem a perfectly
appropriate action.
Bisociation is most graphically encountered in the unpublished
Arrival and Departure II. As Peter Slavek studies Rachel, he observes
her sandals and is reminded of his own childhood, "of the feeling of
dry sand between his toes walking at the beach". At the same time
Rachel's face brings to mind a more painful memory: of the "cursed
Race" and the agony of the Mixed Transports. The two independent
streams of thought clash.
"There must be something wrong with him, a split in the
mind...But perhaps the split was in the world outside, between
the two planes of reality, the one of howling and gnashing of
teeth, the other imbued with gentle warmth and the smooth sand of
the beach between one's toes. Two planes which never met, had no
knowledge of each other. One walked over that safe, flat, sunny
beach, suddenly a hole opened and the underworld swallowed one up
- the Other reality, the realm of...the stif 1ed, unheard scream."
(MS 2317/2)
"All animals are fanatics; man is able to see both faces of the medal
at the same time": Rubashov could see both Bogrov and Arlova being led
to their execution; Slavek could see both his own childhood and the
torture of his race in Rachel's figure. Bisociation, with its
concomitant element of unpredictability and surprise, transforms the
human situation from one of mere pathos into a potentially life-
enhancing moment, from which the subject emerges at a higher level in
the ethical hierarchy.
Of course, Koestler knew this from his own prison experiences, with
various recorded incidences of the "gallows humour" with which he saw
his solitary confinement, noting numerous "trivial aspects of his
tragedy" and the absurdity of his own routine. He had observed the same
phenomenon in Richard Hillary, whose life and writings so eloquently
explored the intersection of the tragic and trivial planes of human
existence. Bisociation, indeed, is what makes the ethical novels so
powerful - Rubashov examining the holes in his socks whilst almost
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simultaneously reflecting upon his own imminent death, and so on. It
can be no coincidence that in the ethical novels, and indeed in
Orwell's revolutionary ethics novels, the revolutionaries are single-
minded serious creations devoid of humour or imagination. Rubashov
stresses the point in Darkness at Noon.
"The most conspicuous trait of the Neanderthal character was its
absolute humourlessness or, more exactly, its lack of frivolity."
(Koestler 1940: 224)
The use of the word "Neanderthal" is thus deliberate, implying that
Gletkin was less than human due to his sing 1e-mindedness to the cause
and a total lack of bisociative thinking^.
Thus, if Koestler had declared in The Yogi... essays the need for a
synthesis between two apparently opposite types of thinking - that of
the Yogi and that of the Commissar - to solve the human predicament,
here was an attempt to explain how such a synthesis might occur, at the
junction of two independent streams of thought. However, all that
Koestler had done at this stage was to explain the mechanism of
creative thought-processes: which is not the same as devising a
mechanism by which such syntheses of divergent thought patterns might
be made to occur more frequently. In short, the process, however it is
explained, remains haphazard.
Self-Assertion and Se1f-Transcendence
From a specific theory of humour, Koestler moves on to examine the
implications of the evolutionary hierarchy that he postulated in 1945,
which he sees as having a distinct biological foundation. Organisms
have two opposing tendencies, which under conditions of stress come
into conflict: self-assertive and self-transcending tendencies. Self-
assertive emotions (including, in Koestler's scheme, laughter) serve as
a downward pull as the organism strives to move up the hierarchical
■7
In Orwell's case, the "animals are fanatics" aphorism almost crossed
divide between Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, with the interrogator
rien initially described as "pug-like of face" (Siegel f169r) and "puggy"
ice on Siegel f256r) before these animalian adjectives were omitted by the
-hor in the final text.
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scale. Self-transcending emotions (such as crying, the theory of which
Koestler sets out in Part Two) ultimately provide the organism with its
social cohesion and provide upward impetus in the evolutionary
hierarchy.
The logical outcome of this should, of course, be a perfectly
integrated human society. Koestler, so often accused of pessimism,
seems to hold on to a dream that sociology and biology "will appear as
branches, or rather levels, of one discipline" (Koestler 1949b: 158) -
and by implication, ethics too will be able to be subsumed into a
totally integrated and continuous social science. It is quite clear, as
Koestler himself admits, that this is not yet the case, because, in his
terminology, human society is not a functionally mature whole.
The question that can reasonably be asked therefore is, why is human
society so "unstable and transitional" that it militates against an
integrated social ethic that Koestler had pleaded for since 1945? The
answer is crucial in our understanding of Koestlerian ethics.
"The reason for this is that Homo sapiens lives in an environment
which is changing through his own activities at a biologically
unprecedented rate, that is, under paranormal8 conditions such
as no other species has ever experienced." (Koestler 1949b: 158)
The rate of evolutionary change and its implications was to become a
dominant theme in the Janus trilogy.
Although much of Part Two is of little interest to the ethicist,
Koestler seeks to shed light on the kind of ethical conflict that had
been the subject of his earlier novels, by explaining such conflicts as
a manifestation of underlying conflicting loyalties. Such conflicting
loyalties arise when the self-transcending and self-asserting
tendencies clash. In cases where the integrative control over the
different tendencies is weak - as is often the case when, for example,
a complex social order has recently emerged that has not had the time
to consolidate - the decision goes against the more recent, higher,
integrated ethic.
O
Koestler's use of the word "paranormal" is unfortunate and misleading
it would later come to be associated, by Koestler and others, with psi
nomena. Although Rhine and Koestler had already corresponded by 1949, and
stler was already interested in Rhine's findings, there is no suggestion
t Koestler was using "paranormal" in the sense intended in much later work.
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Though Koestler does not himself make allusions to his novels, one
immediately thinks of the "Sun State" brought into being by Spartacus
as an attempt to move the revolutionary slaves to a higher and more
socially whole ethic. But the State has not had time to consolidate as
a functional whole before the self-asserting tendencies of various
racial factions come to the fore. The higher ethic that Spartacus had
striven for would, in time, have shunned old methods such as
crucifixion as a means of maintaining law and order; but precisely
because of the fragility of the Sun State in its early days, decisions
of law and order inevitably revert to the old system. A higher form of
integration thus proves elusive.
There are clear undercurrents of Freudian terminology in Koestler's
analysis of ethical conflict, as if the id and ego are the two
conflicting forces at work, the ego representing the integrated and
more stable functional unit that is the goal of the organism in
Koestler's hierarchy. Certainly, in a rare acknowledgement of the value
of Freudian metatheory, Koestler states that ethical conflicts are
experimental neuroses on a higher level (Koestler 1949b: 189). But
Koestler differs from Freud fundamentally in arguing that self-
assertive and self-transcending behaviour are not polarised opposites.
Most "conflicts" are therefore not conflicts at all but merely varying
levels of stress in a stable society - Spartacus, Rubashov and Slavek
are important because they find themselves in societies that are far
from stable! Self-transcending tendencies should, under the right
conditions, more than compensate for any self-asserting thoughts within
society, if that society is stable.
"The 'ethical imperative' of a tree is to grow straight towards
the light and to send its roots deep into the soil, while spacing
the branches and leaves at proper intervals to exclude all mutual
interference. But, then, a tree is a dynamic whole in a
standardised environment, and human society is still remote from
that state." (Koestler 1949b: 189)
Part of the problem, according to Koestler, is that the integrative
tendency and its basis of a "natural system of ethics" (Koestler 1949b:
190) have been neglected in favour of what he described as "great
ideological currents" of the last century, with an emphasis on biology
and sociology. Interestingly, Koestler saw one of the emergent
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disciplines of the post-War era - parapsychology, in the wake of
Rhine's research - as evidence for the self-transcending tendency in
the human organism.
Partly, this is simply a restatement of the argument Koestler had
expressed more succinctly in the second Yogi... essay. The saint, or
the yogi, epitomises the self-transcending tendency in each of us; the
revolutionary, or Commissar, contrariwise stands for the self-asserting
tendency. Yet it would appear, on close examination of Insight and
Outlook, that not for the first time Koestler is leaning heavily
towards the side of the yogi. Explicitly, he is certainly abandoning
any hope of a rational ethic such as might be championed by the
Commissar.
"A completely rational conduct in conformity with the present
scientific out look in general...must inevitably lead to nihilism.
The place for a system of ethics in harmony with our state of
knowledge is vacant." (Koestler 1949b: 231)
Indeed, Koestler refers to "three common fallacies; Rationalism,
Optimism and Utilitarian Ethics" (Koestler 1949b: 228), thus dismissing
the self-assertive tendency of the Commissar once and for all. New
developments in science favoured the yogi or self-transcending
tendency, that part of us that can perceive the Third Order as Koestler
had done in Seville. But if this is familiar territory, what is new is
that Koestler saw the self-transcending tendency as the means by which
the different views of the staircase - mystic and scientist - may yet
be reconciled and a "natural ethics" attained. In other words, the
Yogi, unlike the Commissar, had an important part to play by
contributing his more biologically useful self-transcending persona to
the debate that Koestler now sought to initiate.
I suggest that the tendency towards self-transcendence is thus
further evidence that Koestler's emerging system of ethics was
implicitly spiritual and relied upon acceptance of the existence of his
Third Order.
Coincidental ly or not, Polanyi had also talked of the tension in
science, but in Polanyi's language this was expressed in terms of a
dichotomy between knowledge and faith. Faith, to Polanyi, had to become
more important. Now Koestler was saying the same thing. Science could
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no longer be ethically neutral. In Koestler's terms, the new emphasis
on wholeness in various disciplines should already have indicated to
the scientific community that the ethical neutrality of science was at
an end. Once the tendency towards se1f-transcendence is recognised,
Koestler assumed, the turning-point would be obvious. Having laid down
the principles by which his natural ethics would be governed, Koestler
conceded that further elaboration was necessary.
"But a detailed examination of the integrative tendency as a
basis of a natural system of ethics must be postponed to Volume
II." (Koestler 1949b: 190)
"Common foundations" questioned
Koestler had attempted to show the common foundations of all forms of
creative energy by the existence of fundamental tendencies that exert
themselves in human behaviour.
Reviewers were quick to point out that in this respect, Koestler was
not entirely original, and that he owes a debt to Freud's life/death
instinct. Eros is replaced by Koestler's integrative drive, thanatos by
self-assertion. The key difference, of course, is that whereas Freud
was concerned largely with pathology, Koestler's aim was avowedly
success and health: if external pressures could not bring about a
peaceful society (something that Koestler recognised with Twilight
Bar), might there not be a biological mechanism already in place that
could be utilised for the good of mankind?
Bremner argued that Koestler was looking for a social cohesion and
wholeness that existed in primitive societies and was now lacking in
modern society (Bremner 1949); but again, Freud had sought inspiration
in primitive societies for the basis of his metatheory. Like Freud,
Koestler distrusted traditional religion, so Bremner perceived Koestler
as pinning his faith in the 'oceanic feeling' of mankind - self-
transcending impulses which our more competitive modern society has
allowed to atrophy.
The criticism that Koestler faced is also reminiscent of that faced by
Freud, and for good reason: both had attempted to establish an
ambitious metatheory on the basis of tendencies that could not
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apparently be proven or disproved. Koestler had tried to bring forward
empirical data to support his case, just as Freud had used his famous
case-studies as the building blocks for his fully-fledged
psychoanalytical metatheory. It is important to note, however, that
unlike Freud's case-studies, no-one was disputing the interpretation of
the biological data. Reviewers concurred that the biological sciences
did indeed demonstrate the subservience of parts of an organism to an
integrated whole (Anon., MS 2435/4: 2). The difficulty, and one that
was to be used against Koestler many times, was that Koestler (some
would argue, like Freud) did not know when to stop. The concept of
integration, useful as it is in certain aspects of philosophy, becomes
meaningless in the wider spheres to which Koestler would have it apply
(Anon., MS 2435/4: 11). This overegging of the pudding inevitably led
to a largely hostile reception, with the predictable exception of post-
Freudians like J. A. C. Brown who is almost unique in finding Insight
and Outlook "so readable" (Brown 1949)!^
But what of Koestler's specific system of ethics, implied in the
book? For it could be argued that just because the concept of the
integrative drive has been given undue universal significance, that
does not validate its usefulness in ethics. The New Statesman and
Nation also perceived Koestler's yogi-inclination in the new version of
the 1945 hierarchy.
"There is some suggestion that they [bisociative pairings such as
form and function] form a hierarchy with the field of the oceanic
feeling, overlapping with Jung's archetypal experiences, at the
top." (Anon. , MS 2423/2)
It was also pointed out that, from Koestler of all people, there was
the disconcerting suggestion of unthinking se1f-surrender by the
individual to society as a prerequisite for society to achieve
integration. Koestler, of course, would reply by saying that
9
The other notable supporter of Insight and Outlook is Roy Webberley,
it could be argued that his support of a General Systems Theory
erpretation of Koestler (Webberley 1975) is made with the benefit of
dsight and for the express purpose of advancing a particular view of
ativity that accords with Webber ley's own research. Webberley himself
its that von Bertalanffy, the "virtual founding father" of General Systems
ory (Webberley 1975: 16) only came to appreciate the significance of
stler's work much later.
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totalitarian states are faulty integrations; but that is mere
tautology, and it is true to say that Koestler does not properly spell
out precisely where the flaw in totalitarian states lies; after all,
some new societies, including democratic ones, succeed in spite of the
"self-asserting" pull towards old values. Why should totalitarian
states themselves be flawed? Orwell had criticised the same Koestlerian
generalisation after reading Arrival and Departure: all revolutions are
failures but they are not the same failures.
Insisht and Outlook - Volume Two
One of the first readers of Insight and Outlook was, not
surprisingly, Michael Polanyi. For Koestler's magnum opus was the
'world-saving' joint project to which he had referred four years
previously. Although Polanyi must have felt that Koestler's ideas were
already outdated in the wake of his own research at Manchester with
people like Turing, he was fulsome in his praise (MS 2344/7: 10).
But this was atypical of the reception given to Koestler's
psychological volume. Thus, within a month of its publication, Koestler
wrote to Polanyi informing him he had dropped all plans for a second
volume and had started on a novel instead. He explained why in his
letter to Polanyi of 20 June 1949.
"There are various reasons... One of them is that I wanted to
discuss the matter with some people in Boston. Another reason is
that I must get over the depressing effect of the reception of
the first volume. I know cortical ly very well that jeers and
sneers do not matter, but thalemically my indignation must die
down first, otherwise I could not keep the second volume entirely
free of polemical aigreur, and that would of course be fatal."
(MS 2344/7; 119)
He added that Polanyi should not misunderstand his change of plan; he
had wanted to write a novel for a long time so the sequence of events
suited him. "I hope the second volume will profit from the distance
gained by postponement" he concluded (MS 2344/7: 119). In fact,
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Koestler had already embarked upon the sequel before depression set
in^®. There are echoes here of the summer of 1944 and Koestler's
abandonment of the sequel to Arrival and Departure in favour of
Twilight Bar, also due to acute depression. In both instances the
author left a legacy of an unpublished manuscript and little else, in
favour of work that is generally considered sub-standard but which has
important ethical implications.
Perhaps too Koestler was aware that Polanyi's research and the
Gifford Lectures that Magda had told Koestler her husband was finally
preparing (MS 2375/3: 111) suggested that further work required more
open acknowledgement of Polanyi's contribution. Polanyi's letter of 4
August 1949 must surely have given Koestler food for thought.
"I should very much like to see you again and talk to you about
the problems of Insight and Outlook, both as regards the content
of the book and the problems connected with its authorship..."
(my italics). (MS 2344/7: 120)
Polanyi's less than confident approach to a field of research that he
and Turing were immersed in almost full-time (the so-called resonance
theory of cortical functions) contrasts with Koestler's ambitious
claims for his own work on the same subject. "Even today I feel very
uncertain of my ground" Polanyi had noted; Koestler, meanwhile,
continued to receive less than complimentary letters on Insight and
Outlook and must have begun to consider there was merit in Polanyi's
more reticent approach.
But among the most significant responses to his work, again
indicative of the yogi-slant in Insight and Outlook, was the response
of parapsychologist J. B. Rhine. For Rhine, Koestler's new initiative
to seek a common foundation for ethics and science based on an
integrative view of human society was "a great undertaking" to be
admired. Rhine saw himself as "belong[ing] to a little group of men who
are attempting to reach a broad integration of what men have found
reliable in all fields"; reference to such work in Koestler's volume
not only gave the new science of parapsychology credibility but
1 o
The surviving manuscript of the sequel (MS 2372/2) can be confidently
ed to 1947-48 by the Bwlch Ocyn typed address on the reverse of MS 2372/2:
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suggested that both men were partners in the same quest (MS 2375/3:
102). This was to prove a strong influence in the reassertion of
Koestler's reality of the Third Order in his later writings.
The notes that Koestler left do not reveal that Koestler had
succeeded in synthesising the various trends of Volume One, as he had
claimed he would in the Preface to the 1949 volume (Koestler 1949b: x).
There is no written description of the natural system of ethics he had
promised his readers, but the manuscript contains ample further
scientific evidence, particularly in the field of developmental
psychology, to back up its author's claims for the integrative tendency
in humans. It was left to others, Polanyi included, to pursue the
ethical-theological implications of holistic science. One such person
was the American Clementine Simkins who had, like Koestler, worked on
the theory of the holon since 1943. Simkins sought to develop
Koestler's work along theological lines (she had submitted her work to
Reinhold Niebuhr), and presumably it was this application of Koestler's
holistic theory that made her reluctant simply to pass on the fruits of
her labour to Koestler, with whom she eventually decided to share her
research in 1949. Koestler did not appear to keep Simkins' notes, so
that it is difficult to evaluate the merits of her case; nevertheless,
her lengthy letter (MS 2375/4: 261) suggests that Insight and Outlook
was already giving rise to new applications of Koestler's metatheory.
One can speculate as to whether Simkins was one of the American
correspondents (along with Clara Urquhart, who had pursued Koestler's
ethical league for the freedom of man in America) referred to by
Koestler in the letter to Polanyi of 20 June of that year, with whom
Koestler wanted to discuss the possible sequel to Insight and Outlook.
But the enthusiasm of a few - Simkins, J. A. C. Brown, Polanyi - did
not compensate for Koestler's opinion that people had not taken his
work seriously. Coincidentally or not, Polanyi and now Simkins were
making claims that challenged Koestler's originality. Koestler once
again began to see himself as a novelist rather than an ethical
philosopher "trying to do for philosophy what Einstein attempted for
physics in his unitary (sic) field theory" (Lunn 1949). "My raison
d'etre on this earth" he confided to Polanyi in September is "to finish
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two or three more books... If I succeed I shall wait with a clear
conscience for the devil to take us all." (MS 2344/7: 122)
At the end of July 1949, Koestler confided to a close friend that a
new novel was "well under way" (MS 2376/3: 101).
3.ii. THE AGE OF LONGING
The advent of "Neanderthal"
If Koestler had been considering writing a novel for some time, Cyril
Connolly had unwittingly provided Koestler with the inspiration for its
setting. Connolly had written a graphic description of his experience
in Paris on Bastille Day 1945 in an editorial in Horizon (Connolly
1945a).
"I spent the 14th of July wandering about the... city rejoicing
with accordions and fireworks... and trying to decide what was
missing." (Connolly 1945a: 152)
Perhaps Koestler had already toyed with the idea of using this scene as
the opening of a new novel; certainly, Connolly's perception of an
atmosphere of foreboding and his description of American youth feature
prominently in The Age of Longing. However, Connolly's editorial piece
might not have been taken up by his friend had events in Europe not
provided Koestler with an urgent theme. As Koestler wrote later of The
Age of Longing
"Soviet Russia had turned with dramatic brusqueness from an ally
into an enemy. The Cold War was at its peak. So was Stalin's
reign of terror...It was impossible to foresee against whom he
would strike out next, and with what fantastic charges...It was
the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four and the period in which it was
written." (Koestler 1970: ix)
So Connolly's essay on post-war Paris and Cold War realities come
together in a novel which marks Koestler's return to the historical
writings that had proved so successful in the early 1940s.
But there are two significant influences that suggest The Age of
Longing deserves consideration as an ethical work. The obvious
influence, from Koestler's comment above, is the impact of Orwell's
dystopic vision of post-war Europe - remembering that, until just
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before publication, Orwell was ready to allow his American publishers
to publish the book under the title The Last Man in Europe (Shelden
1991: 469). There are striking similarities between Nineteen Eighty-
Four and The Age of Longing that indicate the impact of Orwell's work
upon Koestler, and these shall be discussed below.
Secondly, unlike the period during which Koestler had first alerted
Western readers to the horrors of Stalinism in Darkness at Noon, by now
Koestler had made his claim for the historical dichotomy between yogi-
ethics and commissar-ethics, and, with Insight and Outlook, had
attempted to give a scientific foundation for his hierarchical ethics.
One might expect a more developed ethical theory to exist in The Age of
Longing than in the earlier novels, and for the characters to behave
according to the different types of ethical model that Koestler had
postulated. Indeed, even Koestler's opponents had countered with
Koestlerian terminology: Mer1eau-Ponty had published a series of
articles under the title Le Yogi et le Proietaire and these articles,
with their implication that Stalin's purges were a historical necessity
- the very argument that Gletkin had used against Rubashov over a
decade ago! - were a major influence behind the writing of The Age of
Longing (Koestler 1970: x).
The book begins on "Bastille Day, 195-". As its author explains in a
short prefatory note, it is not intended as a visionary tale of the
distant future, but "merely carries the present one step further in
time - to the middle nineteen-fifties" (Koestler 1951: 8). And
immediately, in the sentiments of the character Monsieur Anatole, the
novel carries Koestler's fears for Europe one stage further, with his
anxieties of an impending nuclear war expressed at the outset.
'"So it has started,' he said. 'The overture to the next world
war. It always starts with little incidents like this...'"
(Koestler 1951: 12)
Anatole believes that this Bastille Day may be the last before the
advent of "Neanderthal" (Koestler 1951: 23) - the word first used by
Rubashov to express in a derisory manner the Stalinist revolutionaries
that now threatened France - thus placing the action of what follows in
the context of Koestler's hierarchical ethical system. The "little
incident" to which Anatole refers is the accidental knock that brings
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together the novel's two main characters, Hydie, an American lapsed
Catholic, and Fedya Nikitin, an attache of the "Commonwealth of
Freedomloving People", Koestler's satirical reference to the Soviet
Union with hints of his earlier Utopian society set in the future in
Twilight Bar (see Koestler 1951: 17 for an explanation of the usage of
the term).
The discussions that make up most of the novel, whilst perhaps they
are the cause of the novel's uneven literary quality, take place in an
unambiguously spiritual context, as is evident in the final scene at
Monsieur Anatole's funeral.
"For the place of God had become vacant, and there was a draught
blowing through the world like an empty flat before the new
tenants had arrived." (Koestler 1951: 447)
This has clear undertones of Cyril Connolly's famous final editorial in
Horizon with which Koestler would be familiar.
"It is closing time in the gardens of the West and from now on
the artist will be judged only by the resonance of his solitude
or the quality of his despair." (Connolly 1949: 362)
One only has to listen to the voice of the Russian, Count Boris, to
realise how despairing Koestler was.
'"Another year, or another five years at the most, and there will
be no Europe left, nothing. Click' - he made an ugly noise with
his tongue...-'Click - finished.'" (Koestler 1951: 31)
Certainly the "resonance of his solitude" and "quality of his despair"
both apply to Hydie and Fedya, but for different ethical reasons.
Fedya, who in the novel is linked by acquaintance to Gletkin, thus
creating an association in the reader's mind with Koestler's greatest
ethical work, resembles the old Koestler, content with Commissai—ethics
and the ideals of the Party. That the chapters on Fedya's upbringing
are generally regarded as the most accomplished in the book is not
surprising, given the author's use of semi-autobiographical material.
(Koestler was reliving his Communist past as he wrote this; he had
abandoned the first volume of autobiography for the story of Fedya and
Hydie.) Thus, from Fedya's affair with Nadeshda - a character who
shares the same name as a girl with whom Koestler had had a brief but
significant affair - to Fedya's arrival in Paris, the Commissar
character is marked out from his fellows by his commitment to the
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ethics of the Party and solitude in the gathering of Koestler's
characters, each chosen to bring to the discussion a particular ethical
viewpoint.
Hydie, however, remains a more enigmatic character. There can be
little doubt that she is intended to represent the American ideal in
the novel, a typically Koestlerian opposite to Fedya Nikitin's
Commissar. The lapsed Catholic idea may have stemmed from Sonia
Brownwell, Orwell's second wife and a close friend of Koestler. Sonia
had been educated at the Convent of the Sacred Heart, Roehampton, but
such was her "morbid, repressed upbringing" she rejected Catholicism as
soon as she left school, apparently in later life displaying a habit of
spitting on the pavement whenever she saw a nun (Shelden 1991: 443). It
would be easy to argue that Hydie, therefore, represents the kind of
intellectual that Koestler believed that twentieth-century re 1igion had
failed, both fictionally and in real life, and that ethically and
spiritually, Hydie personified Koestler's current predicament: the ex-
Communist still searching for a creed to satisfy both his yogi-
inclination and his Commissar's zeal for social reform.
Certainly, Hydie is used by Koestler as a vehicle for further
reflection on the Yogi-Commissar dilemma. But, upon close examination,
it becomes apparent that Koestler is hedging his bets in a way that he
did not do with, say, the character of Peter Slavek. Hydie may have
lost her faith, but she still has great spiritual insight and finds it
difficult to reject her Christian upbringing. As she confesses to Fedya
"'You see, I could not imagine the world without God just as I
couldn't imagine myself as just tissue without heart and a mind,
and maybe I can't even today.'" (my italics) (Koestler 1951: 159)
It is also interesting to note that yet again in a Koestler novel, the
central character is ridden by childhood guilt - in Hydie's case, the
guilt of being helpless as a child at a friend's death. Hydie's
"confession" arguably parallels the guilt that Sonia Brownwell felt,
well into adult life, at her own apparent blame for the drowning of a
childhood companion in a swimming adventure in Lake Neuchatel in 1935 -
though whether Koestler, or even Orwell, was aware of this is a moot
point (see Shelden 1991: 445-447). Certainly, the whole episode of
Hydie's "confession" is reminiscent of the guilt that Peter Slavek
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professed to Sonia Bolgar for the responsibility of his brother's
death, also during childhood.
Koestler's spiritual longing
Throughout the novel, Hydie continues to reflect Koestler's spiritual
longing: "LET ME BELIEVE IN SOMETHING" Koestler has her plead in upper¬
case letters (Koestler 1951: 46) . The inference that her convent
education had failed her, her acknowledgement that, as she says to
Julien, "I am one of the dispossessed" (Koestler 1951: 41), her
analysis of the crystallisation of her faith into dogma, all point to
apparent deficiencies in Yogi-ethics in Koestler's first extensive
fictional analysis of the Yogi. (Note that had he continued with the
sequel to Arrival and Departure, he had intended to introduce the
character of "Cyril" to explore the same ideas he was now doing through
Hydie.) Does Hydie therefore represent Koestler's final abandonment of
Yogi-ethics as Peter Slavek's "departure" had done for Commissar-
ethics?
The answer lies in the mystical passages of the book, which I shall
argue are evidence of the influence of the reality of The Third Order,
implicit in Koestler's sympathetic handling of the character of Hydie,
and in the undertone - even the title - of the book itself. Hydie's
education hinged upon the Convent's rejection of her mystical
experiences. Through the Sister Bouti1lot-Hydie dialogues, Koestler
makes clear that it is dogmatic religion rather than mysticism per se
that he shunned. Hydie's faith changes from a personal and mystical
belief in the efficacy of love into the dogma of received Roman
Catholic teaching. It is, in many ways, the reverse process that Peter
Slavek underwent in Arrival and Departure. But Hydie discovered
(predictably for anyone who had read Insight and Outlook) that there
were occasions when bisociative thought patterns would cause her to
challenge accepted reason.
"If some experience nevertheless succeeded in penetrating these
protective zones of her mind, she was upset for days. Quite
innocent-looking causes would unexpectedly release a minor
crisis, like a passage from Donne... which, for reasons unknown
but dimly and desperately guessed, threw her into a violent
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crying fit." (Koestler 1951: 71)
Gradually, Hydie's mystic tendencies - the yogi part of her - are
diminished by the nuns' teaching and discipline. The motive for such an
education is tellingly revealed in the alternative terms the author had
used for the Yogi-Commissar ethic in his earlier essays. "She [Hydie]
would make a rotten saint...What we need are crusaders, not saints"
says the Mother Superior (Koestler 1951: 73). Koestler had asserted
that post-war Europe needed neither, but a synthesis of the two. But
whereas it served the purpose of the novel for Hydie's education to
appear as a parable of the secularisation of modern Europe, the
mystical side of Hydie is never far below the surface. Koestler may
wish us to see Hydie as "representative of American womanhood"
(Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 77) and, as such, a wordly-wise figure who has
questioned received dogma. But there are frequent hints that such a
"conversion" may be as fragile as Peter Slavek's, during the "grace had
been withdrawn" prose passage at the beginning of the unpublished
sequel to Arrival.
"Hydie was happy as never before or after in her life. Only
rarely, as if by a sudden eruption of a black sun spot, was the
radiance of her mind marred by an unexpected stab of panic, the
short turbulent fear that it was all too good to be true, and
that one day she would be relegated back into the outer darkness
where the parched souls writhed in the agony of their thirst."
(Koestler 1951: 73)
In other words, the nuns could no more remove the mystical side that
alone explained Hydie's genuine happiness in the past than Sonia Bolgar
could remove the self-sacrificial and equally irrational side of Peter
Slavek's behaviour.
It is almost as if Koestler uses the novel to engage in a battle
within himself to exorcise his yogi-tendencies, a battle he ultimately
loses. Thus, Fedya, resembling Koestler the Marxist, becomes entangled
with Hydie, the would-be Yogi, in a doomed love affair during which
both partners try to convert the other to their way of thinking. Other,
minor, characters are thin disguises for various philosophers with whom
Koestler had crossed swords and much has been made, rightly or wrongly,
of this roman a clef as Koestler later called it (Koestler, A. & C.
1984: 77). Yet few, if any, critics have alighted upon the central
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tussle between the Yogi and the Commissar, as it is played out between
Hydie and Fedya.
It is possible to interpret Hydie's behaviour as the fictionalisation
of Koestler 'the man of action' struggling to come to terms with his
Yogi leanings. After an important conversation with the countei—
revolutionary Commanche, towards the end of the novel, Hydie aligns
herself with Commanche and Delattre - "'We are of the same generation,
and we both belong to the type of talkative men of action'" (Koestler
1951: 392). Perhaps it is Koestler speaking here. But even if this is
not the case, Fedya's analysis of Hydie (Koestler 1951: 342-343) is
almost a replay of Sonia's psychological probing of Peter in Arrival
and Departure. There is a similar gulf between the irrational Hydie,
who will never be able to explain her behaviour in terms that Fedya can
understand (the two occupying different planes on Koestler's ethical
hierarchy), and the Commissar par excellence, Fedya.
The climax of the Hydie-Fedya/Yogi-Commissar confrontation comes when
Hydie, like Slavek, discovers the value of "the ritual sacrifice", her
"departure" no less dramatic than that of Slavek. There is even a hint
that the earlier "departure" was still in Koestler's mind as he wrote
this part of the novel.
"When she came to think of it, her deed already appeared to her
modelled on so many examples, and dictated by such elementary
common sense, that there was really no reason to get excited
about it." (Koestler 1951: 397)
The "departure" or deed referred to is Hydie's attempt to kill Fedya by
shooting him with a revolver. The murder attempt is unsuccessful. For
those wishing to psychoanalyse Koestler, here is an incident loaded
with Freudian meaning - Koestler the would-be Yogi seeking to dispose
irrevocably of his Commissar past but not succeeding; the novelist who
had once again demonstrated he "could not write an infra-red novel
without an ultra-violet ending" (Koestler 1945a: 13).
Ethics in a religious vacuum
With Hydie's "departure" accomplished, insofar as it liberated her
from her bond with Commissar-ethics, the novel returns to the central
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theme of the Yogi essays, namely the difficulty of formulating a system
of ethics in a religious vacuum.
The placing of the action in Paris, and the opening scene on Bastille
Day, becomes significant as Commanche becomes a mouthpiece for
Koestler's ethical dilemma, a dilemma that had evidently not been
assuaged in the 1946 League or in the biological foundations of
hierarchial ethics of Insight and Outlook.
'"Now the source of all political libido is faith, and its object
is the New Jerusalem, the kingdom of Heaven, the Lost Paradise,
Utopia, what have you. Therefore each time a god dies there is
trouble in history...The last time a god died was on July 14th,
1789, the day when the Bastille was stormed... the People have
been deprived of their only asset: the knowledge, or the
illusion, whichever you like, of having an immortal soul. Their
faith is dead, their kingdom is dead, only the longing remains.'"
(Koestler 1951: 392)
The characters in the novel then reassemble for the funeral of Monsieur
Anatole, the personification of the old Europe with those values and
ethical ideals whose death Koestler evidently mourned. Anatole's death
takes on tragic proportions, because the old Europe to Koestler
epitomised continuity with past traditions. Anatole locates the
importance of tradition in Koestler's Weltanschauung early in the
nove1.
"'Continuity means to be conscious of the past but as the past,
not as the present or future. To imitate the past and to abolish
the past are equal sins against life.'" (Koestler 1951: 21)
Anatole's death removes consciousness of the past from the minds of
those seeking to establish their own systems upon present-day Europe.
But without Anatole's knowledge, the mourners, "those who were still
alive and free", were "all sick with longing". They sought spiritual
ideals but they now lacked both Anatole's certainties and even his
experiences.
"There was Monsieur Dupremont... longing for a penance which
nobody could inflict on him; there was Hercules the Atom-Smasher,
longing for a universe whose laws were the same for stars and
men, and were open to the mind's understanding...There was St.
Hilaire, who believed that man's only answer to destiny was the
gesture for gesture's sake, and Commanche, preparing to die with
a flourish but not knowing what he was dying for." (Koestler
1951: 447)
Again, it is Hydie who may come close to reflecting the agony that
162
Koestler felt.
"If she could only go back to the infinite comfort...of a well-
ordered hierarchy which promised punishment and reward, and
furnished the world with justice and meaning...But she was under
the curse of reason, which rejected whatever might quench her
thirst without abolishing the gnawing of the urge; which rejected
the answer without abolishing the question." (Koestler 1951: 447)
Thus, although the novel falls short of the literary standard achieved
by Koestler in the ethical trilogy, arguably it remains the defining
statement of Koestler's own ethical position. The ethical hierarchy
that he had mapped out in the Yogi... essays was inadequate at
fulfilling the spiritual longings of a generation in the "death of god"
post-Darwinian era. Koestler, with his scientific background, was
indeed under "the curse of reason" but the spiritual urge, the question
of finding a solution to the timeless Yogi-Commissar impasse remained.
The frustration that Koestler the ethicist must have felt was
undoubtedly heightened by the Cold War tension of the period. When he
had written the apocalyptic ending to Twilight Bar, victory over
Germany was inevitable and the Allies had yet to drop the atom bomb on
Hiroshima. Six years later, atomic war appeared a plausible scenario in
the not-too-distant future. The final sentence of the novel reflects
this tension whilst maintaining the deliberate ambiguity of Twilight
Bar.
"The siren wailed, but nobody was sure: it could have meant the
Last Judgment, or just another air-raid exercise." (Koestler
1951: 448)
Levene's critique
Koestler's contempt for the spiritual emptiness of Europe is
perceived by Levene (Levene 1985: 112-126) as the central theme of the
novel. Whilst he is one of several critics who rightly point to the
Koestler's lack of "intellectual vigour and literary control" (Levene
1985: 112), Levene makes a valuable contribution to Koestlerian
scholarship by linking Koestler's past political concerns with his
future overtly scientific writing through The Age of Longing.
Levene's evidence for this link is in Koestler's description of the
characters' "pathology of faith", specifically the "misfitted brain"
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discourse of Julien. Here is the first concrete evidence in writing of
the neurological schizophrenia - the Koest1er-MacLean "schizo-
physiology" theory of The Ghost In The Machine - that dominated
Koestler's later writing. In fact, we now know that Koestler maintained
that there was a fundamental flaw in human evolution long before the
work of Paul MacLean came to his attention. In his "This I Believe"
notes for an interview with Ed Morrow on American radio shortly after
The Age of Longing was published, Koestler responds to the programme
editor Raymond Swing's request for "a statement of beliefs" with his
view that Homo sapiens was a biological freak, "the result of a mistake
in the evolutionary process" (Figure 2). Koestler's thesis suggests
that at around this time he had begun to consider that a fundamental
evolutionary mechanism was at work which militated against the very
hierarchical ethic and Utopian goal that had eluded his individual
characters in the ethical novels or his fictional society in Twilight
Bar. In his notes for the radio broadcast of 1954, he stated
"man's native equipment contains some grave fault in the wiring
diagram of his most precious and delicate instrument - his
central nervous system - which impairs the species' chance of
long-term survival or even predisposes it to self-destruction."
(MS 2342/2)
In The Age of Longing, such a flaw is initially identified with God
as Hydie, through her experience of seeing a child dying of cerebral
meningitis, concludes that "God suffered from some malignant form of
insanity" (Koestler 1951: 159). But, as Levene points out, it is in
Julien's diagnosis of the clinical insanity of Europe in which Koestler
moves his ethical thinking forward. Compare Koestler's "This I Believe"
notes with Julien's thesis:
'"Has it ever occurred to you that when poets talk about the
madness of homo sapiens they are making not a poetical but a
medical statement?... A neurologist told me the other day that in
all probability the snag lies somewhere in the connections
between the forebrain and the interbrain. To be precise, our
species suffers from endemic schizophrenia - that characteristic
mixture of ingenuity and imbecility which you could observe in
Boris...Our misfitted brain leads us to a dance on a permanent
witches' sabbath. If you are an optimist, you are free to believe
that some day some biological mutation will cure the race. But it
seems infinitely more probable that we shall go the way of the
dinosaur...'" (Koestler 1951: 365)
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Levene reminds us that in part this refers to an earlier essay,
"Anatomy of a Myth", published in The Yogi... anthology, in which he
had stated that "the human mind is basically schizophrenic" (Koestler
1945a: 121), divided into two mutually exclusive planes. But whilst
previously, such a theory was merely used to explore the nature of
Commissar-ethics ("Anatomy of a Myth" concerned the Soviet "experiment"
and the failure, in Koestler's eyes, of Commissar-ethics) and to
accentuate the differences between mutually exclusive planes of the
ethical hierarchy, now the theory begins to eclipse his view of a
possible synthesis of Yogi-ethics and Commissar-ethics. In this sense,
The Age of Longing is indeed the vital link between the ethical novels
and the Janus trilogy and helps the reader understand Koestler's later
pessimism.
Thus, whilst many saw the novel as an essentially futile exercise
concluding in failure (a criticism that would be aimed at The Cail-
Girls, Koestler's next novel thirty years later), I believe that the
failure in itself is highly significant. Just as the failure of
Koestler's Utopian republic in Twilight Bar marked Koestler's dismissal
of a Benthamite solution to the predicament of man, so The Age of
Longing is, in the light of Koestler's scientific notes of the period,
a more finished analysis of the inadequacy of current ethical systems
than is generally supposed. For what Koestler was now suggesting was
that ethicists had to recognise the fundamental flaw in evolution that
weighted the dice in favour of nuclear war; such a flaw was as
important, if not more so, than the bisociative thought patterns that
provided the human brain with its uniquely creative capabilities.
"The Age of Longing is a bleak song of disease written in the
meagre hope that the truth he has seen will cure the blind, in
the need at least to keep faith with himself." (Levene 1985: 132)
But Levene writes with the benefit of hindsight; what must be stressed
is that Koestler's readers in 1951 had only Julien's self-opinionated
theories and a few hints in "Anatomy of a Myth" aimed primarily at the
Soviet Union to give clues for the reasons behind Koestler's growing
pessimism. Such sparse offerings hardly amount to "the truth".
Levene is on safer ground when he notes that Koestler's
identification with his new thesis, and determination finally to lay
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the ghost of Gletkin's logical successor, Fedya Nikitin, is the cause
of the novel's poor literary merit. Julien comments that "When a writer
becomes a preacher, he is finished" - yet Koestler now lays himself
open to this very charge, apparently out of choice.
"Koestler's choice was to relinquish contemplation and
objectivity, to erode the boundaries between the political essay
and political novel, and with full awareness of the artistic
consequences, to preach sermons on the need for unshakable,
unquestioning belief." (Levene 1985: 114)
Note also the manner in which Koestler equates "original sin" with
the "evolutionary flaw" argument.One wonders if perhaps Levene has been
taken in by the powerful arguments of the characters Koestler portrays,
for no-one could possibly equate Fedya's Commissar-ethics with
Koestler's current philosophy. The point is that it is "unshakable,
unquestioning belief" that Koestler exposes as shallow, here as in the
earlier ethical novels, but with the added sense of urgency in the
threat of nuclear war.
Of course, it is almost inevitable that, as Levene concludes, Fedya
emerges as the most rounded and fulfilled character, given Koestler's
own Fedya-like past. It is equally inevitable that the structure of the
novel resembles his earlier novels at several key points - Fedya's
experiments on Hydie's body (an act of literary plagiarism on
Koestler's part"'"') point to Sonia's treatment of Peter; the opening
and closing symmetry evident in the "signs in the sky" mirroring the
symmetry of Arrival and Departure-, and (although Levene does not
acknowledge this) Leontiev's submissive acceptance of his punishment
redolent of Rubashov's final acquiescence of his sentence. But it is
dogma rather than faith per se that is the primary target for Koestler
now. Peter's "departure", confirming the moral rectitude of Rubashov's
"confession", had demonstrated that faith was still a valid option in
contemporary Europe.
Indeed, Levene acknowledges that Koestler attempted to establish an
ongoing debate about the nature of faith between Julien and Hydie in
the novel (Levene 1985: 124). But Hydie's assertion of "man's
1 1 Nikitin's sexual trick on Hydie is a literary device first found in
ind Wilson's Hecate Country (Davies 1951).
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THIS I BELIEVE
I believe it to be highly probable k that homo Bapiens
is a biplogical freak, the resftlt of a spectacular mistake in
the evolutionary procesa.^'The archetypal doctrine of original
sin, variants of vhibti occur independently in the mythologies
of diverse cultures could be a reflection of man's intuitive
x
hunch that .somewhere along the line of his ascent to prominenc
somethi^^ has gone fatally wrong.
Biological evolution is a proverbially wasteful, S
fumbling process, so there is nothing particularly strdnge
/ /
or improbable in the assumption that man's.native Equipment,'
though superior to thatXf any a known animal species, never¬
theless contains sqrne grave fault in the wiring diagram of
/ X
his most precious and delicate instrument - his central nervou
X x
^ system - whi'ch impairs the species' qhances of long-term
/v'' / / r~
"•"•vival and predisposes it to Belf-destruction. | Unconscious!;
e are still steeped in the Hegelian doctrine that we are
living in the be3t of all imaginable worlds (for if a better
one were imaginable, God would have created it); and so we
keep marvelling at the wisdom of nature which produced rats
which carry fleas which spread the Bubonic Plague, as an
elegant means to maintain the ecological balance. The humming-
| bird hums in the tree^ accompanied by the creaking of the
i antelope's rlhs in the python's embrace, and one wonders whethe
Figure 2. Koestler's unpublished notes for the
interview with Ed Morrow, 1954, revealing Koestler's
credal assertion that Homo sapiens was a biological
freak, at a far earlier date than Koestlerian
scholars have so far assumed.
Note also the manner in which Koestler equates
"original sin" with the "evolutionary flaw"
hypothesis.
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compulsive need to transcend himself" is more than the simple dogma
Levene supposes (Levene 1985: 124). I believe it reaffirms the
influence of the reality of the Third Order in Koestler's work. Hydie's
loss of faith equates in the novel with her loss of self-transcendence,
and this, more than anything in the novel, points to the empty
"longing" that typifies the various characters' feelings at Anatole's
funeral. Might it not be the pathology of dogma that is at stake here
rather than Levene's "pathology of faith"?
"Love in the Afternoon"
There is, arguably, more direct evidence still of Koestler's
continued belief in "the reality of the Third Order" in The Age of
Longing.
I would suggests that the most telling piece of evidence for
transcendent reality, curiously neglected by Levene and others, is that
at its heart, this novel is a love story. In this respect, as in the
author's frequent allusions to his upbringing, the novel resembles
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, which as Shelden has reminded us also
contains a love story at its centre (Shelden 1991: 472).
The similarities between the two works deserve study, for the Fedya-
Hydie affair, like that of Winston and Julia, breaks the oppressive
gloom and philosophical debate. Whether Koestler intended such
similarities is debatable; nevertheless, the chapter "Love in the
Afternoon" has all the seediness and subterfuge of the lovers'
rendezvous that Orwell described in the "shabby little room above Mr
Charrington's shop" (Orwell 1949: 112) in his final dystopic vision.
Fedya perceives No. 1's successor in terms that would have done Big
Brother proud: "it had been necessary to move warily and to watch one's
step with extreme care" (Koestler 1951: 271). And both Fedya and Hydie
come to speak of the oppressive regime of no. 1 . in precisely the words
used by Winston and Julia: "The Party".
If we then apply Shelden's analysis of the central love theme of
Nineteen Eighty-Four to The Age of Longing, then the passion generated
in the love affair of the two central characters can be interpreted as
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a means by which not only can they enjoy a sense of freedom in an
overwhelmingly stifling society but preserve - indeed, heighten - the
humanity they had been in danger of losing: Hydie from her
indoctrination at the convent, Fedya from The Party's control.
"If the Party can kill the sex instinct, it can strengthen its
control over everyone, but Winston and Julia show that destroying
such a powerful urge is impossible, and that the mere expression
of that urge can be a valid form of protest against Big Brother.
It is a reaffirmation of life in the face of Big Brother's
attempt to eliminate all signs of a vital existence among his
subjects." (Shelden 1991: 472)
Koestler's "No. 1" is of course a neai—historical embodiment of
Orwell's Big Brother; the aims of The Party in both novels are
inevitably similar, as the ethical development of their authors had
followed such parallel paths. After all, Orwell and Koestler were both
concerned, at the time of writing their respective novels, that Stalin
might gain power in Europe. Orwell chose to focus on what might happen
in the years following such an event; Koestler chose to highlight the
means by which Stalin might gain power - by deploying nuclear weapons -
if Europe failed to heed the warning. But both writers also knew that
the power of individual love was the ultimate means by which "The
Party" might be thwarted. "Love in the Afternoon" is, I believe, a
fictional description of Koestler's response to Commissai—ethics: the
Commissar symbolised by the severing of the umbilical cord between self
and the world. The action of Hydie and Fedya can legitimately be
interpreted as an attempt, that ultimately failed (or so it would
seem), to re-establish the connection. For as in Nineteen Eighty-Four,
the lovers in Koestler's novel view the world with a heightened sense
of perception of the world about them.
In the case of Fedya, this was the second such attempt, for by
reference to his previous affair with Nadeshda he recalled that "he
could no longer reassemble the fragment of that grammatical fiction
which went by her name" (Koestler 1951: 137, my italics).
Of course, it is possible to see the change in the characters'
perception of the world in purely pragmatic terms without recourse to
spiritual development (or any vocabulary that invokes in the reader the
sense of the existence of a spiritual world). Yet such is Koestler's
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frequent use of overtly religious, let alone, spiritual language that
he is almost asking the reader to view Hydie and Fedya's passion as an
experience that puts them once again in touch with a world that they
had (in Koestler's terms) lost. Thus the transcendent reality - "Third
Order" reality that affirmed the existence of a spiritual world - had
been evident through Fedya's love before; "the grammatical fiction"
from Darkness at Noon is used in a much more personal and sensual
manner in this novel, related directly to human love. Koestler, now
perchance in what he would later call the happiest period of his life
(following the arrival of the South African Cynthia Jefferies as his
secretary at Verte Rive), has become aware that it is not only hours
spent by a prison window that put one in touch with a higher reality.
So there may be a sense in which there are really two revolutions
threatened in the action of the novel: the potential political upheaval
in Western Europe in the face of Stalinist Russia, and the spiritual
revolution that many of the characters discuss in abstract terms but
which Fedya and Hydie secretly enjoy in their love affair.
Evidence of "The Third Order"
The lovers' experience of a higher reality than The Party can ever
admit to is emphasised by the elements of mystery that pervade the
novel - which, I believe, are as deliberate as those Orwell placed in
the Newspeak-dominated Oceania.
Thus, the central love scene in Nineteen Eighty-Four is preceded by
"the red-armed woman" hanging up her washing and singing, "her voice
floated upward with the sweet summer air, very tuneful, charged with a
sort of happy melancholy" (Orwell 1949: 116); in Koestler's novel, the
pivotal "Love in the Afternoon" chapter is preceded by a woman humming
an old song "Talk to me of love, Tell me tender things" as Vardi and
Julien discuss politics. Vardi notes that "we have become embittered
and venomous like old maids" and then "like feeling all of a sudden
young again" (Winston's sentiments exactly) as Vardi talks of the new
possibilities after the revolution. The old woman's singing interrupts
his thoughts with the song again.
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"To judge by the voice she must have been an elderly, wispy-
haired charwoman, probably engaged in sweeping the dust and the
cigarette stumps from the threadbare carpet down under the
cupboard, where they could not be seen, only smelled." (Koestler
1951 : 261 )
This could be interpreted as Koestler's attempt to point to the
"proles" as holding the key to the future of humanity; if so, it would
be highly uncharacteristic as I have argued above that Koestler, unlike
Orwell, believed that no single class of people possessed the answer to
the predicament that Europe faced. It is, in my view, more likely that
such a graphic and accomplished piece of prose interrupts the narrative
of political intrigue to remind the reader that there is a subtext of
mystery that no humanist system or philosophy can grasp.
In fact, at one point in Koestler's novel, the word "mystery" becomes
part of the actual text. It is another little incident, one that occurs
whilst Hydie and Julien are debating the finality of death, that again
reminds the reader of the presence of an order of reality not readily
amenable to ethical systems or political ideals.
"Twilight was descending into the narrow street; in one or two
windows of the little hotel opposite the lights had gone on and
vague shadows moved across the Venetian blinds. A woman in the
street called: "Marcel! Marcel! Tu as oublie ta bicyclette"; and
the fact that Marcel had walked off forgetting that he had a
bicycle seemed one of those poetic minor mysteries one meets in
life which will never be solved. A vague idea drifted through
Hydie's mind that one should pay more attention to this kind of
mystery: perhaps they held out some clue." (Koestler 1951: 172)
Julien, apparently oblivious to the incident, continues to expound upon
the "deification of society" in typical Koestlerian terminology. The
only hope, he suggests, is the emergence of a new transcendental faith
"which would re-establish direct transactions between man and the
universe" (a restatement of the arguments of the Yogi... essays:
compare the phrase "the Man-Universe connection has to be re¬
established" in Koestler 1945a: 15 to Julien's theory).
But the irony is that at the very moment that Julien is speaking,
clues of the existence of transcendental reality (i.e. Koestler's Third
Order) were a stone's throw away.
"The same voice as before called out, invisible under a doorway.
'Marcel! Marcel! Tu as encore oublie ta bicyclette.' The mystery
deepened, and so did the shadows of the evening." (Koestler 1951:
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My thesis is that the song of the charwoman and the incident
concerning "Marcel" serve the same purpose as the coral paperweight and
the 'Oranges and Lemons' verse in Orwell's final work, namely that they
are there to lift the reader's vision from the mundane and the temporal
to a "mystery" that cannot be explained12. In his previous works,
such non-utilitarian behaviour had always been equated with certain
individual actions of Koestler's fictional heroes: Rubashov's
confession, Peter's departure, and so on. But now a higher reality is
observed independent 1v of the main protagonists, indicating that, in
Koestler's work, a humanist explanation is insufficient. The Age of
Longing points to Koestler's increasing awareness that his ethical
system hinged upon human perception of the objective existence of a
Third Order of reality.
For Orwell, who had said in 1943 that Koestler had yet to accept that
death was final, the non-utilitarian world he conjures up through such
literary devises as Winston's dream of the bluebell wood, the Golden
Country and the nostalgia of antique shops is, in Shelden's words, a
reminder of the price which will have to be paid if his dystopic vision
1 2
Even supposing that Koestler's use of the name Marcel in a novel full
thinly-disguised references to living French philosophers is purely
ncidental (Gabriel Marcel being the foremost proponent of a 'theology of
tery' or affirmation of transcendence), it is unlikely that Koestler's
hasis on this trivial yet deepening "mystery" at precisely the point that
ien wishes for a transcendent faith is included purely for dramatic effect.
1 3
In support of my argument, I would draw the reader's attention to the
:ription of the coral paperweight (Orwell 1954: 120): "The inexhaustibly
.resting thing was not the fragment of the coral but the interior of the
-s itself. There was such a depth to it, and yet it was almost as
isparent as air. . .The paperweight was the room he was in, and the coral was
a's life and his own, fixed in a sort of eternity at the heart of the
ital." Significantly, Winston's arrest is marked by the crushing of the
irweight, and Winston's observation of "how small it always was!" (Orwell
: 177). Whilst cautioning any scholar to adopt anything other than a
nist evaluation of Orwell's work, Orwell's awareness of eternity is also
eeping with his expressed wish for a Church of England burial service and
rly points to a non-utilitarian philosophy in certain aspects of his life.
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becomes real. Shelden refers to this as the "sensibility" of existence
(Shelden 1991: 447).
"There must be a place in the modern world for things which have
no power associated with them, things which are not meant to
advance someone's cause, nor to make someone's fortune, nor to
assert someone's will over someone else. There must be room, in
other words, for paperweights and fishing rods and leather
hammers used as children's toys. And there must be time for
wandering among old churchyards and making the perfect cup of tea
and balancing caterpillars on a stick and falling in love. All
these things are derided as sentimental and trivial by
intellectuals who have no time for them, but they are the things
which form the real texture of a life." (Shelden 1991: 477-478)
I would suggest that the difference between Orwell and Koestler is that
Orwell probably equated this world with pre-war England (and with his
own upbringing, much of which is used in Winston's nostalgic dreams):
Orwell was essentially saying to his readers that such a heritage - the
rich language, bluebell woods, time for falling in love and so on -
would be lost in the future if Big Brother was allowed to succeed.
Koestler, on the other hand, offered a more overtly spiritual message
and one that looks forward rather than back. He is realistic enough to
know that his own experiences of a transcendent reality in the Spanish
jail are unique. He asks the reader to look into the future for the
proper recognition of transcendence that is glimpsed by Hydie on
several occasions.
Hence, in this writer's opinion, the "longing" so acutely felt by the
characters at Anatole's funeral is not the failure that is, say,
Winston's at the conclusion of Nineteen Eighty-Four. Koestler, by
offering the reader genuine glimpses of a higher plane of reality that
exists independently of the characters in the novel, is not only
maintaining but advancing his own ethical argument for a synthesis of
Yogi- and Commissar-ethics.
The spiritual revolution betrayed
"The revolution betrayed" thesis, to borrow Orwell's phrase, has now
become a more focused thesis in Koestler's writing concerning "the
spirituai revolution betrayed". Again, there are striking similarities
between the two writers. For if the two novels are at their heart love
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affairs, then it is equally true that the two love affairs result in
betrayal. The passionate bonds uniting Hydie with Fedya and Winston
with Julia are irrevocably broken, with Winston begging O'Brien to turn
the rats upon Julia and Hydie shooting Fedya. Of course, in Orwell's
Oceania, it is inevitable that The Party will win control over
Winston's mind. But the inevitability is equally applicable to the
inhabitants of Koestler's "Paris 195-", given that none of the
individual characters, or indeed European society according to
Koestler, has yet identified the means by which the "broken connection"
between Man and The Universe can be remade.
In fact, the betrayal of the revolution that had once been the joint
concern of both authors to instigate also stemmed from the
preoccupations of the two writers at the time. Orwell was still
extremely worried that Stalinism might be victorious throughout Europe
- hence The Last Man In Europe as the eponymous title for Winston's
revolution, the title which he abandoned only in the final stages of
writing; hence too his apparent willingness whilst in Cranham to write
overtly anti-Stalinist propaganda. The more evocative the world of the
Golden Country, bluebell woods, 'Oranges and Lemons' and beautiful
paperweights with no utilitarian purpose, the greater the contrast with
Newspeak and Big Brother. Orwell's spiritual revolution had to fail.
Similarly, Koestler was now concentrating more and more upon what
would later become the "schizophysiology" thesis (Koestler 1967: 267-
296). In the novel, it is largely through the character of Leontiev
that Koestler's almost obsessive interest in neurophysiology and
psychobiology is seen. Real-life findings from the biological sciences
would feature of course in The Cal1-Girls - but by then, Koestler would
be well-known for the Janus trilogy. Here, such findings are used to
give credence to the lack of spiritual insight of the main characters.
Hydie was, in a sense, fighting not simply her emotions but what
Koestler memorably calls "fatigue of the synapses" (Koestler 1951:
182) .
"The beauty of playing about with the synapses is that we have
discovered methods whereby we can make a man believe that he has
really killed his Mandarin and conf ess with earnest conviction. . .
and killed him in such-and-such a way with the help of X, Y and
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Z, who were his accomplices." (Koestler 1951: 184)^
Koestler was using scientific data to imply that the actions of his
characters were subject to physiological explanation. Leontiev at one
point proposes that biological strife may be manifest in political
struggle (Koestler 1951: 212), further reducing the likelihood of
would-be revolutionaries such as Hydie finding the new faith or
transcendent reality that they were seeking.
My argument, therefore, is that it is not the religious allusions
that are significant as Levene suggests, but the scientific data that
pervade the novel. Not only do they set the scene for Koestler's later
work, but they provide the reason for the lack of spiritual revolution
and the atmosphere of unfulfilled longing at the novel's ending. In
short, given that Koestler had become convinced of the "misfitted
brain" hypothesis - central to his "What I Believe" unpublished credal
statement - then it is as essential for Koestler's later work that the
longing is unfulfilled as it was for Orwell that Winston and Julia did
not live happily ever after.
For Koestler, the conclusion was clear: the perception of the higher
(Third) order of reality is wholly absent from post-war Europe. But the
glimpses of that reality, when combined with the knowledge we now have
of Koestler's already we 11-advanced thesis of schizophysiology, lead
this writer to conclude that The Age of Longing reveals its author's
even firmer belief in both the existence and importance of the Third
Order.
3.iv. KOESTLER'S DYSTOPIA
Utopia as evidence of The Third Order
In Chapter 1, we noted that The Gladiators marked the apparent end of
1 lx
Is this also an example of plagiarism that angered Magda Polanyi? This
y seems remarkably similar to one Polanyi used in the Gifford Lectures
anyi 1955: 289-290), the notes for which Koestler would have seen before
ing The Age of Longing.
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Koestler's belief in a communist Utopia. Goldstein has argued, however,
that the whole of Koestler's life can be interpreted as the search for
a new Utopia as a substitute for "the god that failed" in Stalinist
Russia. But she notes that on each occasion, Koestler was disappointed.
"Reality in The Promised Land was very different from Koestler's
expectations. The precise lack of the utopic, universal and
romantic aspects turned it into a severe disappointment."
(Author's italics) (Goldstein 1992: 6)
Goldstein is not the first to note Koestler's endless searching for a
perfect society. Orwell, in his essay "Arthur Koestler", had also
proposed that "the dream of a just society which seems to haunt the
human imagination ineradicably and in all ages" was the motivation
behind his friend's writings (Orwell and Angus 1970a: 274). Of course,
it is possible to argue that Utopias are useful in highlighting the
deficiencies of existing ethical systems. But Goldstein chooses to
stress the appeal of Utopias to what I have called the yogi part of
Koestler's nature.
"Paradoxically, Koestler's initial rationalism as a man of
science, led him to place his rational expectations in Utopias.
What followed was an infatuation with the irrational aspect of
Utopias. It satisfied both the rational desire for a better life
and his irrational craving for the absolute." (Goldstein 1992: 7)
If we apply Koestler's own terminology to Goldstein's analysis, the
picture that emerges is of Koestler the Commissar attempting to put
down the ethics of his perfect human society to satisfy his Commissar's
instinct for a Benthamite goal - the greatest happiness for the
greatest number of people - whilst at the same time satisfying Koestler
the Yogi's need for a greater perception of the spiritual reality of
the Third Order in society.
Koestler himself acknowledges, at least partly, his search for a
Utopia in The God That Failed. His years in the Communist Party were
the most obvious manifestation of this search - the true communist and
classless society was to be a revival of the primitive communism of the
early Prophets and Christianity. Utopia itself was merely a human
projection of this archetypal communism, according to Koestler.
"Thus all true faith involves a revolt against the believer's
social environment, and the projection into the future of an
ideal derived from the remote past. All Utopias are fed from the
sources of mythology; the social engineer's blueprints are merely
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revised editions of the ancient text." (Koestler 1950: 25)
Given that Utopia represented a model for the synthesis of Commissar-
and Yogi-ethics, it is not surprising that many of Koestler's novels
reflect this fascination. But it is important not to lose sight, in the
ethical framework of his fictional Utopias, of what Goldstein has
correctly identified as the irrationality of Koestler's Utopias: for
they are all, to one degree or another, marked by an individualistic,
or in The Age of Longing social, perception of spiritual reality.
However, such a perception - like Koestler's "discovery" of the Third
Order in Seville - is not readily amenable to rational explanation.
Koestler's fictional dystopias
However, Goldstein's analysis does not differentiate between Utopias
and anti-Utopias or dystopias^®. In this classification, only
Twilight Bar (and then only briefly) can be described as strictly
Utopian. Spartacus' Sun State would have been Utopian, but of course
the Law of Detours ensures it never materialises. Kumar indeed refers
only to one of Koestler's novels as evidence of either Utopia or
dystopia, and that is Darkness at Noon (Kumar 1987: 122, Kumar 1991:
62). Kumar perceives in Darkness... the imprint of "the single most
important text for the genre", namely the Dostoyevskan scene in the
dungeon between Christ and the Grand Inquisitor, refashioned by
Koestler as the Gletkin/Rubashov hearings and by Orwell in O'Brien's
interrogation of Winston in Nineteen Eighty-Four (Kumar 1987: 122).
Kumar's argument for the plethora of anti-Utopias of the present
century (he argues that no great Utopia has been written that has
commanded readers' attention in the manner of Morris or Wells at the
turn of the century) has given man's Utopian dreams fresh impetus:
anti-Utopias make one long for Utopia. In terms of my own thesis, it
could therefore be argued that the lack of spiritual insight that was
so evident in Stalinist Russia itself sowed the seed in Koestler's mind
1 R
Dystopia is the word preferred by Turner to describe the opposite of
—as More's ideal world, after the publication of Joseph Hall's Mundus Alter
dem in 1600. (Turner 1965: 18)
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for his spiritual encounter in Seville Prison and the later emphasis on
Third Order-influenced ethics. Certainly, Koestler does use No. 1's
dystopic society as an example of the mathematical logic that Rubashov
comes to despise after the emergence of the Grammatical Fiction.
Kumar's line of reasoning is evident in Davies' enthusiastic adoption
of The Age of Longing as a Christian text. ("Had I the power to do it,
I would make it compulsory reading for every Anglican priest, from the
archbishops to the latest recruit to the Diaconate.") For if dystopias
exist as a means to further the cause of their ethical opposite, so
Davies sees the "gospel of futility" in Koestler's work as the best
possible advocate of the Christian gospel of faith (Davies 1951). The
more Koestler focuses upon people devoid of spiritual values, the more
one sees the need for spirituality. In short, the description of
dystopia is a statement of faith in itself.
It is easy to read into the text a Christian context that was not
intended by the writer. Certainly, the use of dystopia to promote faith
and warn against the lack of spirituality in society was an innovation
for which Kumar gives due recognition to Orwell (and by implication
Koestler). For they created this new literary technique to make people
conscious of what was happening "outside their own small circle" to
quote Orwell (Kumar 1987: 344) . That Stalin's communism was a false
Utopia was still debatable; nevertheless, for Orwell and Koestler the
best means of arguing against the false Utopia was by the creation of
an anti-Utopia: "the need for heaven [countered] by the fear of hell"
(Kumar 1987: 344).
Is Koestler's dystopia therefore simply a means of responding to
Stalinism? That might be the case if, as Kumar infers, Koestler uses
the literary technique solely in a Stalinist context. But he does not.
After the completion of the ethical trilogy, Twilight Bar examines the
Utopian dream in a wider context and begins Koestler's examination of
the problems surrounding a hierarchical ethic, and the particular
problem of the inbuilt human flaw that, in Twilight Bar, means that
enforced happiness simply cannot be maintained.
The Age of Longing also features Koestler's dystopia and although the
Stalinist context reappears, with the various references to No. 1,
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Gletkin and the Grammatical Fiction of Darkness..., Koestler's main
argument now is to highlight the "misfitted brain" hypothesis as the
reason for dystopic societies. By doing so he makes way for a spiritual
interpretation such as that of Davies, in which the credal "Now I
believe" statement of human misery (Koestler 1951: 176) becomes an
invitation for true belief.
The sense of longing that emerges from the novel's conclusion and the
ambiguous ending, like that in Twilight Bar, is due precisely to the
rational desire for Utopia and the human evolutionary flaw that
Koestler perceives prevents Utopia becoming reality. For Koestler it is
important for his readers to be able to identify with both the dream
and its failure in their own lives; hence the setting of the novel in
"Paris, 195-". As Kateb has observed
"Whereas the classic Utopia stands in a sort of never-never land,
out of time and space, the anti-utopian novel of recent years has
been brought closer and closer to us...to reflect the sense of
impending doom in the writer." (Kateb 1971: 82)
Kateb places The Age of Longing and Nineteen Eighty-Four into this
category. Thus it is possible to see The Age of Longing and, to a
lesser extent, its natural successor in terms of philosophical dialogue
and technique The Cal1-Girls, as evidence of Koestler's continued
emphasis on dystopias as a means of highlighting man's spiritual
longing. What began with Koestler's examination of the failure of
specific Utopias becomes a more general analysis of the reasons for
such failure based on the "evolutionary flaw" hypothesis. If such a
flaw inevitably leads to the failure of man to fulfil his Utopian
dreams, it is scarcely surprising that dystopias become a major feature
of Koestler's post-war writing, based not on a vague feeling of
"impending doom" as Kateb suggests but upon the difficulties man
continues to face in moving up the ethical hierarchy.
The Trail of the Dinosaur
In 1955 Koestler's post-war pessimism appears to have been partly
vindicated, even if one of the possible scenarios at the end of The Age
of Longing, nuclear war, had not come about. Koestler published a
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collection of essays that he saw as a sequel to The Yogi and the
Commissar, an examination of which will highlight the refinements that
Koestler had made to his ethical theory indicated above.
"The essays, lectures and broadcast talks in this book date from
1946 to 1955 and are a sequel to a previous collection, The Yogi
and the Commissar, completed in 1944. At that time the Western
world lived in the euphoria of approaching victory, and the
pessimistic forecasts of that volume were almost unanimously
rejected as fantasies of a morbid imagination. In the ten years
that have passed...all its pessimistic and seemingly absurd
predictions have come true, but none of its optimistic and
seemingly plausible ones - few and cautious though the latter
were."(Koestler 1955: vii)
Koestler argues in the new anthology that man must shift the focus of
his eyes to more vital questions than mere political ones: if
Commissar-ethics had failed to provide a new Utopia, and the
evolutionary flaw was the reason for such failures, then it seemed
appropriate for Koestler to focus upon the flaw rather than upon
Utopia. The famous "Cassandra has gone hoarse, and is due for a
vocational change" statement at the beginning of the new anthology,
entitled The Trail of the Dinosaur, is not as melodramatic as it
sounds. Koestler's dystopias made such a shift in emphasis inevitable,
and no doubt he hoped that if he solved the problem of the evolutionary
flaw then hierarchical ethics might be a more realistic ethical system
for post-war Europe.
That Koestler is less concerned with Stalinism and more with the
failures of society in general is evident in "The Challenge of Our
Time", an essay that reprints the opening talk of a BBC Broadcast
series first made in the spring of 1947.
Although at first sight a restatement of the first Yogi... essay,
using the metaphor of Captain Scott's return journey from the South
Pole as a symbol of the "eternal predicament of man", Commissai—ethics
is now broadened to include Western democracy. For Scott had two
possible roads, faced with the sick Evans slowing down the march back:
the road of morality (the Means determining the End in Koestler's
language) or the road of expediency "where the traveller is guided by
the principle that the End justifies the Means". Koestler's point is
that if you start by throwing the Evanses of society to the wolves,
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then the sacrifice of other weaker members becomes more acceptable.
"Thus, the logic of expediency leads to the atomic disintegration of
morality, a kind of radioactive decay of all values" (Koestler 1955:
12) - a phenomenon not restricted to Stalinism.
Koestler was, by 1947, beginning to see the archetypal Scott dilemma
not so much in terms of political conflict but played out in the
choices faced in the everyday world, with the consequences of man's
actions amplified by the technological age in which he now lives. He
admits he has no "final solution" and stresses in the essay that "well-
meaning ethical movements" are flawed - an oblique reference, perhaps,
to the failure of his own plans for the League for the Freedom and
Dignity of Man. There are hints of Koestler's respect for man's
mystical nature in the essay's conclusion: ethics must be freed from
its utilitarian claims, with distant political goals not allowed to
eclipse the importance of human values.
The importance of faith as a human value is seen in one of Koestler's
most inspired essays, his science-fiction account of post-atomic war
Russia written in 1951 - in other words, written just after The Age of
Longing. In "The Shadow of a Tree", the weakness of Commissar-ethics is
equated with the strength of religious faith of the Russian people in
what has turned out to be a remarkably accurate picture of glasnost and
the end of Communism.
"When in the early years of the Revolution the priests vanished
from the Russian scene, religion did not vanish with them; it
remained alive in the people. But when the Communists vanished
from the scene Communism vanished with them because as a faith it
had never existed among the Russian people." (Koestler 1955: 158)
Commissar-ethics was, for the first time, explicitly bound to the First
or Second Order, that is the inability of a society or person to see
beyond the perceptual or conceptual planes of reality.
The anthology also gave a fresh airing to Koestler's obituary tribute
to Orwell, first printed in The Observer in January 1950. "A Rebel's
Progress: To George Orwell's Death" confirms the thesis that the
distinction between Orwell and Koestler was the former's distrust of a
spiritual ethic.
"Orwell never became a fellow-traveller and never believed in
Moses the Raven's Sugarcandy Mountain - either in heaven, or on
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earth". (Koestler 1955: 104)
It is a dangerous simplification for Koestler to make of the writer of
a complex work like Nineteen Eighty-Four. Indeed it has been argued
that the character of O'Brien is evidence of Orwell's irrational and
quasi-mystical nature (Deutscher 1953: 203). But as Kumar points out,
given that Orwell's essays on James Burnham contradicted O'Brien's
position, it is much more likely that it is O'Brien, not Orwell, who
has succumbed to the "mysticism of cruelty" (Kumar 1987: 340). Sandison
has added weight to Koestler's diagnosis by suggesting that the despair
of Orwell's dystopia was a direct outcome of his sense of isolation and
the spiritual bankruptcy of Protestantism (Sandison 1974: 6)1®.
Certainly if we accept Koestler's conclusion that Commissar-ethics
was bound to exclude any perception of the Third Order of reality, the
difference between the two writers becomes almost inevitable. "Orwell
never completely lost faith in the knobbly-faced yahoos with their bad
teeth", Koestler wrote (Koestler 1955: 105) - in other words, if Utopia
was to be brought about, the proles would be its founders. Of course,
Orwellian scholars might well debate Koestler's analysis: nevertheless,
readers of The Trail of the Dinosaur could well conclude that Orwell's
work contained, lurking beneath the surface, Commissar-ethics in one
form or another, whilst for Koestler the moral bankruptcy of such a
system had been exposed in the ethical trilogy of novels. To the extent
that revolutionary ethics had failed to take into account the existence
of a Koestlerian higher reality, Koestler would come to quite the
opposite conclusion to Orwell: for Koestler, all revolutions are the
same failures.
The concluding essay of The Trail... was, as in its 1945 predecessor,
written especially for the volume. Koestler resorts to familiar tactics
- the use of scientific analogy and mathematical charts - to spell out
1 6
As Crick points out, it is dangerous to infer from, say, the religious
olism in the catechism scene in O'Brien's apartment, that "the whole book
.hus about the state replacing God, and Orwell's agonized despair at
—eving in neither" (Crick 1989b: 151). Crick is more circumspect than
—tier on Orwell's "living without a belief in God", choosing instead to
—light Orwell's perception of the collapse of morality and dislike of
—iD 1icism.
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in graphic terms his own understanding of the ethical dilemma. He asks
the reader to visualise "temperature charts" plotting the destructive
potential of man's power and to compare the exponential curve thus
represented with another chart, "on which we plot the progress of the
species Man in moral philosophy, in cosmic awareness and spiritual
clarity" (Koestler 1955: 232). This latter curve is now in steep
decline, he argues, although the spiritual void is less obvious than
the accumulation of power. Koestler sums up the dilemma in mythical
terms
"The Promethean myth seems to be coming true with a horrible
twist: the giant reaching out to steal the lightning from the
gods is morally insane." (Koestler 1955: 234)
Herein lies the truth of Koestler's much-vaunted pessimism: it is not
so much personal pessimism but the pessimism of the human race.
"And yet, by gaining time, by prolonging this misery of
existence, mankind may yet hope for a reprieve." (my italics)
(Koestler 1955: 241)
He then returns to the old Koestlerian theme of destiny from above
superseded by destiny from below. The function of prayer - defined by
Koestler as the influencing of fate - has become the prerogative of the
scientific laboratory. Religion is thus sealed off from contact with
logical reasoning. Although the pendulum has begun to swing back,
Koestler maintains that the Church still demands "from all of us who
shiver in the darkness precisely that kind of intellectual suicide and
surrender of the critical faculties" (Koestler 1955: 247). Yet he
continues to seek what he hopes will be a spontaneous emergence of a
new kind of faith which satisfies man's spiritual craving without
asking him to "split his brain into halves".
Koestler admits this sounds vague and irrelevant. Indeed, it is
surely asking too much of ESP research or space age technology to
provide the means by which man may move that step higher in the ethical
hierarchy, by revealing the spiritual reality hitherto restricted to
individual flashes of insight and crises infiltrated by the Grammatical
Fiction. It is also important to note that Koestler by no means returns
to "the same spiral pattern" of Utopian dreams followed by
disillusionment that Goldstein claims to find in Koestler's work
(Goldstein 1992: 8). The conclusion of the whole volume indicates that
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whilst Koestler's spirituality is still intact, his search for Utopia
is finally over - the "misfitted brain" hypothesis had seen to that,
and this hypothesis would now feature prominently in virtually all of
his work. The concluding words of the volume reflect Koestler's growing
obsession with the flaw in his hierarchical ethics.
"Once we hoped for Utopia, now, in a chastened mood, we can at
best hope for a reprieve...for had the dinosaur learnt the art of
prayer, the only sensible petition for him would have been to go
down on his scaly knees and beg 'Lord, give me another chance'
(Koestler 1955: 253)
3.v. REFLECTIONS ON HANGING
Utopia and capital punishment
In his commentary to Thomas More's original Utopia, Paul Turner notes
a feature in Utopian literature that could equally apply to approaches
to Koestler's work.
"The position of More's Utopia is rather like that of the baby in
the Judgment of Solomon. One school of thought claims it as a
Catholic tract, in which anything resembling communist propaganda
should be interpreted as moral allegory. Another claims it as a
political manifesto, in which all references to religion should
be firmly ignored. Both claimants seem more concerned with the
rights of ownership than with the work itself..." (Turner 1965:7)
Certainly, it is possible to ignore the references to the Third Order
in both The Age of Longing and the earlier dystopia of Darkness at Noon
and interpret Koestler's work in purely political terms, using the
author's "Cassandra has gone hoarse" statement of vocational change as
evidence for a "political Koestler". Similarly, I have tried to guard
against interpretations of Koestler's novels that make light of the
Stalinist connection and the original context. Koestler's work is, as
I hope to have demonstrated, a synthesis of the spiritual concerns of
the Yogi and the social programme of the Commissar. Koestler's
practical projects - what Crick calls the "small clear things" (Crick
1989a: 71) - such as the 1946 League, are best also considered in this
light rather than as purely political projects per se or allegories of
Koestler's spiritual ethic.
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Such a synthesis, that in Turner's words examines the work itself
rather than seeking to claim ownership over it, applies to Koestler's
active interest in the campaign to abolish capital punishment in
Britain, a campaign that took up all his energies after the publication
of The Trail.... For More's Utopia had itself begun "by pointing out
the irrational barbarity of capital punishment" (Turner 1965: 10),
suggesting alternatives to hanging: much of Book One in More's work is
occupied with a critique of the morality of capital punishment.
For one such as Koestler committed to the hierarchical ethic, then at
least the abolition of capital punishment represented one means by
which his dystopias might be avoided in a species whose self-
destructive tendencies he now recognised. In short, for Koestler as for
More, alternatives to hanging were as much part of their spiritual
ethic as their blueprint for social revolution - and it would be
foolish to consider Koestler's campaign without giving due recognition
to the spiritual ethic with which he now operated.
The anti-hanging campaign
According to Cynthia Koestler, her husband finished writing The
Trail... on 10 February 1955 (Koestler, A. &C. 1984: 188). Within two
months he had started work on a biography of Kepler, his boyhood hero.
However the campaign to abolish capital punishment soon took
precedence, for as Levene writes Koestler "saw the campaign as integral
to his more general concern with man's creativity and destructiveness"
(Levene 1985: 27) .
There can be little doubt that Koestler had considered the subject
for some time before he and Gollancz embarked upon what Grigg describes
as "a full-scale assault on the institution of capital punishment" in
the summer of 1955 (Grigg 1975: 125). Cynthia Koestler recalls the
"grey despair" on Koestler's face in 1953 when Bentley, a 19-year old
grade four mental defective, was hanged as accomplice^ in the murder
1 7
Bentley's partner, Craig, fired the fatal shots but as he was only
ien, he did not hang. Ludovic Kennedy wrote "the law considered Craig
»le of redemption, Bentley not" (Kennedy 1991: 136). Interestingly,
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of a policeman (Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 194). And when the Rosenbergs
were due to be executed as Soviet spies in the United States, Koestler
had sent a telegram to the American President "entreat[ing] you to
reprieve the two guilty spies as an act of human charity..." (MS
2379/1: 125). The immediate catalyst for Koestler's decision to
organise a national campaign may however have been the case of Ruth
Ellis, hanged for shooting her lover in what is generally regarded as
a crime passionel. But whatever the reasons for embarking upon the
campaign, once he began his research it occupied him in an obsessive
manner. Cynthia Koestler wrote later
"He could not stop talking or reading about capital punishment
when he was not writing about it. At night he continued to
dictate the book [Reflections on Hanging] to me in his sleep."
(Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 197)
The National Campaign for the Abolition of Capital Punishment (NCACP)
held its first meeting on 1 August 1955 - barely two weeks after Arthur
Koestler had written to Cynthia informing her "Cap. punishment crusade
started" (Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 193) and six weeks after Koestler's
futile intervention on behalf of the Rosenbergs. Grigg notes that the
Campaign was more of a pressure group than a mass protest; certainly
the first big rally was not held until November 1955, when Koestler
chose not to speak because of his foreign name and accent (Grigg 1975:
126). By the end of 1955, the NCACP had 17,000 declared supporters,
swelling to over 26,000 by February 1956. Its effective weapons were to
be two books: Capital Punishment as a Deterrent and The Ai ternative, an
objective analysis of the issues raised by the lawyer Gerald Gardiner,
and Koestler's emotive Ref1ections on Hanging.
Koestler's loss of rationality
Grigg argues that no writer has better reason to regard capital
—edy also wrote a play based on the Craig/Bent 1ey case entitled Murder
—y: "The theme of the play was how an illiterate youth like Bentley finds
—he condemned cell and for the first time a meaning and purpose to his
; and as he finds it, his life is ended" (Kennedy 1991 : 136) - just as the
^mned Rubashov found meaning and purpose to his life immediately prior to
execution in Darkness at Noon.
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punishment as an abomination than Koestler (Grigg 1975: 124). Koestler
declares his interest in the subject in the Preface.
"In 1937, during the Civil War in Spain, I spent three months
under sentence of death as a suspected spy, witnessing the
executions of my fellow prisoners and awaiting my own. These
three months left me with a vested interest in capital
punishment...Each time a man's or woman's neck is broken in this
peaceful country, memory starts to fester like a badly healed
wound. I shall never achieve real peace of mind until hanging is
abolished." (Koestler 1956: 7)
In a sense, Reflections... is the opposite of the spiritual experience
its author had gone through in Seville. The Third Order was the
spiritual, higher reality that allowed him to escape - and capital
punishment was the reality from which his escape was necessary. Thus
the book is directly connected with Rubashov in the second ethical
novel, with a not dissimilar aim that its readers "should share in
imagination, as he did in Seville gaol, the fate of the poor wretches
who were executed" (Grigg 1975: 127).
This helps explain the powerful and frequently graphic descriptions
of hangings that form the core to the book, which many readers found
objectionable. Ian Gilmour of The Spectator however found Koestler's
attitude "perfectly understandable".
"Indeed his moral fervour combined with his usual literary grace
and distinction may conceivably penetrate the cocoon of
complacency which protects many retentionists from the realities
of the case..." (MS 2424/3)
Nevertheless, parts of Reflections had to be rewritten prior to
publication because the publishers (Gollancz), taking the legal advice
of Gerald Gardiner, feared parts of the book were defamatory
(particularly the "Mace-Bearer" case where Koestler's use of false
names for the victim and her family were scarcely likely to hide their
true identity; and the wider inference of "inhumane judges" who are
equally identifiable: Koestler 1956: 81-82).
Two small points deserve particular mention in this thesis. Firstly,
a close study of Koestler's arguments against hanging both in
Reflections... and the serialised Picture Post articles he wrote early
in 1956 may indicate not merely the strength and subjectivity of
Koestler's feelings (using unsubstantiated material on the name of
Pierrepoint's pub and Lord Goddard's background) but also a certain
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bias towards the middle classes. This is not merely my own
interpretation; the columns of The Observer contained several letters
after it serialised extracts from Reflections... airing readers' anger
at the way in which Koestler used the word "hag" to describe a woman
murdered by a youth ("lad"), the terminology being such that Koestler's
sympathies were undoubtedly with the youth (MS 2418/2). If Orwell
remained faithful to the proles, Koestler as often as not condemned
them in Reflections. . . to Broadmoor as mental defectives or as victims
whose fate was not entirely undeserved. Even in the "Mace-Bearer" case,
there is the strong suspicion in Koestler's interpretation that Donald
Martin's^® victim, his wife Violet, was merely a laundry-maid through
whom Donald contracted syphilis on their honeymoon. Donald, in
contrast, is described as the Town Hall Superintendent retaining the
air of his former Army life in India. "Yet he forgave her the honeymoon
present she had given him" (sic!) whilst Violet's "sexual coldness" is
described as "this debasement of a sacrament... this mortal offence to
the male's pride [which] is not known as a provocation to a reasonable
man" (Koestler 1956: 88). If Koestler continued to hold Commissar-
ethics in utter contempt, here in part is the reason: he did not
disguise when he gave vent to his feelings on capital punishment his
mistrust of Orwell's "proles". Some might even argue that he used every
journalistic trick in the trade to state his own position.
Secondly, one can look at Koestler's response to the complaints he
received over the more graphic descriptions in the book as evidence for
Koestler's irrational side. Among the many controversial passages in
the book is a description of Edith Thompson's prolapse of the uterus as
she made her way to the scaffold in Holloway in 1923 (Koestler 1956:
140). Koestler later admitted, in a letter to Dr Todd of 30 May 1956,
that such "incidental horrors" are not logically relevant. But, he
argued, they are "emotionally relevant". Such is Koestler's emotionally
charged state - one only has to read Cynthia Koestler's account of his
"Mania", the evenings picking arguments in pubs over capital
punishment, and so on - that "emotional relevance" takes over from
1 8The names used here are the pseudonyms penned by Koestler.
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objective fact^9 or rational argument in Reflections.... Here is
Koestler the ethicist succumbing to Orwell's accusation of Peter
Slavek's "loss of intelligence": or loss of rationality, for as in
Arrival and Departure, Koestler firmly believed that his arguments for
abolition, based on personal experience and treating human beings as
sacred individuals, were not amenable to cold, rational discussion.
Koestler could no more understand the position of the "hang-hards", as
he called them, than Peter could understand Sonia. Reflections... is a
book that could have been written by Peter Slavek.
Further evidence of the Third Order
One chapter of Reflections... stands apart from the rest of the book
in its content and dispassionate prose. "Free Will and Determinism"
takes up the dilemma of the ethical polarities of the Yogi and the
Commissar and examines them in the context of capital punishment.
Koestler acknowledged that this was the most difficult chapter to write
(Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 197); Gilmour concluded the chapter was
"unconvincing and irrelevant" (Gilmour 1956). Its author conceded that
the philosophical question was one that had frequently been overlooked
for very good reasons.
"The issue of free will versus determinism is hardly mentioned at
all in the century-old controversy on capital punishment. Yet it
is really the heart of the matter. It is shunned because it is
the oldest and most awe-inspiring problem of philosophy, and
probably an insoluble one. Yet I will try to show that our
inability to solve the problem is the strongest argument against
capital punishment." (Koestler 1956: 93)
One can therefore see why Koestler deemed it necessary to pursue the
matter further. Free will versus determinism had been at the heart of
the Yogi-Commissar dichotomy and was indeed the subtext of the ethical
novels, as I have sought to explain in Chapter 1. But until now, it had
remained either an academic matter - as in the Yogi. .. essays - or an
1 9
For instance, part of the drama of Koestler's account of Edith
—pson's execution came from the statement of two warders quoted by Baxter
le 1948 House of Commons debate; after his book had gone to the printers,
"tier discovered the warders were not present and a correction slip had to
-Jiserted in the printed edition, much to Koestler's annoyance.
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interpretation of revolutionary ethics. The anti-hanging campaign
allowed Koestler the opportunity to relate his ethical evolution to a
matter of topical and highly practical concern.
Koestler argues that if we transpose a deterministic view of human
behaviour, definitions such as "criminal responsibility" become a
nonsense, because a person's actions are wholly determined by the past.
"The function of the law from this strict deterministic point of
view is reduced to deterrence, plus reform through corrective
conditioning. Praise and blame, punishment as vengeance or
retribution, have no logical place in a scientific world-view
which treats man as part of the natural universe, and his
character and actions as subject to its laws. He reacts in any
given situation as he must, for he could only act otherwise if
either his character or the situation or both were different."
(Koestler 1956: 94)
Thus the materialistic philosophy of Marxism denies man his free choice
whilst emphasising, when wrong "choices" are made, the retributive
element of punishment. Koestler points out that even if such a
materialistic philosophy holds true, in our everyday lives free will is
"a useful and necessary illusion for the functioning of both the
individual and society" (Koestler 1956: 95). Conscience can express
itself only in the emotional language of praise or blame, even if you
know logically that there is nothing to praise or blame because you are
not a free agent but a robot.
Koestler then looks at the so-called McNaghten rules (in which the
man accused of murder is considered responsible - having a free will -
unless proved insane by the various McNaghten criteria) and concludes
that the accused is considered to possess a free will unless the
defence proves the contrary, namely that he is governed wholly by the
universal laws of nature (from which his insanity arose). The freedom
of criminal law, according to Koestler, simply means freedom from
determination by heredity and environment.
Having concluded that actions are not determined by the physical
order of reality, Koestler states that we must substitute a different
kind of order or renounce reason.
"To put it bluntly: the concept of criminal responsibility
implies the existence of a super-natural order; it is not a
legal, but a theological, concept." (author's italics) (Koestler
1956: 99)
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It is not therefore a matter of being guilty, in our everyday lives, of
trivial misdemeanours; Koestler emphasises the feeling of guilt we
experience. He maintains that each of us possesses "psychic energy"
that often inhibits culpable impulses and may also give us the moral
and physical strength to overcome the natural determinants that might
otherwise restrict our actions.
"Hence, to say that the accused ought to have made a greater
effort to restrain himself means to say that a man with a given
self in a given set of circumstances is free to react in more
ways than one; and that means that the decision which way he will
react lies outside the circumstances and outside the self. It
implies the existence of a factor 'X' , beyond time and causation,
beyond the order of nature." (Koestler 1956: 101)
This, of course, is a restatement of hierarchical ethics and an
analysis, albeit under a different guise, of Rubashov's "confession".
The individual is free to act according to the level of the hierarchy
upon which he is operating at any given time: Rubashov becomes aware of
his guilt, irrespective of the crime itself, because of a factor
outside his control and outside the self; the Grammatical Fiction.
Those who are offered a glimpse of "factor 'X', beyond...the order of
nature" react, as Rubashov did, in an utterly unpredictable manner to
those on lower levels of the hierarchy. Equally, the individual cannot
be expected to act according to the rules of a higher or lower level of
the hierarchy.
The question that the courts must address, given Koestler's
hierarchical ethic and the existence of a Third Order of reality, is
whether in a specific case the individual is acting on a lower level of
the hierarchy - in other words, his actions being predetermined by his
genes or upbringing - or on a higher level of the hierarchy, where the
individual has been afforded a glimpse of the Third Order before
committing the crime.
"But to decide... that in one case the criminal obeyed the command
of his endocrine glands and should therefore be spared, whilst in
another case he used his metaphysical freedom to execute a higher
design and must therefore be hanged, seems a rather arbitrary
procedure." (Koestler 1956: 101)
Courts are given discretion over the sentencing for all crimes (in
1956) barring murder, which, Koestler concludes, must be ethically
wrong based on the hierarchical system he has outlined.
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Koestler's personal creed
Further evidence of the importance of the Third Order in Koestler's
ethics comes from a lengthy footnote appended to page 102, in which he
states his own personal beliefs. It is interesting that Koestler's
postulation of the Third Order takes on something of a credal statement
("I believe in...") mirroring the two previous occasions where Koestler
highlighted such a phrase - his affirmation of the "misfitted brain"
hypothesis in his notes for the American radio programme, and the title
to his Picture Post series on the anti-hanging campaign, entitled "We
Believe".
"I think that free will is a fantastic notion, but also that man
is a fantastic creature. I believe in the unprovable existence of
a factor x: an order of reality beyond physical causation, about
whose nature only a negative statement is possible: namely, that
in its domain the present is not determined by the past."
(Koestler 1956: 102, footnote)
If Koestler was looking for a creed then the evidence suggests that the
two main elements of his creed were in position by 1956.
The first element was the reality of the Third Order, which Koestler
felt confident enough to use as evidence against capital punishment and
which had hitherto been alluded to in his dystopic novels and essays.
It is interesting that in the same year (1956) Cynthia and Arthur
Koestler conducted a light-hearted but also partially successful
experiment in ESP^O. This took place when the book was in its final
revision stages and quite possibly strengthened the case for Koestler
to declare openly his belief in a supernatural order of reality by
appending the lengthy footnote.
The second element was the evolutionary flaw that so frequently
prevented man from moving up the ethical hierarchy - the "downside", as
it were, of the evolutionary legacy that had provided man with
bisociative thought - creativity or Polanyi's "intuition". This too was
incorporated into Reflections... in the chapter headed "The Monthly
20
Cynthia recalled the occasion clearly much later: "We sat at a
—e...'I'11 draw something,' he [Arthur] said, 'and you must guess what it
He shielded a piece of paper with one hand as he drew, then put it into
pocket and looked at me challengingly. 'It's a horse,' I said.
-Hnphantly he flourished the drawing. It was the head of a horse - in actual
, a knight in chess." (Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 203)
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Sacrifice". If the Third Order was a philosophical argument for
abolition, then the "misfitted brain" was the reason for public
acceptance of the death penalty. (Not that all those whose faith
included acceptance of the Third Order were abolitionists: Koestler
reminds his readers that the Bishops who voted in 1810 for death for a
five-shilling theft had no more charity than the atheist George Bernard
Shaw.) Koestler also refers in this chapter to the "inner kinship" that
unites us to the Christies, the Bentleys and the Pierrepoints "since
what we dislike in them is merely an extreme development of some of the
less palatable aspects of ourselves, of some human quality in which we
all share" (Koestler 1956: 167).
The "Neanderthal" so despised by Rubashov re-enters as "the little
Stone Age man" controlled by the rules of civilised society in all
aspects of behaviour except aggression. The condemned man is thus
equated with the kind of gladiator that occupied Koestler in writing
his first ethical novel. Onlookers at the Old Bailey and spectators at
the gladiatorial circus are alike in witnessing a man fighting for his
life "in the thrilling uncertainty whether the outcome will be thumbs
up or thumbs down" (Koestler 1956: 168). The strength of Neanderthal is
now given much more respect after Koestler's acquaintance with the
"misfitted brain" hypothesis.
"The point is not to deny the existence of the fui—clad little
man in us, but to accept him as part of the human condition, and
to keep him under control." (Koestler 1956: 168)
As in The Age of Longing, Koestler concludes with a warning against the
hypnotic power of tradition and the blind belief that does not question
society's ethics. The final sentence of Reflections on Hanging, with
the statement that capital punishment stands for everything that man
must reject if he is to survive, places us firmly in the world
inhabited by Hydie and Fedya: the longing for a new faith if only to
allow society to survive, let alone flourish. The wider context of
human survival may seem to overstate the importance of the issue of how
to punish the murderer. But if we accept Koestler's premise that the
existence of the Third Order necessitated abolition of capital
punishment and its retention was evidence of the evolutionary flaw,
then the matter of capital punishment does seem to belong to that
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dystopia familiar to his readers from his earlier work.
Conclusion
The anti-hanging campaign drew to a rather ambiguous conclusion. The
early scenes of triumph in the Commons lobby after the House had voted
to abolish capital punishment in February 1956 were premature, for the
House of Lords overturned the Bill and it was a further ten years
before the death penalty was suspended. Long before that, Gollancz and
Koestler had fallen out, for reasons that demonstrate, in part, the
difficulty in assessing Koestler's ethics. Gollancz had hoped that
Reflections... would stress the religious aspects of capital
punishment, and Cynthia Koestler suggests his disappointment in turn
delayed the book's publication.
It is, therefore, possible to interpret Koestler's involvement in the
campaign, and his earlier "Cassandra has gone hoarse" statement, as the
manifestation of political ethics. But a letter that Koestler wrote in
March 1956 suggests otherwise.
"Believe me, this thing [the campaign] is not motivated by thirst
for battle - rather by thirst for peace of mind." (MS 2418/2)
It is tempting to conclude that, given such peace of mind had proved
elusive in the past, Koestler was still searching for an ethical ideal.
But I hope that the evidence of the post-war years has demonstrated
that Koestler's ethical system was, to all intents and purposes,
complete. The lack of peace of mind was due entirely to one of the two
basic tenets of Koestlerian ethics, one that had emerged from his study
of psychology: the "misfitted brain" hypothesis, which prevented the
progression of society to the higher levels of the ethical hierarchy.
But coupled with this lack of peace of mind was an acute spirituality
that, although it did not fit easily with the religiosity of those such
as Gollancz, nevertheless was the driving force behind all his work,
unifying practical projects such as the anti-hanging campaign and
dystopic novels such as The Age of Longing.
Indeed, the real significance of Reflections... , in my opinion, is
precisely the open declaration, in the footnote on page 102, of its
author's Peter Slavek-like irrationality and in the chapter on free
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will and determinism, Koestler's unapologetic acceptance of the
existence of a Third Order of reality. Hierarchical ethics was coming
to be based more and more upon the distinction between those such as
the "hang-hards", the Fedyas and others who had not perceived the Third
Order, and the Hydies and others who had.
Curiously, in his autobiography two years' previously, he had stated
that it was the 1945 Yogi... essay that marked the final attempt to
digest the meaning of the solitary dialogue of cell no. 40 in Seville
and his mystical experiences of the Third Order. He had concluded then
"it had taken five years to digest the hours by the window" (Koestler
1954a: 358). Perhaps Koestler underestimated the hold that the
perception of a higher reality had over him. For if he had plotted out
the theoretical , if random, means of bisociation by which man may
ascend the hierarchy, he had now examined in novel istic form and in
practical ethics the consequence of the "misfitted brain" that pulled
man downwards. I believe that for Koestler, such was the importance of
the Third Order that the rest of his life would be spent exploring the
means by which the "misfitted brain" handicap could be overcome and the
Man-Universe connection of the Yogi... essays re-established, with all
the consequences for a working ethic that entailed.
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CHAPTER 4: THE THEOLOGY OF A SLEEPWALKER
Introduction
The aim of this final chapter is to evaluate Koestler's theology and
assess Koestler's relevance for today, based largely on the first two
decades of Koestler's output as an English writer.
Two works, both dating to 1959, shall be used in my attempt to
complete the picture of Koestler's mature ethical system. The
Sleepwalkers is usually discussed within the context of the scientific
trilogy completed in 1957 with the publication of The Ghost in the
Machine. However, in my opinion, the book is as important for students
of Koestler's ethics as it is for those examining the merits of his
later writings for the reason alluded to by Beloff:
"As its title suggests, the burden of the book was the strong
irrational streak that permeated the thought of some of the
greatest scientists and intellectual visionaries..." (Beloff
1975: 78)
to which, I hope to add, also permeated his ethics. Thus, the lives of
the historical characters in The S1eepwalkers can be legitimately
examined in terms of Koestler's hierarchical system previously
inhabited by purely fictional characters. The characteristics displayed
by Rubashov and Peter Slavek are not that far removed from those
attributed to Kepler or Galileo.
In the same year that saw the publication of The Sleepwalkers,
Koestler's application of his ethical system to the natural sciences,
its author also completed a television screenplay that confirms, in my
thesis, his own position as a scientific sleepwalker. I shall attempt
to show that Koestler, in his continuing spiritual struggle, was still
obsessed with the non-rational ethic of Peter Slavek and ill at ease
with his own scientific upbringing.
The screenplay in question, The Fall of Dr Icarus, merits a place
alongside Arrival and Departure as a work in which its author drew upon
his own experiences for inspiration. Examination of the script may also
provide important clues both to Koestler's spirituality and the reason
why such spirituality was not more openly expressed. The play itself
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has not apparently been subject to scrutiny by other Koestlerian
scholars. Its complex evolution and the problem of its dating are
discussed in Appendix 3.
Taken together, The S1eepwalkers and The Fall of Dr Icarus - which,
incidentally, appear to share an almost identical gestation period in
their author's mind and were earmarked for a large audience in their
respective media - enable us to understand why Koestler chose to devote
the latter part of his life to overtly scientific work rather than
exploring the spiritual or ethical implications that were evident in
The Sleepwalkers as much as in the earlier ethical novels.
The scientific work, therefore, can be interpreted as a natural
consequence of the hierarchical system already in place in 1959. I
shall therefore argue that Koestler's contribution to science is
secondary to his contribution, as yet ignored, to theology and that the
factual basis of Koestler's empirical work is, to a great extent,
irrelevant.
I aim to show that even in the Janus trilogy Koestler remained true
to that system of ethics intelligible only by acceptance of the reality
of the Third Order. Perhaps Koestler was essentially transcendental in
his interpretation of human experience. Unlike other scholars, I
believe he may have succeeded in setting down such an interpretation
based on his own experience. Thus I hope to demonstrate that underlying
all of Koestler's work was an understanding of human nature which
emphasised the element of mystery whilst being rooted in objective
reality, offering an ethical system quite unlike that of any other
author in the present century: a true synthesis of the Yogi and the
Commissar.
4.i. THE SLEEPWALKERS
An argument for irrationality
If The Trail... signalled Koestler's "change of vocation", its author
argued that his next book marked a return to the passionate concern of
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his student days - science. Its precise subject, Koestler later
admitted, was not easily definable, but was related to man's artistic
human creation and his apparent blindness and destructive tendency.
"History reflects them both; but perhaps their clearest
reflection is to be found in the history of man's changing vision
of the universe." (Koestler 1968b: 11)
Using that last phrase as its subtitle, The Sleepwalkers (Koestler
1959), Koestler's contribution to the history of scientific thought, is
perceived by most scholars (Graubard 1975, Toulmin 1979, Hamilton 1982)
as a new departure on the part of its author into the study of
cosmology,
"...a fitting major event along the new path, an original beacon
illuminating the workings of progress in science, with cosmology
as model." (Graubard 1975: 21)
In fact, The Sleepwalkers is better viewed as a summation of Koestler's
hierarchical system simply applied to one particular subject (the
history of science), just as Insight and Outlook had applied the
hierarchical system to creativity a decade earlier. The significance of
this work lies in its summation of Koestler's mature philosophical
system and the glimpses it offers of Koestler's own spirituality.
The Preface indeed recalls Koestler's earlier philosophical works,
notably the second Yogi... essay and the eponymous essay of The
Trail.... Here the author states his intention at the outset to trace,
in the history of science, the change from "destiny from above" to
"destiny from below" and the division between religion and science that
had been the subject of the Yogi... essays.
"Their [Kepler and Galileo's] cosmic quest destroyed the medieval
vision of an immutable social order in a walled-in universe
together with its fixed hierarchy of moral values, and
transformed the European landscape, society, culture, habits and
general outlook, as thoroughly as if a new species had arisen on
this planet." (my italics) (Koestler 1959: 13)
The Sleepwalkers is thus not a history of astronomy but an
investigation into the psychological processes of discovery, a la
Insight and Outlook, that left twentieth century man, in the author's
mind, in the moral vacuum inhabited by his fictional creations. Such an
investigation is coloured before it begins by Koestler's conviction of
the "misfitted brain" theory. Schizophysiology is never far below the
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surface in The Sleepwalkers, even in the author's explanation of the
book's curious title.
"The history of cosmic theories...may without exaggeration be
called a history of collective obsessions and controlled
schizophrenias; and the manner in which some of the most
important individual discoveries were arrived at reminds one more
of a sleepwalker's performance than an electronic brain's."
(Koestler 1959: 15)
One cannot help wondering whether the reference to the "electronic
brain" is a thinly veiled reference to the work of Polanyi and Turing
at Manchester in what we now term cybernetics'' .
Cosmological systems, Koestler argued, reflect the particular bias of
their authors: The Sleepwalkers is no different. Koestler had stumbled
across Third Order reality, like a sleepwalker, during his sojourn in
the Seville jail. This work was an attempt to give academic credibility
in a wider field to what had been, until now, very much a personal
philosophical system of the ethical hierarchy - hence, Koestler
reckoned, the need for a scholar such as Herbert Butterfield to write
its Introduction. If a model for the history of scientific thought was
to be put forward, it had to be one which put "ratomorphism" (into
which he would place Turing's work) in its place and emphasised man's
irrational nature. The S1eepwalkers is a summation of a system of
philosophical thought that was already firmly established in its
author's mind.
Support for my argument may be found from a cursory reading of "Part
One: The Heroic Age" which is essentially a reworking of the history of
hierarchies that we have discussed in The Yogi and the Commissar II.
Koestler makes no secret of his admiration for the "unitary awareness"
of the Pythagorean world. Mystic intuition is integrated into a perfect
philosophical whole: as near to a Koestlerian Utopia as one could ask
A
Polanyi was the driving force behind the work of Alan Turing, the
ileo of a new science", and though the two held differing philosophical
—s, it was a joint discussion over Godel's theorem of mind that led Turing
—t tempt to build an "intelligent thinking machine". (See Hodges 1983: 418ff
detailed account of the Polanyi-Turing work in cybernetics.) Turing's
had come to Koestler's attention in 1949 in a manner which cast doubt on
—validity of Koestler's conclusions in Insight and Outlook (see Michael
lyi to Arthur Koestler, 24 June 1949. MS 2344/7: 110.)
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for! Irrationalitv is a term that Koestler has, up to now, treated only
obliquely - notably in the actions of Rubashov and Slavek, in his one¬
sided interpretation of Hillary's death and in the background of Hydie.
But in The Sleepwalkers, Koestler lays his cards firmly on the table.
"Why should we allow artists, conquerors and statesmen to be
guided by irrational motives, but not the heroes of science?"
(Koestler 1959: 73)
The Greek astronomers are the first "heroes of science" to be given the
Rubashov treatment, as it were. Koestler suggests that the manner in
which they "turned their backs" on the heliocentric system was utterly
irrational. The problem, according to Koestler, was that post-
Aristotelian astronomers denied the rule of the sun over the planets
and affirmed it at the same time. In a sense, the truth or falsity of
this is irrelevant, and certainly the history of science is outside the
scope of this thesis. But what is important to note is that Koestler
used such historical instances to emphasise the constant struggle
within the human mind as it sought to reconcile the apparently
irreconcilable.
"...this 'controlled schizophrenia' continued throughout the Dark
and Middle Ages, until it came to be almost taken for granted as
the normal condition of man." (Koestler 1959: 73)
Later, he drops the term 'controlled schizophrenia' in favour of the
Orwellian term "double-think" (Koestler 1959: 99, 103) to describe the
projection of medieval man's mental conflicts upon "the graceful sky".
The reason for such mental conflicts was that the principle of
continuity that Koestler argued was rediscovered around 1200AD,
offering a hierarchy of living matter - "the chain, thus unified, now
reached from God's throne down to the meanest worm" (Koestler 1959:
96) - was now threatened by the Renaissance. The same principle, of
course, is familiar to Koestlerian scholars from the staircase analogy
of the second Yogi... essay. By offering an alternative view of the
staircase, the "heroes of science" that were at the heart of Koestler's
book were precipitating the division between religion and science that
resulted in the modern ethical vacuum as he perceived it.
When he turns from general cosmologies to the lives of those "heroes"
that were to the fore of his current study, Koestler could not hide his
dislike of Copernicus - "a stuffy pedant, without the flair, the
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sleepwalking intuition of the original genius" (Koestler 1959: 201).
Indeed, Koestler seems to be placing Copernicus firmly into the
Commissar camp alongside Gletkin: phrases such as "almost hypnotic
submission to authority", "traditional prejudice" and "the iron teeth
of dogma" abound (Koestler 1959: 201, 211), indicating an approach that
subsumes Commissar-ethics and Commissar-science as specific indicators
of a more general social malaise.
Kepler
If Copernicus can be likened to a Gletkin, then one need look no
further than Kepler to find Rubashov in The Sleepwalkers. The longest
section of the book is devoted to this one man - and was reprinted
under the title The Watershed a year later (Koestler 1960). Koestler's
view of Kepler as the sleepwalker par excellence - "There is hardly a
page in Kepler's writings... that is not alive and kicking" (Koestler
1959: 245) - is undoubtedly because Koestler's childhood hero was seen
as the perfect synthesis of saint and revolutionary, mystic and
scientist. His account of Kepler's youth also serves to accentuate the
similarities between the Renaissance scientist and his own background.
Thus Koestler describes Kepler as "a man whose childhood [was] spent in
hell and who had fought his way out of it" (Koestler 1959: 219) - an
exaggerated version of the 'man of action' or Baron Munchausen figure
that features so prominently in Arrow in the Blue.2
Kepler, too, seems to have experienced something akin to Koestler's
"hours by the window". That, at least, is Koestler's view as he notes
Kepler's reasoning that "the sky does something for man" (Koestler
1959: 245). Kepler's enquiries into the nature of the universe,
Koestler goes on to argue, were inspired by a medieval brand of
mysticism: and yet they proved "amazingly fertile" (Koestler 1959:
263), just as Koestler's "hours by the window" had proved fertile
2The comparisons between the young Kepler and Koestler are also
isised in the circa 1968 screenplay for BBC2, Blind Stargazer by James
izon (MS 2332/1), particularly their adolescent awkwardness and sense of
ition.
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ground for the foundation of his own ethical and spiritual revolution.
Even the starting point for the two men seemed remarkably similar (but
then Koestler had telegraphed the importance of Kepler's enquiries as
long ago as Arrival and Departure3): for just as Koestler had sought
solace in mathematics in Seville, so Kepler had apparently discovered
his own route to the perception of the Third Order through mathematics.
"Kepler said his prayers in the language of mathematics, and
distilled his mystic faith into a mathematician's Song of Songs."
(Koestler 1959: 265)
Cynthia Koestler would have us believe that such parallels between the
two men came as a revelation to her husband (Koestler, A. & C. 1984:
189) - "only now [in 1954]...he discovered in him [Kepler] a kindred
spirit". But this was not merely a biographer's identification with his
subject. Koestler's elation at discovering the parallels between his
own early experiences and those of his childhood hero is reminiscent of
Koestler's enthusiasm for using Hillary as proof of his theory of the
irreducibi1ity of ethical values. Kepler, like Hillary before him, was
used by Koestler in order to show that his hierarchical system, based
upon the mystical awareness of the Third Order, could be applicable to
contexts other than those he had originally explored.
Thus, if a sense of mystery and the objective existence of Third
Order reality had pervaded Koestler's last novel, The Age of Longing,
these factors were at the forefront now of the great man of science at
the centre of Koestler's research - for Kepler had used the word
himself as the title of his seminal work, Mysterium Cosmographicum.
The main part of Koestler's book concludes with the period from
Galileo - and a lengthy account of the famous trial - to Newton;
Koestler laments that with the publication of Newton's Principia in
1687, mystery had now been removed from the human view of the universe.
"The wild dance of shadows thrown by the stars on the wall of
Plato's cave was settling into a decorous and sedate Victorian
waltz. All mysteries seemed to have been banished from the
O
Thus Peter at the conclusion of Sonia's psychoanalysis: "He felt the
—tation of his early student days, when he had suddenly grasped the
ciple of Kepler's laws of planetary movement and the chaotic world around
/as tamed, and transformed into an orderly, harmonious system." (Koestler
: 123)
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universe, and divinity reduced to the part of a constitutional
monarch, who is kept in existence for reasons of decorum, but
without real necessity and without influence on the course of
affairs." (Koestler 1959: 509)
The implications of irrationality
However, The Sleepwalkers does not end with its author's Victorian
waltz. Koestler then adds an Epilogue of some thirty pages in which he
sums up the implications of the theories he has presented. Once again,
his understanding of mankind hinges upon man's intrinsic irrationality,
which Koestler suggests has an anatomical basis - a brain of such
capabilities that far exceeded man's actual and immediate needs.
"The jerky and basically irrational progress of knowledge is
probably related to the fact that evolution had endowed homo
sapiens with an organ which he was unable to put to proper
use...The history of discovery is, from this point of view, one
of random penetrations into the uncharted Arabias in the
convolutions of the human brain." (Koestler 1959: 514)
Koestler's conclusion is important for two reasons. It is true that his
thinking had been leading him towards such a hypothesis since he began
writing Insight and Outlook. Indeed, he had tentatively hinted at such
a conclusion in The Trail... essay. But its appearance in the final
section of a book on the history of science - and one that, with
Butterfie1d's introduction, its author had hoped would be accepted by
mainstream science - demonstrates that for Koestler, irrationality
could no longer be swept under the carpet or merely alluded to in his
ethical novels. One could compare the Epilogue with the chapter in
Reflections on Hanging upon free will and determinism: the Epilogue was
not necessary in terms of what had gone before, but nevertheless had to
be stated as Koestler saw the history of science as giving weight to
his own recognition of the Third Order.
Secondly, he could now see the human brain not merely as the schizoid
organ that constantly pulled man downwards in the ethical hierarchy.
The existence of sleepwalkers proved that "random penetrations into the
uncharted Arabias in the convolutions of the human brain", as Koestler
poetically put it, enabled man to make the creative or intuitive leaps
of imagination necessary for him to progress upward in the ethical
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hierarchy. In Insight and Outlook, Koestler had focused perhaps too
closely upon the detailed mechanisms - notably bisociation - he
perceived lay behind creativity. Now he saw in the sheer complexity and
size of the human brain the organic foundation of what he called
"sleepwalking": suddenly, intuitively, stumbling across a new way of
looking at the world.
Religion has a role to play in Koestler's developed ethical system.
For Koestler states quite clearly that religion provides the
unconscious with intuitive techniques that transcend its dogmatic
limitations - in other words, the ability to perceive a spiritual
reality that cannot be assimilated into, or described by, lower levels
of the hierarchy. Dogma has its place: where else are the seeds of
intuition sown if there is not some inkling of a higher reality that
has been systemised, however inadequately? But it must always recognise
its limitations when intuition or imagination is applied to the
religious or ethical quest. Here Koestler argues that the same duality
of approach (rational-intuitive) characterises the scientific quest.
"It is therefore a perverse mistake to identify the religious
need solely with intuition and emotion, science solely with the
logical and rational." (Koestler 1959: 521)
That which Koestler was to refer to in Icarus as the "lovers' quarrel"
has gone a stage further, to what Koestler calls the contemporary
divorce between faith and reason. As we shall see below in examining
Icarus, this is not due to grounds of hostility: rather there has been
a progressive estrangement, with post-Renaissance theology continuing
its specialised line, splitting the mind into two halves (the
irrational and the rational) whilst science becomes increasingly
conservative. The modern scientist reacts to phenomena which do not fit
his closed system in much the same way, Koestler reasoned, that his
forefathers reacted to the suggestion of new stars appearing in the
immutable eighth sphere.
As an example of such conservatism, Koestler points to ESP.
Encouraged by Rhine's reaction to Insight and Outlook, Koestler had
become a member of The Society for Psychical Research early in 1956
whilst researching The Sleepwalkers (MS 2381/1: 12). But because
parapsychological data do not fit neatly into accepted scientific
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thinking, mainstream science has largely refused to investigate such
data or fund experimental research (Beloff 1993: 226-234). This
situation, Koestler argues, could never have arisen if faith and
science had not become divorced from one another.
"As a result of their divorce, neither faith nor science is able
to satisfy man's intellectual cravings. In the divided house,
both inhabitants lead a thwarted existence." (Koestler 1959: 537)
Post-Galilean science had produced spiritual starvation. The irony is
that in Koestler's system this might have been perfectly acceptable had
it not been for the capacity of the human brain to provide intuitive
perception of objective spiritual reality.
The possible implications for ethics are not lost on Koestler either.
"The dials on our laboratory panels are turning into another
version of the shadows in the cave. Our hypnotic enslavement to
the numerical aspects of reality has dulled our perception of
non-quantitative moral values; the resultant ends-justifies-the-
means ethics may be a major factor in our undoing." (Koestler
1959: 542)
In other words, the longer mankind remains apparently trapped or
"enslaved" to the lower level of the ethical hierarchy, in which
reality is explained by solely rational phenomena, the more our
perception of the non-quantitative moral values upheld by sleepwalkers
such as Rubashov or Slavek will become dulled to the point that the
dogma of the ends justifying the means becomes acceptable within the
framework of a modern scientific world view.
The lives of irrational thinkers encouraged Koestler to believe that
his fictional anti-heroes such as Rubashov were not that exceptional.
Sleepwalkers would always appear on the scene to remind man of the
Third Order reality he has apparently forgotten. That, ultimately, is
the point of The Sleepwalkers. It is a moral or ethical lesson that
may, in part, have been aimed at Koestler's one-time collaborator,
Polanyi and the other Manchester cyberneticists^. Be that as it may,
the final words of the book are once again, as in the Prologue, a
^There is evidence to suggest that cybernetics had already been the
-e of Koestler's attention shortly after the publication of Insight and
—ook: in October 1949 Koestler had organised a symposium to discuss a paper
l by Polanyi entitled "Can the mind be represented by a machine?" (MS
'3)
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disparaging reference to the kind of powerful "thinking machine" that
Turing had attempted to construct. The lives of Kepler and others may,
its author hoped, "have some sobering effect on the worshippers of the
new Baal, lording it over the moral vacuum with his electronic brain."
(Koestler 1959: 542)
"Sabbatical sleepwalkers"
The significance of Koestler's claim for irrationality as the most
important feature of the human mind was not lost on reviewers. Nor, of
course, was it a complete surprise.
"Those of us who have watched Koestler's political evolution will
not be completely taken aback, as others may be, when they find
it is an attack on scientists and a defence of the theologians."
(Calder 1959)
But if the theme of irrationality was one which united Koestler's
ethics and his historical overview of science, as Koestler had
suggested in the Epilogue, once again he succumbed to the fault of not
providing a cure to match his pessimistic diagnosis of the human
condition. Calder pointed out that the real anxiety people felt over
the modern "divorce" between science and religion was the subsequent
failure of the latter to provide moral guidance in a world dominated by
quantitative science.
The Sleepwalkers does not help. However, one can argue that here, as
in Koestler's other 1959 work The Fall of Dr Icarus (see below),
Koestler is using the dystopic technique he employed in his earlier
fiction to point out precisely the impossibility of a proper
understanding of "non-quantitative moral values" in the post-Newtonian
world. The greater insight of sleepwalkers such as Kepler was simply
the exception that proved the rule. Moral guidance could no longer be
offered to a society that had adopted Newtonian physics or Darwinian
biology as its central tenets.
If reviewers felt distinctly uncomfortable at Koestler's analysis of
modern science, theologians found little consolation in the author's
description of the consequences of a fixed hierarchy. Fison, for
example, opined that the Church faced a similar situation to that
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encountered by the contemporaries of Copernicus and Kepler. Afraid to
change its fixed horizons, Fison accused the Church of being
"sabbatical sleepwalkers".
"Is it not possible that we too today are, for the same reason as
these great men of old and in many ways more than they, walking
in our sleep? Have we not got our centres wrong?" (Fison 1960)
Applying the same analysis to the Church that Koestler had applied to
the history of science, Fison concluded that "a splendid means of
grace" (the Church) had become an end in itself and therefore what he
termed "the most effective insulator from grace".
Fison's analysis immediately highlights one of the great strengths of
The Sleepwalkers-, for Koestler had intended that the book be read as an
analysis rather than a history of a specific subject. The framework for
the analysis had been laid out in the Yogi... essays and Insight and
Outlook (and had been used as the background for the actions of
Koestler's fictional characters). The framework consisted of the laws
of the hierarchy, bisociation as the mechanism for creativity, and the
organic functioning of the human brain in predisposing man to violence
and self-destruction whilst also offering random glimpses of a higher
reality. The framework was general enough to be applicable to theology
as much as the history of science.
All Fison did was apply the Koestlerian model to a subject outside
Koestler's remit. If, as Fison thought, the Christian Church was
operating within the lower levels of a fixed hierarchy out of which
only the occasional sleepwalker might break, and one in which had its
own confining theological language and constructs, then that level of
the hierarchy becomes an end in itself, and the Church is guilty of the
same "ratomorphism" that Koestler loathed in science. In this sense,
The Sleepwalkers is Koestler's most theological book, based on his
understanding of the human mind.
One can perhaps begin to understand why Koestler had earlier objected
so vehemently to C. S. Lewis. Lewis, for all his theological insight,
represented to Koestler the closed mind and fixed hierarchical view of
dogmatic Christianity, incapable of seeing beyond an intelligible
Christocentric universe to a greater mystery. Had Koestler not become
so obsessed by his schizophysiology theory, the approach that Fison
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offered might have been taken up by the author to lead to an overtly
theological work. If this sounds fanciful, one only has to remember
that Koestler's continuing spiritual quest had led him to mystical
religion in India and the Far East at the very time that The
Sleepwalkers was published, leaving behind him in avowedly Christian
Britain
"a sobering and humbling book for all of us who profess as
Christians that we should outthink as well as outlive and outdie
our non-Christian brethren." (Fison 1960)
Wilson makes it clear what Koestler was seeking to achieve, again
alluding to levels of the ethical hierarchy that were beyond those
inhabited by specific religions.
"It is not a desire for a religious revival, but a plea for the
reinstatement of the idea of purpose in the universe." (Wilson
1959)
Wilson did not point out however that such a conclusion had already
been found by readers of The Age of Longing.
Mental and ethical evolution
One of the most complete analyses of The S1eepwalkers is offered by
Mark Graubard (Graubard 1975), who stresses two major themes that
emerge from the book. The first is the idea that progress is not
continuous but a random zig-zag path. It is the randomness of human
thought (the sleepwalking metaphor of people stumbling as if in a daze
with little idea of where they are going) that is Koestler's most
important contribution to philosophy, according to Graubard. Koestler
had wondered how the human species could evolve so comparatively
quickly from cave-dweller to spaceman and had concluded that in mental
evolution, as in biological evolution, a process of natural selection
was at work. In fact, what Graubard does not appear to realise is that
Koestler had been exploring this concept in the ethical novels.
Rubashov, like Spartacus before him or Peter after him, did not have a
clear vision of where his ethical ideas were taking him. But because
all of these characters had each gained some insight from their
different experiences of the Third Order, each had a spiritual
advantage over his contemporaries that led to their systems either
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surviving or (in the case of Spartacus) being incorporated to a certain
extent in society. The inheritance of an acquired higher ethic is
clearly spelt out at the conclusion of The Gladiators.
"'He who receives the Word has a bad time of it,' he [the Essene]
said. 'He must carry it on and serve it in many ways, be they
good or evil, until he may pass it on.'" (my italics) (Koestler
1939: 391 )
Whether Koestler was entirely original in proposing a theory of mental
evolution is a moot point; Graubard gives the credit to Kuhn for
expanding Koestler's ideas whereas we now know, from Kuhn's own
admission5, that the concept was originally developed by Polanyi.
Graubard's contribution to Koestlerian scholarship lies not so much
in his analysis of The SIeepwalkers as in his thesis that Koestler was
himself a sleepwalker, a concept that I am happy to borrow and will
expand after an analysis of Dr Icarus. For if Koestler had pointed out
that geniuses responsible for major mutations (note the biological
language) in the history of thought had shared the same sense of
scepticism, frustration with tradition and a growing feeling of
paranoia and messianism, Koestler was surely guilty himself on all
three counts. I have already noted the overkill of Koestler's post-
Freudian terminology in Insight and Outlook (see pp. 149-150 above);
Graubard identifies a similar overkill in The Sleepwalkers (Graubard
1975: 26), particularly in Koestler's treatment of those figures like
Ptolemy he was quick to dismiss.
But Graubard, like many other Koestlerian scholars, fails to see the
unity of Koestler's work. There is no mention of "the hours by the
window" or the influence of the Third Order in Graubard's thesis. Yet
a perception of the Third Order may lie at the heart of the mechanism
of mental evolution. For if, as Graubard points out (Graubard 1975:
28), mental evolution is a process that takes us from sensations to
conceptions, such a process equates with the three tiers of reality
that Koestler identified in the Spanish jail. The point here is that
mental evolution was not a concept Koestler plucked out of the air but
Magda Polanyi informed Koestler in 1975 that she was in possession of
.ter from Thomas Kuhn in which he admitted the charge of plagiarism. (MS
'7: 246)
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one which he had been working on since the ethical trilogy. The
Sleepwalkers is understood only when one realises that the central
triptych in this portrait gallery, to use Hamilton's analogy (Hamilton
1982: 296), of Kepler flanked by Copernicus and Galileo is mirrored on
the opposite wall by those other sleepwalkers, Rubashov flanked by
Spartacus and Peter Slavek.
4. ii. THE FALL OF DR ICARUS
Koestler's critique of Christian ethics
The play begins with Dr Icarus, a successful psychotherapist,
interviewing Margaret for the post of secretary. This should
immediately alert the reader's attention to a parallel "between Icarus
and Koestler: for in 1948, the author had interviewed the young Cynthia
Jefferies for the post of secretary under remarkably similar
circumstances®. Later, Dr Icarus will marry Margaret, just as its
author would later marry his young secretary. In passing, one should
also note the frequent references to fencing and duelling - a unique
reminder in Koestler's fictional output of his student duelling days.
Koestler's distrust of the working classes - partly responsible for
his shift from Commissar-ethics - is reflected in Icarus, in the
doctor's early warning to Margaret of his cleaner, Mrs Pierce.
"You cannot take her [Mrs Pierce] too seriously. I would say
without fear of exaggeration that she is the most serious factor
in our civilisation. In the Middle Ages she was the cause why
innocents like you were burnt alive at the stake. In the French
Revolution she sat at the foot of the guillotine, knitting
horrible pullovers and socks. In short, Mrs Pierce is a symbol of
the hysteria which has been haunting the world since the moment
when Eve put her fig leaf on." (MS 2325/4: 4)
Note "the most serious factor" and "hysteria": in Koestler's mature
ethical system, the threat of Commissar-ethics appears to lie in the
Not only the circumstances of the interview but Margaret's "innocence"
=strong parallels with our known account of Cynthia's first meeting with
'uture husband (see Koestler, A. & C. 1984: 53-55; 65).
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manifestation of the "misfitted brain" theory on a significantly large
scale in the population. Certainly, Koestler's increasing use of
psychopathological terminology betrays his mistrust of society to
reinstate the spiritual connection of the Yogi.
It is my contention that Act One is a summation of Koestler's ethical
progression of the 1940s. Two of the post-war ethical themes are aired
at length: the aborted 1946 League was clearly perceived by Koestler in
retrospect as a critical failure, judging by Icarus' "The day will
come" speech (MS 2325/4: 5). Secondly, Hector behaves like Peter in
seeking the security of his boyhood existence before "The Fall" and the
death of a childhood sibling (in Hector's case, his sister Judy). The
reappearance of such themes seems to confirm the importance of the
pararational ethic to Koestler's post-war ethics.
But if these themes are merely reworking old material, of more
interest is Koestler's exploration of a Christian ethic in a manner
that elsewhere is expressed only by Hydie. For Margaret's innocence, a
la Cynthia Jefferies, is only half the story; she confides to Icarus
that if born male, she would have been a conscientious objector,
prompting the line that Koestler reworked for the climax of the Hydie-
Sister Boutillot dialogue in The Age of Longing - "So I am going to
have a saint as an assistant?"'' The link between Peter Slavek's self-
sacrificing ethic and Hydie's more overtly Christian mysticism of her
youth is evident in the Icarus-Werner debate upon the efficacy of the
Christian faith.
Icarus comes across as a scientist whose pragmatic concern aligns
himself with Sister Boutillot's view that a Christological solution to
the world's problems is not enough: "a cross alone won't cure patients"
(MS 2325/4: 16). From the evidence of this screenplay, it would appear
that whilst Koestler's fully-developed ethical hierarchy admitted the
need for a "cure" to the "misfitted brain", a purely Christian ethic
was not the answer.
n
The passage in question in The Age of Longing is as follows:
—ing his only interview in all those years with his sister-in-law, the
-^r Superior, the Colonel had asked with wistful resignation: 'Is my
iter going to be a saint?' 'She would make a rotten saint', the Mother
•ior had remarked drily..." (Koestler 1951: 73)
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In Koestler's fictional output, this is the only example where the
author seems ready to discuss the application of Christianity although,
as we have seen in The Yogi... essays, he had admitted that the
Christian hierarchy had been supplanted by the scientific hierarchy. In
The Age of Longing, this was the dilemma faced by all the characters
with the exception of Hydie, who could not shake off her mystical past.
But any doubt that Koestler does not equate mysticism with Christianity
is dispelled in the crucial Icarus-Werner dialogue in The Fall of Dr
Icarus (see Plate 4: Werner's mysticism is linked to Seville). Icarus
concludes by postulating that psychotherapy is a more appropriate
response to sinners in the ethical hierarchy.
A return to Yogi-ethics
If the dialogue of Act One makes frequent use of The Yogi...
material , there is some evidence that here in the post-war years
Koestler had narrowed down the problem to the re-establishing of the
"umbilical cord" between the individual and the world - the prerogative
of the Yogi. The veiled diagnosis of Mrs Pierce quoted above exposes
the fault of the Commissar and the resultant "revolution betrayed";
more explicitly, however, in his analysis of Case One (Hector in the
later Icarus scripts) Icarus categorically states that the problem will
be how to re-establish Hector's connection with the world.
Interestingly, however clumsy this dialogue may appear, the phrase is
untouched in the reworking of Act One, from which one may infer that
Koestler remained primarily concerned with Yogi-ethics and a continuing
search for the means by which his own "oceanic sense", so much to the
fore in Seville, might be rekindled.
Werner remains a more unambiguous reflection of Koestler's suspicion
of conventional religious solutions to Hector's condition. Icarus'
assessment of Werner is an important statement of the dilemma implicit
in Koestler's later works, where the search for the spiritual certainty
of Seville remained elusive for himself and his fictional creations.
"Werner had a lovers' quarrel with God all through the war.
They are suing each other for desertion." (MS 2325/4: 18)
At the start of Act Two, Icarus and Margaret have been married
212
eighteen years; their marriage is in difficulty, a fact not unnoticed
by their sensitive 17-year old son, Felix. Hector reminds us again of
Peter Slavek (or Hillary as portrayed by Koestler) by showing the same
determination for unwarranted heroism, in his desire to "throw himself"
into the Spanish Civil War. Koestler's embarrassment at his own former
naivety in the same conflict is voiced by Icarus.
"You have no idea what a war is - not even a regular war; and you
want to throw yourself into a civil war, in a far country, which
is no business of yours, in the name of some romantic, world-
saving -ism." (MS 2325/4 Act Two 8)
Perhaps too Koestler was reflecting upon the romantic optimism of his
own practical ethic, at least that of the "world-saving"8 project that
came to fruition in Insight and Outlook.
But if Koestler's embarrassment at his own former actions is hardly
surprising, what is fascinating is his Sonia Bolgar-like dismissal of
all forms of sacrifice on the part of Icarus. The lack of Icarus'
understanding of a non-rational ethic is nowhere better expressed in
the screenplay than in the dialogue between the father and son, Icarus
and Felix .
Icarus sees his son's actions - his first sexual experience, his
failure to win a scholarship and so on - as based on cause and effect.
With the tool of fictional dialogue, Koestler explores the application
of his ethical hierarchy to the actions of a potential criminal (in
this case, Icarus' son). Felix's reply to his father's deterministic
diagnosis of his problems is redolent of the arguments that Koestler
expressed in the critical "Free will and determinism" chapter of
Ref1ections on Hanging which interrupted the revision of the
screenplay.
"So the choice is not mine. I can stick a knife into you. It's
just cause and effect. I have no freedom. I am trapped. I have no
will of my own...Blind forces push me wither and thither. Yet I
feel it, I feel it here that it isn't true. One of us must be
crazy." (MS 2325/4: Act Two 17).
The ensuing dialogue was refashioned in the Burch-Solovief debate in
The Cal1-Cirls over a decade later. But in the 1950s, it is Icarus who
O
The phrase used by Koestler himself in a letter of December 1945: MS
'1 : 197.
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is accused of behaving like Burch.
"Do you know what you [Icarus] are doing to people? You mutilate
them. You cut the bowels of Christ out of them...Wei 1, slice me
up and put me under a microscope." (MS 2325/4: Act Two 18-19)
For those familiar with Twilight Bar and The Age of Longing, it will be
no surprise that the debate between father and son is not
satisfactorily resolved. Even Felix's attempt at suicide is not carried
through, as he is interrupted - after a further Koestlerian attempt to
highlight the folly of explaining violent action in terms of the lower
levels of the ethical hierarchy.
Koestler's intriguing exploration of the determinism of Sonia or
Burch takes a dramatic twist in the final act, in which the close
friendship between Koestler and Richard Hillary resurfaces. If, up to
now, the dramatic tension between Icarus and his son is simply a
restatement of the Fedya-Hydie clash of ethical opposites - where, it
could be argued, Koestler is playing devil's advocate by siding with a
'Fedya' in the person of Icarus - then suddenly Koestler personalises
the drama by making Felix desire to emulate Richard Hillary.
The personalisation of Yogi-ethics
The action of Act Three takes place in 1940: from the dialogue, we
can place the action more precisely to the autumn of 1940 shortly after
the Battle of Britain. Felix surprises his father in the aftermath of
Icarus' 50th birthday party (organised by former patients under the
collective name of Oedipus Ex!) by announcing his wish to become a
pi lot.
"I don't know what I am. But I know what I would like to be. I
would like to be like the man who said 'In an age when to love
one's country is vulgar - to love God, archaic - and to love
mankind, sentimental - you do all three.' He was my age, a pilot
shot down and burnt." (my italics) (MS 2325/4: Act Three 33).
The quotation and the following description point unmistakably to
Hi 1lary.
Icarus: "A remarkably mature man for his age."
Felix: "Those who die young walk fast."
Icarus: "And you wish to follow his example.
To be burned alive is rather pitiful."
(MS 2325/4: Act Three 33)
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Such references would have been understandable if, say, Koestler had
written the play in 1944 instead of rewriting Twilight Bar. Equally,
one might expect such references to be expunged from later versions of
the play. But this is not the case. Much of the last Act is occupied
with a discussion of Hillary's non-rational ethic, intended for a wide
audience - this was Koestler' s only work created for the medium of
television - in 1959, sixteen years after Hi11ary's death. Nor can one
accuse Koestler of mistakenly thinking that Hillary would still be a
figure of major public interest9, even though The Last Enemy remained
in print and had been translated into several languages.
The question must be asked: why did Hillary remain a subject of such
biographical and ethical importance to Koestler for such a long time,
a subject not even eclipsed by Koestler's hero-worship of Kepler? The
answer lies in the text of the play itself.
Koestler had attempted to move away from specific and historical
examples of a pararational ethic, in which the hero (or anti-hero) was
influenced by a personal experience of Third Order reality, towards a
more general working of pararational ethics in which the Third Order
exists independently of the characters - as is the case in The Age of
Longing (see Chapter 3) or Insight and Outlook. But, as we have seen,
critics were not convinced. The personalisation of pararational ethics
remained the only technique open to Koestler to silence his critics -
and Richard Hillary, rather than Kepler or Bukharin, remained in
Koestler's distorted view of Hillary's 'sacrifice' the perfect
embodiment of such an ethic, at least for an English television
audience.
Also, Koestler was apparently taken aback at the strength of the
Q
His enthusiasm to publish a volume of Hillary's letters during the war
—precisely because, he had argued at the time, once the war was over,
-ary would no longer be of public interest (MS 2418/1). Yet in the same
—h as The Sleepwalkers was published and in the year that Icarus was
leted, Koestler chose to commence his inaugural address at an Indian
jsium on "Belief and Literature" with a further account of his friendship
Richard Hillary (Koestler 1968a: 32-33).
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(deterministic, he thought) psychological sciences''®. If the
Behaviourism of the Icaruses and Sonia Bolgars of this world was to be
"demolished" as Koestler had wished in 1946 (MS 2327/2), clearly
general theories would not suffice. Richard Hillary would be recalled
to illustrate Koestler's argument.
It should also be noted that the Hi 1lary/Slavek ethic favoured by
Felix is expressed in Christological terms. Felix's self-knowledge of
his destiny - "I know what I would like to be" - again provides the cue
for a Koestlerian clash between religion and science, as Felix repeats
his accusation to Icarus of trying "to cut the bowels of Christ out of
me...Glory be, your experiment failed".
Icarus' rationality too ultimately fails him. Perhaps Koestler felt
that in the conclusion of Arrival and Departure, not enough attention
had been paid to the reaction of Sonia to Peter's volte-face with its
implied rejection of her "cure". Now Koestler is able to play out the
tragedy of those who cannot, or will not, understand pararational
ethics through the central character of Icarus.
The tragedy seems at first innocuous enough.
Icarus: "All I have tried was, since you were born, to make you
live and think rationally."
Felix: "Your kind of rationality defeated itself long ago."
(MS 2325/4: 35)
However, "rationality", as in The Sleepwalkers, has become a derogatory
term. Those who live and think rationally not only perceive the world
differently from the sleepwalkers to whom we owe so much but they have,
according to Koestler, not seen reality: or so Felix tells his father.
"You seem unable to grasp that logic has nothing to do with all
this...Logically [in the war in 1941], we are outnumbered,
outwitted, hopelessly alone. So we are carrying on against logic.
Logic has become a luxury, like butter. Oh, I wish I could make
you see reality, you dehydrated apostle." (MS 2325/4: 34)
The gulf between Felix and Icarus is as great as that between Rubashov
and Gletkin, Peter and Sonia, Hydie and Fedya - or between Kepler and
his contemporaries. Icarus is helpless in preventing his son from
1 0
He had written in the margin of his notes to the aborted second volume
—isight and Outlook, alongside the typed text "Today, when...all the major
—ts of Behaviourism have been demolished" the words "written in 1946 - what
—5 optimism!" (MS 2327/2).
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joining the RAF. The tragedy of the "split brain" and the divorce
between faith and reason has been explored in many of Koestler's works
before and since, but nowhere does it take on the poignancy that it
does in Icarus when the split is personified as that between father and
11
son 11.
The play concludes with Icarus retelling a dream of the previous
night in which he was sinking towards the bottom of the sea. It is a
none too subtle reference to the conclusion of the eponymous Greek
legend; but if the screenplay had been realised, viewers would surely
have been aware that this was also a replay of the ending of Arrival
and Departure, only with more tragic consequences and this time
perceived through the eyes of rationalism.
"A lovers' quarrel with God"
In spite of such references to Arrival and Departure, Icarus is
unique in the Koestler canon. For unlike his identification with
Hillary in the ethical novels, Koestler uses Hillary's higher ethic as
a threat to his own logical and scientific ethical system. Hillary
reappears not as an ally but, if one treats the screenplay on its face
value, as directly opposed to Bolgar-like determinism.
One possible explanation is that Koestler is demonstrating yet again
that he was unable to write other than semi-autobiographically, and
that his suspicion of a higher ethic is simply yet another restatement
of his own position in the 1930s, before the "hours by the window" at
Seville. Icarus therefore becomes the old "Koestler in sandals" figure
of The Gladiators. Such a theory has its attractions, not least the
fact that Icarus could be seen as the semi-fictional jottings of
Koestler's spiritual journey that he was writing simultaneously in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, published as Arrow in the Blue and The
1 1
In 1955, Koestler in fact learnt that he had become a father. He had
confided to Harold Harris that he would have made "an intolerable father"
-^tler, A. & C. 1984: 232). One cannot help wondering if the birth of his
iter, C-I, on 13 April that year, resulted in Koestler alluding to his own
cions in a fictional relationship between father and offspring that
:s down due to a father's intolerance.
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Invisible Writing. A semi-autobiographical interpretation might also
explain why the breakdown of Icarus' marriage occupies much of the
screenplay, mirroring Koestler's stormy relationship with Mamaime.
But as I have mentioned with reference to Rees' autobiographical
interpretation of Darkness... , it does a creative writer like Koestler
a severe injustice to suggest that he is not capable of distancing
himself from his characters, even one whose scientific background
appears to be so close to his own. The problem is compounded by new
evidence which has demonstrated that Koestler's only other fictional
expose of psychoanalysis was written twenty years earlier, even before
The Gladiators\^^ Why should Koestler return to a theme he had more
than adequately covered as a young writer and had finally abandoned
with the curtailment of Arrival and Departure 111 Unless one can answer
that question satisfactorily, Icarus remains an anachronism - and the
'problem play' for the Koestlerian scholar.
My own answer is that Koestler returned antagonistically to the
Hi 11ary/S1avek higher ethic theme precisely because he remained, to the
end of his life, envious of Hillary and of the 'fraternity of the dead'
that Hillary enjoyed with devout Anglicans such as Pease^. Koestler,
in his own perception, never quite made it into that fraternity. Thus,
in his penultimate ethical piece of fiction (superseded only by The
Call-Girls) , Koestler cannot quite bring himself to be on the same side
as Peter Slavek or Richard Hillary. The spiritual struggle continued.
1 1
See Koestler, A. and Nemeth, A. (1996) in which Inspector Konrad
lor - "policier dandy buvant sec, s'exaltant, langant des oeillades aux
s" - appears as the first autobiographical portrait of the young Koestler.
or is described as a logical detective in the manner of Sherlock Holmes
uses psychoanalysis to solve his crimes.
1 2
That is not to say that the "fel lowship" Hi 1 lary enjoyed with the dead
—e meant the two were similar in their theological outlook. "The latter
—se] grew up in a simple, family faith whereas the former's [Hillary's]
^lowship with my dead' was a much more metaphysical concept... more than a
^>very of Christian faith in an after life" (Sainsbury, pers. comm. ). This
—also be equally true of any 'fraternity' Koestler continued to seek with
^edead friends: it would be dangerous to conclude from such a search that
—tier sought or believed in Christian concepts of post-death communion. All
in safely conclude is that he probably did seek fellowship in an abstract,
christian context.
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He could not retreat into the womb of faith (a phrase he used in The
Invisible Writing repeated in Icarus)-, the "oceanic sense" eluded him.
Koestler might have become a very different writer if Hillary had not
been killed. The alleged plans to share a house together, the
zealousness with which Koestler had pursued the project of a Hillary
Memorial Volume and his readiness to serve on the Hillary Trust, all
point to the seriousness with which Koestler took the embodiment of his
own higher ethic. Hillary was among the closest of Koestler's
colleagues during the war, and it is in that wai—time setting that
Icarus provides, in my opinion, the means by which we can properly
understand Koestler's spirituality. Might it not be Koestler rather
than Werner who had "a lovers' quarrel with God" all through the war?
Hillary's death remained the enigma that Koestler could not explain
to his own satisfaction (although some might say that it served
Koestler's interests not to explain it^). Icarus is his final
attempt to apply scientific ethics to analyse Hillary's self-sacrifice,
a painful reminder to Koestler of his ongoing spiritual struggle and
the need to reconcile rational and irrational behaviour in his
hierarchical ethics.
In my view, Icarus reveals Koestler to be the sleepwalker par
excel lence, at one moment able to identify with the mysticism of a
Hydie or perceive the spiritual world through the eyes of a Rubashov,
but remaining for the most part on the lower level of the hierarchical
plane inhabited by the Fedyas and Icaruses of whom he writes with such
conviction and feeling. Here are literary clues of a sleepwalker
ultimately unable either to understand or to emulate the higher ethic
of Richard Hillary, yet capable of stumbling across the means by which
a spiritual world may be understood and the spiritual insights of the
Yogi and the social concern of the Commissar reconciled.
1 3
Burn is the most scathing critic on this point, proposing that
.ler's thesis "seems to me to use Richard as a guinea-pig" (Burn 1988:
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4. iii . CONCLUSION: EVALUATION OF A SLEEPWALKER
Koestler as a scientist
In The Age of Longing and The Sleepwalkers, Koestler had postulated
that the size and complexity of the human brain was to blame both for
man's destructive tendencies and his creativity. However, Koestler's
model was still a working hypothesis that lacked empirical scientific
data with which to back up his hierarchical metatheory. Also, I would
argue that Koestler in 1959 was unsure whether he wished to highlight
man's creative side (as he did with Kepler) or the darker and more
primitive side of human nature, with its concomitant lack of
understanding of higher reality (as revealed in Icarus).
Initially, Koestler's scientific work steered him towards a more
optimistic view of human nature, as he continued the theme of
creativity from Insight and Outlook and The Sleepwalkers and applied it
to all creative activity in The Act of Creation. He set out his plan in
a letter to Polanyi in January 1961.
"I realise that you would prefer me to write novels and
biographies instead of what I am doing. But there are seasons in
life, and I do believe that this attempt to get at the basic
pattern of the creative process in science and art, and all that
it implies, is worth making...ever since that first immature
attempt in Insight and Outlook I felt guilty for having abandoned
the subject without bringing it to a conclusion." (MS 2344/7:
196)
It is perhaps unfortunate that Koestler's work on creativity has been
eclipsed by what is generally regarded as "a deep vein of pessimism and
gloom" in his writing (Beloff 1975: 70). For the extrapolation that
Beloff credits to Koestler from "some of the most appalling events of
recent history" to mankind in general is not strictly accurate. The
"misfitted brain" had also enabled mental evolution to take place and
allowed the occasional sleepwalker a glimpse of an infinite spiritual
reality. The self-sacrificing actions of Rubashov, Hillary or Slavek
were as attributable to the "grotesque quirk of evolution" (Beloff
1975: 70) that has endowed us with our large brain as the violent acts
of the Number Ones or the threat of destruction that looms large at the
end of The Age of Longing.
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The problem, of course, is that Koestler allowed himself to become
sucked into a debate on empirical science that overshadowed the
hierarchical metatheory that is the subject of my thesis. Beloff may
agree with those critics who saw The Act of Creation as philosophical
(or even theological) rather than empirical; but in 1964 a chance
reading of a paper in Modern Medicine changed the course of Koestler's
scientific writing.
The paper in question was Paul MacLean's "Man and his animal brains"
(MacLean 1964). Not only did MacLean's paper back up Koestler's
suspicion of neoDarwinism, but by proposing the concept of a
hierarchical organisation within the nervous system, Koestler had now
acquired what he saw as empirical evidence for his "misfitted brain"
principle. The merits of the MacLean-Koest1er model are a subject for
another thesis; suffice to say, Koestler himself wrote that MacLean's
ideas provided "a most valuable correction" to his, as yet, unpublished
ideas on the hierarchy of the human brain (MS 2347/1: 91 ). MacLean
would later refer to "real intellectual collaboration here" (MS 2347/1:
184). Cynthia Koestler, writing in her diary in February 1967 after The
Ghost... had gone to press, noted that Arthur "would like to write a
short book with Paul MacLean" (MS 2305) - the clearest possible
indication that Koestler grasped the significance of applying the
triune brain theory to human evolution, thus explaining "the
predicament of man". Here was an anatomical explanation for the moral
vacuum so keenly felt by Hydie and others.
"If the evidence had not taught us to the contrary, we would
expect an evolutionary development which gradually transformed
the primitive old brain into a more sophisticated instrument - as
it transformed claw into hand, gill into lung. Instead, evolution
superimposed a new structure on an old one, with partly
overlapping functions and without providing the new with a clear-
cut hierarchical control over the old - thus inviting confusion
and conflict." (author's italics) (Koestler 1975: 281-282)
The die was cast: Koestler, by adopting an anatomical model, now had
to answer the claims and counter-claims of empirical scientists.
MacLean's work also ensured that Koestler's writings would become ever
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more pessimistic^, and it is this that Beloff and others highlight
to the detriment of the earlier non-empirical studies on creativity.
The central tenets of the MacLean-Koest1er triune brain model, as
published in The Ghost in the Machine, can be summed up as follows.
1. A rapid expansion of the neocortex in hominid evolution.
2. The suppression, rather than the disappearance, of more primitive
brain systems into the lower regions of the cortex.
3. The failure on man's part to co-ordinate the "three brains".
Until recently, the paucity of hominid fossil data has meant that the
first of these tenets could not be tested. But from the discoveries of
fossil skulls made by Richard Leakey a clear pattern is emerging of
rapid encephalisation from "Lucy" (Australopithecus afarensis) to Homo
habilis and our immediate ancestor, Homo erectus (Leakey and Lewin
1992: 67-134). Koestler has been proved correct in this respect. There
has indeed been an explosion in the relative brain size of humans:
"three times that of the average monkey or ape" (Leakey and Lewin 1992:
246) in less than one million years.
Empirical scientists would not dispute the first of Koestler's
criteria for schizophysiology - nor indeed, since Broca's discovery of
the limbic system, would they argue against the existence of primitive
brain systems in the lower regions of the human cortex.
However, it is the third tenet of Koestler's thesis - the matter of
the lack of "co-ordination" - that is most controversial. Dennis
Potter, upon reading The Ghost..., was reminded of the similarities
between the tensions within Koestler's reptilian/mammalian brain system
and those in the Freudian struggle between id and ego. Koestler, in
Potter's view, was attempting
"to drug the serpents... almost a biochemical updating of the
Dickensian thought that the world would be all right if only
people would be good." (Potter 1967)
Once again, Koestler had overegged the pudding, extrapolating perhaps
1 lx
My own research indicates that Koestler hardened his pessimistic views
chizophysiology in the last decade of his life e.g. "La pulsion vers
zodestruction" (Koestler 1971); the first autograph manuscript of the
)gue to Bricks to Babel in which Koestler refers to the "urge of our
es towards self-destruction" (later changed) (MS 2318/3).
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too much from MacLean's anatomical evidence - although MacLean himself
resorted to psychological imagery later, referring to the three brains
as "everpresent personalities" (MacLean 1978: 309-310).
Koestler was to write of the "violent abuse" he suffered from the
scientific community, who attacked his concluding suggestion of a
biochemical cure to resolve the predicament of man rather than the
diagnosis that occupied 330 of the 339 pages^ . Of course, "The
Swinging Sixties" were at their height and Koestler could hardly have
asked reviewers, sent copies of the book with a red heart-shaped "peace
pill" and the question "If there were a 'peace' pi 11...would you take
it?" (Toulmin 1977: 169), to play down the latest theoretical arrival
on the Sixties drug scene. Almost inevitably, comparisons were struck
between Koestler and the Sixties cult hero, Timothy Leary.
"The claims made for this imaginary pill are oddly like those
Leary makes for LSD, and the arguments against them are the same
- that a pharmaceutical millennium would only threaten our
capacity for moral and intellectual judgment, and accelerate our
return to the world of Darkness at Noon." (Toulmin 1977: 169)
One is reminded of the similarly weak ending to the second Yogi...
essay: there must be more to re-establishing the "umbilical cord" than
simply teaching meditation in schools. Similarly, could pharmacology
truly provide an answer to the "misfitted brain" that dimmed man's
spiritual vision? But if the "peace pill" spawned a lengthy and
sometimes trivial debate in the newspaper correspondence columns, the
need for such a radical solution should not be forgotten.
Enforcing happiness by psychopharmacological or any other means was
doomed to failure - and surely Koestler knew that. He had said as much
in Twilight Bar. But why were the planet's inhabitants in his early
play so violent and miserable? Koestler claimed that he had found the
reason for "the predicament of man"; the strength of his argument need
not be lost simply because his solution for man's predicament was so
spurious. And, of course, by equating the flaw in man's moral and
spiritual nature with a flaw in the evolution of one of his organs,
1 5
See the manuscript notes for the Preface to the Danube edition of The
:... in which Koestler wrote of "touch[ing] a vital nerve - which in fact
ts purpose" (original manuscript version, later amended) MS 2326/1.
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Koestler could now argue that the "misfitted brain" was a universal
problem, and one that need not be recognised as such by the inheritors,
in each successive generation, of the un-coordinated human triune
brain. It is something each of us has to live with. In effect, Koestler
was putting forward a twentieth century model of original sin1®.
To this scientific work, one must also add Koestler's defence on
Lamarckism and Koestler's evolutionary philosophy, equally applicable
to his ethics as to his scientific work, which reached its apotheosis
with The Case of the Midwife Toad (Koestler 1971b) and its attempt to
rehabilitate Paul Kammerer. The list of critics of Koestlerian
evolutionary theory is impressive: Cotterill - who negated Koestler's
The Ghost... with his own title (Cotterill 1989); Francis Crick, the
co-discoverer of DNA (Crick 1994), Dawkins and, explicitly repudiating
Koestler's work, Stephen Jay Gould (Gould 1980; Gould 1991) who has
offered a Darwinian interpretation of the Alytes experiments.
Let us be clear what is at stake here. It is not the matter of
whether Kammerer had or had not succeeded in proving Lamarckian
evolution - I myself have found in the Archive evidence, in a letter
Koestler received only three months before writing his own suicide
note, that points to the Alytes specimens being faked1^. Rather,
Koestler was at pains to champion an evolutionary theory that would add
weight to his model of mental and ethical evolution put forward in The
Sleepwalkers. Stephen Jay Gould admits that using a Lamarckian model
for cultural or ethical evolution is perfectly feasible.
"[Lamarckism] is the mode of "inheritance" for another and very
different kind of "evolution" - human cultural evolution. Homo
sapiens arose at least 50,000 years ago, and we have not a shred
of evidence for any genetic improvement since then...From perhaps
1 fi
Koestler had made the theological analogy himself as early as 1954 in
—notes for the American radio interview with Ed Morrow, q.v. Figure 2, p.
-■above.
1 7
As the subject may be important to biologists, I will let the final
rest with Peter Huppert, whose letter to Koestler, written shortly after
■ta Kammerer's (Paul Kammerer's daughter's) death, may be of some interest
—istorians of science. "Curiously enough she regarded it as perfectly
tble that Paul had doctored the fatal specimen himself - he was just an
•able prankster." (MS 2394/1)
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one hundred thousand people with axes to more than four billion
with bombs, rocket ships, cities, televisions and computers - and
all without substantial genetic change." (Gould 1980: 70-71)
In other words, spiritual insight or the "non-quantitative moral
values" of a Peter Slavek or Richard Hillary may be transmitted from
one generation to another and built upon in the process. Lamarckism
gives the sense of purpose that is at the heart of Koestler's ethics
from the ethical novels onwards, and is a legitimate scientific model
to adopt for this purpose outside its anatomical context.
Koestler as a theologian
Gould's critique of Koestler (Gould 1980: 68-71) centres upon a
possible Darwinian explanation for Kammerer's experiments. But Gould
goes on to discuss why a Lamarckian interpretation of this work held
such powerful appeal for Koestler.
"[Lamarckism's appeal] lies in its offer of some comfort against
a universe devoid of intrinsic meaning in our lives. It
reinforces two of our deepest prejudices - our belief that effort
should be rewarded and our hope for an inherently purposeful and
progressive world. Its appeal for Koest1er...1ies more with this
solace than in any technical argument about heredity... Darwinism
compels us to seek meaning elsewhere - and isn't this what art,
music, literature, ethical theory, personal struggle and
Koestlerian humanism are all about?" (Gould 1980: 70)
Gould's analysis is a useful reminder that for Koestler the "technical
arguments" of empirical science were secondary to his belief in an
"inherently purposeful" world. In other words, Gould has elucidated the
relationship between Koestler's science and his theology - the former
serves the latter.
But I venture to suggest that Gould has misinterpreted Koestler in
labelling his philosophy as humanist. If Koestler's hierarchy did not
contain a Third Order, Gould's thesis would be vindicated. But as I
have shown, spiritual reality and its interaction with humanity played
a primary role in shaping Koestler's ethics, from his earliest novels
to the Janus trilogy. Such an interaction might cautious us against the
term 'humanist', at least without some qualification, to Koestler's
hierarchical system.
Toulmin, like Gould, perceives Koestler's science as merely a tool by
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which to support a teleological view of creation (Toulmin 1979). Hence,
The Sleepwalkers is seen as an argument for scientists guided like
sleepwalkers "by some 'eye' inaccessible to conscious criticism"
(Toulmin 1979: 47). The Janus trilogy is proof of this teleology,
according to Toulmin: behind the arguments against behaviourism and
evolution lies an essentially philosophical view of the world that
abhorred "any suggestion of randomness, or chance, or indeterminacy"
(Toulmin 1979: 53). Certainly, The Roots of Coincidence seems to
confirm Toulmin's thesis: even coincidences to Koestler are meaningful
coincidences (Koestler 1972)! If there is purpose in creation, beyond
the happenstance of Darwinism, then one is immediately forced to ask
theological questions. Toulmin sees no reason therefore not to discuss
Koestler as a theologian, entitling his thesis "Arthur Koestler's
theodicy on Sin, Science and Politics".
In an interesting parallel, Toulmin suggests that Koestler was born
into a world as threatened by conflict as that into which Leibnitz was
born, where young intellectuals dreamed of creating an alternative
system of world order on a rational basis. Marxism was one such
alternative. Its failure to Koestler was a breakdown of "cosmopolis",
a failure of human beings to harmonise with the logos of nature. In
Toulmin's memorable summing up,
"If it had not been for this psychic deficiency, the God need not
have failed, the Noon would not have been filled with Darkness,
the Night might not have been quite so full of Thieves." (Toulmin
1979: 56)
Toulmin was the first Koestlerian critic to equate sin with cerebral
inadequacy, though he is less than happy with the solution at the end
of the Janus works. "He comes...to bring us not Grace, but a Pill."
Herein lies the reason for labelling Koestler a humanist: the answer to
man's problems lies with us, rather than a divine being.
But so integral is the "psychic deficiency", it is difficult to
accept that Koestler ever truly believed in a chemical answer to the
human predicament. And whilst Koestler remained a pessimist as far as
human nature is concerned, one should not simply ignore those occasions
when his characters encountered a spiritual reality and the ennobling
and uplifting actions that inevitably followed. There really is very
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little point in Toulmin speculating on whether or not the God of
Marxism would have failed a properly 'integrated' Koestler. Besides,
Koestler's work on Kepler, and the comparisons that can be drawn
between him and Rubashov, had at the very least revealed the presence
of a "psychic efficiency" in the sense that the human brain could just
as easily find itself drawn upwards to the Third Order as downward
towards social disintegration. That is the Janus Principle in a
nutshel1 .
"Facing upward or inward, towards that unattainable core from
which my decisions seem to emanate, I feel free. Facing the other
way, there is the robot - or the beast." (Koestler 1967: 217)
What Toulmin sees as entirely negative is (typically for Koestler) both
positive and negative: an inbuilt tendency towards irrationality
countered by the bestial remnant within the Koestlei—MacLean brain.
Of course, the question remains whether or not there is a God at the
top of the Koestlerian hierarchy; for the moment, suffice to say that
such a God would be, to Koestler, beyond rational thought. However, the
very fact that science to Koestler was never an end in itself but
simply a means by which purpose and a higher reality could be
expressed, and rationality subsumed into a hierarchical system,
indicates that Koestler was primarily a theological rather than
scientific thinker.
Toulmin's main criticism of Koestler, like that of Gould, was that
Koestler could not be happy with the purposeless random world in which
he lived. Laurence Chamales, on the other hand, in an important
contribution to Koestlerian scholarship, argues that such restlessness
is typical of the present century (Chamales 1973). "Arthur Koestler is
a vivid example of modern man in search of transcendence or myth"
(Chamales 1973: 1). Like Toulmin, Chamales paints a picture of Koestler
as a theological thinker.
For example, Koestler's early interest in science is, according to
Chamales, only a lever to a more profound "spiritual curiosity"
(Chamales 1973: 2). Significantly, Chamales argues that God did not
satisfy his spiritual yearnings, presumably for the very reason I have
already outlined: namely, that the kind of God invoked by theologians
was too precise and rational to fit into Koestler's irrational and
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hierarchical theodicy. This would certainly fit in with the "lovers'
quarrel with God" argument contained in the Icarus scripts. The
"lovers' quarrel" was with a theologically defined Anglican God, rather
than, say, Anselm's being at the top of a spiritual hierarchy, "that,
than which nothing greater can be conceived".
"One has to wonder if Koestler was born in a different age, would
he have become a religious fanatic or a saint that worshipped God
with great emotional zeal?" (Chamales 1973: 3)
Chamales implies that the scientific world-view militated against that:
yet Koestler demonstrated he was by no means averse to challenging the
rational scientific world-view! Chamales thus concludes that Koestler's
search for transcendence was bound to fail, although his life was spent
attempting to satisfy his spiritual leanings. This is hardly an
original thesis: Carlet had proposed a similar scenario ten years
previously: Goldstein would repeat the argument in her doctoral
dissertation in 1992. The evidence put forward has remained much the
same: the appeal of Marxism to the young Koestler because of the need
to sacrifice oneself to the Communist hierarchy (Chamales 1973: 14);
the spiritual freedom Communism thus represented; the post-Communist
Koestler "viewing himself as a neurotic rebel trying to cause joy in
heaven" (Chamales 1973: 17) and demonstrating an overwhelming need to
unite polar opposites (knowing/unknowing and faith/reason) into a
harmonious whole. So Chamales reaches his conclusion that
"Koestler's work ethic is only a symbol of a twentieth century
intellectual man who has searched for the spiritual feeling of
transcendence and has found little." (my italics) (Chamales 1973:
35-36)
But Chamales goes further than Carlet and Goldstein. For he suggests
that work, combined with his probing of the unknown, has become
Koestler's religion.
If one then applies this interpretation of Koestler's theology,
ultimately godless with at its heart little more than a work ethic, to
the twentieth century world in general, one inevitably arrives at a
spiritually barren and hopeless picture of the world. This indeed is
the picture Chamales paints. Consciously, twentieth century man must
acknowledge he has only human resources. Unconsciously, still the need
to fill the spiritual void remains.
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"Koestler symbolises the dilemma of an intellectual; man wanting
to logically shape his own life yet feeling compelled to submit
to a higher order of system." (Chamales 1973: 24)
However, one would have to ask whether such an interpretation can be
reconciled with the irrational ethics of Rubashov or Slavek. Does
Rubashov rely purely on "human resources" at the point of his self-
sacrifice? Is the Grammatical Fiction merely a further human resource?
Again, one thinks of Koestler's suicide note and the admission that it
was "the oceanic sense" - Koestler's Freudian phrase he used as a
substitute for his experience of the Third Order^® - that sustained
him "at difficult moments, and does so now, while I am writing this".
However else one interprets this "oceanic sense", it is difficult to
view it as another human resource.
One must never forget that Koestler's theology, expressed admittedly
in scientific terms or in fictional scenarios, began autobiographically
in a Spanish jail with a man who thought he was sentenced to death
suddenly undergoing a mystical experience of infinity. Such mysticism
does not lend itself to a systematic theology or an easy definition of
God.
But in my opinion Koestler's life-long interest in the Third Order,
and the manner in which it shaped his ethics, is reasonable evidence
that Koestler was, above al 1 , a spiritual thinker. His spirituality was
as open-ended as his hierarchy. If there is no apex to Koestler's
hierarchy, as philosophers have suggested (Hausman 1966, Toulmin 1979)
then we could hardly expect a conclusive final definition of deity.
Koestler's continued reluctance to express belief in God in
unambiguous terms makes it all too easy for scholars such as Chamales
and Goldstein to argue that his religious quest was futile. But
Rubashov awaiting execution, Koestler in his prison cell in Seville,
Hillary returning to flying for the sake of his dead comrades, Peter
Slavek making a conscious decision to risk his life in the war and
Hydie returning to her childhood mysticism and rejecting Fedya's
1 8
Referring to his experience of the Third Order, Koestler noted "It is
process of dissolution and limitless expansion which is sensed as the
nic feeling'...the peace that passeth all understanding" (Koestler 1954a:
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advances, may want to argue that human resources were not the key to
understanding their ethics or their actions. For them, the religious
quest was not futile, though admittedly it was not expressed in
religious language. Koestler's spiritual struggle was one that
expressed itself more obliquely, through the self-sacrificing and
visionary exploits of sleepwalkers in tune with a higher, but
ultimately unnamed, reality.
The concept of personhood
One might well be entitled to ask that if, in the open-ended
hierarchy, there is no end in sight to the religious quest - and no end
beyond sight either - what is the point of seeking the "oceanic sense"
of Third Order reality?
The answer is, according to Koestler, one becomes a more complete
person.
Central to Koestler's hierarchical ethics is the concept of
personhood, a term one normally associates with Polanyi's Personal
Knowledge. Nevertheless, the idea that as one ascends, however
haphazardly, the different levels of the hierarchy one becomes a more
whole or integrated person is apparent in the ethical novels. Thus,
Slavek is a more whole person than Sonia, Rubashov more balanced than
his interrogators and so on.
Scott has illustrated the concept of personhood by citing the example
of the deformed daughter in A Child Possessed (Hutchinson 1977). In his
novel, Hutchinson plots the course of a father's relationship with "a
child so dreadfully deformed in mind and body as to be scarcely human"
(Scott 1985: 159). Doctors assure the father that talk of personalitv
in this case is not appropriate, and the girl should be allowed to die.
The father is unimpressed by their line of argument and takes the
daughter home.
If Hutchinson's exploration of personhood is familiar, it is
precisely because the relationship between a man and a deformed child
is at the very centre of Arrival and Departure II, which preceded
Polanyi's Gifford Lecture on personhood by several years. In the
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surviving manuscript and typescript, Father Zlatko sees the grotesque
figure of young David as a real person needing care and love. But this
is not the perception of Peter, who initially reacts to the sight of
David in horror: "such a thing should not be allowed to live" (my
italics). But Peter is viewing David from a different level in the
ethical hierarchy, for Koestler explicitly states at the outset in the
"grace had been withdrawn" passage that Peter's communion with the
Grammatical Fiction had been temporarily lost. The contrasting
perceptions of David by two figures, bound together by the same cause
yet at separate stages of ethical development, is one of the most
enduring images of Arrival and Departure II.
Koestler returned to the theme of personhood in his television
screenplay, The Fall of Dr Icarus. It would be tempting to read into
the change from the impersonal "Case One" and "Case Two" to the named
characters of later versions of the script that Koestler too was
ascending his own ethical hierarchy and becoming a more whole person
under the settling influence of Cynthia Jefferies. Whilst that may be
overstating the case, it is possible that Koestler emphasises Dr
Icarus' immaturity by his consistent attitude towards his patients as
mere "cases" - indeed, Icarus' own son believes that he is being
treated by his father in precisely the same manner. Koestler's contempt
of "ratomorphic" psychology and Freudianism is barely concealed in Dr
Icarus.
But the reason for Koestler's contempt of scientific determinism is,
I believe, directly related to his insistence that integrated human
beings, and integrated societies, have respect for human life as
something other than the summation of cells or chemicals: Koestler's "I
love, therefore I am" scrawled in pencil on the cover of the typescript
to Arrival and Departure II. "The sum total of these conditioned
reflexes is called the Battle of Britain" Felix sarcastically replies
to Icarus' "diagnosis" of his son's desire to become a fighter pilot
like Hillary (MS 2325/4: 35). Icarus' perception of the war as
precisely that is as horrific in its own way as Peter's reaction to the
grotesque David as "a thing". The scientific determinist, like the
(temporarily) self-centred Peter, denies the concept of personhood
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which relies upon a spiritual as much as a physical perception of life.
So I would argue that personhood, a central tenet of hierarchical
ethics, takes us back to a spiritual reading of Koestler's ethical
system. Torrance alights on Polanyi's use of the concept to emphasise
the centrality of "belief or intuitive apprehension" (Torrance 1980: 9)
in attaining the integrated personhood that is the desired goal in
Polanyi's own ethical system. But this is equally applicable of
Koestler .
"I do believe that one can suddenly 'see the light' and undergo
a change that will completely alter the course of one's life. But
a change of this kind takes place at the spiritual core of the
subject, and it will take a long time to seep through to the
periphery until in the end the entire personality, his conscious
thoughts and actions, become impregnated with it...Nor do I
believe that a true spiritual transformation can be the result of
a process of rational reasoning... the intellectual re-furnishing
comes afterwards." (Koestler 1954a: 357)
In every novel one looks at, one cannot find a single example of a
character who behaves in a whole or integrated manner without first
undergoing a fundamental change of heart, a metanoia in which the
awareness of spiritual reality plays a critical role.
The relevance of Koestler for today
At the "Meeting to Honour the Memory of Arthur Koestler and Cynthia
Koestler" at the Royal Academy of Arts on 7 April 1983, Harold Harris
read to the invited guests five passages of Arthur Koestler's work,
ranging from Arrow in the Blue to the Epilogue of Bricks to Babel. The
selection, as one would expect from a close friend, was both succinct
and perceptive. The common factor behind all the readings was the
centrality of Koestler's grasp of pararational faith^ and his
experience and awareness of spiritual reality, from his mystic elation
of infinity at the age of 14 to his final writings.
Such a perception of Koestler's life work was shared by the most
distinguished of obituary writers. Anthony Burgess chose to remember
1 9
The most notable example of this was Koestler's quotation from Pope's
lg Christian to his Soul" in his preface to the Voluntary Euthanasia
ity's Guide to Se1f-De1iverance.
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Koestler in terms of a quest, not for knowledge but for faith.
"He began with a Utopian faith and saw it dissolved in the salt
mines. He ended not by turning to organised religion but by
struggling - always struggling - to find answers." (Burgess 1983)
George Steiner, meanwhile, noted that there was nothing very unusual in
Koestler's mystical experience in Spain. "What was unusual was the
direction in which this epiphany impelled Koestler's work" (Steiner
1983). One could put it another way by saying that Koestler's life
journey was a twentieth century reinterpretation of Anselm's fides
quaerens intellectum.
Two ethical issues come to mind as ones which Koestler drew upon his
perception of Third Order reality to bring about what was , as he saw,
a fuller understanding of the ethical issue as a result. The two issues
were capital punishment (as discussed in Chapter 3) and euthanasia, a
late application of his hierarchical ethics (thus outside the scope of
this thesis). But such details, whilst they may be argued as evidence
for Koestler's relevance, are, in my opinion, secondary to Koestler's
broader contribution to ethics. That appeal lies in the working model
he proposed in order to better understand the world and evaluate our
moral values. The model is based on a perception of spiritual reality
that is so intrinsically linked to human evolution as to be universal.
It is a model that will not necessarily appeal to Christians, for the
simple reason that it does not demand a specifically Christian
experience. I believe that what Koestler did was to take the concept of
revelation from a Christian context to a more general context.
Revelation may seem a strong word to apply to Koestler's characters -
yet in what other terms can one describe the dramatic insight that
Rubashov gained from the Grammatical Fiction?20 Of those readers of
Darkness... who corresponded with its author, several imposed their own
20
The word is probably first applied to Koestler's work by Rebecca West,
traces Koestler's ethical interest to "part of the revelation he had
dved in prison" (West 1977: 89). West was one of the first of many critics
he 1950s who suggested that Koestler found a "peaceful ecstasy" or
-Llment in prison following the se 1 f-reve 1 at ion of the fallacy of his
jnist past. Other, notably Deutscher (Deutscher 1977), saw such a
(ation as merely a confusion of intellect and emotion and argued that
.ler, like many ex-Communists, had a characteristic incapacity for
:tive analysis.
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Christological interpretation on the book. What of the portrait that
Rubashov glimpses just before he is shot? "Several of us think it's
Christ" (MS 2378/3: 111-11221). The point is that it is not
necessary, of even desirable, to equate the Grammatical Fiction with
some kind of Christian revelation.
One advantage of Koestler's system - though it would be almost
stretching the definition too far to apply the word system to
Koestler's metatheory - is that it cannot be restricted to any one
religion or group. Koestler invites the reader to undergo his own
journey of revelation and spiritual perception but without the
restrictive baggage of a specific religion or theology. And of course
for those who distrust theological terms such as sin, Koestler's
schizophysiology thesis succeeds, in my view, in emphasising the
seriousness and universality of our flawed nature whilst still offering
a way out to those who look beyond "human resources" (Chamales' phrase)
to the Third Order for purpose and a sense of peace. There is no room
for Darwinian triumphal ism, the "survival of the fittest".
Nor is Koestler's Third Order-influenced ethics based on theory.
Whatever else can be said of Koestler's hierarchy, it remained
primarily experiential. I hope I have presented enough evidence in the
first three chapters to demonstrate that every refinement and change to
Koestler's ethical hierarchy was precipitated by either a personal
experience or the observation of close friends such as Hillary. It is
fundamentally a journey that Koestler invites us actively to undertake
rather than a static philosophy passively to accept.
That flaws exist in Koestler's system there can be no doubt. The
synthesis between saint and revolutionary is never quite spelt out and
the method by which rationalism can be subsumed into a larger world-
view, and man thus move up the ethical hierarchy, remains vague. In The
Yogi..., Koestler had promised a movement that "will re-establish the
disturbed balance between rational and spiritual values", a new age
with new ethical values, the exact properties of which cannot be
21
Koestler refuses to accept such a limited interpretation of his
.est novel. Replying to George Gillespie, Koestler said the portrait in
.ion was that of Hitler! (MS 2379/1: 90)
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formulated from the lower level in which we now live (Koestler 1945a:
106-112). The lack of method frustrated readers more than once.
"As Christ promised the kingdom to the poor, the humble and the
meek, so you expect this new movement to rise 'from the ranks of
the poor'. How, Mr Koestler, please How?" (MS 2374/3: 66)
Koestler himself later summed up this primary flaw of his metatheory.
"A great many people, myseIf inc1uded,...agree ... that a synthesis
of science and religion, of emotional intellect, is indispensable
if our civilisation is to survive. But the question is how to
achieve the aim." (MS 2377/1: 167)
There is also the nagging suspicion, openly aired recently by
Avishai, that the kind of spiritual perception which set Koestler upon
the beginning of his spiritual journey did not seem to bear fruit in
his own life.
"It is very hard, though not impossible, perhaps, to reconcile
Koestler's notion of the absolute with Cynthia's suicide. It is
impossible to square this with her devotion, as described by
Harold Harris." (Avishai 1997: 39)
Assuming that the lack of a "new movement" leaves us forced to examine
Koestler's ethics on an individualistic plane, Avishai legitimately
asks whether Koestler's transcendent ethic proved "too sublime to be of
use to him, or to Cynthia, not only at the end, but during their many
years together". Avishai leaves the question unanswered. For my part,
I would offer two thoughts on the usefulness of Koestler's ethics.
Koestler is not the first, and will certainly not be the last, to
propose a system of ethics that is perceived as at odds with his
private life. Secondly, Avishai's analysis fails to identify another
important flaw in Koestler's ethics: the randomness of our encounters
with a higher reality and the disturbing ease with which we can move
lower down, rather than higher up, the ethical hierarchy. (Witness
Peter Slavek at the beginning of the sequel to Arrival and Departure
and the "grace withdrawn" episode.)
A detailed analysis of randomness in Koestler's system has been
provided by Hausman, using as his primary text The Act of Creation
(Hausman 1966). Essentially, Hausman states that bisociation depends
upon two random events occurring simultaneously.
"Koestler's attempt to construct what he believes to be a
scientifically based theory thus reaches its limit in the appeal
to chance. And in thus reaching the limit, the theory also denies
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the possibi1ity...of fitting bisociation into a complete
determinism. Moreover, it is the admission of chance which leaves
open to Koestler the opportunity to indulge his poetic,
metaphorical and more speculative considerations of creative
activity." (Hausman 1966: 99)
Peter Slavek could not dictate the moment for the acceptance or
withdrawal of grace - such things, being bisociative, were beyond his
control. It is reasonable to conclude that a journey dictated by random
events can hardly be called, to use Avishai's term, "sublime". It is,
however, realistic.
It is also dynamic. Koestler appeals to the restless spirit, the
seeker. Augustine's "our heart cannot rest until it finds rest in you"
becomes to Koestler "our heart cannot rest". Nevertheless, the
possibility is there for each of us to gain, through spiritual
perception, a better understanding of the world in which we move. Thus
we move up (or down) the Koestlerian hierarchy, with guilt as our moral
spur and the Grammatical Fiction as an unpredictable companion.
But how are we to view those at other stages of the spiritual
journey? Koestler makes us aware of the problems posed by differing
hierarchical values. At the core of the Yogi-Commissar problem lies the
problem of communication, the lack of understanding between the
Rubashovs and Gletkins, the Fedyas and Hydies (the Arthurs and
Cynthias?). In his Sonning Prize Address in 1968 (Koestler 1981: 123-
136), Koestler suggested that language is "perhaps the main reason" why
the downward pull is stronger than the upward pull in the ethical
hierarchy. The Yogi does not share the same vocabulary as the
Commissar.
"...language, instead of counteracting intraspecific tensions and
fratricidal tendencies, enhances their virulence. It is a
grotesque paradox that we have communication satellites which can
make a message visible and audible over the whole planet, but no
planetwide language to make it also understandable." (Koestler
1981 : 134)
Again, the diagnosis: again, the lack of a cure. Nevertheless, by
drawing attention to the difficulties of specific languages within the
spectrum of human religions and ideologies, Koestler offers a timely
reminder of the importance of locating a lingua franca accessible to
Yogi and Commissar. Hence this reaction of Trevor Huddleston, whom
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Koestler met during the anti-hanging campaign (MS 2380/3: 174), to The
Sleepwalkers:
"Arthur Koestler has written a book which should be read most of
all by those whose vocation is the proclaiming of Christian
truth...it ought to find a place on the bookshelf of every
bishop, priest, minister, and teacher who is at all concerned
with the question of communicating his beliefs to the modern
world." (author's italics) (Huddleston 1959)
At the very least, here is an ethical model that pays attention to
the existence of boundaries of language and understanding across
cultures. In practical terms, these are the problems addressed by
Amnesty and its forerunner, the Koest1er-Orwe11-Gol1ancz League of
1946. In theoretical terms, we can also learn from Koestler's careful
use of scientific and literary analogy to make his metatheory
understood by as wide an audience as possible. Koestler's "sole aim"
for the creation of an "ethical consensus" (Goldstein 1992: 284)
deserves to be considered up by others. Or, as Huddleston concluded
after reading Koestler, we need to think, so far as maybe, in each
other's categories.
Throughout his life Koestler wrestled with the attractions of Yogi-
ethics. It is easy to denigrate the place or worth of an individual, to
uphold the Benthamite ethic of the greatest good for the greatest
number of people. Koestler at times appears as the champion of an
individual ethic. Human life is sacred and no human being should be
used as a means to any other person's end. His characters, as often as
not, acquit themselves with dignity and respect for others in acts of
supreme self-sacrifice.
But we must also remember Koestler's own wariness of the Yogi.
"Perhaps the solution was to be found in a reversal of Bentham's
maxim: - the least suffering for the smallest number. It sounded
attractive - up to a point. But beyond that point lay quietism,
stagnation and resignation." (Koestler 1954a: 358)
After all, in the last word to the ethical trilogy, the synopsis to the
unfinished Arrival and Departure II, the Yogi-figure is seen as more of
a temptation than a solution to Peter's crisis.
Yet what Koestler has in common with personal ist ethicists is the
understanding, in a world of neoDarwinian chance evolution, of man's
spirit and uniqueness: literally the ghost in the machine, with a firm
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division between the human species and the rest of the animal kingdom.
The insights of other scientists, particularly Michael Polanyi, have
lent themselves to theological interpretation (Torrance 1975, 1980).
Yet theologians remain apparently distrustful or ignorant of Koestler,
in spite of his insistence on the unique creative nature and the unique
sinfulness of man caused by his triune brain. Huddleston's plea has
gone largely unheeded.
Koestler also calls us to look afresh at the relationship between
science and religion. According to Koestler, the one needs the other.
Certainly, his insistent call for an irrational science, demonstrated
historically in The Sleepwalkers, suggests that the two are closer to
one another than is commonly realised. Even thirty years ago, the
discoveries of particle physics had called into question the concept of
a materialistic predictive view of the universe. What I would call
Koestler's "quantum ethics", in which the characters are as
unpredictable as their sub-atomic components, and who move between
separate levels of an ethical hierarchy with sudden bursts of energy,
is a perfectly reasonable model for us to take into the next century.
It is as "reason-able", at any rate, as sub-atomic physics.
The model is based, therefore, on revolution rather than evolution.
Gradual progress is not a concept assimilated into Koestler's
hierarchy. Ethical Lamarckism may account for the means by which the
lessons of a sleepwalker are passed from one generation to another; but
the path of man's so-called 'progress' remains a haphazard and zig-zag
path due to the conspiring factors of chance and the unique inheritance
of the triune brain. Yet the hierarchical model may account for the
sudden shifts in twentieth century society: the appeal and dramatic
rise of Commissai—ethics as expressed in Stalinism and Nazism, the
subsequent shift to the opposite end of the spectrum, the popularity of
Yogi-figures such as Gandhi, and so on. Evolutionary models, such as
Julian Huxley's "evolutionary ethics" (Toulmin 1977: 169) on the other
hand, are arguably ill-equipped to cope with such sudden shifts of
thought, nor do they satisfactorily resolve the question of the lack of
apparent progress in ethics since the dawn of civilisation.
"...there is the striking, symptomatic disparity between the
growth curves of technological achievement on the one hand and of
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ethical behaviour on the other...In the sixth century BC the
Greeks embarked on the scientific adventure which, a few months
ago, landed us on the moon. But the sixth century BC also saw the
birth of Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism; the twentieth of
Stalinism, Hitlerism and Maoism. There is no discernible curve."
(Koestler 1981: 126)
The hierarchical model, for all its randomness, has proved to be
remarkably predictive in the very society that gave rise to Koestler's
anti-deterministic crusade: Communism. "The Shadow of A Tree" (Koestler
1955: 151-176) is an uncannily accurate description of the collapse of
Communism and the first free elections in post-Soviet Russia. Nor was
this piece of "science-fiction" a hit-and-miss case of one prediction
among many coming right. The collapse of Communism was perfectly
predictable given the model for Third Order-influenced ethics that
Koestler had put forward. "Religion...remained alive with the people"
(Koestler 1955: 159). Communism, in its later years, only existed among
people outside Russia - an observation Koestler made in 1951. The
strength and resilience of that part of man's spirit which connects him
to the universe (for that is how Koestler phrased it), which Koestler
had experienced for himself, is greater than any single system. And
Koestler was to turn to empirical science to illustrate his argument.
But Koestler's subsequent failure to systematise his ethics and
arrive at a method by which bisociation might be more properly
controlled is in itself a failure from which we can still learn. The
irreducibi1ity of ethical values was a notion that Sonia Bolgar had to
learn from Peter's irrational behaviour - and perhaps Koestler, too, in
Icarus, had to accept that the self-sacrifice of Hillary was not a
subject for empirical investigation. Koestler presents us with a
scientific dystopia: from dissociation of language, goals and morals,
we hunger for bisociation.
Most importantly, Koestler leaves us with a mystery that should not
rather than cannot be explained. Human ideas of God and standards of
morals rely not on a logical progression but on a revolutionary and,
disquietingly, random process of insight and imagination. Polanyi
incorporated such empirically hostile notions into science; Maslow
achieved something similar in psychology. Is it not possible that
Koestler could achieve this for ethics?
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Nevertheless, let us not read too much into Koestler's hierarchy: God
remained absent by name, the hierarchy open-ended. All that Koestler
asked was that the appropriate response to man's twentieth century
predicament had to take into account a perception of a higher order of
reality. Ethics, therefore, needed to be influenced by the Third Order,
and that requires insight. Perhaps, however, it does not require God,
for spiritual reality arguably stands in Koestler's system without the
need of a specific deity, Christian or otherwise. After all, he wrote
"a genuine mystic experience may mediate a bona fide conversion to
practically any creed, Christianity, Buddhism, or Fire-Worship"
(Koestler 1954a: 353).
That the kind of ethical values Koestler's fictional heroes
demonstrated might remain beyond analysis will be difficult to accept
in a rational world or in theological systems that often leave little
room for sleepwalkers stumbling across a great mystery. But our
mysterious and random encounters with the Third Order cannot be
discounted: they lie at the very centre of Koestlerian ethics.
Orwell offered us one picture of the future. In his thesis of a
revolution betrayed, Nineteen Eighty-Four, the triumphant O'Brien
submits a picture of the future as "a boot stamping on a human face -
for ever" (Orwell 1954: 215). Koestler provides a life-affirming,
indeed 1ife-enbanc/ng, alternative in which our humanity is fully
realised by incorporating into our lives a perception of a spiritual
reality. It is a picture of potential human creativity and love that is
as mysterious as it is profound. In Koestler's world, to borrow
Shelden's imagery, there is time for things which have no power
associated with them, things not meant to assert someone's will over
someone else; time for wandering among old churchyards and making the
perfect cup of tea and balancing caterpillars on a stick and falling in
love. This is the reaction Koestler educes in his readers.
"I continue to enjoy your book [The Age of Longing] immensely. I
have begun to feel an enrichment, a surrounding as it were of
this world in which Fedya and the girl...move, so that it is
difficult when I wake up in the morning...for a minute or two to
recognise the world of schedules and trains to be taken and
newspapers to read." (MS 2377/1: 21)
Such things cannot be analysed or reduced to physiological components;
240
but that does not detract from their reality. We are enriched by our
surprising encounters with the Third Order; and they leave an indelible
mark upon our behaviour. Koestler's struggle was to attempt to
incorporate such mysteries into an ethical system that is both
descriptive and predictive of human behaviour.
"Prophet and poseur"?
If the starting-point of this thesis was Koestler's account of the
"hours by the window" in Seville, then it is surely appropriate to
conclude, as Koestler himself did in his published works, by a final
reference to the significance of the Third Order. For Koestler's last
published book, at least as far as new writing was concerned22,
entitled Janus: A Summing Up is both a summary "and also a
continuation" of his non-fictional work (Koestler 1979: author's note).
And it is, in Koestler's terms, a journey that ends where it began in
Sevilie.
"I shall conclude this book with a kind of credo, the origin of
which dates some forty years back, to the Spanish Civil War. In
1937 I spent several months in the Nationalists' prison in
Seville, as a suspected spy, threatened with execution. During
that period, in solitary confinement, I had some experiences
which seemed to me close to the mystics' 'oceanic feeling'...I
called those experiences 'the hours by the window'. The extract
which follows...ref1ects what one may cal 1 'an agnostic's credo' .
[Koestler then quotes the relevant passage from The Invisible
Writing, Koestler 1954a: 353-354.] (Koestler 1979: 285-285)
Appendices apart, these are the last words of Koestler's final new
published work. Koestler, it seems, wishes his readers to take leave of
him with the 'agnostic's credo' as a conclusion to his journey.
Thus, if the hierarchical model that Koestler had attempted to
describe over a period of forty years was, as I hope to have
demonstrated, the direct outcome of "the hours by the window",
Koestler's own spirituality, can be traced to this same experience. The
charge that can be levelled against Koestler, and indeed against my
op
The later Kaleidoscope (Koestler 1981) amounts to an anthology of
iously published work, drawn largely from Drinkers of Infinity and The
of Achilles.
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thesis, is that Koestler was the type of man who needed to find purpose
and meaning in one creed or another, and if the god of Communism failed
him, he would read into the world a higher, spiritual, order of reality
that would alone give meaning to both the world and, more pertinently,
his own experiences. This is essentially the view of Toulmin: Koestler
invents spirituality as a convenient peg upon which to hang his
crusading zeal .
If one equates spirituality with the figure of the Yogi, then such a
criticism is, at least in part, valid. And of course it is necessary
for Koestler to side with the Yogi, at least temporarily, in order to
counteract the attractions of the Commissar.
"Utilitarianism and pragmatism were the real targets of our
protests. To think, as Bentham did, that the worth of human
action is determined by its utility or expediency, is to open the
way to the suffering of count 1 ess mi 11 ions...Our 'strangled' cry
was simply uttered against the idea that ends justify means...So
I think it would be quite unfair to accuse us, ex-Communists, of
becoming figures out of Dostoevsky's novels, singing Gregorian
hymns into our beards." (Koestler 1968a: 286)
Even such a parodied view of spirituality had its attractions when the
"nightly, muffled 'madres' and ' socorros' rang in the ears of Koestler,
the prisoner under (or so he thought) the sentence of death. But
spirituality to Koestler was much more than simply the "warm protective
womb of faith" he struggled against in Seville (Koestler 1954a: 353) or
the prerogative of a Dostoevskian monk. If one took spirituality to
mean the awareness of a higher order of reality, then it was possible,
or so Koestler believed, to be both prophet and poseur of the kind that
had once irritated him^. in other words, the dualism of Koestler the
rationalist and Koestler the spiritual thinker can, I suggest, cope
with what we read in Koestler and what we know of him.
What one should not do is assume that for Koestler the spiritual
struggle ever reached a conclusion - or, for that matter, a climax.
"This is a story without a climax" he had warned later readers of
Dialogue. . . (Koestler 1954b: 208). That remained true of his later
life. He returned from India and Japan as disillusioned with Eastern
23
See Koestler's essay on Andre Malraux, "Prophet and poseur". (Koestler
166-169).
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mysticism as he had once been with Communism. The only wisdom he had
acquired, he said, was the childishly simple lesson that one should
never ask yourself whether a "holy man" is a saint or a phoney, but
"try to draw a balance sheet of the amounts of saintliness and
phoneyness in him" (Koestler 1968a: 169). The journey and the spiritual
struggle, I believe, continued.
If the balance sheet of this thesis weighs too heavily in favour of
Koestler the spiritual thinker, it is partly because Koestler the
humanist has had much written on that side of the balance sheet. One
could argue that the campaign for the abolition of hanging, the novels
and the 1946 League may still be seen within the framework of
Koestler's humanism, although from his own handwritten note, one would
surely have to modify this to sceptical humanism (Figure 1). I hope
that I have demonstrated, however, that the evidence of Koestler's
spirituality permeating these works deserves attention. And if one can
accept a dualist view of Koestler the prophet and poseur, perhaps there
is room for both.
In any case, spirituality for Koestler was not a question of one's
personal experience nor was it the sole property of the Yogi. In his
ethics, the influence of the Third Order led him to attempt to
transcend the position of the Yogi and the Commissar. Neither the
rational world nor the spiritual world was enough to save the world
(note the world, not the individual) from man's self-destructive
tendencies. His ethics, and also his spirituality, was an attempt at a
synthesis of apparently opposing principles. I leave it to the reader
to judge for himself whether he succeeded in reaching the synthesis
towards which his life struggled.
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POSTSCRIPT
Sir Dick White, who had attempted to recruit Koestler to Military
Intelligence in the Second World War2^, remained fascinated both by
Koestler and his masterpiece, Darkness at Noon, well into retirement.
"In his living room overlooking the garden he had created, White
contemplated his old enemy - the communists. Occasionally he
would re-read Arthur Koestler's Darkness at Noon, fascinated by
Gletkin, the chilling NKVD interrogator, an ambitious cog in
Stalin's machinery of tyranny." (Bower 1995: 374)
On the last occasion when his biographer visited White in the autumn of
1992, Bower found the old man, then suffering from terminal cancer, re¬
reading Darkness at Noon.
Koestler's fictional creation of Gletkin was, in White's opinion, the
biggest argument possible against the Soviet system. It is probably not
surprising that that great novel should continue to occupy the thoughts
of a man like Sir Dick White; for Gletkin was a deliberate embodiment
of the spiritless and inhuman system that British intelligence, and
White himself, had attempted to undermine. What is more interesting,
however, is that as with Orwell's dystopic work, Nineteen Eighty-Four,
the apparent passing of Gletkin's system has not diminished interest in
the novel2®.
One recent reader of Darkness... was John Scripps, who in April 1995
Bower recently wrote that Koestler had responded to an informal offer
! to him by Dick White, head of British Military Intelligence, to work in
e's department during the war. "Over croquet he [White] asked Koestler,
schild and Hart to produce anti-Nazi propaganda 'to make Goebbels sit up' .
er 1995: 46). But White's idea broke up after a few weeks' squabbling.
this researcher asked Bower to comment upon the source for this evidence
upported by any material in the Koestler Archive I have seen), and its
ications, Bower replied that the information was disclosed in an interview
White as the latter was dying of cancer. White was "intrigued by
—tier" (Bower, pers. comm.) and "wanted to use Koestler's brains, as he
—Hart's". Whilst Bower uses this evidence to demonstrate the wide sphere
—nfluence and ambitious plans of British intelligence in 1941, the fact
ins that Koestler - even assuming such a conspicuous figure could ever
^ as a spy - responded negatively to White's grandiose scheme.
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In 1991, the Penguin edition of Darkness at Noon sold over 4,000
==js - more than double any of Koestler's other works (MS 2457/1).
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earned the dubious distinction of being the first Briton to be executed
in Singapore since independence. Convicted of the murder of a South
African tourist, Darkness at Noon was one of the last books Scripps
read before being hanged in Changi Prison.
"Scripps has spent the last few months in jail writing letters
and reading [Darkness at Noon and other requested books] in his
small cell, where the light was kept on 24 hours a day and his
movements were monitored by camera." (The Times, 19 April 1996)
One could not ask for a greater contrast to White in his English
country garden than a semi-illiterate convicted murderer in a tiny
prison cell reading the same book. Yet perhaps Scripps' predicament
offers one final clue to the nature of all of Koestler's work,
fictional and non-fictional. For it is just possible that Scripps came
to Darkness at Noon not to rehearse or confirm anti-communist arguments
but in a final attempt to gain some kind of autonomy and self-respect
in a situation that depersonalised its subject. For that, rather than
the Hearings between Rubashov and his interrogators, had also been the
theme of Darkness... Rubashov, like Scripps after him, had been a
condemned man yet through the spiritual experience of Third Order
reality, expressed through his encounters with the Grammatical Fiction,
he had found some sort of release in the moment of execution.
Indeed, perhaps Scripps and White, and every other modern reader of
Darkness at Noon encountering Koestler's greatest work for the first
time, are not as dissimilar as one might suppose. Faced with the
prospect of imminent death, either from cancer or the hangman's noose,
both may in fact have found inspiration and consolation from Rubashov's
death and the "oceanic sense" that marked Rubashov's sacrifice of life.
Of course, we will never know whether or not Scripps ultimately did
find himself sharing Rubashov's last glimpse of a higher, spiritual,
reality. Darkness. . . is not a simple do-it-yourself spiritual
guidebook, nor did its author ever claim it to be such. The haphazard
nature of finding oneself encountering the reality of the Third Order
remains.
Nevertheless, for all the haphazard and apparently random nature by
which a spiritual reality might be revealed to Scripps, to White or to
ourselves, I hope to have demonstrated in this thesis that the
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principle of a spiritual reality directly affecting human behaviour
when that reality is perceived lies at the heart of all of Koestler's
work. That surely is the real strength behind Darkness. . . as much as
the newly discovered and unpublished works such as Arrival and
Departure II and Dr Icarus.
Third Order reality must be perceived before a complete and
integrated working ethic can be undertaken. The ephemeral nature of
that perception lies behind much of the failure of human ethics. In
outlining his theory of the "misfitted brain", Koestler had attempted
to give scientific credence to original sin. Conversely, Koestler had
been aware that perception of the Third Order offered a solution to the
Yogi-Commissar dilemma that focuses upon the centrality of the
individual at the expense of society or vice versa. Such a solution had
been apparent in the "hours by the window" in Seville; I hope this
thesis has revealed that far from working out the implications of this
experience by 1945, such a spiritual experience was the inspiration
behind his new holistic system.
However elusive his actual experiences of a higher reality may have
been, both at the time and retrospectively, I hope that the evidence I
have shown demonstrates that, until the very end of his life,
Koestler's work and life were determined by his experience and pursuit
of the Third Order. This had provided him with the basis of his own
ethical system and made him an intensely spiritual thinker. To acclaim
Koestler as simply a humanist may be to oppose the dualist tensions
reflected in the antithetical titles of his work and indeed the
spiritual struggle that may never have been fully resolved. Let the
final word rest with Koestler himself.
"I feel that this present account gives a far too tidy and
logical description of a spiritual crisis with its constant ups
and downs, advances and relapses; its oscillation between new
certainties and old doubts; its sudden illuminations, followed by
long periods of inner darkness, petty resentments and fear.. When
I got out [of prison], the process continued. It had started at
the unconscious foundations, but it took many years till it
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APPENDIX 1
ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE II
PART ONE: THE KNOD1
1 .
He did not know whether this door at which he knocked in the darkness
meant safety or a trap, and for the first time since his mission began
he felt fear, bordering on panic, running in shivers through his skin
and spine. He turned his collar up and knocked twice more at the door
of the rickety little house. It was a terrible disappointment to find
that the fear which he thought vanquished, had returned, like a cancer-
growth returns after each new operation. Now that he had admitted its
presence, he was even able to recall the exact time when the fear had
re-taken possession of him: at ten o clock, two hours ago, when the
explosion with its blue flame-spear had stabbed the night, followed by
the red and black blaze, the slow-motion ascent of the big concrete
morsels of the dam like rocks thrown up by a volcano; the whirling
flight of fragments of the railway-bridge, thin as matchsticks,
preceding the hesitant, pathetic collapse of the whole structure; the
roar and drawling thunder making the ground vibrate under his feet,
overlaid by the second and third explosion; - and then silence.
It was during that short, ominous silence that the Fear had regained
possession of him, together with the incredulous realisation of his
mission's success. For up to that moment of silence which preceded the
stampede of boots, the Police whistles, sirens and fire-bells; up to
that moment of silence suspended in space and time, he had never really
believed that he would succeed. At first, during the period of
instruction two thousand miles from here, at that curious training
A
The word "VOW" has been crossed out in the typescript and "KNOD" (sic)
rted in Koestler's hand.
>
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1.
ae did not know whether this door at which ha knocked in the darkness
meant safety or a trap, and for the first time since hi3 mission began ha
felt fear, bordering on panic, running in shivers through his skin and spine,
^a turnad his cellar up and knocked twice more at the door of the rickety
little house. *t was a terrible disappointment to find that the fear which
ha thought vanquished, had returned, like a cancer-growth returns after each
new operation. Now, that he admitted its presence, he was abax even able to
recall the exact time when the fear had re-taken possession of Kixxxxmix
him: at ten o clock ..tiro-night; two hc\lrs ago, when the explosion with its
blue flane-spcar had stabbe<T**the night, followed by the red and black blaze,
the rlow-motion ascent of the big concrete norsols of the dam like rocks thrown
up by a volcano; the whirling flight^fragsmentc of the railway-bridge, thin
as matchsticks, preceding the hesitant, pathetic collapse of the whole
structure; ^the roar and drawling thunder making the ground vibrate under his
feet, overlaid by the second and third explosion; - and than silence.
It was during that short, ominous silsnce that the Tear had regained
possession of him f together with the incredulous realisation of his mission's
success. For up to that moment of silence which preceded the stampede of boots,
the Police whistles, sirens and fire-bells; up to that moment of silence
suspended in spaoe and time, ho had never really believed that he would suooeed.
At first, during the period of instruction two thousand miles frcm here, at that
curious training centre billeted on a Tudor M country house with 'Monrepou'
Figure 3. The first page of the surviving typescript
of Arrival and Departure II. One of the cleaner pages
of typing, the pencil annotation in Koestler's hand
"Amo, ergo sum" is discernible at top right (but much
clearer in the original document).
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centre billeted on a Tudor country house with 'Monrepos' written over
the gate; the dam, bridge and power-station had merely existed as an
abstract point on the map, surrounded by a compass-circle in red ink
and magnified in detail, but utterly unreal. Equally unreal were the
potential helpers he was to ferret out2 for the task, those vague and
furtive allies without a name and address who were only to be reached
through a precarious chain of connections, constantly breaking up and
being re-formed, with many dubious links, tense with intrigue and
distrust. The more the moment of departure approached the more the
whole scheme had appeared to him as an elaborate phantasmagory, with
the admirably logical details which one finds in the delusions of the
insane. When at last the car drove him to the aerodrome, he wondered -
while trying to make polite conversation to the officer beside him - at
what precise moment the dimmed headlights of the winding lane pointed
in the direction of the dam, the bridge and the power station, and he
had more difficulty than ever to convince himself that they really
existed, somewhere on the immense, arched surface of the Continent.
Even during the hours of the uneventful flight over a cover of cloud
which now looked like a lake boiling over in the moonlight, now like a
snow-covered plane, it seemed incredible that they were really moving
towards just that one, microscopal spot on the earth; the only reality
behind it all was his conviction that he would never return, and the
tranquil acceptance of that fact.
Imbued with the certainty of sacrifice and self-immolation, he had
been immune against the Fear - that strangling horror of abandonment
that he now felt on the doorstep of this mute, sordid house. There had
of course been moments of nervous anxiety while he waited in the
aerodrome, or during the minute preceding the jump from the plane; but
they were merely physical. The great Fear had returned only after the
explosion, when he suddenly awoke to the fact that, against all
expectation, his mission had been successfully fulfilled and brought to
an end. In that moment of silence, immediately after the first wave of
elation or perhaps even simultaneously with it, he had felt as if a
p
The words "hunt up" are typed above this phrase as an alternative.
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burden of which he had believed to be rid for ever, has descended anew
at him: the burden of the hope for survival, the responsibility towards
himself which it carried.
During the previous weeks, ever since his arrival in the hostile
country, he had been beyond hope and fear, a man without his shadow,
released from human bondage. He had lived and acted with a supreme
sensation of freedom, free from all personal worry and care, in a
prolonged state of euphoria. It was this sensation of freedom and
irresponsibility which had enabled him to accomplish his mission; to
inspire confidence and exert authority, to overcome the incountable
difficulties, dangers and snags with a sleep-walkers assurance. But now
he had woken up. The explosion had shattered the dream, had buried that
deep source inside him from which his serene self-assurance had sprung.
He was cut off from the subterranean communion with a force that he
could not name, and left shivering and alone; the stars had suddenly
become paler, the immense night had shrunk and closed in around him
like walls; his lost shadow had returned and lain down at his feet.
Grave had been withdrawn, death re-gained its sting. He was condemned
to hope again.
2.
There was still no sign of life inside the house. This was an address
which he was only to contact after having accomplished his task, to be
helped out of the country to neutral soil. It was a chain which worked
independently and without3 contact with those who had helped him so
far.
A patrol approached through the street; their boots squelched in the
mud. Peter pressed himself tight against the wall. The yellow beam of
a torch hit the wall three feet ahead of him and moved on. As they
passed him, one of the soldiers began to whistle Schubert's Serenade.
The low whistling to the dragging rhythm of the footsteps conveyed a
feeling of hopeless dejection. He waited until the smacking squelch of
q
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the boots had died away and then knocked once more at the door. Again
there was no response; and yet some instinct told him that the house
was not empty. He pressed his ear against the door.
At first he was not certain but as he kept still, holding his breath,
he heard the breathing at the other side of the door beyond doubt. It
sounded rather like the quick panting of a dog on a hot day. But the
rhythm was even faster and irregular; it was the panting of a human
being trying to suppress a scream or a sob, probably by pressing its
fist into its mouth and biting its knuckles. The closeness and stifled
intimacy of the sound left no doubt that the person was standing
pressed against the other side of the door; Peter imagined he could
feel the vibrations of its heartbeat through the wood. He knocked again
at the door, even softer than before, a whispered series of raps.
The other person's terror, radiating through the door, had
obliterated^ his own, so that he was more surprised than scared when
he felt the touch of a hand on his shoulder. He turned and saw a short,
shapeless figure in a black cassock, facing him in the darkness.
"What do you want in my house?", the priest asked. His voice was
meant to be menacing but sounded frightened instead. His hand remained
on Peter's shoulder, but the grip of his fingers was soft; his
asthmatic breath blew in short, sour whiffs into Peter's face. In his
right hand he held some white and shiny object, which Peter made out as
milk-bottle [as if preparing to strike with it]5. The sudden
apparition of the bellicose little priest seemed unreal and grotesque,
but Peter had been prepared for it and an immense feeling of relief
mounted like a hot bubble in his throat, halfway between a nervous
chuckle and a sob. He gave the password:
"I came to confess, father."
The grip on his shoulder relaxed [and the arm holding the milk-bottle
went limp]; but the voice remained suspicious:
^The word "erased" is typed above as an alternative.
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"At this hour of the night?"
"I came from far and I have far to go", said Peter.
For a second the priest stood still, breathing audibly and
scrutinizing Peter who, in spite of the darkness, saw the shimmer of
the slightly protruding eyeballs looking obliquely up to him. Then the
hand let go of Peter's shoulder and began to fumble for the key under
the cassock.
"There is somebody behind the door", said Peter in a whisper, and
heard simultaneously the soft, swift patter of bare feet running away
from the door and up some stairs.
"Nobody lives here except me", the priest said feebly. He opened the
door; the darkness inside the house was denser than the street. The
priest bolted the door and struck a primitive lighter; it consisted of
a thick, long wick, with the flint and wheel attached to it by a clasp.
They stood in a narrow passage, in front of an equally narrow
staircase; there was a sour, nauseating smell in the house. The priest
picked up a candle stuck into a bottle from under the staircase, lit it
and led the way in silence up the stairs.
"I tell you there is somebody in the house", said Peter softly, as he
mounted the stairs behind him. The priest gave no reply.
They entered a small room, containing an iron bedstead with a rug
spread over the mattress, a kitchen table and a packing crate serving
as a stool. The broken window-pane was covered by a newspaper. The
priest took off his cassock and hung it on two hooks over the window,
to screen the yellow light of the candle. He wore a broadly striped
sleeveless undershirt (tricot?) like a footballer's dress over his
black shirt (surplice). He was very short and plump; in spite of his
surplice Peter knew that he was bow-legged. His tonsure was surrounded
by thin strands of hair, moist with perspiration like a flushed
child's. Everything about him was soft and rotund except for the
protruding eyeballs which at certain moments^ stuck out of his face as
if mounted on stems, like the sad eyes of an insect on a magnified
photograph. He patted the rug on the bed, asked Peter to sit down,
The words "when he became excited" are written above as an alternative.
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fumbled about distractedly in the room and turned to the door^,
muttering that he would be back soon. At the door however he hesitated.
He seemed to listen for noises out in the passage. A shifty look came
into his eyes, and he asked awkwardly:
"You have not - perhaps - something eatable on you?"
Peter produced a piece8 of chocolate and some crunched biscuits from
his pocket and handed them over. The priest's round face suddenly lit
up, and in that moment Peter began to like him. "Wait please", he said
with an apologetic smile. He plunged his hand into Peter's pocket,
turned it inside out and shook the crumbs into his other hand. He
fumbled under the bed, pulled out a piece of cardboard and carefully
heaped the chocolate, the crumbs and the biscuits on it. Still smiling,
he again turned to Peter:
"Milk... You have not - perhaps - your iron ration of tinned milk? -
Of course not", he said apologetically, as Peter shook his head. "I
could get no milk to-day... It's a catastrophe", he added in sudden
despair, staring at the cardboard arrangement. Then his eyes lit up
again. He dived gingerly under the bed -[the space under the bed seemed
to contain all his household equipment] - and produced a spirit lamp
and a small sauce-pan with an iron handle. He divided the chocolate
into two halves, put one half into the saucepan, covered it with water
from an earthenware jug and lit the lamp. "Help yourself and God will
help you" he said with a sly smile. Then he listened again. Peter heard
the same suppressed breathing behind the door as a few minutes ago in
the street. For a second the priest looked at him doubtfully.
"Oh", he said at last, "[you may as well know.] It will make no
difference..."
He opened the door by a few inches and spoke very softly into the
darkness:
"We have a visitor...But he is a friend, you need not be afraid. Come
in, pigeon..."
Slowly, as if not to frighten the child by the sudden fright of the
7
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stranger, he opened the door. "This is Rachel" he said, taking her hand
into his plump fingers, his round face beaming timidly.
The first thing Peter noticed and the last thing he was to remember
of her, were Rachel's eyes. They were dark, wide-open with a [slight]
winged slant / with a soft slant like a bird's wings / over the high
cheekbones; the candle gave them a weird glow. The rest of the small
white face seemed merely a frame for them made more effective by the
smooth fall of the dark hair, which, like a pair of heavy curtains,
parted in the form of an inverted V on the temples. She was about
seven, slim and frail, and dressed in blue flannel overalls, the blouse
neatly tucked into the slacks. She was certainly scared but her eyes
were dark and calm, [with the heavy stillness of hospital patients when
the nurse bends over them;]^they turned away from Peter to the food on
the table then slowly back, and remained fixed on Peter's face. He felt
their watchful gaze like a physical touch. He tried to smile, then
averted his eyes^®.
"He is a friend", repeated the priest, bending over the spirit-lamp
and stirring the brew. "He brought you chocolates and biscuits. This
half is for you." He spoke to her as if she were an adult, and there
was deference in his voice, an apology, almost an implorement.
The child's gaze returned to the cardboard and for a moment remained
glued on the food, but she did not move from the door.
"Why don't you eat it, pigeon?" the priest asked timidly.
Rachel gave no answer. She stood upright at the door, watching Peter
as if he might jump at her at any moment and she had to be prepared;
and yet her eyes were not scared.
"Tell me that you are a friend", the priest said.
Peter smiled laboriously, baring his upper teeth. "Good evening", he
said.
"I am cooking this for David", said the priest. "I could get no milk
9This phrase has been substantially reworked, with later scripted
•ections suggesting "their heavy stillness disowning the of their
11 ess bodies".
1 0The words "but after a while it was he who had to avert his eyes" are
d above as an alternative.
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today." He sounded even more apologetic. "How is David?"
"He will die", the child said in a calm, thin, frozen voice.
"Now, now", said the priest. He took the saucepan with the boiling
liquid from the lamp, blew at it for a while, and carefully decanted it
into the milk-bottle. "We must wait until it cools, then we shall take
it up to him. It will give him strength..." He rubbed his hands; it
looked as if he were washing them in invisible water.
Rachel's eyes followed every movement of his. "You must give him
milk", she said.
"Tomorrow", said the priest. "Tomorrow I shall certainly get milk.
Meanwhile this will give him strength." He wiped the pearling (sic)
sweat from his tonsure. "Tomorrow..." he repeated helplessly. He sat
down on the crate and stretched out his plump hands, trying to pull the
child onto his knees.
"Come, eat these lovely things", he went on. "He has brought them,
our friend. Lovely, they are..."
He glanced furtively at the cardboard, and hurriedly, guiltily
averted his eyes. The child let itself11 be pulled nearer to the
priest, but remained standing at the crate. He put the cardboard into
her hand. She accepted it and looked at the chocolate. Suddenly the
sweet smell of it struck her and her eyes filled with tears. The priest
got up and gently forced her to sit down on the crate. His hands shook
and his tonsure was again covered with little drops of sweat. "Now
eat", he said in a thick voice. "The bottle will meanwhile cool and
then we shall take it to David."
He picked up a broken piece of biscuit and pushed it into her mouth.
The child swallowed and began to cough. He patted her on the back and
broke a piece of chocolate from the bar, but she shook her head. When
she finished coughing, she said in her thin, controlled voice:
"I have not said the prayer."
"Oh, the prayer. How could you forget it?" said the priest, and his
round face suddenly beamed with relief. "They have a different grace
for different kinds of food", he explained to Peter. He bent down to
1 1
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the child:
"Is there also one for chocolate, pigeon?"
Rachel looked puzzled. She wiped her eyes and squinted at the
chocolate. "After all, she is only a child", Peter thought with relief.
"I shall say the First Fruit of the Year."
"Then you shall have to say it twice", the priest smiled. "Once for
this year and once for last year."
The child's face remained serious, but her eyes, fixed at the brown
lump in the priest's hand became troubled. Peter thought that she
really looked like a dark pigeon12, which will never fly and knows
it.
"Blessed be the Lord, king of the world, Who groweth the fruit in the
orchards" the child recited quietly.
"Now you eat", the priest said contentedly, "and I shall talk to the
guest."
He sat down on the bed, on Peter's side; the child sat on the crate,
turning her profile to them, eating slowly and carefully, raking up the
crumbs together and picking them up with her fingers.
With a relieved sigh, the priest turned to Peter:
"You will be safe", he said. "You need not worry. The children come
first."
Peter nodded. He understood that he was to ask no questions in
Rachel's presence. But her prayer, the exotic beauty of that pale face,
the slant of her eyes and the dark intensity of her gaze, had given him
sufficient clues. She belonged to the Cursed Race. He remembered the
mixed transports, their lilting song, their phantastic shadows on the
rocks as they marched into the vans. He had probably seen her parents
among them, some bearded little man in a black silk cap and a frail,
withered woman with Rachel's mouth and eyes, leaning on his arm,
marching with small, dancing steps through the double hay of the
burning torches. He tried to avoid the child's eyes. "Can I sleep
here?", he asked instead, ashamed for having to care about himself.
"You are welcome", said the priest, [with a solemn little bow]. "But
1 2
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you will have to sleep in the attic, with Rachel and David, in case
there is a search..." He hesitated, then asked:
"You have brought the money?"
Peter nodded.
"In that case you only need to stay one night. I shall get your
papers tomorrow. Tomorrow you will be safe..."
His eyes became shifty, and there was an undefinable reproach in his
voice. He seemed to want to add something, but bethought himself (sic).
"We shall talk later", he said, rising. "First we must take his dinner
to David."
He felt the temperature of the bottle. Rachel shook the last crumbs
from the cardboard into her palm and licked them up, watching him. He
shook the bottle, half lifted it to his lips, checked himself and
handed it to Rachel:
"You better taste it before we give it to him, pigeon."
She took a very small sip and tasted it earnestly. Then she nodded,
slowly licking her lips. The priest took the candle and led the way to
the landing, then up the narrow wooden steps - a compromise between a
staircase and a ladder, which creaked menacingly under their feet.
Rachel followed with the bottle and Peter brought up the rear. She
climbed the steps in front of him and Peter saw, as her feet came with
his eyes, that she wore old leather sandals over her bare feet - it
reminded him of his own childhood, of the feeling of dry sand between
his toes walking on the beach. The callous skin over her heels was
wrinkled with pale scars where the sandals rubbed. He felt a craving to
pick her up and carry her, the warm little body in f 1 anne 1-overal 1 s
huddled against his chest. Through a chink of the rough deal-wall he
saw the pink reflection of the fire on the sky. It made him start, for
since he had met the priest he had almost forgotten about the dam. Once
more he wondered how on earth he, Awkward Peter as they had called him
at school, had been capable of carrying out this task. Perhaps he had
only dreamt it - he knew he hadn't; and yet the whole thing now
appeared very much like a dream. But had it not always been the same in
the past? The leaflets, the hunt through the soot-covered suburbs, the
breathless escape on the tram - and then, coming home to mother, the
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whole thing had dissolved into dreamy unreality. And the same applied
to the interview with Raditsch, the cellar with the six black-clad men,
the mixed transport - on Sonia's couch they were but echoes of a weird
fairy tale1^. But the pink glare was there, and the dam was burning,
and he had done it. That same gaunt body of his which became filled up
with the molten lead of shyness whenever he looked at the little girl,
had done all the jumping and running and cunning: this face with the
timid grin, bearing its teeth at him through the mirrors of the past,
was taken seriously by others as the face of a responsible man of
action. They had believed him, some even respected him and obeyed him.
Why then could he not believe in himself? Not even with the evidence of
that reddish glare before his eyes? Why did it all seem pretence, a
school pantomime of naive heroics? There must be something wrong with
him, a split in the mind...But perhaps the split was in the world
outside, between the two planes of reality, the one of howling and
gnashing of teeth, the other imbued with gentle warmth and the smooth
sand of the beach between one's toes. Two planes which never met, had
no knowledge of each other. One walked over that safe, flat, sunny
beach, suddenly a hole opened and the underworld swallowed one up - the
Other reality, the realm of [the tragic and the absolute], of the evil
dream, the stifled, unheard scream, the torture of death and nativity,
where we all wear cothurns and Greek masks before their faces. And then
one comes up again and they ask one: where have you been? If you told
them the truth they would give you pills or send you to the
psychiatrist. And yet there it is, under their feet, the Other plane.
Who then suffered from a split in the mind - he, Awkward Peter or the
world?...
The loft was dark and stifling. It smelled of hot wood and some
unspeakable putrefaction. In the light of the candle which the priest
had raised above his head, Peter saw a big heap of maize-cobs, the
grain eaten off, which he knew was used in this country as pig-fodder.
The heap was almost man-high and rose to within a few inches from the
apex of the slanting roof. Thick cobwebs hung from the beams, cobwebs
1 3The word "myth" is written above as an alternative.
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such as Peter had never seen before. They must have hung there
undisturbed for years, built and reinforced by generations of spiders,
until the mass of dead and desiccated insects, of dust and fluff have
gone into the making of a repulsive fabric, at places almost thick as
a finger, dangling like a series of curtains or dirty stage-prospects
across the loft. Rachel went down on her knees and, by rapidly throwing
the cobs aside dug a kind of groove or ditch into the cob-heap which
allowed her to creep through under the cobwebs leaving them undisturbed
over her head. Her digging had the precision of long-practised habit,
and as she quickly threw the cobs both sides and behind her she
reminded Peter of a little terrier digging after a mole, the priest
also went down on all fours and crept forward behind her, careful not
to set the cobwebs aflame with his candle; Peter crawled after him.
In the distant corner of the loft, hidden from the entrance by the
cob-heap, there was a mattress on the floor and next to it a packing
crate which served as a cradle. Peter marvelled at the ingenious
simplicity of the hiding place. The priest got on his feet and Peter
followed his example; and then he saw the being in the crate, and
seized by panic turned away.
He had seen people tortured, disfigured and dead; he had been
hardened to the sights and sounds of the other plane, the world of the
evil dream - or rather, he had developed an elastic defence against
their impact, a system of mental springs or buffers underneath his
sensitive timidity. But this creature was different; it evoked that
mystic, nauseating horror which monstrous perversions of nature brought
forth: cats with dog's heads, six-legged calfs or embryos preserved in
jars. That was indeed what this being in the cradle looked at first
sight. Its head with the hollow eye-sockets resembled the skull of a
mummy; it was inordinately big and hung loosely on a long, thin,
wrinkled neck, like a plucked chicken's. Its legs were shrivelled
sticks, pointlessly attached to a balloon-like belly, with the outsized
naval and genitals sticking out like obscene stigmata. But the most
frightening thing was that this creature actually lived. Slight
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convulsions ran through the atrophied limbs; the thin old-man's
mouth1^ sucked at some shiny object and its chin glistened with
drivel; swarms of flies were crawling over its face. Peter thought in
horror: such a thing should not be allowed to live. He did not think of
its suffering; his panic was caused by the fact that the monster shared
with him the same quality of aliveness, thus threatening the natural
fundaments of his own existence. He turned his head away and, as it
always happened when he was scared, his elastic defences began to work.
Like a well-oiled mechanism, his reasoning stood up against his fear,
his brain took control over his bowels. He suddenly understood why the
dog-headed cat, giants, midgets and monsters were so frightening: they
exploded the illusion of Nature's infallibility, gave away the squalid
secrets of her workshop, shook the fundaments on which one stood; if
such mistakes were possible life ceased to be safe...
He looked at Rachel. She watched her brother with the same still,
intent gaze as she had watched Peter and the chocolate. He looked at
the priest. He was contemplating the monster with a rapturous look -
like a lover contemplating his sleeping girl, a mother her beautiful
child. Their eyes met and Peter again read in them that glimmer of
accusation and reproach he had noticed before. Or was he imagining it
all - expression, implications, all this jugglery with ton-heavy
weights of guilt? But then, he was back in the underworld again, in the
spheres of heavy breathing where each look and sigh was fraught with
deadly meaning. The cobwebs, like heavy curtains, shut the everyday
world out. He was back on the stage, among the tragic and theatrical
footlights. Imagine telling Sonia about this unreal scene - the
corpulent^ little priest, unfit for his heroic role like a cheap
actor on a provincial stage; Rachel with her unearthly, earnest
sweetness - did not her pouting mouth remind him of Odette and behind
Odette of a face even more remote, hidden among the cob-veil prospects
of the past?; and he himself, bending over this horrible thing in the
crate, one foot in a dream, one in reality...
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The priest slid his plump hand under the mummy-he ad. The idea of
touching that soft, deformed skull nauseated Peter. As he forced
himself to look closer, he saw that the shiny object the creature was
licking was the smooth, round head of a copper Jesus crucified on an
ebony cross. The priest turned the creature's head round, pushed the
rubber dummy of the bottle between its lips, picked up the crucifix and
wiped the drivel from it.
"Perhaps you think this is blasphemy", he said to Peter, "But babies
like glistening things and I have nothing else. I am sure he does not
mind. "
The creature sucked at the bottle. Its eyes were closed and grimy.
After a few seconds it began to cough. Its face went blue, the puffed
body contracted in a spasm, it threw up what it had swallowed. Rachel
wiped its face and the priest made awkward soothing noises. They tried
again, with the same result.
"What's wrong with it?", asked Peter with a thick voice, fighting his
nausea.
"Wrong?", said the priest. "There is nothing wrong with David. He
used to be a beautiful fat baby."
"But is there not something - the matter with it?"
"Nothing", the priest said drily. ["Nothing except that he is
starving to death."]
At last they succeeded in making the creature keep some of the liquid
down. It lay more quietly now, its head turned away. The priest laid
the cross with the copper Jesus next to its face. He watched it [for a
while, then turned to Rachel:]
"I must now talk with the guest. Later he will come up and sleep
here. You go to sleep, pigeon. Shall I tuck you in?"
Rachel shook her head. She had taken off her sandals and stood
barefooted in her trim overalls on the mattress.
"Shall I say your prayers with you?"
Again she shook her head.
"Good night", said the priest. He held out his hand and Rachel shook
hands with him. Then he went down on his belly and crept back under the
cobwebs. Peter followed him. On the other side of the heap they stood
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up and refilled the ditch with cobs. The priest looked at him with
modest triumph:
"They have searched the house twice and never suspected that there
was anybody behind this heap. Poked their heads over the top of the
ladder, saw the cobwebs and went down again. They are stupid - in a
way. "
Carrying the candle before him with a rounded arm as if leading a
church procession, he preceded^ Peter back to his room. He invited
Peter to sit on the bed and seated himself facing him on the crate.
"Now we can talk", he said, wiping the perspiration from his head.
3.
The business part of their talk did not take long. Father Zlatko -
that was the priest's name - was in contact with a corrupt officer of
the army of occupation, who for a very considerable sum, sold exit
permits, duly signed and stamped, to neutral territory. Peter handed
the money over, which the priest counted carefully, wetting his thumb,
and with the same [greedy] look as before, when arranging the food on
the cardboard. Tomorrow morning Father Zlatko was to see the officer in
question: by noon Peter would be in the train, and by the same night
safely over the frontier. It was as simple as that - if one happened to
have the right contacts, the money, and if there was no hitch. In nine
out of ten cases there was a hitch. "You are lucky", said the priest
with a sigh, in which Peter once more discerned that undertone of
reproach.
An awkward silence followed. Peter knew that Father Zlatko was not
supposed to ask [him] questions; nor was he. The house and the street
were silent; it was deep in the night. Peter felt very tired. He rose;
"I better get some sleep."
The priest rose hesitatingly, took hold of the candle, then sat it
down again as if he had reached a sudden decision. "Wait please", he
said. "I have something for you. I have kept it for a special
1 fi
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occasion... It is not often that I get visitors, you know", [he added
awkwardly.]
He reached under the bed and brought out a bottle with a pale liquid
in it and two glasses. He pulled out the loose cork with his teeth and
held the bottle under Peter's face. "Smell it please", he said.
A scent of fruit, spirit and bitter almonds rose from the bottle.
Peter inhaled it deeply. For a second he closed his eyes and a
succession''7 of loose, shapeless memories floated through his mind:
students' attics crammed with books and photograph, youngsters
sprawling on the couch and carpet in a haze of mixed cigarette smoke
and of the same smell mounting from the pools of upset^® glasses; the
garden of an inn surrounded by a stone wall, hung with Chinese papei—
lamps, a gypsy with his fiddle stuck under his chin swaying and bowing
like a willow in the breeze and a second one, with one eyes, beating
the xylophone with his padded drumsticks in a woeful frenzy; and the
same scent of fruit, spirit and bitter almonds in a young woman's
breath, escaping through half-open lips. "Plum brandy", he said with
awe and wonder in his voice, bearing his teeth.
The priest nodded, wiping the dust from the glasses which were both
cracked. He carefully filled them to the brim with his plump, nimble
fingers.
"Illegally distilled", he said. "The peasants here all do it. I got
this bottle from one named Janko. He lived three houses further down.
They shot him a fortnight ago; the next day his wife brought me this
bottle, before they took her too." He smelled the glass with dilated
nostriIs.
"What did he do?", asked Peter.
The priest smiled. "Oh, nothing. He got drunk on St. Stephen's day,
the patron saint of his family, sang certain songs and said certain
things. The windows were open and one could hear him in the street -
well, this is to his memory. Requiescat in pace..."
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He threw his head back and drained his glass in one gulp. Peter did
the same. The drink was so strong that it felt in his throat more like
some burning, scented vapour than a liquid. It burned its way down to
the centre of his body and from there radiated well-being and delight
into all his tissues. Then he felt as if the pure spirit, freed from
all substance, were mounting back to his head, purging it from
weariness and selfish fretting. A minute before he had been drunk with
fatigue and buzzing thoughts; now he felt suddenly sober in a relaxed
state of crystalline wakefulness. Father Zlatko had sat down on his
side on the mattress, smiling vaguely in front of him. "God bless poor
Janko", he said. "He had no children fortunately, so he need not fret
wherever he is."
"Does not fretting end when it is over anyway?", said Peter.
The priest looked at him with his protruding eyes. "You don't
believe", he asked amiably, filling the glasses. Peter shook his head
and blushed.
"Then it is easy for you", said the priest. "No responsibility. No
long-term obligations. Life is a holiday for you. I wish [to God] I
were able not to believe."
Peter looked [sideways] at his face. It looked naive and sincere. He
had been puzzled by this little priest who had almost struck him with
a milk-bottle; now he understood that there was no mystery about Father
Zlatko: he was simple-minded. He was also weak and soft, but he had the
peasant's cunning, /that ancestral[ry] shrewdness which was in the
blood of his countrymen./
"If you don't believe", said the priest, "what makes you do these
dangerous things?"
Peter emptied his glass and grinned. "That's what I have been trying
to find out since..." he said, and felt an immense well-being spread
through his body. "Sometimes I think I know the answer, then it slips
away from me. But I once met a young man - he was burnt all over and
disfigured - who said that nothing was more boring than to try to find
out one's own motives."
The priest looked vacant; he did not understand or was not
interested. For a while they both sat in silence on the narrow bed,
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looking into the yellow flame of the candle.
"Do you think David will die?", the priest asked.
Peter felt as if he had been wakened from a pleasant, hazy dream. He
resented it. The image of the repulsive little monster spoiled the
hour's enchanted peace. "I thought it was crippled or had some
disease", he said.
The priest shook his head. "There is nothing wrong with little
David", he said. "He was a nice fat baby when I took him. Fat like
this..." He indicated it with his plump hands. "You should have seen
him."
He paused and emptied his glass with a jerky movement.
"Now he will die", he went on, "and it is my fault. My fault, and
your fault."
Peter gave no answer. After a while the priest started talking again.
The potent drink on an empty stomach had gone to his head; his tongue
became heavy and he kept on slowly nodding with his head toward the
flame; but what he said was coherent, and gradually his story unfolded
itself.
Father Zlatko had lived for eleven years in a monastery, as brother
storekeeper; he had entered the monastery at the age of seventeen,
prompted by a vision of the virgin Mary with whose voice and smile he
fell in love; since then, however, he had never seen her again. His
theory was that she had been frightened by the violence of his emotions
at their first meeting, and he hoped1^ that if he conducted himself
well and gave constant proof of his devotion to her Son, she would come
again, though probably only in his old age. During the short struggle
when the country was overrun by the invader, the monastery had been
destroyed and the order dissolved; so Father Zlatko had decided to come
and live with his brother in law. The brother in law however had been
killed in the fighting, and as he had been a widower with no family or
dependents, Father Zlatko took temporary possession of the house. The
occupation authorities left him alone and the villagers welcomed his
arrival, as the parish priest had been killed too.
1 9
The words "but he knew" are typed above as an alternative.
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A short time after he had come to live here, the occupation
authorities had started the usual round-up of members of the Cursed
Race in the freshly conquered country. They were not numerous in the
land, sixty or seventy thousand of them - grocers in little mud-bound
hamlets, tailors, watchmakers, weavers and artisans; the people were
rather fond of them, they respected their ardent family life and looked
with jovial derision upon the oddities of their peculiar traditions and
rites. Now, however, they were informed that these people were the
Cursed Race, who by their devilish conspiracies had brought about the
Nation's downfall. Some believed it because they were bewildered and
depressed, ready to believe anything, and because the official
utterances brought some ancestral suspicion of black magic and
witchcraft in them to stir; the majority shrugged their shoulders and
looked on with dumb, non-understanding eyes; but they too began to
avoid the Itzigs - not because they believed in the conspiracy, but
because they felt that those were doomed, marked by the angel of death,
and in the same way as they avoided consumptives and bankrupt farmers
who had lost their land. Misfortune is near to disgrace, and the
disgraced are not loveable; the healthy avert their eyes in sight of
the stigma of death. So it came about that during the great round-up
there was uneasiness, but no real stirring of protest, when some
members of the Cursed Race came to ask their former gentile friends for
a hiding place and help - their eyes lit with the craze of fear like
oxens and calves which have broken loose from the halter^® in front
of the slaughterhouse - the natives fidgeted, became embarrassed and
used transparent excuses for their refusal. It was not cowardice; only
the instinctive quailing^1 of the healthy from the smell of sickness
and death. Thus it came about that, without causing great disturbance,
the Mixed Transports could start from all over the country with their
hymn-singing, vomiting freight of living flesh.
But there were some exceptions. In that morass of fear and abasement
which the country had become, little islands sprang up, isolated men
20The word "rope" is typed above as an alternative.
21
The word "blanching" is typed above as an alternative.
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and families, which stood out firm and pure in the midst of the
bottomless squalor and stench, as if supported by some underground
rocks of granite. They hid and harboured the doomed and many paid their
lives for it and some with the lives of their families: wife, children,
servants, grandparents, all put to death in one lump, dying
unquestioningly, un-understandingly, in dumb, immortal glory. They did
not do it out of any special liking for the persecuted, whom fear had
often made repulsive, but for reasons only dimly felt and difficult to
put into words, which were however for Father Zlatko the final proof of
the existence of God.
"I have read", he said with a heavy tongue, "that one of your great
philosophers has said: Man is to Man a wolf..." He chuckled. Your
philosopher should have come to live among us here, and see and learn.
See and learn, see and learn", he repeated, rubbing his hands. "You
too...You have courage, but you have much to see and learn. Why, you
did not even know what a baby looks like if it has no milk. You thought
he was a cripp1e . . ."
Peter nodded; he nodded in humility, but the movements of his head
became rather emphatic under the influence of the transparent liquid,
and he kept on nodding without knowing it. But through the haze of his
head he recalled the trite phrases about 'starving children' which he
had so often heard and used without knowing what he was talking about,
without an image of the shrivelled, pot-bellied little creature behind
the heap of maize; and as he went on nodding what he affirmed was the
utter separateness of the two planes, of the plains and the underworld;
and that, whatever Sonia said, it was the latter which was his home.
She called it morbidity, and so did the other people22 of the plains;
for they had not seen David and the mixed transports, and did not know
what they were talking so breezily about...
Father Zlatko went on rubbing his hands; his face was flushed and
puffed; his weak mouth twitched. The smell of the spirit and of his
empty stomach came in little puffs.
"Sodom and Gomorrah", he said and chuckled. "Fire and rocks...Was it
22The word "inhabitants" is typed above as an alternative.
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rocks? No, it was something else..." He looked puzzled and his lips
worked.
"Fire and brimstone", said Peter.
"Brimstone!", the priest repeated contentedly. "You are clever, son.
But you do not love people."
It struck Peter that this was probably true. He could not decide
whether he was drunk or not. He felt a great excitement, a strange
elation, as if this were a decisive hour in his life; but he knew not
whether this was really so or merely drunkenness.
"I am stupid", said the priest, smiling, "but I know a thing or two.
You have read the philosophers, but you have not understood the meaning
of Sodom and Gomorrah."
Peter was not even sure whether the priest was drunk. To make sure,
he emptied his glass.
"I will tell you about it", said Father Zlatko. "Abraham started by
promising to find fifty good men in Sodom and God agreed that if
Abraham found fifty there shall be no brimstones [sic). But no sooner
had God agreed to fifty, Abraham offered forty-five; and when God
agreed to forty-five, Abraham offered forty; and when God agreed to
this too, Abraham offered thirty; and God agreed and he offered twenty;
and God agreed and he offered ten..." He chuckled. "Now there are two
kinds of people. There are those who are disgusted with Abraham's
haggling and think that the Lord was very patient with him, and side
with the Lord. Those are the people who have righteousness but no love.
But there is the other kind, who are on Abraham's side. They understand
that numbers do not count, and that one ounce of goodness may redeem a
hundred tons of wickedness, because God's creatures cannot be weighed
against each other on a fishmonger's scale. That was the lesson which
Abraham wanted to teach God; but God at that time had an angry headache
and had set his mind on brimstones. But despite his anger he must have
recognised that Abraham was right, and that is perhaps why he made the
covenant with him...The stupidities I talk", he said with a chuckle.
With all this, Father Zlatko seemed quite unaware [of the fact that]
he himself was one of the righteous men for those sake Sodom was
probably to be spared the second time. From a few hints Peter was able
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to piece together the story of Rachel and David. They were the children
of a well-to-do timber merchant from a neighbouring village. Father
Zlatko had met their Father once on a railway journey and entered into
conversation with him. The merchant proved to be a student of the
talmud, and they had a theological disputation which the priest
immensely enjoyed. He had never heard of him again, but the merchant
must somehow have heard of his arrival in this village, for on the
night before the great round-up a little peasant girl arrived at the
priest's house with the two children. She was the merchant's servant
maid; she had walked the eight miles between the two villages holding
the nursling in her arm and Rachel by the hand. That had been three
months ago, and by now what remained of the learned merchant and his
wife bleached somewhere in the mass-graves of the East, covered with
chloride of lime, to prevent the members of the Cursed Race
contaminating the world even after their death. David had then been a
healthy child, kicking his legs and tear (end of typescript)
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APPENDIX 2
DRAFT FOR A PETITION1
(To be signed by at least a hundred leading personalities)
(1) Since the end of the Second World War there has been an alarming
increase in mutual suspicion and tension between the Western
powers and the U.S.S.R.
(2) After the first World War, the Victorious Powers had broadly the
same political structure, and though there were conflicts of
interest, there was no serious danger of war between them.
(3) After the second World War, there is a basic difference in
political structure between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers.
Therein lies the fundamental cause of the growing suspicion and
tension which, if allowed to develop unchecked, will leave no
reasonable hope of avoiding a third World War within the next few
decades.
(4) We believe that despite this structural difference a stable modus
vivendi can and should be found between the U.S.S.R. and the
Western Powers. Its pre-condition is the abatement of suspicion,
that is, psychological disarmament.
(5) The aim of this Petition is to impress upon those who hold
political responsibility, and primarily the Government of this
country, the necessity to include the psychological factor in
their power-calculations, as a factor equal in importance to Air
Force and Navy. More precisely: that "psychological disarmament"
should be made an object of international negotiations, as
armaments in the Air and on the Sea are, and made subject to
A
Koestler Archive, MS 2345/2: 6-8. The typescript document is reproduced
e s impl ic i ter ■, brackets are used as in the text, unless stated otherwise.
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clearly defined clauses. Some of these are suggested in
paragraph(8).
(6) The measure of "psychological armament" should be defined as the
extent to which a government obstructs the free exchange of
information and ideas with the outside world. A country which
builds a Chinese Wall of censorship from behind which it fires
propaganda salvoes, is committing psychological aggression.
(7) The term "psychological armament" is not meant to include
criticism directed by one country against another. [This
democratic right is as vital on the international as on the
{domestic front}^ if the country criticised has facilities for
stating its case in the Press of the country from which the
criticism originates.]^ But it becomes poisonous if the country
attacked is deprived of this right of defence.
(8)^ Since the end of the war, some of the victorious nations have
raised certain territorial claims. Great Britain, who has no
territorial claims, should table the demand for a general
psychological disarmament, the first step of which would be an
agreement between the [Big Two of Europe,] Great Britain and the
U.S.S.R., based on the following points:
(a) Free access of British newspapers, periodicals, books and
films to the general public in the U.S.S.R. and territories
occupied and controlled by her; and vice versa;
(b) Such modifications of existing censorship regulations as to
permit the free circulation of information about the outside
2 • .
My own insertion; the original manuscript is overtyped at this point.
Q
This section is circled in the original typescript.
^(8) (a) to (c) are bracketed in ink in the original typescript.
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world throughout both countries and territories occupied and
controlled by them;
(c) The conclusion of an agreement between the Reuter and Tass
agencies, according to which each of the two Agencies will
compile a news summary of 500-1,000 words per day which the
other Agency undertakes to distribute for internal
consumption. The news summary should be confined to a factual
presentation of items relating to developments in internal
politics, economy, the Arts and sports, and its publication
should be encouraged in the newspapers of both Government
Parties and in the national Press;
(d) Each of the two contracting powers to broadcast news
summaries and other factual informative material about their
own country in the language of the other. The two contracting
powers to undertake not to jam these broadcasts, and to
facilitate their reception by relays from their own network;
(e) The abolition of restrictions on travel for British subjects
in the U.S.S.R. and territories occupied by her, and vice
versa;
(f) Active co-operation between the two Governments in the
promotion of "Vacations Abroad"-schemes, on a mutual exchange
basis, for students, teachers, writers, workers and
professional men and women, who should be given opportunity
to become acquainted with everyday life in the visited
country by private billeting and contracts, unhampered by
official direction and restriction.
(9) The signatories of this petition realise that serious difficulties
may be encountered in obtaining the acceptance of the above
demands. Hence Psychological Disarmament should be given high
priority on the agenda in all future negotiations. The demand for
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the free circulation of ideas across frontiers, for restoring the
arrested bloodstream of the world, should be raised at every
meeting of the Big Four, the Security Council, the Committees and
Assembly of the U.N.O., and made the pre-condition of any
concessions of a political, economic of (sic) financial nature.
(10) Even if acceptance of these demands were delayed, Great Britain,
by presenting them, would exert a beneficent influence on world




THE DATING OF "DR ICARUS"
The Fall of Dr Icarus has the distinction of being the most
substantial unpublished work in the Koestler canon. No reference has
been found to the play in Koestler's own records or in any of the
bibliographies or recent studies. Quite apart from any intrinsic merit
or ethical import, the existence of the play demonstrates that Koestler
was not unwilling to try his hand as a playwright after the hostile
reception to Twilight Bar. The manuscripts also show Koestler
interested in and willing to write for the relatively new medium of
television. Dr Icarus remains the only work created by Arthur Koestler
specifically for this medium.
Five complete typescripts exist of Dr Icarus. Of these, two are
housed in the original Koestler Archive (MS 2325/4). For reasons that
I have been unable to ascertain, the bulk of the material passed into
the hands of Harold Harris, and after Harris' death into the Harris
files appended to the Archive. This material includes the definitive
bound and dated 110-page typescript The Fall of Dr Icarus: A Play For
Televis ion in 3 Acts by Arthur Koestler, 3rd December 1959 and two
other typescripts (MS 2462/5 and MS 2462/7), the latter inscribed on
the title page "10 copies Friday 12 o/6".
Considerable manuscript notes (MS 2462/6), that also found their way
into Harris' possession, will enable Koestlerian scholars to analyse
their subject's working method in a manner not possible with most of
his published works. As the play underwent successive revisions, each
new script further accentuated the autobiographical detail contained in
the play's action as the characters took on an identity all too
familiar with those who know Koestler's life history.
Thus, whilst the earliest version places the action only vaguely into
"the Early Twenties", "The Late Thirties" and "The Early Forties" (MS
2325/4) and does not give names to the characters Case One and Case
Two, later versions narrow the focus of action to 1920, 1938 and 1940,
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give the cases names and introduce, for light relief, the character of
Mrs Smith and her dog, Pilgrim Father - the latter reflecting, no
doubt, Koestler's own brief re-enactment of the earlier settlers
following his impulsive purchase of Island Farm in 1950.
Dating the various manuscripts poses no small problem yet is crucial
if we are to place Dr Icarus in the scheme I have outlined in this
thesis of his ethical development from 1939 to 1959. That the play has
ethical implications, there can be no doubt; indeed, its ethical theme
leads this researcher to suggest that it ranks alongside the two
Arrival and Departure novels as a work of major ethical significance.
The dating of the play that I propose below, by showing that the idea
behind Dr Icarus evolved for over a decade before reaching its final
form, strengthens the significance of the play.
The first clue for dating the rough working of the play - the second
of the original Koestler Archive scripts - comes with the sketch on the
verso of 2325/4: 59, which it is safe to conclude is the author's
sketch for Icarus' study. Although crudely drawn, the sketch can be
identified as the study in Bwlch Ocyn, with Koestler's dog Sabby asleep
on the hearth! (Figure 4.)
Of more significance, perhaps, are the manuscript notes entitled "Act
One" that were passed to Harris (MS 2452/6). Notes to Act Two also
exist on Bwlch Ocyn notepaper. The fact that these are related to the
earliest version is confirmed by the working title of the play,
Faustus, changed to Icarus. There is a strong resemblance in the
"leitmotif" notes for the play with those of the unfinished sequel to
Arrival and Departure: Icarus' "rejection of the basic plane as
experienced in (a) identification with suffering (b) mystic (religious
painter) and (c) love as an absolute" all point to Peter Slavek.
Furthermore, Koestler has written in these notes "Bring in Peter's
promise? His guilt feeling?" (Plate 5.)
Compelling evidence for an early dating to the germination of Dr
Icarus is that Koestler was clearly, from these notes, still working
out his feelings of the "hours by the window". Yet, in his
autobiography, he claims to have worked through these feelings by 1945.
Taken together, these pieces of evidence lead me to conclude that the
w w A
Figure 4. Koestler's sketch for Icarus' study: Bwlch
Ocyn (c. 1947) or Long Barn (c. 1956)? Whilst the
fireplace design evokes Long Barn, the crude shape
and size of the dog on the hearth point to Sabby,
linking the sketch to Blwch Ocyn. Either intei—
pretation suggests Koestler again using his own
experience and setting for a fictional character¬
isation. (MS 2325/4: 69 )
idea for the play was taking shape shortly after the author abandoned
Arrival and Departure II, and was sufficiently well-formed in his mind
for Koestler to sketch out a draft during the Bwlch Ocyn period, circa
1947-1948 when the characterisation of Peter Slavek was still fresh in
his mind.
It appears that an early script was completed in January 1953, for we
have a reference to "a play" in a letter dated 7 July 1953 that can
refer only to Dr Icarus:
"I...have written a play, which I finished six months ago, and
which nobody wants to produce as it is lacking in theatrical
technique." (MS 2379/1: 143)
Koestler confessed to another friend that "the first act is the
sketchiest of all, and the principal character is so far only a
contour". (MS 2379/1: 34)
The question then arises, Is it possible that Koestler refashioned
the script in 1953, put it to one side and then simply returned to the
finished script in 1959? Considerable differences in the Harris scripts
and those in the original Koestler Archive suggest this did not happen.
Koestler's sensitivity over his foreign accent (reflected in Werner's
accent exaggerated in the later, Harris, scripts) was more acute in the
1950s^, when we know it was an important factor in Koestler declining
public speaking engagements in the anti-hanging campaign. Also, the
final dated version contains an almost verbatim passage from the second
volume of his autobiography, The Invisible Writing, published in 1954.
"At 20, I knew all the passages to be found in the Catechism, and
the world was an open book. At 65, near journey's end, I know
that it is a text written in invisible ink. In our rare moments
of grace we are able to decipher a small fragment of it." (MS
2462/5: 120)2
•1
In March 1950, Koestler declared in a letter he would not broadcast
ain: "my accent is too disillusioning for my readers" (MS 2376/3:363). This
the earliest written reference I have found to Koestler's sensitivity over
s accent.
2
The equivalent passage in The Invisible Writing reads: "The quality of
t faith I cannot define beyond saying that in my youth I regarded the
iverse as an open book... whereas now it appears to me as a text written in
isible ink, of which, in our rare moments of grace, we are able to decipher
mall fragment." (Koestler 1954a: 15)
291
This passage does not occur in earlier versions of the script,
indicating it was added to Icarus after 1954. Admittedly, this does not
conclusively point to a date of 1959, but it certainly seems reasonable
to argue that Koestler revised Icarus six years after the first script
was completed in 1953. This would be also fit in with the evolution of
the televisual medium in the intervening years: it is highly unlikely
that Koestler would have written "a play for television" in 1948-53 but
several years later, the project was much more likely to appeal. And
note too the July 1953 reference is to "a play", not a screenplay. By
1959, television had gained a substantial audience, one which a writer
of Koestler's innovative nature was unlikely to ignore. Television
might also help the play's author overcome the problems of "theatrical
technique".
The fact remains that such a lengthy gestation period and its
substantial revision for television after 1953 prove that Koestler was
still very much examining the ethical and spiritual implications of his
"hours by the window". The content of the screenplay confirms this
theory.
Finally, the early change of title from Faustus to Icarus may itself
say something about Koestler's ethics. Reference to Goethe's doctor,
who sold his soul to the devil in exchange for worldly knowledge, was
dropped in favour of reference to the Greek story of the man who would
literally seek to ascend to the heavens in flight - an oblique metaphor
of Koestler's lifelong search towards Third Order reality beyond what
is perceived on earth. The Greek legend obviously continued to
fascinate Koestler in his later years - one of his final projects,
which he eventually had to abandon in 1981 due to ill health, was a
parapsychological investigation into levitation. The project was named
after Icarus' son: Project Daedalus (MS 2406/2).
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Since the above was written in June, 1982, my wife decided that after
thirty-four years of working together she could not face life after my death.
4 . K •»:
I fear both death and the act of dying that lies ahead of vis. I should
have liked to finish my account of working for Arthur - a story which began when
our paths happened to cross in 19^9. However, I cannot live without Arthur,
despite certain inner resources.
Double suicide has never appealed to mej but now Arthur's incurable
diseases have reached a stage where there is nothing else to do.
«T\aa_R KJI «_i \\j-f
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Jubilant feeling of being alive and Jubilant Indifference to death.
Not rsxixxx sour resignation, but Jubilations Life, where is thine
mysery, cteath wr.ere xxisy tnlne sting? 1 am , Je suls, ego sum, vagyok|
And out of this world you cannot fall. Oain ? Hurts. 0, lovely hurt.
Joy? Bliss. Oh blessed bliss. But then: garrotte, Grandinvs torture.
The opposite, the anguish, angst, the gnashing of teeth.
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